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1858.

In the Goods of

of probates and letters of administration, made before the February 24. commencement of this Act, which may be void or voidable by reason only that the Courts from which respectively the same JOHN ELWELL, were obtained, had not jurisdiction to make such grants, shall be as valid as if the same had been obtained from Courts entitled to make such grants."

Jun.

The 87th section enacts, that "Legal grants of probates and administration made before the commencement of this Act, and grants of probate and administration made legal by this Act, shall have the same force and effect as if they had been granted under this Act;" with proviso for payment of further stamp-duty in certain cases.

The 88th section enacts, "Provided that where any probate or administration has been granted before the commencement of this Act, and the deceased had personal estate in England, not within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court by which probate or administration was granted, or otherwise not within the operation of the grant, it shall be lawful for the Court of Probate to grant probate or administration only in respect of such personal estate not covered," etc.

It was now sought to take the direction of the Court on the effect of any or all of these sections on the administration granted as above stated.

Dr. Deane, Q.C., after stating the circumstances of the case, observed that it differed from The goods of Freckleton (a), where the grant was good as far as it went, but did not extend far enough.

SIR C. CRESSWELL: I do not wish to retract the opinion I expressed in the case of Freckleton, but it was extra-judicial.

Dr. Deane The view I take is that the grant is made good by the Act, and is out of the hands of the Court.

SIR C. CRESSWELL: The difference between the grant in this case is, that it is in terms confined to the diocese of Lichfield, the London as well as the Prerogative grants are general in their terms. Suppose this Court were to be induced to grant (a) Supra, p. 16.

an administration of goods within a particular district, would that give the administrator a right to goods elsewhere?

1858. February 24.

In the Goods of

Dr. Deane, was not asking for a grant, but for the opinion JOHN ELWELL. of the Court.

Dr. Phillimore, Q.C., was instructed on behalf of the Bank of England to say that they were ready to act on his Lordship's opinion.

SIR C. CRESSWELL: It will be time enough for me to come to a decision on the point, when you bring before the Court a definite motion which requires me so to do.

N.B. The prayer at the end of the paper was: "To decree that the said letters of administration are valid and extend to the whole of the personal estate of the deceased in England, or that the said letters of administration are valid and extend to so much of the personal estate of the deceased as was within the jurisdiction of the Consistory Court of Lichfield at the time of the death of the deceased; and that letters of administration of the personal estate and effects of the deceased, to which the aforesaid letters of administration do not extend, may be granted to the said Henry Elwell by Her Majesty's Court of Probate."

In the Goods of SOPHIA HENDERSON LUDLOW, Spinster

(deceased).

Administration with Will annexed.-Residuary Clause.--Con-
struction." Things."

In a will which contained specific bequests of several articles of plate,
furniture, etc., the last specific bequest being that of £30:
HELD, that a bequest to R. S. of "the residue of my things" would not
entitle R. S. to a grant of administration as residuary legatee.
This was a question as to granting administration with the
will annexed, arising on the construction of the deceased's

In the Goods
of SOPHIA
HENDERSON
LUDLOW.

1858. February 24.

In the Goods
of SOPHIA
HENDERSON
LUDLOW.

will. The will was a holograph paper, dated September, 1842,
and in page one, which contained bequests of £100 and of
several small articles to R. Ludlow, a brother of the testatrix,
there were certain interlineations and erasures.
In page
two the testatrix specified some small articles to be left "to
my niece, Mrs. Sutton;" then on the next line by itself and
on the right-hand half of the page, "and to her son R. Sutton,
£30." Then, after a blank space of nearly three inches, " and
the residue of my things I give to my brother, James Ludlow."
There was no attestation clause, and neither of the attesting
witnesses could speak as to the condition of the will at the
time of its execution. James Ludlow was the brother and only
next of kin of the deceased.

Dr. Deane, Q.C., moved for administration with the will annexed to James Ludlow, as residuary legatee, and that the probate should include the alterations in page one and the words in page two, "and to her son Robert Sutton, £30." The word "things" in the residuary clause might be construed in reference to the next preceding bequest of " £30 to Robert Sutton," so as to include property of the same nature, and to give James Ludlow the general residue.

