coffee. [...] Comrade Macuch dwelt upon the Korean situation, and described all the main shortcomings that had been noticeable in the development of the DPRK's economy and that still existed in many places. [...] for instance, he related how senselessly industry had been developed in the DPRK; in his view, what was most characteristic of this was that the Hungarians and the Czechoslovaks were building plants of completely similar type and capacity in Kaesong and Huich'on respectively, even though the DPRK's demand for the machines produced there could be abundantly met by just one such factory. In his view, the Korean leaders are thinking of long-range plans for exporting machines to the South-east Asian countries. In his view, this plan will continue to lack any real basis for a long time. They have built many factories where they cannot provide the workforce, the skilled workers, the engineers, etc. There are also frequent disruptions in the supply of raw materials because they have neglected the development of the mining industry [...]. Although the 3rd Congress of the Korean Workers' Party had already dealt with these mistakes, they set such guidelines for industrial development that they could not prevent [the repetition of] the earlier mistakes. Later, the CC plenums held in August and December finally modified the earlier plans, and instead of new industrial projects, they resolved to enlarge already existing ones and improve their technical standards. In addition, they are laying more and more emphasis on improvement of living standards, for there are still serious problems in this field.

As far as he knew, Comrade Macuch said that in South Korea the population's living standards were higher, which was made possible by the fact that the substantial aid given by the USA provided employment for the industrial workers in certain branches of light industry, and by the fact that they did not invest as much in industry as was the case in the wartorn DPRK. In his view, peasants also live better in South Korea, for there is more and better land at their disposal, and they use much more artificial fertilizer-800,000 metric tons in 1955, as opposed to the DPRK's 125, 000 metric tons of course, this does not mean that the South Korean population lives well, it merely lives relatively better than the population of the DPRK.

[...] Comrade Macuch said that the Americans were doing their best to curtail the influence and authority of the N[eutral] C[ontrol] C[ommission]. Various disturbances and provocations are constantly occurring in the border zone; for instance, recently Rheeist provocateurs came over to a border village, killed the chairman of the cooperative, and kidnapped several youths. In Comrade Macuch's view, it is not right that the press of the DPRK does not deal concretely and publicly with these and similar cases but always writes merely about the "Syngman Rhee clique," the "gang," the "traitors" etc. (To our knowledge, the press did write about that border incident; Comrade Macuch was misinformed in this case.) In his opinion, this formulation is not right, for the South Korean population also keeps an eye on it, and the latest elections also showed that more than half the popula

tion supported Syngman Rhee. It would be more sensible if the attitude of the government of the People's Republic of China toward Jiang Jieshi and other leaders active on the island of Taiwan became a lesson for the DPRK. Recently, the following policy is being pursued there: they [the GMD leaders] are called upon to return home [...]. In our opinion, the DPRK cannot completely follow the Chinese example in this field, for the greater part of the population [lives] in South Korea, and conditions are entirely different.[...]

The question obviously also took Comrade Pelishenko by surprise. Nonetheless, he briefly gave the following answer: He is convinced that the peaceful unification of Korea will take place in a historically short time. He repeatedly emphasized in a historically short time, and by that he meant that it would not unite today, tomorrow, next year or in a few years but rather in the course of the worldwide triumph of the socialist idea. The existence of the socialist world system led by the Soviet Union, the rapid expansion of popular movements of [national] liberation in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Latin American states, and the unprecedented anti-war mood and desire for peace of the world's peoples were all facts which made possible the worldwide triumph of the socialist idea in a historically short time, Comrade Pelishenko stressed.

In our opinion, the Korean leaders may harbor the idea that the division of Korea was caused by the Soviet Union, and, thus, its unification also depends solely on it. Comrade Pelishenko certainly became aware of that. This is why he emphasized that Korea would unite in a historically short time-thus, he practically referred to the fact that the history of the division of Korea had been related to the objective historical events that happened in the last stage of World War II.

The dialogue described above consisted of just one question and one reply. Comrade Yi Chu-yon tacitly acknowledged what had been said by Comrade Pelishenko.

Károly Práth Ambassador

DOCUMENT No. 13

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001711/ 1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

DOCUMENT No. 12

Information Report Sent by Károly Fendler to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, "Conversation with Comrade Kim, Interpreter of the Korean Embassy", 30 October 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 006373/1959. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík, D. Min. Károly Szarka.

On the evening of the 28th [...] I met Comrade Kim, the interpreter of the Korean Embassy with whom I have long had friendly relations. During the conversation, Comrade Kim mentioned the following:

[...] The head of the IVth Political Department [of the North Korean Foreign Ministry] told them that the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party "considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country." [emphasis in the original] In reply to my question Comrade Kim said that they "are considering accomplishing it in the '60s", then called my attention to the increasing discontent in South Korea, which had been further aggravated recently by extremely great damage from a typhoon. In what follows he said that this very assessment had induced the Korean comrades to convoke the Supreme People's Assembly, the latter having passed the resolution and letter already known to us. For the time being the Embassy is fully occupied in working up the documents of the session, their Center [the Foreign Ministry] charged them with making it known as widely and actively as possible [...], to such an extent that even the staff of the commercial branch agency is carrying out tasks related to it. [...]

