WATCHFUL GUARD OF CANADA. 415 America with whom we have had a most extensive commercial intercourse. Well, then, at the head of this neighbouring nation, who would like nothing so well as a retaliatory blow upon England, we see an able, active, wary, counsel-keeping, but ever-planning sovereign; and we see this sovereign organising an army which, including his reserve, is more than six times greater in amount than the whole of our regular forces in our two islands, and at the same time labouring hard to create a navy equal to, if not superior to ours. Give him a cause of quarrel, which any foreign Power may at any time invent or create, if so minded; give him the command of the Channel, which permanent or accidental naval superiority might afford him, and then calculate if you can-for it would pass my reckoning power to do so-the disastrous consequences to the British nation which a landing of an army of from one to two hundred thousand men would bring with it. Surely even a large yearly expenditure for army and navy is an economical insurance against such a catastrophe. To the argument that, ample financial means being necessary for national defence, we should devote our principal attention during peace to the husbanding of our resources, he used to reply, that if a war should suddenly come, as it might have come, with France about Tahiti, or with America about the Trent,' the want of ships, troops, guns, and dockyard defences would be ill made up for by the fact that some hundreds of merchants and manufacturers had made large fortunes; for that this would only be offering to the butcher a well-fatted calf instead of a well-armed bull's head.' When it was urged that our measures of preparation made the French angry, he answered that it was so only because these preparations rendered us secure against the effects of French anger. 'The anger of a Power no stronger than ourselves may be borne, with regret no doubt, but without alarm. The anger of a Power greatly and decidedly stronger must cause apprehension, and is likely to lead to humiliation or disaster.' He was also very watchful at this time for the security of our Canadian frontier, in presence of the strife in the United States, and insisted on an increase to our regular force in Canada, in order, by so doing, to 'keep the United States Government in check, to give spirit and confidence to our own people in the provinces, and to take the best chance for the continuance of peace.1 Towards the end of the session Mr. Cobden made a vigorous attack upon Lord Palmerston and his conduct of affairs. The Prime Minister was accused of playing false to the professions of Reform which had, it was alleged, been freely made, if not by himself at any rate by many of his followers, when Radical support was wanted to oust the Tories. He was charged with owing his retention of power to the support of his political adversaries, who had more confidence in him than in their own leader. Mr. Cobden asserted that, what with fortifications, ironclads, wars in China, and reinforcements sent in haste in every direction, whether to Canada, during the 'Trent' affair, or elsewhere, Lord Palmerston had cost the country one hundred millions, which, he maintained, was too heavy a price even for such a bargain. Lord Palmerston replied with quiet confidence and imperturbable good humour. He left the charge of lukewarmness about Reform as one for which the country, and not he, was responsible; but, acknowledging the other points, he sarcastically thanked Mr. Cobden most warmly for having drawn attention to the successful efforts which the Government had made for the preservation of the honour, the safety, and the interests of the empire. The very acts which Mr. Cobden urged as calling for censure he claimed as those which deserved the chief approbation of the House, which, nothing loath, testified their accord in this view. Both sides of the British House of Commons are always ready to support a Minister whose extravagance, even if it deserve that name, is in their belief honestly intended for the maintenance of the national interests, and not merely for the promotion of the interests of a class or a party. To Duke of Newcastle: September 1, 1861, TREATMENT OF CHURCH PATRONAGE. 417 The Church patronage which Lord Palmerston administered during his two premierships was so large, that the principle on which he declared himself to act, and on which, indeed, he consistently did act, is worth reading in his own words. I can certainly of my own knowledge assert, that the one way in which a clergyman could make it certain that he would not get preferment was to commence his letter of application by a statement of his political opinions, thus making them a ground of claim. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Carlisle, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland : I have never considered ecclesiastical appointments as patronage to be given away for grace and favour, and for personal or political objects. The choice to be made of persons to fill dignities in the Church must have a great influence on many important matters; and I have always endeavoured, in making such appointments, to choose the best man I could find, without any regard to the wishes of those who may have recommended candidates for choice. I conclude this chapter with a short but suggestive note about Slavery and the Board of Admiralty : August 13, 1862. My dear Russell,-No First Lord and no Board of Admiralty have ever felt any interest in the suppression of the slave trade, or taken of their own free will any steps towards its accomplishment, and whatever they have done in compliance with the wishes of others they have done grudgingly and imperfectly. If there was a particularly old slow-going tub in the navy, she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try to catch the fast-sailing American clippers; and if there was an officer notoriously addicted to drinking, he was sent to a station where rum is a deadly poison. Things go on better now; but still there is at the Admiralty an invincible aversion to the measures necessary for putting down the slave trade. These prejudices are so strong with the naval officers of the Board, that the First Lord can hardly be expected not to be swayed by them. VOL. II. I Walmer Castle: August 17, 1862. EE For nothing will Lord Palmerston be more honourably remembered than for his long and successful efforts for the suppression of the slave trade and the discouragement of slavery. From the moment that he was called to the Foreign Office in 1830, he entered warmly into the subject, and with his whole heart laboured for their extinction. He sought to engage all maritime states in one great network of treaties for the combined annihilation of this nefarious traffic in human beings, and to a large extent he succeeded. Some of the Spanish and other diplomatists used to be quite surprised at what they thought his craze, and were fain to humour him on, what they considered, so insignificant a matter. When action succeeded to negotiation-as, for instance, in the decisive blow dealt in 1840 at the Portuguese slave-dealers by the destruction of their barracoons on the West Coast of Africa-he never allowed any consideration for the susceptibilities or anger of foreign Governments to induce him to halt in his course. the contrary, when the country, sick with deferred hopes and aghast at the expense of the necessary squadrons, seemed at one moment disposed to flinch, his earnest language, conveying lofty aspirations, maintained its spirit and strengthened it for renewed efforts. On CHAPTER XVII. CONFERENCE RUSSIA AND POLAND-VISIT TO SCOTLAND-PROPOSED CONGRESS-- CRIMINAL As Premier, Lord Palmerston kept a watchful eye over the proceedings of all the departments of his Government, and was an unwearied attendant on the sittings of the House of Commons, ready at any moment to smooth a difficulty or avert a storm. But he was very chary of speech; and when there was nothing particular to say he did not attempt to say it. The session of 1863 was entirely deficient of any subject of debate, domestic or foreign, which could call for any lengthened interposition on his part, with the exception of the question of Poland; and while this was being discussed he was kept away by an attack of his old enemy the gout. The immediate cause of the Polish outbreak was a seizure by the Russian Government of all the young men in the cities whom they had reason to believe were disaffected, and their enrolment in the ranks of the army under the name of a conscription, or partial recruiting.' In fact, to use the words of our ambassador at Petersburg, it was a simple plan, by a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to kidnap the opposition and to carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus.' No wonder that this produced resistance. Those who escaped took to the woods and organized themselves in armed bands. |