PROPOSES DOCKYARD FORTIFICATIONS.

375

The

War was declared a few days after this. It was intimated to the Spaniards that if Tangier were occupied by their troops, we could not permit the occupation to be prolonged after the close of the war. Spanish Foreign Minister promised that Spain 'would not take possession of any point on the Straits the position of which would give her a superiority threatening the navigation.' On this assurance being given, and the undertaking being observed, Great Britain remained neutral.

The next letter refers to the fortifications which were afterwards constructed. It was a subject much canvassed at the time, and on which Lord Palmerston was excessively anxious.

There could be no question which so thoroughly tested the patriotism of a British statesman, because the more it was successful the less likely it was to be popular. The fact that we were placed in a state of adequate defence was precisely the fact that rendered any attack upon us unlikely; and if we were never attacked, it was sure to be said that our defences were uncalled for. But we must remember that though the boy who cried wolf' did so often when the wolf did not appear, he was right in the main, for the wolf did come at last, and the flock was eaten because the cry had been disbelieved. We might as well have no locks on our doors and no bars to our windows, because thieves do not attempt to break into our houses every night.

94 Piccadilly: December 15, 1859.

My dear Gladstone,-Sidney Herbert has asked me to summon a Cabinet for to-morrow, that we may come to a decision on a fortification question, and I am most anxious that the arrangement which he has proposed should be adopted.

The main question is whether our naval arsenals and some other important points should be defended by fortifications or not; and I can hardly imagine two opinions on that question. It is quite clear that if, by a sudden attack by an army landed in strength, our dockyards were to be destroyed, our maritime power would for more than half a century be paralysed, and our

colonies, our commerce, and the subsistence of a large part of our population would be at the mercy of our enemy, who would be sure to show us no mercy. We should be reduced to the rank of a third-rate power, if no worse happened to us.

That such a landing is, in the present state of things, possible, must be manifest. No naval force of ours can effectually prevent it. Blockades of a hostile port are no longer possible, as of yore. The blockading squadron must be under sail, because there would be no means of supplying it with coals enough to be always steaming, while the outrushing fleet would come steaming on with great advantage, and might choose its moment when an on-shore wind had compelled the blockaders to haul off. One night is enough for the passage to our coast, and twenty thousand men might be landed at any point before our fleet knew that the enemy was out of harbour. There could be no security against the simultaneous landing of twenty thousand for Portsmouth, twenty thousand for Plymouth, and twenty thousand for Ireland. Our troops would necessarily be scattered about the United Kingdom; and with Portsmouth and Plymouth as they now are, those two dockyards and all they contain would be entered and burnt before twenty thousand men could be brought together to defend either of them.

Then, again, suppose the manœuvre of the first Napoleon repeated, and a large French fleet, with troops on board, to start for the West Indies, what should we do? Would the nation be satisfied to see our fleet remain at anchor at Torbay or Portland, leaving our colonies to their fate? And if we pursued the French, they might be found to have doubled back, to have returned to the Channel, and for ten days or a fortnight to have the command of the narrow seas. Now the use of fortifications is to establish for a certain number of days (twenty-one to thirty) an equation between a smaller inside and a larger force outside, and thus to give time for a relieving force to arrive. This in our case would just make the difference between safety and destruction. But if these defensive works are necessary, it is manifest that they ought to be made with the least possible delay; to spread their completion over twenty or thirty years would be folly, unless we could come to an agreement with a chivalrous antagonist not to molest us till we could inform him we were quite ready to repel his attack. We are told that these works might, if money were forthcoming, be finished possibly in three, or latest four years-long enough this to be kept in a state of imperfect defence.

ARGUMENTS FOR FORTIFICATIONS.

377

But how is the money, estimated in round numbers at ten or eleven millions, to be got? There are two ways: annual taxation, to raise for this purpose over and above all other expenses a third or a fourth of this sum, or the raising a loan for the whole amount, payable in three or four annual instalments, with interest, in twenty or thirty years. The first method would evidently be the best in principle, and the cheapest, but the burthen would be heavy, and the danger would be that after the first year the desire for financial relief might prevail over a provident sense of danger, and the annual grants would dwindle down to their present insufficiency; and the works would thus remain indefinitely unfinished. The second course has the advantage of being financially as light, or nearly so, as the present system, because the annual repayment of principal and interest would be but little heavier than the present annual votes, while we should gain the same advantage of early completion of works which would be secured by the greater financial burthen of the first plan.

Arrangements of this kind have been deemed, by the deliberate judgment and action of Parliament, wise and proper for private persons. Why should they not be so for a nation, in regard to outlays of the same nature as those for which private persons have been by law enabled to charge their estates? The objection to borrowing for expenditure is stronger for individuals than for a nation.

The individual, if he went on borrowing for annual expenses, would end by having no income left to live upon or to assign to a fresh lender. A nation would, perhaps, in the end come to the same standstill, but its power of increasing its income is greater than that of an individual; but still Parliament has encouraged and enabled private persons to borrow money for permanent improvement of their estates, the money so borrowed to be repaid in a limited number of years.

If we do not ourselves propose such a measure to Parliament, it will infallibly be proposed by somebody else, and will be carried, not indeed against us, because I for one should vote with the proposer, whoever he might be, but with great discredit to the Government for allowing a measure of this kind, involving, one may say, the fate of the empire, to be taken out of their hands. People would say, and justly too, that we and the proposer ought to change places, and that he and his friends had shown themselves fitter than we were to assume the responsibility of taking care ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.'

In accordance with these views he moved a resolution in the following session providing nine millions for the purpose of fortifying our dockyards and arsenals. His proposals were founded on the report of a Royal Commission which had enquired, during the preceding autumn, into our means of defence. The resolution was adopted by the House by a large majority, and the results of his action are seen in our existing forts and lines round Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Cork.

CHAPTER XV.

FRANCE AND THE ITALIAN DUCHIES-SYRIA EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S SCHEMES-NEUTRALITY OF SAVOY-ATTITUDE OF FRANCE-THE 'DERBY' OF 1860-CONFLICT BETWEEN LORDS AND COMMONS ON PAPER DUTIES-DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 'PRESS.'

WHATEVER may have been the previous differences which arose between Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell in the course of their long career, these two statesmen were, during the years which covered the second Palmerston administration, thoroughly united, both in their general views of policy and also as to the best manner of giving them effect.

In the year 1860, Italian affairs absorbed almost the whole interest of foreign events, and both ministers had for their one aim the speedy realisation of an independent and united Italy. In the following memorandum, drawn up by Lord Palmerston and circulated among his colleagues, we find sketched out the policy which, in agreement with the Foreign Secretary, he wished to pursue. We must, however, in order to appreciate it, recall the position of matters at the opening of the year.

The Congress which, by the Treaty of Zurich, France and Austria had engaged themselves to summon had been postponed. The British Government had then come forward and proposed that France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, that the French Emperor should concert with the Pope for the evacuation of Rome, and that Sardinia should not send troops into Central Italy until its several states had voted as to their future destiny, she being at liberty to do so as soon