derogate from the dignity of your Lordships' House in any respect whatever. I ought almost to apologize for saying this, because I do not think I can possibly be mistaken in the conclusion I have arrived at, that your Lordships to a man will be at one with me on this point. Your Lordships can have no privilege-no notion of artificial dignity or importance-which you would desire to stand in the way of the due administration of justice. The name and shadow of the appellate jurisdiction of this House is utterly unimportant, unless it can be shown that the substance of that jurisdiction ought in the public interest to be maintained. I feel assured that I rightly interpret your Lordships' opinion, judging from what has occurred in this House, when I say that your Lordships long ago came to the conclusion that any improvements which can on solid grounds be shown to be desirable your Lordships will willingly make, although they may involve some diminution of the exercise of judicial power in the name of the House. At the same time, I agree that all proposals of this nature should be carefully scrutinized by your Lordships, and I am most willing that those I now submit to your Lordships should undergo the strictest examination."

After a further brief review of past schemes, Lord Selborne proceeded to explain the proposed constitution of the new Court. "I propose," he said, "that there shall be five ex-officio members-the Lord Chancellor, who shall be the head of the Court, and the heads of the four Divisions of the High Court-namely, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron. In that way there will be a representation of the Court of First Instance in the persons of the principal Judges, who will also belong to that Court. In addition, I propose there shall be a number, not exceeding nine at any one time, of ordinary Judges, who in the first instance will be obtained in this way :-The two present Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery, the four salaried Judges of the Privy Council, who were appointed under the recent Act in the contemplation of a future Court of Appeal, and three Judges to be transferred from the present Courts of First Instance, who are permanently to serve in the Court of Appeal. I need not say that whatever Government may have to carry out such a measure would endeavour to select from the Courts of First Instance some of the most able and experienced Judges. The reason for fixing the number at nine is this:-The Acts under which the three Election Judges and the four Privy Council Judges are appointed are not permanent Acts; and, as to the Privy Council Judges, any power of appointing an additional Judge would, in the natural course of things, cease this year. It was not contemplated that so large a number would permanently be required; and, as this may well happen also with the new Court of Appeal, it is thought right not to make nine an inflexible number, though at present it is desirable to take advantage of the existence of these Judges. In addition to these ex-officio and ordinary Judges, it is also proposed that her Majesty shall have power to appoint as additional Judges

of the Court of Appeal any persons who have filled any judicial office in England which would qualify them to be members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or who may have filled the offices of Lord Justice General or Lord Justice Clerk in Scotland, or Lord Chancellor or Lord Justice of Appeal in Ireland. Such appointments would be made with their own consent, and not otherwise. I hope and believe that those who have discharged the duties which would qualify them, and who have strength to enable them still to render useful service, would not refuse to give their assistance in the new Court of Appeal as additional Judges. I should not myself stand here to ask your Lordships' assent to such a proposal without being ready myself to serve in such a capacity, if her Majesty should think me worthy of the honour, when I cease to be Lord Chancellor. That is the proposed constitution of the Court of Appeal. It is proposed that its decisions shall be final, and that the only appeal from the High Court shall be to that Court. It is proposed at once to transfer to it the Admiralty and Lunacy appeals which now go to the Privy Council; and it is proposed to enable it to sit in divisions, with not fewer than three Judges in each, so that it may overtake and dispose of all the business. However great it may be, such a number of Judges will doubtless be able to transact it. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council remains, and, with respect to it, the only constitutional point to be borne in mind is this:-Appeals from the Colonies and from India go to her Majesty in Council, and it has always been the custom for the decrees and orders of the Court to be issued in her Majesty's name, the assent of her Majesty being given in Council. But Parliament has passed Acts regulating these appeals, so far as relates to the hearings, and there is no part of her Majesty's foreign possessions in which any exception has ever been taken to the regulation of these appeals by such Imperial statutes. What I propose in this Bill is not at once to remove the appeal business of the Judicial Committee to the new Court, because it might possibly be thought reasonable to see the working of the new Court for a short time before that is done; but since this jurisdiction, in a constitutional point of view, is with the Queen in Council, it appears to be an unexceptionable mode of proceeding to empower her Majesty, if she think fit, to transfer the appellate jurisdiction now exercised by the Judicial Committee, in other than ecclesiastical causes, to the new Court of Appeal. I do not propose to touch the subject of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; it is one sui generis, standing apart, and the prospect of passing this measure would not be increased by any needless interference on my part with ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Judicial Committee will remain to advise her Majesty upon any non-judicial questions which may be referred to it, and, as far as my proposition goes, it will remain to determine ecclesiastical appeals under the present law. If her Majesty should exercise the power which I shall ask the House to confer upon her, all the other judicial business of the Privy Council would be transferred to the new Court of Appeal. It is

