exchanges in the U.S.S.R. and hosting exchanges in the U.S. These expenses are part of DOE's general program budget and are not considered as a special cost against program resources.

Assessment of Benefits

In the fusion exchanges, DOE benefits substantially from access to the best of the U.S.S.R. fusion scientists, experimental facilities and data complementary to U.S. programs. DOE has gained considerably from the innovative ideas and approaches of the Soviets, and has applied the Soviet experience in specific DOE experimental projects. The fusion exchanges have also increased confidence in DOE experimental approaches, an important factor when conducting costly and challenging research. DOE has also realized both cost and time savings through these activities.

For proper perspective on the fusion exchanges, it must be noted that it is impossible to discuss fusion without mentioning major Soviet achievements, which have profoundly affected the U.S. fusion program and cover every major aspect of fusion science. For example, the Soviets invented the Tokamak confinement concept on which DOE has expended the majority of its program funds. The Soviets were coinventors of the magnetic well for mirror machines, did the original work on the concepts which led to the development of the plasma-stream stabilization process for mirrors, and simultaneously with the U.S., invented the tandem mirror concept. The Soviets were the first to operate a tokamak with superconducting magnets and pioneered the development of negative-ion neutral-beam sources and gyrotrons for plasma heating. The Soviets are also world leaders in fusion theory which is the analytic underpinning for all fusion design work.

In

In the area of FPM, the U.S. is a world leader and at present U.S facilities are generally more advanced than those in the U.S.S.R. This explains why more Soviets come to the U.S. than U.S. scientists go to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet scientists that have participated in the exchanges have generally been of high quality and have contributed significantly to the success of the joint efforts. For example, several of the experiments performed at Fermilab involve major investments on the part of the U.S.S.R. in equipment which represent cost savings to DOE over their lifetime of several millions of dollars. particular, the Soviets supplied a very sophisticated Transition Radiation Detector which has worked excellently and has helped resolve some scientific uncertainties regarding the validity of the prevailing theory of fundamental forces. The development of the first prototype of a "lithium lens" by the Soviets provided the basis for the utilization of a second-generation lithium lens as the critical hardware element of the antiproton source for the new Tevatron Collider at Fermilab. The Tevatron Collider will be a key element in returning leadership in the field of high energy physics to the U.S. The Soviets excel in such technical areas as innovative acceleration, detection techniques and theoretical physics. DOE has gained much from direct exposure to their ideas and thinking, and indirectly from the stimulation provided by such direct contacts.

DOE has an interest in the Soviet fast breeder reactor program and in the area of reactor safety. As a result of the Joint Committee meeting in August 1986, exploratory talks will begin in these two areas to see if topics of mutual interest can be identified. The DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will work together in developing possible cooperation in reactor safety.

The Soviets seem to be positive on the exchanges. The trust and confidence in the exchanges seems to be on the upswing on the part of both the U.S. and Soviet participants. In FPM, the Soviets are continuing near the same level as in the past to send scientists to visit and work in the U.S. In fusion, the Soviets are now sending their best scientists to the U.S. and are allowing long-term exchanges to take place.

Preference for Future Directions

The Joint Committee in August 1986, agreed to explore some additional areas which would lead to a limited, modest expansion of activities. In fusion, the Joint Committee requested the Joint Fusion Power Coordinating Committee to begin a process which may result in some joint planning of work in order to accelerate progress in the future. In FPM, the Joint Committee commended the JCCFPM to be ready to consider possible new areas for cooperation. As noted above, exploratory talks will begin in the areas of fast breeder reactors and reactor safety to identify topics of mutual interest. In general, the U.S. approach is cautionary, and will proceed on a step-by-step basis to increase activities where justified based upon mutual benefit and scientific merit.

APPENDIX 3A(12)

President's United States - Soviet

Exchange Initiative

Office of the Coordinator

September 5, 1986

Dear Congressman Hamilton:

Thank you for your letter of June 30, 1986, to Charles Z. Wick, Director, United States Information Agency, concerning the General Exchanges Agreement signed by the President in Geneva last November.

In a discussion with your staff members Christopher Kojm and Michael Van Dusen, on August 11, 1986, we agreed a three-part document would be produced, rather than a response to the inquiry which is really designed for organizations which run only one exchange program. This response includes:

I.

II.

Historical Background of Cultural Exchanges

Scope of present Agency Activity/GEI activity
III. Reasons for promoting U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

Thank you for your interest.