Károly Fendler

official in charge of Korea

On 10 December the [East] German Ambassador had a dinner party on the occasion of his departure. [...] I had a conversation with the Korean head of the Korean-Chinese Armistice Commission. I asked him whether the international détente was perceptible in Panmunjom too. He told me that it was not, because the Americans dropped perhaps an even larger number of agents behind North Korean lines than they had done before. The general expounded that they would soon put an end to the provocations of the Americans, because they "would unite Korea next year." Then he spoke of the unity and correct policies of the Korean Workers' Party as if it were the guarantee of the unification of the country. The general was obviously in a state of intoxication. Interestingly, the Polish member of the Neutral [Nations Supervisory] Commission was of the opinion that at present, the Americans were "silent" in Panmunjom.

[.....]

Gábor Dobozi

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

DOCUMENT No. 14

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001660/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] on 16 December I paid a visit to [Soviet] Comrade Yulin. During the conversation, several issues came up, on which I give the following information:

Comrade Yulin told me that the December plenum of the [Korean] Workers' Party had placed very healthy proposals on the agenda, and it also appeared to the Soviet Ambassador that this plenum had actually begun to correct the errors committed in the last years. He agreed with me that the most important resolution had been one that dealt with the rapid development of mining. In his opinion, mining should have been developed earlier, because that would have largely solved the problems which have cropped up in the supply of raw materials and in foreign trade. With regard to that, the issue of North Korea's foreign trade problems came up. Comrade Yulin mentioned that it caused very great difficulties in Soviet-Korean relations that the Korean comrades could not

send goods in return for [the goods they got from the Soviet Union], although the Soviet Union asked Korea for goods which every country gladly exported (e.g. vegetables, fruits, canned food). He made mention of the fact that supplying | Siberia with vegetables presented a very great problem to them [the Soviets], and they wished to import a large part of the needed goods from Korea. He told me that as regards the trade agreement for 1959, the Soviets had already met their obligations one hundred percent, whereas the Koreans had only met 56 percent of their obligations.

In the opinion of Yulin, most of the mistakes noticeable in the DPRK are attributable to one thing, namely, the exaggerated national pride of the Korean people. The mistakes made in the economic field also derive from that, for the Korean comrades are loath to adopt the experiences of other countries. They do not ask for advice, and they go their own way. He told me that after the 21st Congress [of the CPSU], Khrushchev had had a long discussion with Kim Il Sung in Moscow. Kim Il Sung set forth the data of their first Five-Year Plan and the targets of the coming years. Comrade Khrushchev did not agree with this plan, and made clear that these plans were not realistic, because they lacked an economic base. One could not base such a huge plan solely on the dynamism and enthusiasm of the workers, Comrade Khrushchev said. He censured the Korean comrades for taking no account of the possibility of cooperation with the other fraternal countries, and for wanting to produce everything by themselves. It was particularly inappropriate, Comrade Khrushchev said, that the DPRK wanted to make preparations for the large-scale production of tractors and trucks. At that time, Comrade Khrushchev's opinion was disregarded and Kim Il Sung maintained that they were able to fulfill the plan. Khrushchev told him that they [the Soviets] also wished to fulfill their Seven-Year Plan in five years, but if that was not possible, one had to acknowledge it. Kim Il Sung explained the production of tractors and trucks by saying that their agriculture was badly off, it was urgent to equip it with tractors and trucks, but, due to their very limited export potential, they were not able to import the latter.

Comrade Yulin told me that they had noticed several times that if the Korean comrades borrowed some experience from the fraternal countries, they were loath to speak about it. He cited as an example that the resolution on the reorganization of local industries had been patterned after a Chinese one, and when the Soviet comrades made mention of that, they [the North Koreans] declared that "this is not a Chinese experience, we carry it out on the basis of our own ideas."

On 1 October this year, Khrushchev again met Kim Il Sung on the occasion of the Chinese national holiday. Following the December plenum, it appears to them [the Soviets] that the talks were not unsuccessful, and certain changes are indeed noticeable. On this point Comrade Yulin mentioned that the Soviet government, though it had been aware of the inappropriate economic policy [of the North Korean leadership], decided to help the DPRK with everything. They follow the principle that if they [the North Koreans] want to solve the problems by themselves, they should realize the

mistakes on the basis of their own experiences. In what follows he told me that the Korean comrades did not inform them either about the measures they intended to take. [Similarly to the Hungarians,] they [the Soviets] also learn of their resolutions and plans only after these have become accomplished facts. Recently, all they could do was subsequently warn the Korean comrades that the elimination of boards in the ministries had not been appropriate. They still regard it as inappropriate, and they do not consider the explanation given by the Korean comrades acceptable, for the work of the boards was taken over by the ministries' party committees. The Korean comrades argue that the party committees include the ministers, deputy ministers, assistant under-secretaries and departmental heads, and, thus, they do not need to discuss the same task in two places [...].