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convenient it should be so, because if we are to have the services of these four Judges appointed for the business of the Court of Appeal, it is manifest we must provide in the first instance for the discharge by them of those duties for which they were specially appointed to the Judicial Committee, and the two systems will be most conveniently combined if we have the whole business brought together. Furthermore, the provision made by the appointment of these four Judges for the judicial business of the Privy Council is only a temporary provision, and unless Parliament should think fit to amend the Act of 1871 by giving additional powers to her Majesty to provide for that business, it must soon fall into its former condition, and necessitate fresh legislation."

The new Bill met, on the whole, with general approval. The only serious objection raised emanated from the practising members of the Equity Bar, nearly all of whom publicly expressed their alarm at an arrangement by which the Court of Chancery was apparently deprived of its controlling power and converted into one of four co-ordinate tribunals. It was urged that, although all Courts will henceforth have power to provide the proper remedy for every wrong, the great majority of the present Judges, forming three Divisions out of four, must be expected to prefer the system to which they have been accustomed, and that they would be exempt from the interference which the Court of Chancery has hitherto in certain cases exercised very beneficially.

Acting as spokesman of this feeling, Lord Cairns proposed and carried an amendment to the effect that the Lord Chancellor should preside over the Second Division, which was to consist of the Judges in Equity; and when the Bill was returned to the House of Lords, he favoured the re-insertion of this amendment, which had been struck out in the House of Commons. Lord Westbury, though afflicted by an illness which proved fatal in the summer of this year, intimated his approval of the Bill. In the House of Commons it was introduced by the Attorney-General.

Yielding, to a fanciful scruple, the Lord Chancellor conceded that the House of Lords should still be the Court of Appeal for Scotland and Ireland, and that ecclesiastical appeals should be, as at present, decided by the Judicial Committee. After the Bill had passed the House of Lords, it was discovered that neither Scotland nor Ireland was so far enamoured of Home Rule as to prefer an ancient Court of Appeal, which had been discarded by the rest of the empire as obsolete, to the most efficient tribunal which Parliament had been able to devise. In deference to what seemed the opinion of all parties interested, and to the judgment of the House of Commons, the Ministers undertook to modify the Bill by including Scotch and Irish appeals among the subjects of the new appellate jurisdiction; but, as soon as their purpose had been announced, Lord Cairns called the attention of the House of Lords to an alleged breach of privilege which the House of Commons would be committing if it were to suppress the residuary judicial functions of the House of Lords. He

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argued that the Bill was not intended to interfere with the jurisprudence of Scotland and Ireland, while the Lord Chancellor had himself said that it would be undesirable to change the existing system in Scotland, and had added that there were constitutional objections to sending Scotch and Irish appeals to an English Court. While the Bill was passing through this House, all the occupants of the Treasury Bench expressed their opinion against there being only one Court of Appeal for causes from all the three kingdoms, yet project was now being attempted. This was a clear, palpable, and most serious infringement of the privileges of their Lordships' House, as any measure which affected the jurisdiction of that House ought to commence there, and ought not to be altered elsewhere. This principle had been established on many occasions. It was absolutely necessary to bring this matter forward now, because neither House submitted its privileges to the decision of the other, and if the Bill came up containing that which was objectionable it must be laid aside and could not be considered, and that was a course which he did not wish to adopt, as he had too much goodwill towards the measure as it was sent to the House of Commons.

