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Oshima, the northern group of islands, reverted to Japanese control in 1953. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. The early phases of military government here were in several respects unique in American experience. The Ryukyus were considered a part of the Japanese home islands. During our attack on Okinawa a large part of the civilian population took refuge in caves or temporary shacks in the mountains, where they were living when our troops moved in. The Japanese used the former police force to organize and control these people, and there were extensive guerrilla activities, taking the form of unexpected harassing night attacks by machinegun, rifle, and mortar fire against the headquarters and bivouac areas of small American units. Many CAMG personnel were wounded in such attacks and a number killed. Guerrilla bands also endeavored to prevent CAMG control of the civilian population, using propaganda, threats, and punishment, and the kidnapping, trial, and execution by beheading or torture of civilian leaders who were collaborating with CAMG. They were especially active in rear areas from which our tactical units had been withdrawn. CAMG teams in such areas learned very early to set up local defenses and procure weapons.

In the rear areas the Japanese also conducted a very efficient psychological warfare campaign. Early in the occupation our CAMG units, through public address systems, notices, and meetings, began to fight the Japanese propaganda, a difficult task. At a later date, newspapers printed in Japanese in Hawaii were distributed to the civilians. Our psychological wafare service assisted through the use of public address systems in airplanes and through the printing and broadcasting of leaflets.

EMERGENCY FEEDING AND MEDICAL CARE. Every city in Okinawa, and practically every village, had been destroyed and the people driven from their homes, either by the Japanese before our arrival or by our own operations. Space on the island was at a premium, on account of our military needs. It therefore became necessary, after the first three months, to concentrate civilians in restricted areas. As a result we had to provide for prac

tically all the needs of a large civilian population and to build temporary housing on a mass scale.

Medical care of the population assumed greater importance here than in any other area. In the period of preparatory naval gunfire and aerial bombardment of Okinawa, and in the subsequent fighting, there were very heavy casualties among civilians. We were forced to attach surgical teams to the CAMG units with the combat divisions, and to provide hospitals for the wounded. In addition, there was a heavy load on CAMG medical facilities caused by people suffering from exposure, malnutrition, starvation, and various insectborne diseases, due to the period they had spent as refugees under primitive conditions.

In this operation, units of other services were placed under the temporary command of military government. Included at various times were Navy dispensaries and hospitals, Quartermaster truck units, a military police battalion. Marine military police, Naval construction battalions, landing ships, landing craft, and provisional infantry rifle battalions. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps authorities were sympathetic, and their tactical and service units lent valuable assistance on request.

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION. The Ryukyus were never self-sufficient in prewar times; two-thirds of the rice, one-quarter of the wheat and barley, and one-half of the soybean requirements had to be imported. Cane sugar, a subsidized crop (101,045 tons, annually, from 1930-39), exceeding consumption by 900 percent, was the principal industry. Textile manufacturing (household type and centered in the northern Ryukyus) was the second most important industry, and accounted for 61.8 percent of the value of exports.

Most industry withered as the war drew closer to Okinawa. Lack of shipping cut off coal and raw materials from Japan; the fighting obliterated 20 percent of the population and 95 percent of the housing, and destroyed industrial equipment. "Peace" found the natives a scattered and bewildered people, with neither a government nor a going economy.

Restoration of prewar agricultural

production was hampered chiefly by an arable land shortage on Okinawa, where military requirements took approximately 30,000 acres. To assist the people to get crops started, 15 mechanical teams were organized, each equipped with a tractor, plow, and disk harrow. These teams began operating during the summer of 1946, and contributed materially in placing some 5,000 acres of land under cultivation. Sea walls, flood gates, and drainage areas that had been destroyed during the war were rebuilt. Farm animals, seeds, and fertilizer were imported. Rebuilding of ports, factories, and private industry was made possible through government loans and grants. Fishing was encouraged through building of refrigerator plants, boat construction, and education; as a result there is now a surplus of fish for export.

The Ryukyus' economic recovery has been hampered by the lack of transportation facilities. To alleviate this, Army surplus vehicles and a limited number of small Navy vessels were given to local governments; coal was brought from Iriomote to Okinawa; other interisland trade and traffic was reestablished; and phosphate rock has been shipped to Japan and there traded for much-needed fertilizers. A small number of landing vessels have also been made available to the fishing industry.

POLITICAL REHABILITATION. Local government in Okinawa came into being on 22 April 1946, when a native government was established with certain limited powers, all under the supervision of the military governor. At the same time there was established an advisory board called the Okinawa Assembly and various other governmental departments. Democratic elections were held on 1 February 1948 for mayors and assemblymen of cities, towns, and villages. The laws of the city, town, village, and rural governments were revised so as to introduce the following: the principle of direct elections by universal suffrage in all local areas; the concept that local assemblies can be effective in controlling local areas; a new election system to prevent election manipulation; and the principle of recall

and initiative. Civilian courts were established in the three prefectures and at lower echelons, on the same basis as the military government courts.

