years had elapsed since foreigners had obtained anything like a secure foothold in China. Prior to the Treaty of Nanking their business dealings had been confined to Canton, where they had resided on sufferance under a regime of constant humiliation. Only on the conclusion of that Treaty in 1842 did they attain a status and cease to occupy a position that might, perhaps, be not inaptly compared to that of the peregrini of ancient Rome.

seems

Unfortunately, the Chinese failed to appreciate, or, as nearer the truth, determined to ignore the changed conditions, and consequently a prolonged struggle ensued to obtain a reasonably practical recognition of the change that had been wrought.

Things were brought to a head in what is known as the "Arrow War," which resulted in 1858 in the Treaty of Tientsin and a general extension of the rights of foreigners, these events again being followed two years later by Lord Elgin's return to China and the invasion of Peking by an armed force in order to compel observance of the terms of the new Treaty.

Thus in less than twenty years there had been three wars between Great Britain and China; or rather, Great Britain had been engaged in three wars with China, in two of which, those of 1858 and 1860, a measure of assistance had been rendered to the former power by France. On each occasion the troops of China had been defeated. But the humiliation did not end there. Despite years of successful resistance on the part of the Chinese, the foreign trader had at last gained a permanent footing in the country.

It naturally resulted that in the years immediately following these events the hostile feeling against foreigners became intensified. It would be matter of surprise had it been otherwise. Treaties of themselves do not necessarily either engender friendly feelings or guarantee their existence. At anyrate, as far as the official classes were concerned, the attitude of the Chinese in the early sixties was bitterly anti-foreign. They were pledged to the maintenance of what Mr. Alexander Michie calls "the settled policy of keeping foreigners at arms' length at all costs," and there was no hope of any encouragement being forthcoming for enterprises in which foreigners could be in any way interested. The country, in fact, had not opened up in the way that the more sanguine had hoped, hence the unpromising state of affairs when Sir MacDonald Stephenson arrived in the field.

His first act was to invite the views of foreigners of all classes, merchants, missionaries, and officials, on the subject of the desirability of the introduction of railways. There was, of course, no room for difference of opinion on this point. But the question rather was whether the moment was opportune, and some of those applied to for an expression of view qualified their opinion with hints at difficulties, or doubts as to whether the time had come for such a move. The majority, however, having expressed their approval and dwelt with enthusiasm on the commercial aspects of the matter, refrained from comment in regard to the practicability of the proposal, and quietly awaited further developments.

The opinion of the Chinese was next sought, and for this purpose a large meeting of merchants was held in Canton.

Chinese merchants have always been characterised by a strong utilitarian sense; they have only to be convinced of individual benefit to adopt the means that conduce to so desirable an end. When, therefore, it was shown for the sake of illustration that the construction of a railway from Canton into the interior would inevitably cause a great increase in the declining trade of the place, they were unanimous in their desire for its immediate construction.

Sir MacDonald seems to have derived much encouragement from the enthusiasm of the Cantonese. What he apparently did not realise was that this enthusiastic class occupied the lowest grade in the Chinese polity, and at that time enjoyed but little influence.1

The next step was to formulate a scheme, and accordingly a comprehensive system, that should not only supply the needs of China but bring her into rail communication with the outside world, was planned. Taking Hankow, the great emporium of Central China on the Yangtze River, as a starting-point, Sir MacDonald proposed lines eastward to Shanghai and westward through the provinces of Szechuen and Yunnan to India. From Chinkiang, which was to be served by this great Yangtze Valley trunk, a line to Peking by way of Tientsin was projected, while a line was to run from Hankow southward to Canton. Thus the

1 The Chinese polity is divided into four classes in the following order(1) Literati, or scholars, the class from which officials are drawn; (2) agriculturists; (3) artisans; and (4) traders.

four chief Treaty Ports of the Empire, which are also the most important trade centres, were to be put in rail communication.

In addition to these great trunk lines it was proposed to connect Ningpo with Shanghai, and to carry a line from Foochow inland to tap the trade of the rich province of Fuhkien.

