is not to change or transfer the public offices," &c. In the fifth : “Also the said Holy Synod defines and ordains that the Lord John Pope XXIII. is not to change," &c. (the very same prohibition.)* As I have before observed, the declaration itself contains no terms to indicate a dogmatic definition. No one is called on to believe anything. Obedience is the one thing aimed at; obedience, indeed, founded on right to command, which right is affirmed but not proposed for substantive intellectual assent, much less for an assent of Faith.

No doubt, in the enacting part in each of the sessions, there is an attempt to exercise control over the Pontiff in disciplinary matters. Whether this attempt was legitimate or not is beside my purpose; because I am considering not the action of the Council, but what is pretended to be its teaching. What I contend is, that the Council did not profess to teach dogmatically at all. The legitimacy of the action may be sustained on the ground that the Pontiff was not undoubtedly possessed of the dignity which he claimed, and, even independently of this, that he was acting perversely and could be resisted; for there was no question of any teaching on his part, nor of any universal law imposed by him on the Church. But it matters not whether the Council exceeded its own proper bounds or kept within them. Certainly Martin V. never said that the Council had committed no mistakes of action.

Further, we have in the acts of the fifth session an express distinction drawn between the matter of these Synodal constitutions and the matter of Faith. Immediately after the constitutions (including what I have called the second Decree), we read:-" Which having been thus gone through (peractis), the above-mentioned Reverend Father and Lord Andrew, Bishop elect of Posen, read some suggestions (avisamenta) in the matter of Faith and on the matter of John Huss." Then comes a heading or title: "Tenor of the suggestions (avisamentorum), in the matter of Faith."†

There is here an express transition from the "constitutions" to the "matter of Faith." The constitutions, therefore, were not considered to enter into the matter of Faith. So much for the nature and character of the Decrees in the mind and intention of the Council. Now, as to the confirmation by Martin V., confessedly his general confirmation of the Decrees of the Council was confined to matters of Faith.

What are we to say to this argument of Mr. Gladstone: "Vaticanism has effectually settled this question" (of this matter belonging to Faith) "against itself. For it has declared that the Papal Infallibility is a dogma of Faith (divinitus revelatum dogma Const.' ch. IV.) But, if by this definition the Infallibility of the Pope in defini

+ Ibid, p. 67 and p. 73.

* Labbe and Coss. p. 77. "Which things having been done, our Most Holy Lord the Pope said, answering to the words related, that he wished to hold and inviolably observe, and never in any way to contravene, all and singular the things determined, concluded, and decreed in matters of Faith by the present Council in a conciliar manner (conciliariter). And he approves and ratifies the things thus done in a conciliar manner, and not otherwise, nor in any other way."-Council of Constance, Sess. 45. Labbe and Coss. Tom. xvi. F. 748.

tions of faith belongs to the province of materiæ fidei, and of ea quæ pertinent ad fidem, the negative of the proposition thus affirmed, being in the same subject matter, belongs to the same province. It, therefore, seems to follow, by a demonstration perfectly rigorous," &c.; and here follow the inferences already quoted.* I reply, first, that the Council of Constance has said nothing directly against the Infallibility of the Pope, nor has it said anything clearly against the superiority of an undoubted Pope over a General Council. I reply, secondly-and this is the point I have in hand at the present moment-that, even if the Council of Constance did deny constructively the Infallibility of the Pope, and constructively, or formally, the superiority of an undoubted Pope to a General Council, this denial did not belong to the materia fidei in the sense in which Martin V. spoke in his confirmation of the Council. How so?-Mr. Gladstone exclaims. Surely, if the affirmation of the Pope's Infallibility and superiority belongs to matter of Faith, the denial of these prerogatives must equally belong to matter of Faith. For the character of the matter, the category to which it belongs, does not consist in, nor depend on, affirmation precisely or denial precisely. The thing is of the same class when denied as when affirmed. This is no doubt specious, but it is not to the point. By matter of Faith we are here to understand what was treated by the Council as matter of Faith, what was dogmatically taught by the Council. I most fully admit that, if the Council dogmatically taught the fallibility or inferiority of an undoubted Pope this teaching would be in matter of Faith, and would be proved to be so by the Vatican classification of the Pope's Infallibility and superiority. But a mere statement or declaration in a disciplinary constitution is not dogmatic teaching.

