and 7,500 prisoners and 120 guns captured.

The American Tank Corps was created on 26 January 1918 as a separate arm. Under the command of its Chief, Brig. Gen. S. D. Rockenbach, it entered its first engagement on 12 September 1918 in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. Objectives were seized and the salient reduced in 36 hours."

By the end of the war, armor had been used by the Americans, British, French, and Germans in a total of 91 engagements. However, in spite of this and the dramatic example of Cambrai, the potentialities of armor

were not fully appreciated. Tanks were capable of breaking the agonizing stalemate that had been created by the machinegun in combination with elaborate field fortifications and barbed wire, and of restoring mobility to the battlefield. But they were too new, and their technical imperfections were too great, to permit more than limited application. Most tacticians of the time assumed that tanks would always play a secondary role, operating in support of infantry to reduce strong points and centers of resistance. Our National Defense Act of 1920 assigned the Tank Corps to the Chief of Infantry. Its remnant was broken up into separate companies and assigned on the basis of one company per infantry division; a few other units were formed into infantry-tank regiments.

Meantime, however, a gap was developing in American military doctrine. According to that doctrine the branch of the Army which provided a swift maneuvering element, and which could exploit a victory by shock power, was the (horsed) cavalry. But in the light of World War I and its lessons it was beginning to be realized that cavalry could no longer fill this role. Certain far-sighted officers believed that armor was destined to take its place. The decade 1930-40 was marked by the gradual victory of this concept over the alternative view that tanks were mere auxiliaries to infantry.

In 1930 the first elements of what was to become the Army's mechanized force

were assembled at Fort Eustis, Virginia, under the command of Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis. This 1930 experiment, although valuable in later years, was discontinued by the War Department, and the various arms and services were directed to carry on their own experiments in mechanization. In 1933 the mechanized cavalry was formed under the Chief of Cavalry, Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry. The 1st Cavalry Regiment was sent to Camp Knox (Ky.), mechanized, and combined with the nucleus of the Fort Eustis forces. Later, artillery support was added; another cavalry regiment, the 13th, was mechanized; and these units were combined to form the 2d Cavalry Brigade.

The pioneers at Fort Knox evolved a new and daring concept. They visualized a mechanized force executing missions based on speed, firepower, shock action, and a large operating radius; exploiting a breakthrough, seizing distant key points, and making wide flanking maneuvers to strike an enemy in his rear areas. This force would have, organic to it, all the supporting arms and services needed in modern warfare-infantry, artillery, air, signal, engineer, and so on; a team of combined arms, able to operate deep in enemy territory.

Following field maneuvers in Georgia and Louisiana, during which all available armored equipment and units were assembled, the Armored Force was born on 10 July 1940. It was formed from elements of cavalry, infantry, and artillery and consisted of 242 officers and 7,015 enlisted men, with 393 light tanks. Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee was designated as the first Chief of the Armored Force. Meantime the 1939 German campaign in Poland had shown beyond dispute what armor could do when properly handled.

Before the end of 1941 the Armored Force contained five armored divisions. In the following months more were activated. In July of 1943 the title of the Armored Force was changed to Armored Command. In October the II, III and IV Armored Corps were removed from the jurisdiction of that

command and redesignated respectively the XVIII, XIX and XX Corps, with two or more armored divisions in each. This resulted in the reduction of the Armored Force from its position as a semiindependent force of sixteen powerful armored divisions, and placed it in the normal command channel under the Commanding General of Army Ground Forces. In February 1944, in furtherance of the same policy, the Armored Command was redesignated the Armored Center.

By the end of World War II, armor was recognized as one of the major combat arms. On all fronts our tank battalions, working with the infantry, proved that they could ably support its advance and actively assist in defensive situations. In the European Theater, armor employed in mass proved to be the most effective weapon with which to exploit successes. On 20 July 1950 an act of Congress established the Armor branch. Thereby armor came into official being, combining all the esprit, tradition, and background of the historic cavalry arm, the Tank Corps of World War I, and the Armored Force of World War II. Cavalry as a separate arm ceased to exist, and the light armored units which had been known as "mechanized cavalry" were incorporated into the new Armor branch.