A connection was also proposed between Canton and the projected line to India, which latter was shown in the map illustrating the scheme as taking a great southerly bend as it approached the western boundary of China.

It will be observed that the routes of two of the chief lines. approximated roughly to the routes to be taken by the projected Canton-Hankow and Tientsin-Nanking railways. But the Shanghai-Nanking railway, now under construction, is the only section of the Yangtze Valley system of the future which will coincide with that projected by Sir MacDonald Stephenson. The latter's proposals were for a line closely following the river, but the idea of the railways now projected in this region is to develop the hinterland and facilitate communication with the river; to prove subsidiary to, rather than to enter into competition with, the great waterway. Another point that may be noted is that the advantages of a line putting Hankow and the capital in direct communication, following the route taken by the present ChingHan line, do not appear to have suggested themselves to Sir MacDonald's mind. Perhaps he thought, as some still appear to think, that the railway between Tientsin and the Yangtze would prove too serious a competitor of such a line.

So much, however, for the main arteries and the general scheme of the system as it was to be gradually developed. Sir MacDonald now proposed that a start be made on certain short sections by way of experiment. In view of the desirability of impressing the Imperial Government with the advantages of railways, he thought operations might be commenced with advantage under the eyes of the Court itself on the Peking-Tientsin section of the PekingChinkiang line. More valuable lines commercially would be those between Shanghai and Soochow, or between Canton and Fatshan. It might therefore even be desirable, in his opinion, to start the construction of two or three lines simultaneously.

In this shape the scheme was laid before the Imperial Government, and the proposal put forward that the experimental lines should be undertaken as Government work. Every care

taken to remove difficulties, to anticipate objections, and to meet the prejudices of the Chinese Imperial authorities. Special stress was laid on the fact that China was a land of vast resources; that materials of most kinds and labour of all kinds were to be had in the country. Chinese railways could, in fact, be built by the Chinese themselves.

The result, however, was preordained. Sir MacDonald Stephenson, in virtue of his credentials, and possibly of his high professional standing, obtained for himself a respectful hearing; but his memoranda shared a different fate, finding their way into pigeon-holes from which they have never been disinterred. The Government was impervious to argument, the fact being that, apart from all questions of prejudice, of which our own early railway experience should make English critics tolerant, the country as a whole was not conscious of the need of improved communication, and the officials were determined that railways, if introduced at all, should be introduced by the Chinese themselves when the need arose.

The last word had been spoken. With it ended a scheme which has often been criticised and more often scoffed at as the dream of a visionary. Yet such criticism seems hardly justified. Its author did not aim, as has been generally represented, at the immediate creation of a vast system. He urged experiments on an unambitious scale, and further development on proper lines as results might justify. As has been already indicated, his object was to prevent the repetition in China of the mistakes that had been made in other countries by haphazard development. And except that at times the routes of some of the lines were chosen without much regard to rivers and mountain ranges, due to lack of knowledge of the configuration of the country, and that it was proposed to put Peking in communication with India, an idea calculated to rouse the suspicions of the Chinese at the outset, the scheme, it must be admitted, was fundamentally sound.

The mistake Sir MacDonald made was, of course, in assuming the existence in China of the dangers he set himself to obviate. He almost seemed to overlook the fact that he was not dealing with a new country, but on the contrary with a country densely populated and in some respects highly developed a country of great distances in which trade routes and trade centres were, and for centuries had been, very clearly determined. It required no

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great railway expert to locate trunk lines. Their routes in most cases were obvious to the most superficial observer of the trade and geographical conditions of the country.

He also mistook the Chinese character and the temper of the official classes. The information at his disposal in England was not sufficient to enable him to form a just estimate of the circumstances of the time. His scheme, like that of the Shanghai merchants, was premature. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that there is much to be said for his contention in reply to critics, "that if a measure is sound and assuredly beneficial, as in this case it is admitted to be on all hands, it can never be premature to take the initiative step, advancing only from time to time as the opportunity may be afforded.” 1

1 Railways in China, by Sir MacDonald Stephenson (1864), p. 13.