and in cases where suits are decided by a single Judge, before what Judge. But some of your Lordships may suggest that perhaps, through ignorance on the part of the suitor, or from some other cause, the action may have been begun in a wrong Division, and then what is to be done? Why, the suitor will not lose his cause it will simply be removed into the right Division, and the proceedings will be taken up at the point to which they had arrived at the time of transference. There will also be power to transfer any case from one Division to another, or from one Judge to another, in consequence of the nature of the case or because of litigation going on elsewhere, or for any other reason which may make such transfer desirable."

Lord Selborne then proceeded to deal shortly with the sittings of the Courts and with the subject of trial, and on the question of Procedure said that the Bill would adopt the recommendations of some of the members of the Judicature Commission, who had suggested certain rules which would be embraced in the schedule. They covered all the main points of procedure, he said, and "their object is to get rid of long and expensive pleadings, to establish a single uniform system, to constitute the means of giving a decision when there is no practical defence, and in many other respects to introduce useful improvements."

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My Lords," said the Lord Chancellor, "I now come to the subject of the Appellate Jurisdiction. I do not propose to deal by this Bill with the appeals from Scotland or Ireland. Those countries have each their own system of jurisprudence and judicature, with which, so far as their original jurisdiction is concerned, this Bill does not in any way deal. Furthermore, the evidence given before your Lordships' Committee last year by gentlemen conversant with the practice of appeals from Scotland was to the effect that no change was desired in that country. I think the views entertained by the people of Scotland on this subject are entitled to very great respect; it would be an unwise and unnecessary thing to propose changes applicable to that country which the public opinion of that country does not require. As to Ireland, there was also no evidence that any change was wanted. I do not, of course, conceal from myself that if you establish in England a thoroughly good appellate jurisdiction, and find that it works as we hope it will work, opinion both in Scotland and Ireland may probably hereafter tend to the application and adoption of the same system in those countries. But I am perfectly content to wait, and not to anticipate the time. All I propose is that, in the constitution of the Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, we may make it possible to have the services of eminent Judges who have served in Scotland and Ireland.

"I will now remind your Lordships of the present state of the appellate jurisdictions in this country. We have four Courts of Review-the Exchequer Chamber, the Court of Appeal in Chancery, your Lordships' House, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. These Courts give to the dissatisfied suitor, in most,

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although not in all cases, the opportunity of a double appeal. In Admiralty cases there is only one appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In Lunacy cases also there is only one appeal to the Judicial Committee. But all the cases in the Superior Courts of Common Law, which are brought by Error to this House, must go through a double appeal. They must first go to the Exchequer Chamber, and in every case where an appeal is taken to the Exchequer Chamber it may also be brought to this House. It is not so in Chancery. In Chancery cases there is an option generally for the appellant either to come at once to this House or, if he prefers it, to the Court of Appeal in Chancery; but every judgment of that Court is subject to an appeal to this House. Therefore, there is generally a system of double appeal for the suitor. I have never concealed my opinion that this is not a good system. If you have a good Court with sufficient judicial power to command the confidence of the country, it is better that there should be no double appeal. I would not exclude the power where you have an appeal heard by a small number of Judges of having it reconsidered by a larger number of Judges. But my opinion is that if establish an adequate Court, it is desirable for the parties and for the general interest of the country that the decision of that Court should be final, and that you should not multiply appeals. You never can escape, by going through any number of Courts of Appeal, from the risk of differences of opinion in each and every one of them, and from doubts arising as to whether the last Court decided better than those before it. What you want is to make as good a Court as possible, and to give it all the power and authority you can, and that, in my humble judgment, is best accomplished by making it final. I will now briefly review the results, upon this subject, of the useful discussions of the last few years; and I hope your Lordships will pardon me if I first ask permission to read a passage from a speech delivered by myself in the House of Commons six years ago, when I moved this question. Your Lordships will, at least, see that the opinions which I now express on this subject are not newly formed, and that they are indeed the same that I expressed at that time. Addressing the House of Commons on the 22nd of February, 1867, I said, 'I will venture to state what has occurred to me as the best way of meeting all these difficulties, before I say a word on the most difficult portion of the subject, relating to the august tribunal of the House of Lords. Taking the three Courts I have mentioned alone-the Court of Error in the Exchequer Chamber, the Court of Appeal in Chancery, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council-I am of opinion, if the House agrees with the view I have expressed, that one Court of Appeal is sufficient that out of the Court of Appeal now existing in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council you might, with some additions, form a most admirable Supreme Court of Appeal, capable of discharging the whole of the business which is now done by that Court and also by the Courts of Exchequer Chamber, and of Appeal in

