Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist WarRoutledge, 2007年4月16日 - 256 頁 This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 67 筆
... fighting, the PLA's capture of the three towns took a bitter three-week struggle. The political objective was not achieved: Vietnam did not abandon its occupation of Cambodia, nor did Vietnam transfer a large number of troops from the ...
... fighting after 1979. Although a weak connection between the battles on the northern border of Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was identified, she did not explore the relationship in any detail.7 Questions and arguments A ...
... fighting force despite its weaknesses in materiel and planning.15 The PLA's earlier history accords with this view of ideology as the secret weapon that can enable an army to overcome a stronger opponent, but its experience in the Third ...
... fighting force. The 1979 PLA was designed to serve as a political model for the transformation of Chinese society, not as a tool of Chinese national strategy. Chinese society and its leaders had shaped the PLA as a political tool and ...
... fighting, . . . it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, [and] helping them to establish revolutionary political power.14 (Jiang Siyin of the PLA Political Academy ...
內容
3 | |
11 | |
Narrative | 31 |
Explorations | 109 |
Conclusion | 157 |
Principles of the political work system | 167 |
Principal duties of the political commissar | 169 |
Notes | 170 |
Bibliography | 205 |
Index | 229 |