If the East Germans were directed to enter combat against the West Germans, particularly if they were asked to do so under circumstances such as those pertaining to Berlin at the present time, I would believe that they would be highly unreliable, and in anticipation of that, not only would they not be deployed, but it is entirely possible that they would require certain Soviet forces to monitor their actions. Similar considerations apply to divisions in other satellite nations.

It would be very difficult to quantify this feeling of unreliability in a specific way.

A MATTER OF SPECULATION IN SOME CASES

Senator LAUSCHE. Is this subject of doubtful reliability a factor that is rather universally accepted as true in and among your top echelon men?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe so, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, I can see the East Germans; what about the Poles and the Hungarians?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We are speculating here, and it is difficult to feel any certainty in such speculation. We have discussed it many times. We have considered it when we develop orders of battle. Even though we may think they are unreliable, we wish to be conservative, and therefore we assume that they will have a rather high degree of reliability in order that we can properly estimate the amount of force we need to bring to bear. But the probabilities are that they would be less reliable than such estimates. Senator LAUSCHE. Frankly, in my opinion, we have no greater base of strength anywhere than, I think, we have in those satellite nations. I think they are uniformly waiting for the chance, and it is a factor that I know should be considered.

DEPENDABILITY OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

Senator Mansfield asked the question about the reports that emanated out of Laos, I think he said, of military men and State Department persons doubting the choice of this coalition government; am I correct in that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I understood him to say that reports had come out of Laos that U.S. military officers had encouraged Phoumi to oppose proposals for composition of the government that had been put forth by Souvanna, and thereby to oppose the national policy of this government.

I do not believe those reports are well-founded, although I have seen them myself. But in any event, we have taken action to indicate to military officers, for them to understand what our foreign policy objectives are, and to act accordingly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you examined the intelligence reports that have come from the Navy, Army or the Air Force concerning that the reliability of Souvanna Phouma?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do they contain any statements indicating that he is not reliable?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think they contain information that indicates that he has had problems of relationships in the past with

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representatives of the U.S. Government, which have caused him at times to be confused as to what the policy was of that government or what it would be in the future. But I have no reason to believe that he is unreliable in the sense in which I think you are using the term.

I think that it is extremely important to recognize that the Communists, through the North Vietnamese and others, are a major power force in Laos today, and how effective a coalition government would be in the future in retaining the neutrality of Laos is very difficult to predict. I would not feel qualified

APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED

Senator LAUSCHE. The reason I am posing the question is that on February 2, 1961 the Ambassador to Laos, in this room, stated that Souvanna Phouma was not reliable and was not to be trusted.

Since that time there has been testimony that Thailand's upper officials have expressed the same doubt about Souvanna Phouma's reliability. Similar word has come out of Vietnam that they do not trust him, and similar word has come out of Taiwan.

I begin to wonder if maybe those rumors, if they were spoken by our military men, have some substance to them, and that you are getting a Castro into Laos. I have great apprehensions about it, and I merely wanted to express myself to you about it.

AZORES BASE AND POLICY ON ANGOLA

Now, getting to Angola, did I understand that our present monthly tonnage transport capacity is about 28,000 tons?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To Southeast Asia. I used this as a measure of our capacity.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it ought to be 80,000?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It ought to be 80,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we lost the base in the Azores, we will lose 50 percent of capacity during certain seasons of the year? Secretary MCNAMARA. On moves toward Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Having in mind the significance of the Azores base, and having in mind the experience in the Congo and applying it to Angola, I will just put the question on that. Have we formulated an opinion that we ought to support the immediate independence of Angola?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator, this is obviously a question of foreign policy that I think should be discussed by the Secretary of State. I would simply say that the State Department has participated fully in our analysis of the Azores and their military use, and is fully informed on that point and has taken full account of that in preparing their recommendations.

SOVIET REFUSAL OF NUCLEAR AID TO CHINA

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have an opinion as to why the Soviet Government will not give to the Red Chinese the nuclear bomb? Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, but it is based on sheer speculation. Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to have it for my own informa

Secretary MCNAMARA. My own opinion is that the Soviet Union recognizes the danger to them of allowing the Communist Chinese to have control of such a weapon.

I have stated that increasing the number of independent power centers or decision centers relating to nuclear weapons adds instability to all international relationships. This is what we believe. I think it is also what the Soviet Union is perceptive enough to see, and they are acting on that belief in refusing, I believe, up to the present, to make such weapons available to Red China.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is there possibly added another separate factor, and that is that the Soviet does not trust the everlasting fidelity of the Red Chinese to Moscow?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It would be the sheerest of speculation for me even to comment on that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put it the other way. Do you believe that they are motivated by the same reasons we are in not wanting to give it to France or to Germany?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Personally I do, but I recognize the possibility of the other factor you have mentioned.

ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting to the subject of covert aggression, you described that you had set up an operation under General John A. Heintges and General William Rosson for developing this covert operation in the Department of Defense. Is that a new operation? Secretary MCNAMARA. It is new in the sense that these two men are being assigned to posts that did not previously exist. It is new also in the sense that additional emphasis is being placed in the entire field.

In the first amendment presented to the fiscal 1962 budget last March, we asked from Congress appropriations to permit an increase of 150 percent in the special forces which are the anti-guerrilla type forces of the U.S. Army, raising them from roughly 2,000 to 4,500 or 5,000. That was the first of a series of steps which have been taken to place increased emphasis on anti-guerrilla type operations within the Defense Department.

The President, upon numerous occasions, has expressed his determination that we will build a greater anti-guerrilla capacity, a capacity to oppose successfully covert operations.

These moves I mentioned are most recent of the series of moves to achieve that objective.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Well, good enough.

Just one thing more. I was Governor of a State for 10 years, and I did not have a single department in the State government possessed of the willingness to keep rebuying and rebuying things, although there was no need, as did the military department. I am extremely delighted to see how vigorously you have taken hold of the subject.

I think all of the reports indicate that you are cognizant of the fact that there has been much waste, and you are trying to stop it. I am one who is refreshed and strengthened in my faith that a real

effort is being made to conduct that Department with some recognition of the taxpayers' right.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. I hope the record will continue to support that conclusion.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I will just merely second what Senator Lausche said. The questions that I directed in this other connection were in no way intended to reflect on the job that you are doing.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You have been rather patient with us, quite patient, and we appreciate it.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee continued into executive session at 12:40 p.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Morse (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Aiken, and Williams.

On unanimous vote, the committee ordered the favorable report of the nominations of Walt Whitman Rostow to be Counselor of the Department of State and its Chairman of the Policy Planning Council; Vice Admiral Edward Nelson Parker, to be Assistant Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Jacob Dyneley Beam, to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; William Averell Harriman, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Walter P. McConaughy, to be Ambassador to Pakistan.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript. [The committee adjourned at 12:40 p.m.]

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