Chancery. The constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is most excellent, as far as it goes. I have no hesitation in saying that that Court, powerfully constituted, with a sufficient number of Judges to render it capable of subdivision, and comprising men conversant with different kinds of law-Common Law, Equity, and, it might be, Scotch law, as well as Colonial and Indian lawwould be able to dispose of the appeals most beneficially to our jurisprudence, with great satisfaction to the country, and at no very great additional cost. You might have the Lord Chancellor, though, if the House of Lords retained its appellate jurisdiction, he would be required there frequently. You might also have the Lords Justices, and all the other eminent persons now constituting the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. You might have two or three other permanent Judges with proper salaries, chosen with reference to qualities which are not ordinarily to be found in the Judges of the Court of Chancery.. ... Some such measures as these have been suggested by high authority, as necessary to maintain in efficiency the Judicial Committee, even for its present purposes. I venture also to think that those who may hereafter fill the high office of Lord Chancellor might, considering the circumstances which often deprive the country of their services in that office, be called upon, ex debito, in consideration of their pensions (which are ample, though not too great), to give their services in the Supreme Court of Appeal, as they now voluntarily give them, from a sense of public duty, in the House of Lords. It would be thus quite practicable to form such a Supreme Court of Final Appeal as might unite the various jurisdictions now exercised by different Courts; and then I should certainly recommend that the Court should assemble in the same place as the other Law Courts-in the future home about to be provided for justice in the neighbourhood of those who practise the law, and not, as the Judicial Committee now does, in such an inconvenient place as the Privy Council Office in Downing Street. I do not conceive that there would be any constitutional objection, resulting from the relation of the Colonies to the Crown, to giving such a Court jurisdiction over Colonial and Indian appeals, because its Judges might be, and in practice would be, Privy Councillors, and, being so, would be qualified to advise her Majesty on all matters of that kind.'-[3" Hansard," clxxxv. 857.]

"My Lords, in reading this passage from my speech delivered six years ago, I desire to prove to you that I have not now arrived at a new conclusion: and if in what I now propose I seem to ask your Lordships to relinquish some part of your judicial authority, I hope your Lordships will feel persuaded that this does not arise from a disposition on my part to take anything away from the dignity and importance of your Lordships' House. Independently of my being the youngest Member of your Assembly, my own constitutional principles have always made the honour, the dignity, and the constitutional power of this House, most dear to me; and there is not a man in it who would be more unwilling to do anything to

derogate from the dignity of your Lordships' House in any respect whatever. I ought almost to apologize for saying this, because I do not think I can possibly be mistaken in the conclusion I have arrived at, that your Lordships to a man will be at one with me on this point. Your Lordships can have no privilege-no notion of artificial dignity or importance-which you would desire to stand in the way of the due administration of justice. The name and shadow of the appellate jurisdiction of this House is utterly unimportant, unless it can be shown that the substance of that jurisdiction ought in the public interest to be maintained. I feel assured that I rightly interpret your Lordships' opinion, judging from what has occurred in this House, when I say that your Lordships long ago came to the conclusion that any improvements which can on solid grounds be shown to be desirable your Lordships will willingly make, although they may involve some diminution of the exercise of judicial power in the name of the House. At the same time, I agree that all proposals of this nature should be carefully scrutinized by your Lordships, and I am most willing that those I now submit to your Lordships should undergo the strictest examination."