Moreover, the technical meaning of matter of Faith in that Council, seems to have been what had relation to the errors of Wickliffe, Huss, and others whose doctrines were examined and censured at Constance. The business of the Council was mainly threefold: namely, the extinction of the schism, the reformation of abuses in the Church, and the maintenance of sound doctrine, by the elimination of heretical and otherwise unsound tenets broached by various evil teachers. This last head of the Council's work appears to have been emphatically designated matter of Faith, and it is in this sense the phrase must be understood in the confirmation of the Council by Martin V. Principles of Faith naturally entered into the transaction of the other business which engaged the attention of the Fathers, but were not comprised under the distinctive appellation of matters of Faith.

The Pope likewise restricted his confirmation to those things which were done conciliarly to use a rather strange English or unEnglish word-(conciliariter acta) that is to say, after the proper manner of proceeding of a Council. Now, in the fourth and fifth and some following sessions the Council was carried on according to an unusual system of division into nations; and, besides, the Decrees

"Vaticanism," г. 61, and IRISH MONTHLY, Vol. IV. (No. 33) p. 225.

regarding the Council's power were not maturely discussed as dogmatic decisions would need to be. It is quite true, as I have stated elsewhere, with reference to the Pope,* that when an Infallible authority solemnly teaches a doctrine, exception cannot be taken to its teaching on the ground of insufficient deliberation. But a General Council disjoined from the Pope is not an Infallible authority, as I have long since explained and proved, even irrespectively of the personal Infallibility of the Pontiff. Hence, conciliar dogmatic Decrees not yet sanctioned by the Pope are in an inchoate condition, and the mode of their adoption may be examined by the Pope, and he may properly restrict his approbation to those which have been duly treated of in the Council, and if he use this restriction we are at liberty to inquire how far it extends. I do not, however, care much about the word conciliariter, as I can maintain my point independently of it.

I undertook to show first, that the Decrees of Constance, of which Mr. Gladstone makes so much, do not express or imply what he understands them to mean, nor anything else at variance with the Vatican definition; and, secondly, that those Decrees were not confirmed by Martin V. I have, I think, succeeded in establishing both these points. As to the first, at the very least I have proved that the Decrees need not necessarily be understood in a sense opposed to the dogmatic decision of the later Council. This much is enough; for the onus probandi lies on the side of those who affirm the opposition. It is their business to show that the Decrees of Constance must mean what they -our opponents-say. As to the second, I venture to assert that the proof is thoroughly conclusive.

66

After all we have seen concerning the Council of Constance, it will be easy to understand how much or how little force there is in a triumphant passage of Mr. Gladstone's "Vaticanism."+ Pope Martin V. derived his whole power to confirm from his election to the Papal Chair by the Council. And the Council was competent to elect because the See was vacant. And the See was vacant because of the depositions of two rival Popes, and the resignation of the third; for, if the See was truly vacant before, there had been no Pope since the schism in 1378, which is not supposed by either side. But the power of the Council to vacate the See was in virtue of the principle asserted by the decree of the fifth session. We arrive then at the following dilemma. Either that decree had full validity by the confirmation of the Pope, or Martin V. was not a Pope; the Cardinals made or confirmed by him were not Cardinals, and could not elect validly his successor, Eugenius IV.; so that the Papal succession has failed since an early date in the fifteenth century, or more than four hundred and fifty years ago.

"Therefore the decree of the fifth session must, upon Roman principles, have been included in the materiæ fidei determined by the Council, and, accordingly, in the confirmation by Martin V."

By way of reply to the argument contained in this passage, I make

• IRISH MONTHLY, Vol. IV. (No. 33) p. 235. Pages 59, Co.