The onetime powers of the policecensorship and supervision over all types of meetings and over virtually every phase of the Okinawan's lifewere greatly curtailed. The police officer was made a servant of the local administration.

EDUCATION. The operation of schools was suspended from the time of the invasion of Okinawa until May 1945, when elementary classes for children were authorized. In August a CAMG Education Section was established to develop and coordinate the educational program, determine policy, and furnish school materials. It was a difficult problem, there being a lack of school buildings, textbooks, and competent teachers. A program of adult education, using educational films and information centers, has been undertaken throughout the Ryukyus. The Army supplies films and projectors; projectionists and other mechanics are being trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, an exchange of students and national leaders has been instituted. Each year selected candidates are given grants for study in the United States and Japan. They are urged to utilize their newly acquired skills in responsible positions in the islands.

THE SITUATION TODAY. USCAR, operating under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, exercises its powers over the Ryukyu Islands in pursuance of Executive Order 10713, signed by the President on 5 June 1957. It is organized under the High Commissioner into departments and teams. These latter work in close liaison with their opposite number components in the native government. The maximum amount of autonomy is given to the native government consistent with its capabilities. The Executive Order sets forth U.S. objectives in the islands, including the development of an effective and responsible Ryukyuan Government, based on democratic principles and supported by a sound financial structure; the improvement of the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants;

and the promotion of their economic and cultural advancement.

There will continue to be a very active CAMG operation in the Ryukyus as long as they retain their military

significance to the peace of the free world. The results achieved by such operations clearly demonstrate the military interest in dealing with the people and their institutions.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In each of the many countries in which our forces are stationed, the relation between them and the civil population and government is a matter of continuing interest to the CAMG organization. These relations exist with respect to the logistic needs of our troops and the individual needs of our personnel, and also in social and legal fields.

Furthermore, wherever the American soldier goes he soon becomes identified with community endeavors. His openhanded generosity is to be expected as an adjunct to our activities in any country. Typical of these activities, and evidence of the official support they generate, were the Armed Forces assistance program to German youth activi

ties (GYA) and assistance to Korea program (AFAK), each of which augmented the considerable donations of time and money of the troops.

Apart from official support of activities such as GYA and AFAK, the humanitarian response of our military forces has always been prompt and effective in civil disasters such as floods, explosions, and large-scale accidents. Examples were our extensive military flood relief operations in the Netherlands in February 1953, and "Project Mercy," the resettlement in the United States of thousands of Hungarian refugees following the Hungarian revolt in 1956.

CURRENT CAMG

With an ever-increasing destructiveness of modern weapons, both the scope and the importance of CAMG activities will continue to be enlarged. In a possible future war, no matter how much care is taken to minimize its impact on civilians, it is virtually certain that larger numbers than ever before will suffer personal loss, privation, injury, and lack of the basic necessities of life. They probably will not have the guidance, assistance, or control normally provided by their local governments. Continuing damage will certainly contribute to mass hysteria, and tend to convert the previously normal populace into an uncontrolled mob-a frightened, hurt, and disrupted people who seek only to flee further injury with whatever possessions they can carry, and to obtain, by any means possible, what they need to keep alive.

From the viewpoint of a commander of troops operating in the area, the potentialities of such a disorganized population are not difficult to imagine. They will clog the roads, and interfere with or prevent essential movements of troops and supplies. They will require amazing tonnages of military supplies

CONCEPTS

merely to remain alive. They will compel the diversion of combat troops to protect lines of communication and supply installations, and perhaps to neutralize guerrilla action fomented by enemy agents. They can do all this and more-they can all but stop a military operation in its tracks, unless the necessary CAMG controls are planned in advance and put into effect immediately.

It is therefore clear that CAMG operations are required fully as much by military necessity as by humanity and the customs of war. The civil population must be firmly controlled. It must receive the necessary minima of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Also, it must be kept informed. Knowledge that help is being offered, to remove the inhabitants out of harm's way if necessary and to provide for their basic needs, will materially reduce their tendency to hysteria and flight, will make them more amenable to control, and will promote their eventual support of our national objectives.

In addition to these civil control and relief activities, CAMG must provide for local civil defense and damage control measures, for public health and

sanitation, and for mobilizing the local resources to meet military requirements and essential civilian needs. The CAMG organization, operating at the "grassroots" level, is also a highly important source of information and intelligence concerning enemy activities.

The commander of troops, through his CAMG operating agencies and his G5, must learn many things about the population under his control: their history, customs, and problems; their social structure, and its areas of sensitivity; their economy; their cultural, religious, and political backgrounds; and the sys

tem of government to which they are accustomed. Also, he must see that his entire command is indoctrinated with CAMG principles and applies them.

CAMG activities begin with the initial planning for an operation, and continue concurrently with all its phases. The moment a commander moves into an area, decisions must be made concerning the civilian population. Such advance planning, and such prompt and correct decisions, may be a material and even an essential contribution to the winning of the victory, and later of the peace.