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After a further brief review of past schemes, Lord Selborne proceeded to explain the proposed constitution of the new Court. propose," he said, "that there shall be five ex-officio members-the Lord Chancellor, who shall be the head of the Court, and the heads of the four Divisions of the High Court-namely, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron. In that way there will be a representation of the Court of First Instance in the persons of the principal Judges, who will also belong to that Court. In addition, I propose there shall be a number, not exceeding nine at any one time, of ordinary Judges, who in the first instance will be obtained in this way:-The two present Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery, the four salaried Judges of the Privy Council, who were appointed under the recent Act in the contemplation of a future Court of Appeal, and three Judges to be transferred from the present Courts of First Instance, who are permanently to serve in the Court of Appeal. I need not say that whatever Government may have to carry out such a measure would endeavour to select from the Courts of First Instance some of the most able and experienced Judges. The reason for fixing the number at nine is this:-The Acts under which the three Election Judges and the four Privy Council Judges are appointed are not permanent Acts; and, as to the Privy Council Judges, any power of appointing an additional Judge would, in the natural course of things, cease this year. It was not contemplated that so large a number would permanently be required; and, as this may well happen also with the new Court of Appeal, it is thought right not to make nine an inflexible number, though at present it is desirable to take advantage of the existence of these Judges. In addition to these ex-officio and ordinary Judges, it is also proposed that her Majesty shall have power to appoint as additional Judges

of the Court of Appeal any persons who have filled any judicial office in England which would qualify them to be members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or who may have filled the offices of Lord Justice General or Lord Justice Clerk in Scotland, or Lord Chancellor or Lord Justice of Appeal in Ireland. Such appointments would be made with their own consent, and not otherwise. I hope and believe that those who have discharged the duties which would qualify them, and who have strength to enable them still to render useful service, would not refuse to give their assistance in the new Court of Appeal as additional Judges. I should not myself stand here to ask your Lordships' assent to such a proposal without being ready myself to serve in such a capacity, if her Majesty should think me worthy of the honour, when I cease to be Lord Chancellor. That is the proposed constitution of the Court of Appeal. It is proposed that its decisions shall be final, and that the only appeal from the High Court shall be to that Court. (It is proposed at once to transfer to it the Admiralty and Lunacy appeals which now go to the Privy Council; and it is proposed to enable it to sit in divisions, with not fewer than three Judges in each, so that it may overtake and dispose of all the business. However great it may be, such a number of Judges will doubtless be able to transact it. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council remains, and, with respect to it, the only constitutional point to be borne in mind is thisAppeals from the Colonies and from India go to her Majesty in Council, and it has always been the custom for the decrees and orders of the Court to be issued in her Majesty's name, the assent of her Majesty being given in Council. But Parliament has passed Acts regulating these appeals, so far as relates to the hearings, and there is no part of her Majesty's foreign possessions in which any exception has ever been taken to the regulation of these appeals by such Imperial statutes. What I propose in this Bill is not at once to remove the appeal business of the Judicial Committee to the new Court, because it might possibly be thought reasonable to see the working of the new Court for a short time before that is done; but since this jurisdiction, in a constitutional point of view, is with the Queen in Council it appears to be an unexceptionable mode of proceeding to empower her Majesty, if she think fit, to transfer the appellate jurisdiction now exercised by the Judicial Committee, in other than ecclesiastical causes, to the new Court of Appeal I do not propose to touch the subject of ecclesiastical jurisdiction'; it is one sui generis, standing apart, and the prospect of passing this measure would not be increased by any needless interference on my part with ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Judicial Committee will remain to advise her Majesty upon any non-judicial questions which may be referred to it, and, as far as my proposition goes, it will remain to determine ecclesiastical appeals under the present law. If her Majesty should exercise the power which I shall ask the House to confer upon her, all the other judicial business of the Privy Council would be transferred to the new Court of Appeal.

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