ARMOR TODAY. The term "armor" does not refer to tanks alone, but includes the contingents of other arms and services which operate with it. A large armor unit thus constituted, and supported by tactical air, is the most powerful ground striking force in the world today. It can live and fight on the atomic battlefield. It has the organization, equipment, and firepower needed to close with and destroy the enemy. It can cover wide fronts and deep zones of action in dispersed formations, and concentrate rapidly at need. The following capabilities are inherent in armor

(1) The ability to maneuver, control, and direct tremendous firepower on the battlefield. This ability, in conjunction with the staying power of armor units, permits maximum exploitation of suc

cess.

(2) The ability to move rapidly from one area to another and interpose it

self decisively at a critical point, thus applying the principles of surprise, maneuver, and the offensive.

(3) The ability to disperse quickly in order to minimize the effects of enemy atomic weapons, and to concentrate rapidly to take advantage of the effects of friendly atomic weapons.

It is difficult to visualize a major war in the foreseeable future with an enemy who will not have powerful armor. The hostile armor must be defeated, and the supremacy of our own on the battlefield must be gained, before complete victory can be insured. This will be the task of our armored divisions and corps, supported by organic atomic firepower and fighter aircraft.

In addition to these major armored units, there are tanks which are organic to or attached to infantry, and which provide support in all types of operations. They will often be given infantry support and used on independent or semi-independent missions. The tanks operating with infantry units are employed to

(1) Destroy hostile armor.

(2) Add strength to the attack and counterattack through its firepower, mobility, and shock effect.

(3) Assist in exploiting successes in the attack.

TACTICS OF ARMOR. Successful armor actions are based on rapid but thorough estimates and deliberate planning, followed by bold and violent execution. Armor commanders are normally issued mission-type orders which tell them what to do, not how to do it. These orders include the commander's concept in as much detail as is feasible, but give maximum latitude to subordinate commanders with minimum restraint, which allows them to take immediate advantage of changing local conditions.

Armor units are assigned to all major Army commands. A modern corps, for example, may consist of two or more infantry divisions, one or more armored divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, plus an armor group (composed of two or more seperate tank or armored infantry battalions). In addition, each of the infantry divisions has an armor battalion and an armored cavalry squad

ron.

Although especially suitable for of

fensive operations, armor units can conduct an effective defense. They may be used initially in delaying action forward of the battle position. They may then be employed as a reserve, to add depth to the battlefield and to counterattack as required. They may at times be used to occupy any sector of the battle position covering major avenues of approach for enemy armor. But whether operating as a striking force in the defense or occupying a sector of the line, armor in defense employs offensive techniques. Its units are limited, in the organization of a position-type defense, by the amount of armored infantry available. It is better suited by its characteristics for the mobile defense, which employs a combination of offensive, defensive, and delaying tactics, and whose success depends on eventual offensive action.

Armor is also very effective in retrograde operations. Its mobility, firepower, and extensive and flexible communications make it well suited to conduct an aggressive delaying action, in which heavy damage can be inflicted on the enemy with minimum risk to the delaying force. It can cover a much wider front in a delaying action than can a comparable infantry force.

Armor demands that its personnel, both officers and enlisted, possess daring, audacity, and great physical dexterity and mental mobility. It must always be borne in mind that any product of man's technological ingenuity is completely and entirely dependent upon human direction. The efficient, precise, and decisive weapons employed by armor are made so only by the intelligent, daring armor soldier, the ever-important man who directs and operates them.

CAVALRY, THE PARENT OF ARMOR. Horsed cavalry, although it no longer exists in our Army, was for most of our history one of the major combat arms, with a record in war and a professional esprit second to none. It was from the concept of cavalry that armor was borne, as has been explained above.

This country's mounted force traditionally consisted only of light cavalrydragoons and mounted rangers. Heavy cavalry, designed exclusively for shock action, was virtually unknown. The Continental Army of 1777 contained four regiments of light dragoons. After the

Revolution the first company of dragoons was established in 1792. By 1861 six mounted regiments were in existence. At that time they were consolidated into one corps and redesignated as followsThe First Regiment of Dragoons as the First Cavalry.

