their own goods in return, and with which the balance was accounted unfavourable. Besides these duties and prohibitions, the exportation of raw produce was prevented as much as possible, and that of wrought goods encouraged; the former by prohibitions or duties, and the latter by, not merely an exemption from duty, and drawback of such duty as might have been previously imposed, but sometimes by an absolute bounty paid on their exportation. The same ends have been sought to be obtained through treaties of commerce between different states; by which peculiar privileges, exemptions, and monopolies, have been conceded to the merchants and goods of one state in the markets of the other. Colonies, too, have been founded in distant countries for the same objects; with a monopoly reserved of the supply of their markets for the merchants and productions of the mother country.

Such has been the origin of the chief part of the intricate, complex, and senseless regulations which crowd the commercial codes of modern civilized nations, and harass industry in a thousand ways. But though the views and maxims of the exclusive or commercial system are absolutely groundless, and have for the most part been long since exposed, to say nothing of its having been sufficiently proved that mischief is the only result which can follow from acting on them, there are, nevertheless, still to be found individuals and nations who, from ignorance, prejudice, or interest, adhere in a greater or less degree to them, while the regulations themselves are suffered to continue with scarcely any relaxation in their strictness. National industry has grown up and accommodated itself to the artificial and unnatural position in which they have placed it, and cannot now without serious injury be abruptly returned to that free and wholesome position in which its energies would have been exerted with the best effect. The financial system, too, of most countries is intimately interwoven with and dependent on this artificial state of things. Hence, in many instances, such state of things has been perpetuated not only by the difficulties attending the change, but by the public revenue it affords. There are, however, means of raising a revenue sufficient for the public service without resorting to a system of restraint on industry, which

superadds to the burthen of taxes the mischief resulting from the restraint.

It has already been shown that it is absurd to attempt to enrich a country by a forced accumulation of money beyond the natural wants of the circulation; since, whatever be its quantity, its value, the only useful quality it possesses, must sink to and meet the level of the payments it has to make. Not only is it impossible to enrich a country by such an accumulation for this reason, but it is impossible also because the money itself cannot be procured from abroad except by an exportation of goods of an equal value to that which the money bears in foreign countries; while a depreciation in value taking place when brought home, a national loss must be sustained upon the transaction, equal to the depreciation. Neither can a country be impoverished by that exportation of its specie which takes place in the course of trade; because the goods it purchases and brings home are of higher value by the amount of the merchant's profit; for unless he gained a profit, there would be no inducement for him to undertake the trouble and risk of the adventure. The riches of a country do not consist in its gold and silver only, but in all those things which are useful or desirable, and that require some exertion to procure or to preserve. When such things are possessed in abundance by any people, they will not long be without as much of the precious metals as their circumstances require, or as is advantageous for them to keep. If the quantity of specie they possess be at any time more than sufficient for its uses, and a profit can be made by sending it abroad, it is quite as fit an object of exportation as any other, since the excess retained at home yields no advantage; and if it be merely a temporary excess, it will be sure to be brought back again when the returning wants of circulation shall again raise its value. The balance of trade cannot always incline one way. On the average of years, the balances of purely commercial transactions must meet each other, (losses excepted,) since neither the home nor the foreign merchant will part with their goods except for an equivalent. If the balance on the whole be more on one side than on the other, it must be occasioned either by the transport of capital for foreign investment,

or by the expenditure of revenue by governments or individuals out of their own country. It is equally impossible to prevent the export of specie and of capital. Spain, notwithstanding her prohibitory laws, for centuries supplied all Europe with silver. Great Britain, too, found it impossible by the severest enactments to prevent the exportation of its gold coin. Capital is still more easily exported. It may be sent not only in the shape of money, but in that of goods of all kinds. It is most usually exported in the shape of bills of exchange, which are ultimately liquidated by goods.

