trained strike forces went forward, the KPA would break the deadlock. When asked about the Americans' ability to land troops behind the North Korean frontline, Kim answered "we estimate that presently, a US counterattack is not possible; they do not posses sufficient troop support, and therefore a landing in our rear ports would be difficult."21

The North Koreans believed in a quick victory and also had a tendency towards adventurism. Chai reported that North Korean leaders had initially not planned on US intervention and had predicted victory within a month. Even after the US entered the war, they repeated the slogans "solve the problem before 15 August," and "August is the month of victory." We can see from their mobilization of large groups of technicians and students for military service and their serious waste of manpower and financial resources that the North Koreans had decided to "put all their eggs in one basket." Chai returned to China on 10 September to deliver his report, and after his return to Pyongyang, told Kim, on Zhou's order, that he hoped the North Korean army would consider a strategic withdrawal. Unmoved, Kim answered only, "I have never considered retreat.'

22

The North Koreans were thus not prepared to invite the Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe disagreements between China and North Korea concerning the state of the war and strategic planning. After the successful UN landing at Inchon, however, the situation changed completely. The Chinese leaders felt that sending troops to Korea was already unavoidable.23 When Zhou met with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin and Moscow's military attaché on 18 September he asked first about the situation in Korea, complaining that except for what they read in the newspapers and heard from Pyongyang Radio, the Chinese leaders knew nothing about the war situation. Even the Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang was unable to receive reports concerning the progress of the war. Zhou also pointed out that he had little contact with North Korean leaders regarding military matters and that the Chinese leadership did not even understand the basic strategies of the KPA. China had once attempted to send a high-level military mission to observe the developing situation, but to date, Pyongyang had not responded. Zhou suggested that if the KPA did not have sufficient reserve troops, they should withdraw their main forces north and establish reserve assault forces. They

mendation that the main force of the People's Army should withdraw north.

On 21 September Liu Shaoqi again reported to Roshchin that the CVA's morale was high. If necessary, they would be willing to fight, and they were confident they could defeat the American armed forces. Chinese leaders believed that if the US threatened the existence of North Korea, the Chinese would have to aid their Korean comrades. On the same day Zhou told Roshchin that except for being told by Kim that "the Korean people were prepared for a long war," Beijing had received no further information from Pyongyang.25 Although Stalin's personal representative to Pyongyang, General Matvei V. Zakharov, had urged Kim to seek Chinese aid,26 it was only a week later, on 28 September, that the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party called an emergency meeting to discuss the issue. After heated debate, the Politburo unanimously decided that once Seoul fell, there would be no way to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel, and if they did so, it would be impossible for the remnants of the KPA to offer any effective resistance. Faced with imminent defeat, North Korean leaders unanimously agreed to send formal letters to Stalin and Mao requesting direct military assistance from the Soviet Union and China. Despite Stalin's explicit warnings to Kim in April that he would not send Soviet troops to Korea if the Americans intervened, North Korean leaders nonetheless first turned to Moscow.

Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim Il Sung asked Soviet Ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject of requesting Soviet troops. Shtykov avoided his question, and a "confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate" Kim Il Sung and his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong swallowed their pride and sent the letter to Moscow. 27 Stalin replied on 1 October that the best plan was to send the CVA, after first consulting with the Chinese.28 With no other choice, Kim urgently summoned the Chinese ambassador late that night and requested that China send the 13th Army Corps, which had already been deployed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean war effort. 29

Two factors led the North Korean leaders initially to refuse direct military assistance from China. The first was Kim's excessive confidence in his estimates of the military situation. The second was the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs, which gave North Korean leaders

cause for alarm. For these two reasons, Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war. Even after Chinese troops entered the war, these two issues would continue to strain Sino-Korean relations.

Creating a Unified Sino-North Korean Command

Due to the difference of opinion between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships as to whether to send Soviet air force units to provide cover for Chinese troops, the dispatch of Chinese forces to Korea was repeatedly delayed. However, Mao's personal commitment to the cause never wavered.30 When Zhou went to the Soviet Union to discuss the issue of military equipment and air cover, the Chinese and North Koreans were already discussing specific issues concerning Chinese troop deployment. However, because of the pressing situation, the two sides had not yet had time to discuss command, communication, re-supply and transportation, much less arrive at an agreement on these matters.