The Second Regiment of Dragoons as the Second Cavalry.

The Regiment of Mounted Riflemen as
the Third Cavalry.

The First Regiment of Cavalry as the
Fourth Cavalry.

The Second Regiment of Cavalry as the
Fifth Cavalry.

The Third Regiment of Cavalry as the
Sixth Cavalry.

Four additional regiments of cavalry, the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, were added in 1866. In 1901 the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Cavalry were added. In 1916 the number of regiments was increased to 25. By 1920 the cavalry arm consisted of 950 officers and 20,000 enlisted men, under a Chief of Cavalry.

Up to World War II, cavalry participated in every major military campaign of our history. It saw action in the Mexican War, the Indian Wars in Florida and in the West, the Civil War, and the campaigns in Cuba and in the Philippines. For almost a century and a half the cavalry played a vital role in extending the frontiers of our country, securing its borders, and maintaining peace and order in newly-opened areas. Frontier posts manned by elements of its gallant regiments were often the only islands of refuge for our pioneers in hostile Indian country. But with the advent of the machinegun in World War I, the importance of the horse as a means of battlefield mobility rapidly declined. In that war, only the 2d Cavalry Regiment saw mounted action in Europe.

During the 1930's the cavalry, substituting the tank, armored car, and jeep for the horse, looked to this mechanization as a means of continuing its traditional role, and even expanding it. Meantime, prior to World War II the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions had been organized. The 2d was deployed in North Africa early in 1944. By then, however, the tank had become the dominant weapon in the open North African terrain; the division was therefore inactivated and its personnel assigned elsewhere. The 1st Cavalry Division fought in the Southwest Pacific as infantry.

Today the name and traditions of the

1st Cavalry Division are perpetuated in a conventional infantry division. The colors and traditions of the other old line cavalry regiments are carried by the tank battalions and armored cavalry units of the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.

Cavalry units in Armor today bear little resemblance to the cavalry units of a few years ago. Due to the greater frontages and depths that will be assigned to armored and infantry divisions on the atomic battlefield, armored cavalry units must execute reconnaissance and security missions over greatly extended distances. The range and power of modern weapons place on the armored cavalry units additional requirements for target acquisition and damage assessment. These

have been met by increasing the strength of cavalry elements in both the armored and infantry divisions, and by incorporating new type elements known as "Sky Cavalry" in armored cavalry squadrons. Highly technical electronic devices, such as aerial infrared detectors, aerial TV systems, aerial and ground radar sets, and aerial and ground photo equipment are being developed, together with improved communications, to provide a better means of gathering information over extended areas. This highly complex equipment will increase the cavalry squadron's ability to conduct reconnaissance and security operations over great distances, and enable it to meet requirements of the battlefield of tomorrow.

1 July 1920-23 Jul 1924 24 July 1924-20 Mar 1926 21 Mar 1926-20 Mar 1930 22 Mar 1930-21 Mar 1934 26 Mar 1934-25 Mar 1938 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942

.Maj. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook

.Maj. Gen. Malin Craig .Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Crosby ..Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry .Maj. Gen. Leon B. Kromer . Maj. Gen. John K. Herr

10 July 1940-31 July 1941

1 Aug 1941-8 May 1943

9 May 1943-30 Nov 1943

1 Dec 1943-30 Oct 1945

..Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee ..Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers .Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. .Maj. Gen. Charles L. Scott

Army Aviation as it exists today had its beginning early in World War II. When the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces) were created in March of 1942, aviation in general came under the Army Air Forces. However, on 6 June 1942 the War Department made light observation aircraft organic to field artillery units of infantry and armored divisions and to the headquarters of each field artillery brigade and group. Initially 10 airplanes were authorized for each infantry division and 6 for each armored division. The aircraft so assigned were the low performance, Piper Cub type, capable of operating from hastily prepared airstrips, and were intended to function primarily as observation posts for the

adjustment of artillery fire.

