wealth to characterize the subject and object of economical inquiry, coupled with a peculiar language adopted in its investigations, that much of the abstruseness of character which this science has appeared to possess, and much of the error which prevails respecting it, must be ascribed. Although terms may be well defined, it is difficult always to recollect the precise sense intended to be conveyed; their proper signification is often misapprehended or imperfectly understood; the reasoning, in consequence, is unsatisfactory, and fails to carry with it its full force of conviction. From this abstruseness of character of political economy, and the consequent fatiguing nature of its study, the minds of men have often revolted from that attentive examination of its doctrines which they deserve, and, from an imperfect apprehension of their reasonings, have sometimes discarded their conclusions altogether; while the partial errors which, from the same sources, have pervaded the science, errors which its infancy might have excused or palliated, have exposed it to ridicule, and brought it into contempt with the uninformed; a contempt too often fomented into hatred by ignorant prejudice and self-interest. Hence it is that society has failed to derive those eminent benefits from the science which it is so well calculated to confer.

From what has been now said, it will not perhaps be disputed, that the quality of value is wholly unsuitable to represent the qualities, the increase or diminution of which it is desirable for the purposes of economical disquisition to ascertain; and that an estimate so formed must necessarily be imperfect, because it represents a quality of no moment to the inquiry, while at the same time it wholly omits all those properties the increase of which constitutes its very end and object.

Since then, as we have seen, value is not a quality by which the products of national industry can be properly estimated, the appreciating of this quality being useless, except with reference to foreign exchange, it results, that the consideration of those circumstances which affect and determine the value of commodities in the different stages of their progress, and in the different changes of society, the discussion of which usually holds so conspicuous a place in economical writings,

must be accounted of subordinate importance, and be of use only with reference to foreign commerce.

It may perhaps be superfluous to notice that price is not a circumstance from which the estimate of production can be properly formed. The price of a commodity is the expression of its exchangeable value in money. It is not uncommon to speak of the price of a commodity in labour, or in some other commodities; but where this is not expressly mentioned, it is understood to be in currency. Whichever way it be understood, is immaterial; for, since exchangeable value itself cannot yield a just estimate, it follows that so neither can its expression of price, whether in money, labour, or goods.

The money prices of goods in any country and at any time, or the dearness or cheapness of gold and silver, depends on the power possessed of producing or purchasing these metals. A country which has no mines within its own territory, must, of consequence, purchase these metals from abroad; and therefore the power of such a country of purchasing in the bullion market depends on its relative means of producing with facility goods for exportation which are in request in that market. It is not enough for such a country to be successful in every branch of industry required for the supply of the home market: if it would have a suitable quantity of the precious metals, it must be able also to produce goods for exportation. Many countries possess a fertile soil, and the power of producing without difficulty a tolerable supply of necessaries and conveniences for their own people; but not having manufactures or other productions of small bulk and superior quality and value, suited for conveying to distant countries, their power of purchasing bullion is comparatively small. Now the precious metals, like every thing else, are a correct measure of value at the same time and place, and according as they are difficult of attainment, the value of all other things estimated by them, or their money prices, is low; while, on the other hand, in proportion as these metals are easy of attainment, the money prices of every thing else are high. In the countries to which allusion has been made, in which the power of purchasing bullion is

comparatively feeble, the value of money is high, and the prices of every thing else correspondingly low.

The higher price of almost every thing in Great Britain when compared with most other countries, is the consequence, in part, of its superior power of producing exportable goods, and of purchasing every thing in foreign markets; and, in part, of the high duties imposed on the importation of nearly every foreign production, which check the return from being made. in goods, and induce in a measure a return in specie. The general advance of prices of all articles in this country during thirty years, from the close of the American to the termination of the French war, is to be accounted for chiefly by the great start which England during that period had made in advance of other countries in improvements in the production of exportable goods, such as cottons, hardware, and many other kinds of exports, which obtained a preference in foreign countries, and gave a great increase of power in purchasing, both in the mining countries and in the world at large. While, on the other hand, the decline of prices since the period in question is to be ascribed, not only to the alteration in our currency, the consequent demand created for a large quantity of bullion, accompanied too by a partial suspension of the working the mines in America; but also to foreign nations having in a measure adopted our improvements, supplied themselves with some of these commodities, become competitors with us in other countries, and deprived us of the all but monopoly which during the war we possessed of the supply of the mining countries; they have been able to acquire some of these metals for themselves; and, consequently there, is, less left for us.