SIR C. CRESSWELL: It is very much guesswork in these cases. From a close inspection of the will the residuary clause, which would be last written, and which I am disposed to think was last written, is in a darker ink. That which is written on the erasures is also in a darker ink. It is very questionable whether the bequest to Robert Sutton was not introduced subsequently to the execution of the will. However, as there is nothing to show that it was, it may stand. I cannot construe "the residue of my things" so as to carry the general residue. The word "things" here must be taken ejusdem generis with the things enumerated in the body of the will. Decree letters of administration, with the will annexed, to James Ludlow, as next of kin, but without the alteration in the first page.

In the Goods of SAMUEL WILLIAM LEWIS (deceased), on

Motion.

Will.--Custody of Testator.--Revocation.

A. made his will, being in extreme illness, on the 15th of December, and
placed it in his mother's custody. At his request his mother gave it
to him on the 21st. On the 22nd he died, and the will was found under
the bolster of his bed, with the signatures and attestation clause torn
off; the latter were nowhere to be found. A. had expressed no dis-
satisfaction with his said will.

On motion for probate of the paper to his widow as executrix:
HELD, that the will was revoked.

The deceased, in this case, died on the 22nd of December, 1857; on the 15th of the same month, being then in extreme illness, he requested his cousin, Robert Lewis, to prepare a will for him, which was accordingly done, and the will was duly executed; it was then, by the deceased's desire, delivered to his mother, Rebecca Lewis, who retained possession of it till the 21st of December, when, at the deceased's request, she redelivered it to him in the same state as it had been delivered to her after the execution. On the following day the deceased died, and whilst his body was being laid out, the will was discovered under the bolster of the bed upon which he was lying, but that part of it which had contained his signature, and the attestation clause and signature of the subscribing witnesses was torn off and could not be found. The deceased, after executing his will, expressed his satisfaction at having done so to Robert Lewis, who continued in attendance upon him till his death. It did not appear that the deceased, in any way, mentioned the subject to any other person. Under these circumstances his widow, who was appointed executrix of the will, wished to take the opinion of the Court of Probate.

Dr. Waddilove moved the Court to decree probate of the paper to the widow as executrix therein named, but presumed that the Court would feel itself unable to do so.

SIR C. CRESSWELL: I must, of course, reject your motion. The widow is entitled to a grant of letters of administration of the goods of the deceased as dead intestate.

1858. February 27.

In the Goods of SAMUEL WILLIAM

LEWIS.

1858.

February 27 &
March 2.

In the Goods of
WILLIAM
BROWN.

In the Goods of WILLIAM BROWN (deceased), on Motion.

Will.-Revocation.

The destruction of a second will, itself revoking one of prior date, does not reinstate the first will, even though it may be in existence at the testator's death. Parol evidence admitted as to the contents of the second will.

William Brown died in February, 1857, leaving a widow and six children,—the youngest, a daughter, being still a minor. He was possessed of real property to the amount of £40,000, and of personalty in value above £10,000. On the 6th of November, 1846, the deceased duly executed a will, disposing of his real and personal property, which was before the Court annexed to the affidavit of his widow.

On the 21st of July, 1855, the deceased executed another will, disposing of his real and personal estate, of a different tenor and with a different appointment of executors, thereby revoking the will of 1846, which, however, was found in his possession at his death, though not among his papers of moment and concern.. The will of 1855, when executed, was delivered to the deceased, who said he should possibly leave it at his banker's; this he never did; and since his death diligent search had been made for it, but it not having been found, the presumption arose that it was destroyed by himself. Neither the instructions for, nor any draft of, the will of 1855 were in existence, having been destroyed by the deceased himself at the time of executing it; but the substance or contents of such will were deposed to by Robert Breckon, of Whitby, the confidential solicitor of the deceased, who had drawn and been an attesting witness to both of the said wills.

In consequence of doubt being felt as to whether the deceased died intestate, or whether the will of 1846 was operative as to the real estate, his eldest son and heir-at-law brought an action of ejectment, which was tried at Guildhall on the 15th of December, 1857, before Lord Campbell and a special jury, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Queen's Bench on a special case,-the questions for the opinion of the Court being: First, was the will of July, 1855, proveable by parol for any purpose; if so, was the will

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