action which terminated in a brilliant triumph for England.

But how was Lord Palmerston able to carry out his war policy so vigorously? The answer is a very simple one. He was backed and urged on by the nation at large, who were incensed at the insolence of Russia. Thus he was able to pursue his plans, being encouraged and supported by a people who were well able to carry out what they resolved upon.

Kinglake said he (Lord Palmerston) "was gifted with the instinct which enables a man to read the heart of a nation."

His judgment was rightly pronounced, for Palmerston saw the feelings of his national constituents and steered his course well and skilfully.1

I The strength of Lord Palmerston's character and his determination in matters of ready action is well illustrated through an incident recorded by Baron Bunsen ("Memoirs of Bunsen "): "Bunsen and Palmerston had elected to be rowed over to Portsmouth from Osborne, when guests of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and, the weather being rough, the Foreign Minister took the helm, demonstrating the connection between steering the vessel of State, as Bunsen phrased it, and steering a boat at

What, then, was the national feeling of England at that time?

In the present instance," said the Prince Consort, "their (the English) feeling is something of this sort: The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, and the oppressor of Poland." From these royal remarks, I do not think I shall be far wrong in saying that the growing tendency of the English people towards liberalism since the Reform Bill of 1832, and the teaching of William Wilberforce, had led them to consider Russia not only as a national enemy but as a general opponent of the rights of humanity and civilization. No wonder that a war became a necessity after this public manifestation.

At the end of the last chapter I stated that England had rapidly increased in wealth and prosperity since the Repeal of the Corn Laws. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, stated

sea-'Oh, one learns boating at Cambridge, even though one may have learnt nothing better,' remarked Lord Palmerston; and guide the craft safely to shore he certainly did. But when they landed, alas! the train was gone."

that such was the vigour and elasticity of the English trade, that even after the disadvantage of a bad harvest, and under the pressure of war, the imports from day to day, and almost from hour to hour, were increasing, and that the very last papers laid on the table showed within the last three months of the year that there was an increase of £250,000 in the national exports. This, then, was one of the reasons which enabled England to carry on this war so successfully.

Let us turn our attention for a short time to France, which at this period was undergoing considerable internal agitation. Republicanism was now abolished and Monarchy reigned in its stead in the hands of Napoleon III. (1852). There seemed every prospect of the French Monarchy being firmly

re-established.

The French Emperor was very desirous of starting a European War for the purpose of securing his seat on the throne, and also for the aggrandizement of his country abroad.2 The

2

1 Gladstone's speech, May 8, 1854.

"Napoleon's object was clear: in the first place, to

interests of his country, both religious and political, were opposed to those of Russia with regard to the Holy Places, while both England and France had a common interest in keeping the Ottoman Empire from Russia. This latter interest acted as a means of union. between the two Powers, both of whom were ready at any moment to attack Russia, and the publication of the Czar's memorable. conversation with Sir H. Seymour still further cemented that union.

The result we have already seen. Russia was humiliated.

wrest from the Emperor Nicholas the moral hegemony which he wielded on the Continent, and then, after conquering Russia, to get his hands free to tear up the treaties of 1815, restore to France her so-called natural frontiers, and reconstruct the map of Europe in accordance with Napoleonic ideas" (Count Vitzthum's "St. Petersburg and London," vol. i. p. 73).

CHAPTER VI.

THE BLACK SEA CONFERENCE.

French influence destroyed by the Franco-Prussian War-Russia annuls the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris-Condition of Europe prevents their enforcement by the Powers-London Conference; Russia secures the Black Sea; England's mistake-Alsace and Lorraine destroy the balance of power.

RUSSIA had convinced herself that the separation of England from France was not a sufficient guarantee to hinder the possibility of the alliance of the two Powers against her, because a common interest would unite them immediately. Russia now determined to crush down one of the two Powers, independently of the other, and was only waiting for an opportunity to do so.

In 1870 the Franco-Prussian War broke out through the question of the Spanish Succession. England maintained a strict