We pass from the consideration of value in exchange to that of value in use, or to employ a more simple expression-utility. The question then is, does the intrinsic utility of objects present that character which is suitable to be regarded, as forming the foundation, and indicating the results, of economical inquiries?

The quality of utility, or desirableness, must undoubtedly exist in every object, for the acquisition of which human exertion is made; because no rational being would labour for any

but such objects. But although utility or desirableness must be found in every thing for which men voluntarily undergo labour, yet, taken by itself, this quality cannot possibly either indicate the things which comprise the subject and form the object of political economy, or afford an estimate on which its reasonings may proceed.

If utility, taken by itself, were considered to express the subject of our inquiries, those useful things must be included which nature spontaneously furnishes in more than sufficient quantities, and the acquisition and preservation of which do not call for the intervention of any human being. The light, air, and water are not only of the highest utility, but even of the most indispensable necessity; their abundance may be regarded as natural opulence. Yet since for the acquisition of such things no labour is necessary, they cannot, consequently, come within the scope of those inquiries which have for their object to facilitate labour. In order to bring them within the province of our investigations, it would be necessary to add to the quality of utility or desirableness that of being procurable only by some sacrifice of labour or property. Accordingly, the quality of utility taken by itself, cannot express the class of subjects which constitute the science of political economy.

But if such things only are included to the acquisition of which labour is necessary, an estimate of the products of industry by their utility would still be wholly indeterminate and inappreciable. It would leave out of question altogether that most important consideration,-the relation which the utility of product bears to the cost of its production or acquisition. In adopting this quality to estimate the production of a nation, and leaving out of view the cost of acquisition, though the labour expended in the acquisition of the whole products of its industry were reduced one half, while the amount of utility of these products remained the same, this estimate would indicate nothing different from before; and though the condition of the people were thus bettered by one half, political reasoners, depending on such an estimate, would fail to know anything about it. But what is utility? It is not a quality of the article affirmed to be useful. It is not an attribute of the persons to

whom the article is cf use.

Like exchangeable value, it is an

abstract idea, a sort of relationship between the qualities of the article and the state of the individuals to whom it is of use. It is not a quality of the article; for it may have utility as regards some person, and none as regards another; it may be of use at one time, though not at another. If a person cease to be in want of the article, its utility is immediately lost, though all its properties remain the same. It is the circumstances of this person that are changed, and not the qualities of the article; which shows that utility is not a quality of matter. Length, and weight, and bulk, are material properties appertaining to objects, independent of other objects; they are invariable, and serve at all times as properties by which they may be measured, compared, and described. But utility is an immaterial quality, which cannot be definitely appreciated or compared, and has nothing about it to which, for the purposes of general appreciation, a measure can be applied. It is even worse than value. The affirmation of value is determinate; because we have always objects of comparison of definite appreciation. We say that an article is precisely of the value of so many pieces of coin; for, in fact, precisely so many, and no more, may be had for it. But we cannot say the same of utility: we cannot affirm that an article has precisely the same utility as another article, except it be identical with itself; much less can we state the exact fractional parts of another article to which its utility may be equal. Neither is utility always susceptible of comparison. In similar objects, utility may be compared; thus we may compare the utility of bread with that of meat; or one sort of clothing with another sort. But in dissimilar objects this is impossible. How can the usefulness of a tool be compared with that of a garment? and how is it to be determined that the one is more useful than the other? There are no tangible points of comparison between them. Utility is a quality which is for ever varying; not by a change in the article itself, but by a change in other things. As therefore it has reference to the state and qualities of other objects, utility can only be employed as the standard of estimation by bringing these other objects into account. Without this, it expresses nothing