+ Ibid. Vol. II. p. 226

the following observations. (1) The See was vacant by the removal of whoever was the true Pope, whichever was the man. The certainty of the vacancy depended on the operation of causes sufficient to remove each of the three in case he happened to be the true Pope. One, as Mr. Gladstone says, resigned; that was Gregory. Two were deposed. Of these, John, who was most likely true Pope up to that time, accepted his own deposition, and thus equivalently resigned; though, even if he had not, he could have been set aside as doubtful. The other, Benedict, was, at the best, a doubtful Pope, and consequently could be deposed by the highest authority that existed in the Church under the circumstances, since there must be a way of getting rid of a doubtful Pope. Whatever power the Council had of deposing a Pope did not depend on any definition or declaration, nor does Mr. Gladstone say it did, but, as he does say, on a principle, and so far he is right. But when he says this was the principle involved in the Decree of the fifth session, he unintentionally confuses the matter. For the Decree might involve something more than the principle on which the power of the Council rested. Thus, the principle might regard a doubtful Pope, or a case of schism, and the decree might include a certain Pope outside of a case of schism, and then the principle would be right and the decree wrong. (2) The principle on which the Council's action depended, so far as this affected the validity of Martin's election, did not need his recognition, nor could such recognition give it certainty, were it previously doubtful; for, if it was not sound he was not Pope. If he had denied the principle he would have compromised his own position. But omitting to affirm is not denying; and yet Mr. Gladstone seems to imply that it is, or, at any rate, if it is not, his argument falls to the ground. (3) Whatever power the Council had of deposing a Pope did not and could not come from a Pope, nor depend on his confirmation or recognition. It was a singular, abnormal power which accrued to that Council in special circumstances, and would accrue to another Council in similar circumstances. It may be said, no doubt, that a definition of the Pope and Council dogmatically affirming such a power would give the doctrine a new status for the future. But the Council of Constance, as we have seen, did not frame such a definition. It proposed nothing to be believed on the subject. As to Pope Martin's right to his position, his universal acceptance by the Catholic Church settled that; and the universality of this acceptance was not appreciably affected by the obstinate persistence of Peter de Luna with a handful of adherents.

JUAN DE PEDRAZA'S "DANCE OF DEATH."*

BY DENIS FLORENCE MAC CARTHY, M.R.I.A.

HIS auto has a special interest in Spanish literature as being

ΤΗ the first of the autos sacramentales that was printed, and the

earliest of those hitherto discovered the date of which is absolutely certain. Autos on other sacred subjects had, no doubt, been published earlier, as in the "Cancionero" of Juan del Encina, Salamanca, 1509, where eleven of them appear under the title of "Eglogas," and one under that of "Aucto." But no auto specially "directed to the praise of the Most Holy Sacrament," as expressly mentioned on the title-page of "The Dance of Death," is known to have been printed before the year 1551, when that excessively rare, and, until within the last few years, entirely unknown auto was published. Spanish literature is indebted to the late lamented Ferdinand Wolf of Vienna for a knowledge of this interesting rarity, which gives a fixed starting point for all investigations as to the rise, progress, and decline of so important a department of Spanish poetry as the Sacramental Drama. The grim fancy or moral so widely diffused throughout Europe during the middle ages as represented in such various ways by the artist and the poet, in which every living being, from the highest to the lowest is led away by Death in a mystic dance to the grave, was known in Spain as in other countries for nearly two centuries before. There the truth so beautifully expressed by Shirley

Sceptre and crown

Must tumble down,

And in the dust be equal made

With the poor crooked scythe and spade,”

found metrical expression as elsewhere; but it was not until Juan de Pedraza, "cloth-shearer and citizen of Segovia," composed his auto of the Dance of Death, that it received that dramatic development of which the subject was so capable. This was so evident to Moratin, who was ignorant of the existence of the auto, that he gives even the poem of the "Dance of Death" under date 1356, though it has no dramatic character whatever, the first and earliest place among the dramatic pieces anterior to Lope de Vega, which he has enumerated in his "Origines del Teatro Español."

This ancient poem referred to by Moratin called the "Danza General," is preserved among the manuscripts in the Library of the Escorial. It is comprised in ninety-seven octave stanzas. The Escorial MS. being unique, and the poem, as it was supposed, never having been printed, a transcript was made of it by Senor Gayangos for Mr. Ticknor, who published it in the appendix to the first edition of his "History of Spanish Literature," 1849. It has been reprinted

"Farsa llamada Danza de la Muerte." Autos Sacramentales desde su origen hasta fines del siglo XVII. p 41. Madrid, 1865.