The natural wants and the artificial desires of the individuals composing a society occasion a demand for the products of industry, and direct the labour of that society into the different occupations in certain quantities or proportions to each other, according to the relative magnitude and intensity of these wants and desires. Industry, when left to itself, naturally flows into different occupations in this proportion, since their products are in request in this relation to each other, and because for that reason, such occupations are the most lucrative. Industry at least thus flows in that measure which the skill and capital of individuals enable it to embark in these occupations. The nature and urgency of the wants and desires of individuals can only be judged of by themselves; and when authority steps in, and says, that this particular product which you are about to create is less beneficial to you than some other would be, it interferes in a matter about which it cannot but be ignorant; and in preventing certain individuals from producing such products, it diverts part of the productive energies of the nation towards an object of less desire, and more or less unsuited to the wants and wishes of the people, at the expense of others of more urgent desire. It does this, too, in a greater or less degree, in proportion as it diverts industry more or less widely from the natural course which it would follow, if left entirely free.

But it may be asked, Is it not possible by authority so to regulate and direct the exertion of industry, as to render it more successful and more beneficial to the whole community than it would be if left to itself, and each individual were allowed freely to act as he pleased, regarding only his own personal and private

interest, and without reference to the public good? It must be confessed that this is possible. But the public good, as it is made up of the good of individuals, can only be promoted by promoting the good of individuals; and while each individual is advancing apparently nothing but his own personal interest, he is advancing likewise the general interest, except it happen that his exertions tend to the detriment of some other individual or individuals, as much as they tend to his own benefit. It is true, excessive competition in a particular business tends to the injury of the persons engaged in it; but this is not a public loss; because the low prices which this competition produces, are so much gained by the purchasers of the goods; and the advantage on the one side is as great as the loss on the other, while the saving is applicable to expenditure in other directions. Restrictive regulations in themselves produce no one article of wealth or any other effect, whether beneficial or injurious, except as they direct industry. If they operate at all, they direct industry into a course in which it would not otherwise flow. The real question then is, whether the artificial direction, which is thus given to industry, renders it more or less productive than it would have proved had it been left free to follow that path which individuals would have sought out for it. But why was it necessary to make any regulation or impose any restraint at all, if it had not been that the artificial direction of industry, although supposed beneficial to the public, was prejudicial to the individuals concerned in it? If legislative regulations were the expression of a knowledge of business more intimate, more profound, and yet more extensive, than that of the people themselves, they would in such case have a decidedly beneficial effect on both public and private wealth. If statesmen were acquainted with everything, and the agents of administration were always pure, they would do good by their interference with industry. But, independently of errors and abuses of administration, (the inevitable consequences of such interference,) it is impossible for governments to be so well acquainted with business, and the circumstances and capabilities of individuals engaged in it, as those individuals themselves. It is the constant study of every man to find out the most advantageous methods

of employing his capital and labour; and it may fairly be taken for granted, that every man in his local situation, and with his attention directed more especially to a particular department of business, sharpened too by the personal interest he has in the inquiry, must be able to judge, better than any statesman can do this for him, of his own capabilities, and in what way his capital and labour may be employed to produce, both as regards the time present and the future, the greatest return. If, however, the individual should not be acquainted with the best mode of conducting his business, still it is not necessary to make any compulsory regulation on the subject, and to visit him with penalties for his ignorance. It is sufficient merely to show to the workman, in a clear and intelligible manner, a better way of doing his work, and his interest, so far as he is able to act upon it, will infallibly determine him to adopt it. But if he is better acquainted than any other person with the best mode, then, to make any regulation, or lay any impost, that shall at all occasion a deviation from the course he would otherwise pursue, must, in almost every instance, deprive him of advantages which circumstances offer, and compel him to submit to disadvantages that might have been avoided. So far from statesmen having hitherto had more exact and comprehensive views of industry than individuals, and being better able to direct it in the most advantageous course, they have always been the dupes of interest and prejudice. The different classes have endeavoured by artifice and conspiracy to obtain legislative favour at the expense of the rest; and thus such interference has uniformly proceeded on erroneous statements, or false views of the nature of things, and false maxims built upon them. It was to be expected, therefore, as it has proved, that authoritative interference should produce nothing but mischief. As thus individuals must in almost every case be injured by restrictive regulations, it is easy to perceive that this circle of private injuries, in which all parties have been losers, cannot consist with the public good. The state, as made up of individuals, must be benefited or injured through the medium of individuals, and in the measure as the sum of individual benefits exceeds or falls short of the sum of individual injuries. If a man, in pur