The Economic Nature of the Firm: A ReaderLouis Putterman, Randy Kroszner Cambridge University Press, 1996年1月26日 - 390 頁 This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, and Oliver Williamson, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Bengt Holmstrom, and Oliver Hart. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's economic nature and its place in the market system; Part II covers the scope of the firm; Part III examines internal organization and the human factor; and Part IV ties the firm's organization and behavior to issues of financing and ownership. This second edition has twelve new selections and an introductory essay that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm. |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 77 筆
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內容
a new introduction | 1 |
Within and among firms the division of labor | 33 |
From The Wealth of Nations | 35 |
From Capital | 46 |
From Risk Uncertainty and Profit | 60 |
The use of knowledge in society | 66 |
Relational exchange economics and complex contracts | 72 |
From The Visible Hand | 78 |
Production information costs and economic organization | 193 |
Contested exchange new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism | 217 |
Understanding the employment relation the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange | 233 |
Multitask principalagent analyses incentive contracts asset ownership and job design | 254 |
The prisoners dilemma in the invisible hand an analysis of intrafirm productivity | 267 |
Labor contracts as partial gift exchange | 276 |
Profit sharing and productivity | 288 |
Finance and the control of the firm | 297 |
The scope of the firm | 87 |
The nature of the firm | 89 |
Vertical integration appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process | 105 |
The governance of contractual relations | 125 |
The organization of industry | 136 |
The limits of firms incentive and bureaucratic features | 146 |
Bargaining costs influence costs and the organization of economic activity | 162 |
Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm | 175 |
The employment relation the human factor and internal organization | 191 |
Mergers and the market for corporate control | 299 |
Agency problems and the theory of the firm | 302 |
Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure | 315 |
Organizational forms and investment decisions | 336 |
The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm | 345 |
An economists perspective on the theory of the firm | 354 |
Ownership and the nature of the firm | 361 |
References | 371 |
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常見字詞
activities agency costs agent Alchian and Demsetz allocation analysis Armen Alchian assets assume bargaining capitalist cash posters Coase Coase's competitive consumption contract cooperation coordination decisions discussion division of labour effect efficient effort employees employment enforcement equilibrium equity Eugene Fama example existence factors factors of production Fama firm firm's function Harold Demsetz Holmstrom important incentives increase individual industry inputs interest internal investment Jensen Journal less literature long-term managers marginal product market transactions maximization Milgrom neoclassical nexus of contracts nonpecuniary benefits Oliver Williamson open corporations operations opportunistic behavior optimal organization organizational output owner owner-manager ownership parties performance price mechanism problem profit sharing property rights relation relationship rent residual claimants residual claims shirking specialized specific structure supplier tasks team production tion transaction cost transaction cost economics utility vertical integration wage wealth Williamson workers