The Lord Chancellor, in replying, expressed his regret that there should be a disturbance of the harmony which had hitherto prevailed respecting this measure. He regarded this discussion as inconvenient, and declined to go into what was taking place in the House of Commons. He was not in favour of the proposal to bring up appeals from Scotland and Ireland, but remarked that that proposal did not emanate from the Government, and was not approved of by them until they were satisfied that public opinion in Scotland and Ireland was in favour of the change. The question of privilege, he added, had never occurred to the Government; but the matter should be looked into, and he asked their Lordships not to contemplate taking an extreme course with the Bill.

On Lord Cairns' assertion of privilege forming the subject of argument in the Commons, "As far as I am concerned," said Mr. Gladstone, "I have no doubt there ought to be one final Court of Appeal for the three kingdoms; and I have also no doubt, after listening to the very manly statement of the right hon. and learned gentleman the member for the University of Ireland (Dr. Ball), there will be one Court of Appeal for the three kingdoms, and that the just claim of Ireland has received a recognition which I believe will be permanent and effectual at the proper time, whether it be found practicable or not to give effect to it during the present session. I think it only just to say so much in answer to what has fallen from the right hon. and learned gentleman. There has been no difference expressed among the speakers to-night with regard to the supposed privilege, which has threatened to be an impediment to our proceedings, and for my own part, all reflection confirms me in the conclusion that that privilege is as purely visionary as any claim in the history of Parliament that ever was set up. On the other hand, those who share that opinion agree with the Govern

ment in thinking it is not desirable we should enter into controversy with the other House of Parliament upon the subject. It has been our desire to frame our course with reference to this principle —it might be, if the House of Commons were weaker than it is, it could not afford to pass by an occasion when its rights are challenged; but it is because it is strong in the breadth and depth of its popular base, as well as in great historical traditions, that we come freely to that conclusion which the public interest dictates as the best, on the whole, with reference to the circumstances before us, and do not trouble ourselves about the question—what observations or criticisms may be made upon the apparent surrender of rights, which, if we had thought fit, we might have proceeded to urge?"

Mr. Disraeli commented on the singular fate attending the Billthat, though supported by the leading men of both sides, it should fall into serious difficulties at this late stage. This he attributed entirely to the vacillation of the Ministry, whose mind was not yet made up as to what course they would take. With regard to the question of privilege, Mr. Disraeli said it was not his place either to assert or deny it, but he severely censured the mode in which Mr. Gladstone had met it. First he had vehemently denounced it, then he had yielded to it with fatal, not to say pusillanimous, facility. If the House of Lords ever did advance the privilege, the existence of which had been asserted (for what had happened amounted to no more than that), the House of Commons would be involved in disgrace and discomfiture if it had no better arguments to rely upon than the precedents cited by Mr. Gladstone. These precedents, Mr. Disraeli maintained in a long and elaborate analysis of them, had no force or application, and he concluded by a vehement condemnation of Mr. Gladstone's conduct in allowing an important legislative measure to be modified and endangered on the mere rumour of a claim of privilege.

According to the most approved precedents, the claim of privilege was certainly unfounded; but the fate of the Bill depended on Lord Cairns, with an eager majority of the House of Lords awaiting his signal; and the Government, which had, fortunately, not yet introduced the proposed amendment, wisely deferred to a power which it could not directly resist. It was far better that the Judicature Bill should pass into a law, than that it should, as an abortive project, be somewhat more complete.

About the same time Mr. Hardy obtained the unanimous assent of the House of Commons to a proposal that Ecclesiastical Appeals should be transferred to the Supreme Court. It happened by an odd coincidence that on this point the opinions of secular legislators coincided with the wishes of the extreme advocates of clerical independence. The sound and dispassionate judgments of the Judicial Committee, which have hitherto preserved the Church of England from disruption, have confirmed the conviction of intelligent laymen that articles of conformity are most safely committed