DISTURBANCES IN ITALY.

13

affairs. The government of the Papal States is intolerably bad; nothing can make men submit to such misrule, but physical force and despair of external assistance.

These States had formerly municipal institutions of great antiquity, which gave them much civil security. These institutions were swept away by the French invasion, and were not re-established at the peace of 1815. Outbreaks and insurrections and conspiracies have followed each other in rapid succession, sometimes when there was, often when there was not, a prospect of succour from without. The French Revolution of 1830 produced an explosion in the Roman States, and that explosion led to the conferences out of which the Mem. arose. Nothing was done, and discontent has more than once been since manifested by overt acts. Leave things as they are, and you leave France the power of disturbing the peace of Europe whenever she chooses. Two or three millions of francs, properly applied, will organise an insurrection at any time, and the ascendancy of the Liberal party at Paris, whenever it may happen, either by the result of an election or by the death of the king, will soon be followed by an outbreak in Italy. That is the point to which the French Liberals look; they know that if they tried to get back to the Rhine they would have against them all Germany united, Russia, and more or less England; but in supporting an insurrection in Italy against Papal misgovernment, they would stand in a very different position. England would probably take no part against them; Prussia would not stir a foot; Russia would not be very active, and, perhaps, secretly not displeased at anything that might humble and weaken Austria. But Austria would interfere, and could scarcely help doing so, even though not very efficiently backed by Russia; France and Austria would then fight each other in Italy, and France would have all the Italians on her side. But the war, begun in Italy, would probably spread to Germany, and, at all events, we can have no wish to see Austria broken down and France aggrandised, and the military vanity and love of conquest of the French revived and strengthened by success. If these things should happen, and they may not be so distant as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig Government of 1846 was about, and why they did not take advantage of the liberal inclinations of the new Pope to encourage and induce him to make reforms, which, if then made, might have prevented such events. I own that I for one should be altogether at a loss for any answer to such an interrogation.

If, on the other hand, we take the step which I propose to take towards the other four Powers, we shall either succeed or fail. If we succeed in getting any one or more to join us, I believe we shall be doing a thing agreeable, as well as useful, to the Pope, and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reforms which every enlightened member of the Roman Government has long seen and acknowledged to be necessary. If, on the contrary, we fail, and if all four should refuse to do anything, we shall at least stand justified, and shall be able to show that we are wholly absolved from the responsibility of any misfortunes which may hereafter arise from that quarter.

Far from being animated by the passions of the revolutionist-as it was the fashion of party then to describe him-Lord Palmerston wished to turn revolution everywhere aside by compromise.

His error, if error it was, consisted in thinking that a government of priests would willingly resign any portion of their power to laics; and that men of the stamp of Mazzini and his disciples would care two straws about moderate constitutional government. The first idea was to open diplomatic relations with Rome, and send a regular ambassador. No regular ambassador or minister, however, was ever named; and thus Lord Minto was ultimately sent on a special mission, which will presently be spoken of. The affairs of Italy were not alone in demanding attention at this time. In Portugal, the intrigues of France and Spain to undermine the traditional influence of England had created a confused variety of factions; whilst the want of tact and judgment on the part of the Court, both as to the measures it adopted and the men it employed, had produced dissatisfaction, terminating in insurrection. The civil war which broke out with the revolutionary supreme Junta was caused by the arbitrary acts of the Royal Government, who hoped for a Spanish intervention in their behalf. As the Crown could neither subdue the rebels, nor the rebels triumph over the Crown, the country was in a state of anarchy, amidst which the Queen was not unlikely to lose her

CIVIL WAR IN PORTUGAL.

15

throne, and Portugal its last chance of reviving prosperity.

Lord Palmerston's endeavours, from October, 1846, to the following March, were directed to persuade the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the Junta, and to prevent Spain from interfering by force of arms. In the spring of 1847, he found that the Portuguese Government would not come to terms with the Junta, and that the Spanish Government would interfere, in spite of England, if the throne of Donna Maria should be in imminent danger. None could deny that her throne was in such danger, and that the whole country was going to ruin by reason of the war. The British Cabinet therefore, at last, determined to intervene, and, in conjunction with the naval forces of France and Spain, brought the conflict to an end on the basis of an amnesty and the constitution. By this means, while serving the interests of British commerce, Lord Palmerston was enabled to secure to the Portuguese nation those concessions which would not have been made if Spain had interfered singly at the request of the Absolutist Party, and saved the Portuguese Government from that political dependence on Spain which would have been the result of obligations due to her alone.

