der it more conformable with the personal feelings and views of the President, and he is more disposed than some of his late Ministers were (though we have no great fault to find with them) to follow a course of foreign policy calculated to create community of views and action between England and France.

Broadlands: November 16, 1849.

My dear Canning, The French are in a monstrous hurry to get their fleet back from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. But yesterday I received from Normanby a proposal from the President that we should give you and Aupick discretionary power to send away the squadron whenever and as soon as you should think their presence no longer necessary, and this was so reasonable a proposal that we at once closed with it.

Our own view is that it is desirable that our squadron should return towards Malta whenever its presence near the Dardanelles is no longer wanted; but that it should stay where it is as long as its presence is of importance as a moral support for the Sultan. Whenever the Porte and the two Imperial Courts have come to an agreement upon the main points, the squadron might well come away; but it would not do for us to bring it away while any material point was unsettled, and that we should thus have the appearance of leaving the Sultan in the lurch.

Moreover, it would not do that the Russian agents at Constantinople should have a pretence for saying that Russia had ordered our fleets off, and that as we had thus yielded to the demands of Russia, the Porte had better do so too, because experience in this instance would show her that though we might swagger at first, yet when it came to the point, we were sure to knock under, and that thus Turkey would always find us ready to urge her on to resistance, but backing out ourselves when Russia began to hold high language to us and to show us a bold front.

They would represent us as a barking cur that runs off with its tail between its legs when faced and threatened. We should thus lose all we have gained and most of what we had before.

You will, of course, not fail to bear all this in mind in using the discretionary authority now sent to you; and though we shall be glad to find the presence of the fleet no longer necessary, it is better that it should stay there a week or a fortnight too long than that it should come away too soon.

DEFENCE OF ACTION OF THE FLEET.

119

If you should think the continuance of our fleet for a further time important and essential, and Aupick should, under his instructions, declare himself of opinion that the fleets are no longer necessary, and if he should make a great difficulty in coming round to your opinion, there would be no great harm done if you were to split the difference, and if the French fleet -which has been specially ordered to keep separate from ours —was to work its way towards Toulon, while ours remained a little while longer, cruising or anchoring in the Archipelago.

Broadlands: November 14, 1849.

My dear Normanby,-It would have been quite ridiculous and mean to have ordered back our ships at the bidding of Russia, and merely upon her assertion of what she had sent as an answer to the Porte. Great countries ought not to act with such precipitate levity, and should put some degree of method and deliberation in their conduct. We sent our fleet up to the Dardanelles to be ready to support the Sultan in case of attack, and in order that his knowledge that our fleet was there for that purpose might give him courage to hold his own in his negotiations with Russia. That negotiation had not yet reached Constantinople when our last accounts came away; it would turn upon demands some of which the Porte might object to; the bullying system might again be resorted to, if our ships came away before everything was settled, and their departure during the negotiation would be represented by the Russian agents at Constantinople as an abandonment of Turkey in deference to the remonstrances of Russia. We ought either never to have sent our fleet, or to keep it there till matters are settled. The French, however, are of course at liberty to do what they like with their own; but they ought to have pointed out to them that the hasty retreat of their squadron will be represented by the Russians at Constantinople as a concession by France to Russia.

Of course, as you say, disappointed ambition will try to turn popular feeling against an English alliance which thwarts personal projects; but we must deal with this as best we can. There is always some difficulty or other to be striven against in public matters, 'For the current of politics doth seldom run smooth.'

With reference to our alleged infraction of treaty stipulations, Lord Palmerston writes:

Broadlands: November 22, 1849.

My dear Canning,-Do not let Parker again anchor or enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles; his doing so has a very bad effect; it is difficult to argue that it is not entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, and that therefore it is not a violation of the Treaty of July, 1841.1 Nesselrode seems to have taken the matter quietly, and no wonder; for such a nibbling at our Dardanelles Treaty is just what the Russians would like to see us establish as a precedent, and they would not be slow to follow our example. The port regulation of the Turkish Government by which the anchorage within the outer castles is allotted for ships-of-war of all nations to wait in till they know whether they can be permitted to go up to Constantinople, can fairly and logically be applied only to such shipsof-war as may by permission go up to Constantinople; but those are only light vessels for the use of the embassies and missions, and that port regulation cannot be deemed to apply to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, which cannot, according to treaty, go up to Constantinople while the Porte is at peace: at all events, it is close shaving and nice steerage, and exposes us to a disagreeable discussion about words, and puts us to prove that being within the Straits is not entering the Straits; and that is not an easy demonstration to make good. If Parker is blown away from Besika Bay, let him go to Enos, or Jaros, or anywhere else where he may find shelter, never mind how far off; for wherever he goes he can always be back in time, and any attack of the Turkish territory by a Russian fleet or army is at present quite out of the question. We shall send you on in a few days our decision about the demands of the two Emperors. I should guess, from Brunnow's language to me to-day, that the Russian Government would be content to have the renegade Poles eloignés from the frontier, and made to residebut not as prisoners-in Asia Minor; and Brunnow affected to treat very lightly the Austrian demand, representing that as a matter the Porte could easily dispose of if she had settled satisfactorily with Russia.