CAMG ORGANIZATION

The Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in the Department of the Army, has the mission of keeping the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff informed on all CAMG matters.

CAMG TRAINING. Training is conducted at the U. S. Army CAMG School at Fort Gordon (Ga.). Instruction in CAMG doctrine and functions is also given in most Army service schools, and CAMG departments have been established in Reserve schools.

CAMG UNITS. These have been organized in both the Active Army and the Army Reserve. They are composed of specialists in the fields of language, food service, economics, commerce and industry, price control and rationing, property control, public finance, transportation, public safety, public health, public welfare, legal matters, public education, labor, public works and utilities, public communications, public transportation, displaced persons, civil information, and arts, monuments, and archives. The Army Reserve contains 91 CAMG units, and the Active Army has 3 in addition to the CAMG School. The following types of units exist

CAMG Area Headquarters A. It may function as a staff and planning agency within a major headquarters, or as a separate operating command.

CAMG Area Headquarters B. It is similar to Area Headquarters A, but is much smaller and is more flexible. CAMG Group. It is a self-support

ing operating unit, with the necessary functional teams such as Economics, Public Health, Finance, Public Utilities, Public Safety, Displaced Persons, and others as required. It can perform CAMG operational functions in support of a field army or similar command, or can provide CAMG area support in the administration of a large city, a province, or a similar political subdivision. It can command up to 10 CAMG companies.

CAMG Company. It is also a selfsupporting operating unit, similar to the group, but smaller and normally operating at the corps or lower level. It has 10 organic platoons, which are normally used to support divisions or battle groups.

FUNCTIONING OF UNITS. CAMG units are furnished to field armies as needed. A field army attaches them to corps and divisions as required for direct support, and to other elements of the army as area support. A unit in direct support is assigned to, and moves with, its corps or division, and furnishes CAMG assistance related to the immediate effort. A unit in area support consolidates or "follows up" the gains of battle, and stabilizes control in its assigned area. It remains there as long as needed, and is attached to the same combat unit (division or other) as long as that unit's area includes the community or territory in question. When rear boundaries are advanced so that this is no longer the case, the CAMG unit remains in place, and responsibility for its activities passes to higher headquarters.

Chapter 31

THE ARMY'S PART IN OUR NATION'S DEVELOPMENT

Throughout our history the United States Army has rendered priceless services to the nation and its people in such fields as public health, construction, waterway development, technol

ogy, industry, agriculture, transportation, disaster relief, exploration, and many others. In this respect it is unique among the world's great armies.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICINE

In no peaceful field do we owe more to the Army than in that of medicine, sanitation, and public health.

YELLOW FEVER AND THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE. Perhaps the best known contributions of the Army to world health and sanitation are the discovery of the cause of yellow fever and the subsequent cleanup of the Panama Canal Zone.

Yellow fever, first reported in the 17th century, became endemic in tropical areas in the western hemisphere, and produced periodic disastrous epidemics in the Americas and Europe. It was one of the reasons why the French failed to build the Panama Canal.

In 1900 Maj. Walter Reed, head of the U. S. Army Yellow Fever Board, was charged with the responsibility of finding the cause of yellow fever and then eliminating the disease. The board which Reed headed was composed of Maj. James Carroll, Maj. J. W. Lazear (who died from the effects of a mosquito bite in the course of the investigation), and Aristides Agramonte, a native of Cuba.

After unsuccessful experiments Maj. Reed decided to test the theory of

Cuba's Dr. Carlos Finley-that the fever was transmitted by mosquito bite. He had to use human subjects, as no animal was then believed susceptible to the disease. In all, twenty-two volunteers submitted to experiments. The work started in August of 1900, and the board spent eight months in solving the problem. It was proved conclusively that the host and carrier of the disease was the female of the mosquito Aedes aegypti.1

It was Maj. (later The Surgeon General) William C. Gorgas who first put the discovery that mosquitoes transmit yellow fever to a practical application. Gorgas, as Chief Sanitary Officer in Havana, screened yellow fever patients from mosquitoes, destroyed mosquitoes and their breeding places, and by such measures had in three months freed Havana from the disease for the first time. His success in Cuba naturally led to his being put in charge of similar work in the newly acquired Canal Zone.

As plans were being developed for digging the Panama Canal, Gorgas was transferred from Cuba to Washington, D. C., to provide advice on sanitation. For two years he studied the Canal

1 The Secretary of War stated in his annual report: "The brilliant character of this scientific achievement, its inestimable value to mankind, the saving of thousands of lives, and the delivery of the Atlantic Seacoast from constant apprehension demand special recognition from the Government of the United States." Congress directed, and it is still the practice, that the annual U. S. Army Register carry a "Roll of Honor" giving the names and achievements of the 23 men who risked their lives in these experiments.

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