As the war progressed, Army Ground Forces greatly enlarged its program of organic aviation. Experience in battle showed that every major type of ground combat unit except antiaircraft units found a use for light planes, and borrowed them from field artillery units whenever it could. They proved their value not only for artillery observation but for courier, liaison, photographic, visual reconnaissance, column control, and emergency supply missions as well. A requirement for liaison planes to be made organic to all the combat arms was recognized. To this end, in August of 1945 the War Department authorized more aircraft for each type of combat division, and a few organic aircraft for each cavalry group, cavalry squadron,

separate tank battalion, separate engineer battalion, tank destroyer battalion, and tank destroyer group. The war ended before the program could be implemented.

At the close of the war the Army had some 2,000 light aircraft. During the precipitate postwar demobilization the number was reduced to around 200. However, the war had clearly shown the importance of organic aviation with ground troops; and when, in 1947, the Air Force was separated from Army control and became an independent Armed Service, this type of aviation remained with the Army. Since then it has continued to expand, especially during and since the Korean conflict. By the end of 1957, in three combat arms and four technical services there were a total of around 5,000 aircraft, either fixed or rotary wing. To operate and maintain them required about 4,000 commissioned officers, 900 warrant officers, and 9,000 enlisted men.

MISSION AND FUNCTIONS. The mission of Army aviation is to augment the capability of the Army to conduct effective combat operations. By definition, Army aviation is organic aviation. It is not a separate combat arm or corps. Instead, it is an integral part of the Army, designed to live with the Army in the field. This means that it must be under the full and immediate control of, and subject to the direct orders of, the commander responsible for ground operations. Its planes must be able to land and take off in small unimproved areas; and it must be possible to maintain and operate them without elaborate ground facilities. Army aviators must have a basic understanding of ground warfare and of logistical support operations.

The following are the functions of Army aviation and the types of planes used to perform them

Observation. This is done by the fixed wing Bird Dog (L-19) and by two types of helicopter, the Sioux (H-13) and the Raven (H-23). They amplify and supplement other means available to the Army for locating, verifying, and evaluating targets for mortars, artillery, and missiles; adjusting the fire of those weapons; and obtaining information on enemy forces not obtainable by air reconnaissance agencies of the other services.

Rapid Troop Movement. This involves the air movement of combat units, up to battle group size, within the combat zone. It is accomplished by the Shawnee (H21C), the Choctaw, (H-34), the Mojave (H-37A) helicopters and the fixed wing Otter (U-1A). Their use enables a commander to cross natural obstacles such as swamps, rivers and woods; to cross or bypass enemy minefields, contaminated areas, etc.; and to capitalize on superior mobility and exploit the shock effect of atomic fire power.

Rapid Movement of Critical Supplies and Equipment. The same aircraft used for the tactical transport of troops are used for supply transport on the basis of urgent need, when supply by ground vehicles is impracticable or time is a determining factor. In addition, Army aviation is today being employed on an increasingly wide scale to transport (displace) weapons systems within the combat zone.

Use to Supplement Ground Reconnaissance. The aircraft mentioned above can be used to increase the mobility and flexibility of ground reconnaissance forces. They also facilitate counterreconnaissance, screening, flank security, and the seizure of critical terrain features in advance of heavier forces engaged in pursuit and exploitation operations. In this role Army aviation does not become involved in Air Force-type tactical reconnaissance, nor is it employed to execute deep, large-scale, airborne penetrations.

Command, Liaison, and Communications. Although these are old functions of Army aviation, they are assuming greater importance today than ever before. This is so because survival on an atomic battlefield demands quick reaction and increased mobility on the part of widely dispersed ground units. In this role, in addition to observation aircraft, the Army normally uses the Beaver (L-20), a utility plane, and the Seminole (L-23), a command ship. Army aircraft are used regularly for wirelaying, for reconnaissance of the axes of signal communications, for passenger and courier service, and as radio relay stations between march elements or between combat formations and higher headquarters.

Battlefield Casualty Evacuation. This