On 8 October, Mao informed Kim Il Sung that China had decided to send troops, and asked that Pak Il-u meet with Gao Gang and CVA Commander Peng Dehuai in Shenyang to discuss the various issues involved. At dusk that day, Pak arrived in Shenyang, and on Kim's orders, urged the Chinese to send troops immediately to control the areas of Hamhung and Sinuiju, an intervention necessitated by the continued escalation of the American troop presence. He also specified that the CVA would use only North Korean currency while in the DPRK, for which they would be reimbursed later according to the exchange rate. Their firewood would be purchased by the local North Korean governments, and supplied to the Chinese army according to market price. Pak explained that Kim Il Sung was then in Tokchon, and that he was of the opinion that the CVA command should be established there. The issue of joint command for Chinese and Korean forces was thus raised. According to Chai's observations, Kim's initial thinking was rather simplistic. Considering the urgent circumstances, he believed that since he had asked China to send troops to help the KPA, the power to command those troops would naturally belong to Korean leaders. Only after receiving word that China was preparing to send several hundred thousand troops to Korea did he understand the enormity of the situation. He then realized that it was not feasible to have Koreans command the CVA, and suggested that the two sides merge their command structures.31

Naturally, Peng saw the situation differently. First, Stalin had clearly stated in his telegram of 1 October that "the CVA must naturally be commanded by Chinese leaders."32 Second, their experience in Korea made the Chinese question the North Korean command capability. In his report to the Central Military Commission, Peng stated:

The Korean Party's recruitment situation is extremely serious. All men between the ages of 16 and 45 have been inducted into service. No one is caring for the families of drafted workers, and the masses have nothing to eat. There are no long-term plans, and adventurism

is all one can see! Military control has been extremely childish. On the nineteenth Pyongyang issued an order to defend to the death. As a result, 30,000 defenders could not escape [from advancing UN forces]. The North Koreans agreed to conduct party and political work in the KPA, but they have not agreed to construct a political commission system.

After the Shenyang meeting, Peng Dehuai exclaimed to Chai Chengwen, “I have a responsibility to the Chinese and Korean people, and to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers!"33 In Peng's view, there was simply no question of giving North Koreans control over Chinese forces. He did not even understand the views the North Koreans advocated concerning the command of their own troops. The KPA's main force had already been routed, and new troops were currently organizing and training in China. It was impossible for them to participate directly in military maneuvers. This was not the time to point out such facts, however, so when Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai met for the first time on 21 October, neither leader raised the issue of a unified command structure. During their discussions about how to coordinate the actions of their two armies, Kim agreed to send Pak Il-u to serve as Peng's liaison officer.34 On 25 September, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formally appointed Pak as Assistant Commander of the CVA, Assistant Political Director and Assistant Secretary of the Party Committee. 35

With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified control of the two armies gradually reappeared on the agenda. During the first campaign, Peng repeatedly reported that the lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Koreans caused confusion over language, problems with Chinese unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the obstruction of roads from party, government, army, and civilian withdrawal, as a result of which "the CVA's ability to fight has been hindered."36 Of special importance were the many incidents in which the Volunteer Army was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops. One such incident occurred on 4 November, when the 39th Volunteer Army encircled the US 24th Division southeast of Pochon. There they were mistakenly attacked by a KPA tank division that had been ordered to proceed to Sunchon, and the US forces were consequently able to escape. Re-supply and transportation efforts were also hampered by a lack of coordination.37

Because of such problems, Peng asked the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang to raise the issue of a coordinated command structure with Kim Il Sung, hoping that the KPA would relocate its headquarters closer to the CVA. Since Shtykov supported Peng's suggestion, Kim on 7 November reluctantly agreed to the Chinese proposal to open new fronts in the enemy's rear areas. He accordingly decided to send the Bang Hosan and Choi Inyang Army Corps behind enemy lines. However, although Kim continued to send advisers to act as liaison officers and trade intelligence, he did not agree to relocate the army's headquarters or to establish any kind of unified command. Kim disregarded Peng's personal letter

The unified command would report and make suggestions to the North Korean government-based on the actual situation and the needs of the war-concerning rear mobilization work, supplemental training, and the reestablishment of local administration in Korea. The unified command would be responsible for clearing all news items concerning the war and distributing them to the Korean news agency, which would publish them in the name of the general headquarters of the KPA.

