unfounded impressions that revolutionary plots are in agitation. On the other hand, the same agency may be employed to represent to the people that their sovereigns are insincere in their promises of concessions, and thus the people, being stimulated to use force for the purpose of securing political reforms, the very acts to which they may have been delusively led on may be converted into a pretext for depriving them of the objects of their legitimate expectations.

It will be your duty to counteract, as far as possible, these sinister efforts. You are instructed to say to the Minister that the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still in the hands of the sovereigns, but that it is now too late for them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress; and that resistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the necessity of yielding to irresistible demands. That it is better for a Government to frame its measures of improvement with timely deliberation, and to grant them with the grace of spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to adopt, on the sudden, changes perhaps insufficiently matured, and which, being wrung from them by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert the natural order of things, and being of the nature of a capitulation of the sovereign to the subject, may not always be a sure foundation for permanent harmony between the Crown and the people.

To the popular leaders with whom you may have intercourse, you should use language of the same tendency and arguments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns will produce ill-will and repugnance, which must lead their rulers, on their part, to be constantly looking out for an opportunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged to bear. That mutual distrust will thus be created between the governors and the governed. That this distrust will break out in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party. That open discord will thence ensue, and foreign interferenco may be the ultimate result.

It was imbued with these sentiments that Lord Palmerston scanned the horizon, and one of the first matters to attract his attention was the state of Switzerland. He naturally viewed with the greatest concern the possibility of any such interference by the Great

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

HENRY JOHN TEMPLE

THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

THIRD TENURE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE-SWITZERLAND-SPANISH MARRIAGES-PORTUGAL-ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.

LORD PALMERSTON was close upon sixty-two years of age when, in 1846, he went to the Foreign Office for the third and last time. Nearly twenty years elapsed before he died, but death found him still in harness and the working head of a powerful Administration. During this long space, with only two short intervals, he was continuously in office-first as Foreign Secretary, next as Home Secretary, and twice as Prime. Minister.

Of these years the five given up to Foreign Affairs' were the most unquiet which, with his own country at peace, could fall to any man's lot, and culminated in his abrupt retirement at the close of 1851. The year which immediately succeeded his taking the seals was sufficiently full of anxious events, B

VOL. II.

such as the Spanish marriages, civil wars in Spain and Portugal, and the disturbances in Switzerland, which, at one moment, seriously threatened the independence of that sturdy little republic; but these formed but a fit prelude to the storm which broke over Europe in 1848, and continued to rage throughout the following year.

To aid, by his countenance and counsel, the triumph and maintenance of constitutional freedom, was Lord Palmerston's desire. He foresaw clearly enough the results of despotic repression. The events of the revolutionary year were, in his opinion, but the natural fruits of the growths planted by the hands of absolute sovereigns. To prune betimes was, as he incessantly pointed out, the only check which kings, ministers, and patriots could usefully apply. In fact, during the whole of 1847, he was bent on giving such aid as was in his power to those Governments which were willing and able to put their house in order.' While, however, he recognised the necessity, he was little hopeful in the prospect. History admonishes us, he used to say, that rulers seldom have the forecast to substitute, in good time, reform for revolution. They take no note of changes around them, and forget that it is the preexisting spirit of slavery in the people that has made tyrants in all ages of the world. No tyrant ever made a slave who was not one already-no community, however small, having the spirit of freemen ever had a master for long. When subjects change their spirit, they will also restrain or else change their rulers.

The following extract from a circular despatch sent to the British representatives in Italy, in January, 1848, gives such a clear compendium of his views and of his previous endeavours in other directions that I here insert it :

The situation of the sovereigns of Italy towards their subjects is one of which advantage may be taken by the enemies of both. It is not difficult to convey to the sovereigns false reports that risings are intended, and to create in their minds

unfounded impressions that revolutionary plots are in agitation. On the other hand, the same agency may be employed to represent to the people that their sovereigns are insincere in their promises of concessions, and thus the people, being stimulated to use force for the purpose of securing political reforms, the very acts to which they may have been delusively led on may be converted into a pretext for depriving them of the objects of their legitimate expectations.

It will be your duty to counteract, as far as possible, these sinister efforts. You are instructed to say to the Minister that the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still in the hands of the sovereigns, but that it is now too late for them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress; and that resistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the necessity of yielding to irresistible demands. That it is better for a Government to frame its measures of improvement with timely deliberation, and to grant them with the grace of spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to adopt, on the sudden, changes perhaps insufficiently matured, and which, being wrung from them by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert the natural order of things, and being of the nature of a capitulation of the sovereign to the subject, may not always be a sure foundation for permanent harmony between the Crown and the people.

To the popular leaders with whom you may have intercourse, you should use language of the same tendency and arguments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns will produce ill-will and repugnance, which must lead their rulers, on their part, to be constantly looking out for an opportunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged to bear. That mutual distrust will thus be created between the governors and the governed. That this distrust will break out in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party. That open discord will thence ensue, and foreign interferenco may be the ultimate result.

It was imbued with these sentiments that Lord Palmerston scanned the horizon, and one of the first matters to attract his attention was the state of Switzerland. He naturally viewed with the greatest concern the possibility of any such interference by the Great