A more glaring violation of the Whig principle of non-intervention could hardly be cited; but it was a useful one, and served to add to the many proofs that might be given of the absurdity of establishing general theoretic rules to be practically applicable to every variety of case. In the mutable condition of human affairs there is but one universal doctrine that a statesman should preach to a sensible people-the necessity of acting in such a manner as, according to circumstances, may be the best for the particular country he governs, and most advantageous to mankind at large.

The following correspondence gives somewhat more in detail a consecutive account of the action taken by the British Government in the matter:

Foreign Office: Oct. 30, 1846.

My dear Normanby,-I am this afternoon returned from Windsor, where I have been for two days. The Queen and Prince are very anxious and uneasy about the state of Portugal. We send off to-morrow Colonel Wylde, who goes in the Cyclops, from Portsmouth to Oporto and Lisbon, to see and report on the state of things, and we shall order a reinforcement of our naval force in the Tagus. But this is all we can at present do, and our interference must be confined to giving advice and taking care of the personal safety of the Queen. It is a most unfortunate state of things; but I trust the danger is somewhat exaggerated; still it is great; and what makes matters worse, it has been brought on by the folly of the Court, instigated I believe by the German tutor, Diez. It was foreseen that, if the elections went on and the new Chambers should meet, one of their first acts would be to address the Queen to remove the intermeddling tutor. Thereupon he set to work to secure himself, little caring for or little foreseeing the danger in which he was involving the King and Queen. The only way, as he thought, to avoid the address was to prevent the meeting of the Cortes, this could only be done by getting rid of the Government which was pledged to call them; the way in which that could be accomplished was by making a coup d'état; and so it was made, against the advice of all persons whose judgment was worth having, and without consulting Lord Howard, because they knew he would have been against it; and contrary to the opinion of our Court, though I believe that opinion arrived too late.

Carlton Terrace: Nov. 1, 1846.

My dear Normanby,-We have heard of Parker's arrival at Lisbon, with his whole squadron, so that our naval force in the Tagus will now be respectable. No doubt his presence will produce a useful effect; when people see a strong force, they do not exactly know how far such a force may be authorised to act, and they fear the worst, and guide themselves accordingly. Parker will be instructed to protect the persons of the Royal Family, if they should be obliged to take refuge on board their own line-of-battle ship in the Tagus, or on board one of ours; and in case of need he will be authorised to garrison the fort of Belem with his marines; but you had better say nothing about This gentleman had been placed by his family about the young King.

INFLUENCE OF CABRAL'S POLICY.

17 this latter point, lest the French should intrigue to prevent it. But if you should hear of its having been done, you will know that it will have been sanctioned by the British Government. Rothschild said to me last night that he heard from Paris that the Government there said they should not mind our squadron going into the Tagus provided we did not send any land troops. I think they can hardly have said this, because they know well that we are bound by old and special treaties with Portugal, and that if the casus fœderis were to arise we should not inquire whether the French Government minded or not that which we might feel ourselves called upon by our treaty engagements to do.

It had been under the influence and auspices of Costa Cabral, who was once termed in a debate in the House of Commons the 'Jonathan Wild' of European diplomatists, and who had started life as a furious Liberal, that the Portuguese Government had entered on their course of exasperating tyranny. Soon after Cabral had been compelled to fly, the Marquis de Saldanha occupied the post of President of the Council, but he succeeded to the taint of Cabral's policy and reaped its fruits. The head-quarters of the rebels under the revolutionary supreme Junta of Government was at Oporto. Lord Palmerston, on the eve of an attack upon that place by the Royal troops, determined to try to negotiate between the parties, and so avoid the loss of life and property which the capture of Oporto by storm would necessarily involve. He wrote, therefore, to Colonel Wylde, under the date of January 26, 1847, instructing him to go to Oporto and to enter on the following negotiation :-

The basis of negotiation must be a declaration and engagement made by the Queen, to you, as the representative in this matter of the British Government, that immediately on the termination of the civil war, she will establish constitutional government, and call a Cortes without delay. Unless this assurance is given in the most formal and positive manner, we cannot meddle with the matter. She ought, I think, also to assure us that she will not, for the present at least, bring into office the Cabrals, against whom the revolt has taken place. Of course she would с

VOL. II.