After Kim returned to Korea, he met with Peng again on 7 December in a very friendly atmosphere to discuss specific matters. The two leaders agreed to set up a unified command structure within several days, and Kim guaranteed that there would be no further interference in the military command. He also accepted the Chinese suggestion to abolish the previously deployed 3rd Army, and ordered them to merge with the Volunteer Army 9th Group.45 Peng was satisfied with the situation and repeatedly pointed out that "the bravery and stubborn spirit of the People's Army and its strict military command system are worthy of study." He ordered the cadres of the 9th Military Group to study and learn from the situation of the Korean 3rd Army Corp, in order to "relay realistically the experience of the Chinese army in political and local work." But should conflict arise with the established Korean system, the Chinese army "should not be harsh and unyielding."46

In early January 1951, Stalin's envoy to Beijing, Semen Egorovich Zakharov announced that two divisions of the Soviet air force had recently entered Korea, and were providing two lines of air cover from Jian to Jiang Jie, and from Andong to Anju. In addition, by early April, the Chinese planned to send five air force divisions, and three Korean air force divisions were already participating in the war. Consequently, the Chinese expressed a desire to create a unified air force command structure. After consultations, a Sino-Korean unified command structure was established based on the coordinated command structure.47

Thus, under pressure from Moscow, China and Korea were able to resolve the issue of joint command of their armed forces. Unlike the joint command of US and UN forces, which had been accomplished smoothly, the unified command of Chinese and Korean forces was only accomplished with great difficulty. The Koreans were concerned about national sovereignty. Korea's long-standing relationship with China as a subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the command of their army very difficult for them to accept. For the Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military power and in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage. Thus, from a realistic viewpoint, it was essential to place the joint command in the hands of the Volunteer Army.

The Debate Over Advancing South of the 38th Parallel

After the CVA's victorious second campaign, which pushed the front line toward the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai requested permission for his forces to regroup. He reported to Beijing that due to the recent victories, the Korean Work

ers Party, the North Korean government, as well as the army and the people were all in high spirits and looking for a quick victory. "The Soviet ambassador has said that the American army has retreated and [he] wanted our army to advance quickly. This was not only the attitude of the Soviet ambassador, but also the request of the majority of comrades in the North Korean Party." Peng, however, believed "the Korean campaign was still difficult and long-term. Because the enemy had shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy and the front lines had shortened and narrowed, enemy military power had become more concentrated, which benefited the UN forces." Though enemy morale was lower, they still had approximately 260,000 soldiers and would not retreat from Korea. Consequently, he urged that the CVA "adopt a plan of gradual advancement."48 For political reasons, however, Mao overruled these suggestions and ordered the volunteer forces immediately to launch the third campaign and cross the 38th parallel.49

50

With regard to tactics, Mao approved Peng's recommendation to advance gradually and agreed that after crossing the 38th parallel, the main army forces (including the KPA) should withdraw several kilometers to rest and regroup. Peng's forecast proved accurate. Although the third campaign resulted in the KPA/CVA advance across the 38th parallel and the capture of Seoul, UN forces managed to carry out an orderly retreat. Thus, although the Sino-Korean army captured some territory, it did not inflict many casualties on the enemy. On 3 January 1951, Peng informed Kim Il Sung by telegram that the enemy had quickly retreated after its defenses had been broken, and the victory was therefore not very meaningful. Only 3,000 troops were captured. If the enemy continued to escape southward, the KPA/CVA would pursue them to Suwon and await orders, Peng explained. The third campaign would pause to reorganize and re-supply after Seoul, Inchon, Suwon, and Hongchon were taken. If the enemy mounted a heavy defense of Seoul, the CVA would not launch a strong attack, since conditions were not yet favorable. Mao relayed Peng's decision to Stalin. 52 Because the CVA was exhausted, like an arrow at the end of its flight, and "the enemy is trying to lure us into a trap along the Naktong River and lure us into assaulting its fortified position," on 8 January Peng ordered the advance to halt. This decision left the North Koreans extremely dissatisfied, and they strongly opposed it. In light of the lessons learned from earlier setbacks during the war, Kim agreed to regroup for two months after crossing the 38th parallel, but in his heart he still hoped to claim a quick victory. He was diplomatic, however, always pushing Pak Hon-yong and the newly appointed Soviet ambassador V.N.Razuvaev to the forefront. The day the attack halted, Kim told Chai Chengwen that the process of regrouping and reorganizing should not last very long, that one month should be sufficient. If too much time passed, he explained, the rivers and rice paddies would begin to thaw, hampering troop movements, while the enemy was attempting to slow the pace of the war in order to rest their forces and re-supply.54