1 The words of the treaty were: All ships-of-war of all nations coming to the Dardanelles are to stop and wait at the anchorage between the outer and inner castles till they know from Constantinople whether a firman will or will not be granted to allow them to proceed further on.'

HIS OBJECTION TO THE MODIFIED DEMANDS. 121

When the two Powers were baffled in their demand for the surrender of the fugitive Poles and Hungarians, Austria substituted a request that Turkey should keep them in confinement, and not allow them to emigrate to any other country. The Sultan indeed had originally proposed something of the sort when their extradition was summarily demanded, although he had never offered to keep his captives at the good pleasure of a foreign Government, but only for a time, and at his own discretion. In the following letter Lord Palmerston protests against the Austrian demand.

F. O.: November 27, 1849.

My dear Ponsonby,-I have only time to write two lines. before the post goes. You say you do not understand what the objections are which Canning alludes to as liable to be urged against the demand now made by Austria upon Turkey about the refugees. Those objections are, that it is unreasonable and incompatible with the dignity and independence of the Sultan that he should be made the gaoler of the Emperor of Austria, to take charge of persons whom the Austrian Government may consider politically dangerous; and that the performance of his duties as such gaoler should be subject to the superintendence of the agents of a foreign Power, and should continue until that foreign Power should consent to the cessation of his gaoler's duties. The Treaty of Bucharest does not give Austria a right to exact this servitude from the Sultan, and the duties of good neighbourhood do not require it at his hands. That which the Sultan is bound to do, is to prevent his territory from being made a place of shelter from whence machinations should be carried on to disturb the internal tranquillity of neighbouring States; but this obligation would be fully performed if the Sultan sends out of his dominions those subjects of foreign Powers who may justly be suspected of having intention so to abuse his hospitality. All, therefore, that Austria can require on the score of good neighbourhood-and this is more than by treaty she can demand-is that the Hungarian refugees should be sent out of Turkey; but to require that they should be detained and kept under restraint in Turkey is an unreasonable demand, and one which if Turkey were to comply with, it would do more harm to Austria in public opinion in Europe than could be counterbalanced by any conceivable

advantage to be derived from it. As to publications which these Hungarians might make in France or England, there are Hungarians enough come away to publish everything that can be said or revealed; and as to the sympathy which Kossuth would excite here or in France, they may depend upon it that he will be a much greater object of interest while unjustly detained in Turkey than if he was living at a lodging in Paris or London. It is bad policy in the Austrian Government, as well as injustice. Pray endeavour to persuade them of this, and to prevail upon them to be content with the expulsion of these Hungarians.

I write you this, and desire you to do your best, though I hear from many quarters that you oppose instead of furthering the policy of your Government, and that you openly declare that you disapprove of our course. No diplomatist ought to hold such language as long as he holds his appointment. It is idle trash to say that we are hostile to Austria because we may disapprove of the policy of a Metternich or the cruelties of the Manning Administration which now governs Austria; you might as well say that a man is the enemy of his friend because he tells that friend of errors and faults which are sinking him in the esteem of men whose good opinion is worth having.

And three days after to the same:—

F. O.: November 30, 1849.

The requirement of Austria about the Hungarian refugees is preposterous, and quite inconsistent with a due regard to the dignity and independence of the Sultan. It is as incompatible with the dignity of an independent Sovereign to make himself the gaoler for the State offenders of his neighbours as it would be for him to make himself purveyor for the executioner of that neighbour. Schwarzenberg, in his note of reply to Musurus, in pretending to quote what Musurus had said, put words into Musurus's mouth which Musurus did not use, and which materially alter the sense of the offered engagement. Musurus did not use the word 'Dorenavant;' and he said nothing about the arrangement lasting as long as the Austrian Government might choose. But what a childish, silly fear this is of Kossuth. What great harm could he do to Austria while in France or England? He would be the hero of half-a-dozen dinners in England, at which would be made speeches not more violent than those which have been made on platforms here within the last four months, and he would soon sink into comparative obscurity;