The Honorable

Lee H. Hamilton

House of Representatives

United States Information Agency

301 4th St, SW

Washington, DC 20547

Sincerely,

Apartm

Stephen H. Rhinesmith
Coordinator

I. SOVIET-AMERICAN CULTURAL EXCHANGES:

1945 TO THE PRESENT

Soviet-American cultural relations since World War II can be divided into roughly four distinct periods: Pre-Agreement (1945-1958); Early years of Cultural Agreements (1959-late 1960's); Detente (1970-1979); Post-Afghanistan (1980-1985).

1945 -1958: During this period there were very few cultural contacts. In the mid-eighties a few Soviet performing artists did in fact appear on American stages, most notably the late Soviet pianist Emil Gilels. Also an agreement to exchange America magazine and Soviet Life was signed separately in 1956. The Soviets signaled their interest in expanding contacts and the way was opened for the eventual signing of the first agreement (Lacey-Zarubin) which provided for a broad series of exchanges.

1959-late 1960's: The programs which have become traditional Soviet-American exchanges all took shape during this period. The famous Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debate occurred at the first American national exhibit, which presaged the regular traveling exhibits. Exchanges of graduate students/faculty began in the same year under the predecessor to IREX. These programs, together with delegation visits in a number of fields, began modestly, but by the late 1960's had become well established.

1970-1979: With the improvement of relations between the countries and the signing of a number of inter-governmental agreements, the range and size of the exchange programs under the cultural agreement grew rapidly. An exchange of faculty lecturers under the Fulbright program was agreed to and began in 1974. Direct university-to-university agreements (SUNY-MGU, Lowell-Tbilisi, MUNCIA-MGU, etc.) were concluded and many others were in the process of negotiation. The ACLS set up a joint commission with the Soviet Academy of Sciences to undertake joint projects in a wide variety of fields in the social sciences and humanities. By the end of the seventies these commissions sponsored nearly 200 scholars traveling annually to each other's country. The National Academy of Sciences had also signed an agreement for the exchange of individual scientists and joint working groups. Perhaps more important, the momentum for the creation of a large number of private contacts was well under way.

A regular exchange of performing arts groups brought first rank performers to each country. In the 1970's, we sent major symphony orchestras and solo performers, dance companies, popular entertainers, etc. The Soviets sent the Bolshoi opera and ballet companies, the Moiseyev dancers, the Moscow circus and a host of lesser groups.

The flow of related programming, including a substantial number of Amparts and private visitors who were scheduled by the Embassy, increased dramatically.

This period was not without its problems. Soviet society remained closed and it was often difficult for exchangees to gain the access necessary for the successful completion of their programs. The American side was often frustrated because it had little say over which Soviets would come to the U.S. Nonetheless, the exchange process was creating a number of important personal links between scholars, artists, government figures et al., which for the Soviets was an extremely important factor in creating successful programs.

1980-1985: Already in the late 1970's there were a number of storm signals on the horizon. The exchange agreement negotiations in 1979 were adjourned in November over two unresolved issues--the Soviet demand for a virtual anti-defector clause and the U.S. concern about the lack of balance in the academic exchange area. Negotitators had worked out reasonable compromises and assumed that the negotiations would resume the following year. The invasion of Afghanistan caused the American government to show its displeasure by allowing the exchange agreement as well as many other agreements to lapse. On top of this, the exile of Andrei Sakharov caused many, including the National Academy of Sciences, to suspend exchange programs.

On the Soviet side, a number of institutions, particularly the Ministry of Culture, took a position that without an agreement they would do no business with the U.S. During 1980-1985, no American performer appeared on a Soviet commercial stage (with the single exception of John Denver in July 1985), and all exchanges between museums, theaters, libraries, etc. ceased. The Ministry of Higher Education and the Soviet Academy of Sciences agreed to continue educational exchanges, but in fact these proceeded at much reduced rates.

The American Embassy, in an attempt to compensate for the virtual disappearance of American cultural groups from the Soviet scene, began to invite groups to perform at the Ambassador's residence, and then to try to program them at various Soviet institutions, such as the Composer's Union, the Friendship Society, etc. Without an agreement and in the face

of official noncooperation, the results of this attempt and other collateral programming were modest.

1985--: In August 1984, negotiations were begun to renew the exchanges agreement which had lapsed in 1980. The final documents for the General Exchanges Agreement were signed on November 21, 1985 in Geneva. At the same time, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in their Joint Statement to seek new ways to expand contacts between the two peoples. While negotiations continued, there was no substantial movement on the Soviet side to improve existing programs or plan for new ones. Only with the signing of the agreement at Geneva have Soviet institutions moved into high gear to get once-flourishing programs back on track.