51

Kim was prepared to meet with Peng to discuss the

issue, and Peng agreed to send a telegram with Kim's proposal to Mao immediately. The CVA commander nonetheless maintained that his army had to regroup and rest.55 On the morning of 9 January, when Zakharov was informed that the CVA and KPA had already stopped their advance, he expressed his objections, stating that he had never heard of any victorious army in the world not pursuing its enemies and not taking advantage of victory. This halt would give the enemy a chance to catch its breath and would thus squander the advantage that had been won. Even after listening to a patient explanation by Nie Rongzhen, Zakharov held to this. opinion." At this point, Stalin resolved the issue by sending a telegram stating that in order to avoid international condemnation of China, the CVA should remain north of the 38th parallel and its two coastal regions, while allowing the KPA to continue its southward advance. Mao immediately relayed this message to Peng."7

On the evening of 10 January, Chai Chengwen accompanied Kim to Peng's headquarters, where Peng analyzed their military situation, emphasizing that their forces needed to regroup so that, after full preparation, they could destroy even more of the enemy during the next campaign. Kim agreed to regroup for one month. Peng thought that pushing the enemy right now might force them to relinquish a little more territory. But prematurely forcing them into a narrow region around Pusan would not help to divide and conquer the UN forces. Kim argued that even if they could not exterminate the enemy, it was still important to expand territory under CVA control. Peng replied that exterminating the enemy was better than expanding territory, because after the enemy army was destroyed, they would naturally gain territory. Kim, however, held his ground, arguing that it would be beneficial to have more territory and additional population under KPA control when the post-war elections and peace settlement took place. Peng replied that it was not necessary to consider this; the most important thing at present was to win victories and annihilate the enemy. Since the two could not agree, Peng showed Kim the telegram from Mao Zedong on the ninth. Kim still would not give ground, however, claiming that he was not expressing his individual opinion, but the collective opinion of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party. To reinforce this point, Kim called Pak Hon-yong to join the meeting."

58

On 11 January, Peng received an emergency telegram from Mao concerning Kim's proposal to shorten the rest and reorganization period. Based on Stalin's telegram, Mao suggested that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th People's Army Corps be deployed at the First Corps' line south of the Han river, while the CVA would withdraw to Inchon and north of the Han river, to rest and reorganize for two or three months. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon and Seoul and the KPA would be re-supplied with the soldiers training in northeastern China. If Kim felt it was unnecessary to re-supply and reorganize the Korean troops, they could continue their advance and the North Korean government could directly command their movements. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon, Seoul, and the areas north of the 38th

Parallel.

That day at dusk, Peng Dehuai, Kim Il Sung, and Pak Hon-yong had a very heated debate. Kim and Pak thought that Stalin's idea of sending the KPA ahead alone was a sign that they held the advantage, and that the American troops would retreat from Korea. Pak mentioned several recent news items and intelligence reports provided by the Soviet Union indicating that the US army would soon withdraw from the Korean peninsula. The enemy would, however, not leave unless the Sino-Korean forces pursued them, Pak maintained, because they needed an excuse. Peng retorted that if the Chinese and Koreans did not pursue, the Americans could still withdraw on their own, with a perfectly good excuse. Pak stated once more that unless they pursued the Americans, the UN forces would not withdraw. China and Korea should utilize the internal contradictions of the American capitalist class, Pak declared. Peng replied that it was only after SinoKorean forces had destroyed a few more US divisions that these contradictions would deepen. Only after the CVA had regrouped could it continue to fight.

Kim intervened at this point, repeating his idea of sending the 3rd Volunteer Army Corps south within half a month, then sending the remaining forces forward after a month's rest. Losing patience, Peng raised his voice and emotionally declared that their ideas were wrong and that they were dreaming.

In the past, you said that the US would never send troops. You never thought about what you would do if they did send troops. Now you say that the American army will definitely withdraw from Korea, but you are not considering what to do if the American army doesn't withdraw. You are just hoping for a quick victory and are not making concrete preparations, and this is only going to prolong the war. You are hoping to end this war based on luck. You are gambling with the fate of the people, and that's only going to lead this war to disaster. To reorganize and re-supply, the Volunteer Army needs two months, not one day less, maybe even three [months]. Without considerable preparation, not one division can advance south. I resolutely oppose this mistake you are making in misunderstanding the enemy. If you think I am not doing my job well, you can fire me, court marshal me, or even kill me.

Basing his remarks on a telegram from Mao, Peng Dehuai told Kim that the CVA would be responsible for all coastal defense, rear maintenance, transportation, and defense from north of the line between Inchon and Yangyang. "The 4th Army Corps, consisting of about 120,000 men, has already had approximately two months' rest. Command them yourself; let them advance south as you see fit. If the American army really does withdraw from Korea as you think, I will happily exclaim 'long live the liberation of Korea.' If the American army does not withdraw, the CVA will go ahead and attack south as planned." Under these circumstances, Kim had no choice but to admit that because the KPA was not pre