Comrade Yulin regarded the extension of the powers of the provincial, city, and district party committees as the curtailment of professional one-man management. [...]

Comrade Yulin informed me that at the December plenum, Comrade Kim Il Sung had also dealt with the work of the Korean press and the self-conceit of party members. Comrade Kim Il Sung sharply criticized the press for often attaching great importance to issues of lesser importance, writing articles [about such issues] for days on end, and thus misleading public opinion. He also subjected the self-conceit of party members to sharp criticism. He emphasized that it was a very important task to accustom party members to modesty. With regard to the press, Comrade Yulin also told me that they had a lot of difficulties, because the Korean press did not deal much with Soviet issues. They often prefer "their own little events" to great international events. For instance, while the world's press devoted whole pages to the reports that dealt with Comrade Khrushchev's visit to America, the Korean press published nothing, or just very short news [...], about it. It was only the intervention of the Embassy that ensured that subsequently the Korean press dealt appropriately with the visit. [...] I told him that we had also experienced similar phenomena; for instance, the Korean press hardly wrote anything about the 8th Congress [of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] in the first days.

We also spoke about the Koreans returning from Japan. Yulin told me that until now, the Korean Red Cross and the Soviet shipping company had made agreements for three ships. They will bring home approx. 3,000 Koreans [...] the South Korean government did its best to prevent their repatriation. [...] from 13 December on, a state of emergency was declared in South Korea, and the navy was put on alert in case there would not be any other way to prevent the arrival of the repatriates' ships in North Korea. The captain of the first ship declared before sailing that if the ship were attacked, they would regard that as an attack on the flag of the Red Cross and also as an attack on the Soviet flag. According to the Seoul T'ongyang news agency, on 14 December the American commander of the UN troops stationed in South Korea gave an order that prohibited the UN soldiers stationed in South Korea from participating in any action directed against the repatriates. He also instructed the South Korean Minister

The large-scale return of Korean citizens from Japan goes on. [...]

Of the repatriates, those fit for work found jobs without exception. A large number of young people enrolled at colleges and universities. [...]

The technical experts who have returned from Japan are held in high esteem. Their wage-level substantially exceeds that of the other skilled workers and engineers, and in several plants they earn wages that are higher than those of the factory manager. It is beyond doubt that in many cases, the standard of their craftmanship is higher than that of the skilled workers trained in Korea [...]. It is questionable, however, whether this difference is proportionate to the difference between the wages.

Those who have returned from Japan usually enjoy great privileges over other Koreans. Almost every repatriate was given a comfortable flat in a new building. They do not pay for the flat or the electricity. In the first months they get food and heating for free. In order to improve their food-supply, the competent authorities adopted a resolution about the establishment of special goods departments, where only repatriates can shop, in several stores in Pyongyang [...]. These departments are better supplied with goods than the other departments of the stores. To the knowledge of the Czech and Romanian comrades, prices are also lower in these departments. The privileges described above also include the fact that in the cities, the repatriates do not pay fares on public transportation.

When we discussed the aforementioned with the Soviet, Czech, Romanian, and Mongolian comrades, they unanimously declared that they refused to believe that the privileged status [of the repatriates] made a good impression on the Korean workers. Sooner or later, they will raise the question whether it is justified to favor the repatriates in terms of supply and wages to such a large extent. [...] such voices are already heard.

The Korean workers particularly often say that if so many people return home, they also include a number of people

***

DOCUMENT No. 16

Information Report Sent by Lajos Karsai to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, "Visit of Korean Provisional Chargé d'Affaires Paek Chong-won," 27 June 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 005061/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík,

1st D. Minister János Péter, D. Minister Károly Szarka,

Assistant Under-Secretary Márta Kolozs, Departmental Head János Radványi, Departmental Head Péter Várkonyi.

On 23 June of this year [...] I sent for Comrade Paek Chong-won, the DPRK's Provisional Chargé d'Affaires in Budapest.

[...]

With regard to the South Korean [emphasis in the original] situation, Com. Paik Chong-won made the following evaluation:

The leading elements of the South Korean mass demonstration of April were composed of students and the urban petty bourgeoisie. In essence, the workers and peasants did not voice their opinion. The slogans were just political ones. The main thrust of popular wrath was directed against Syngman Rhee, and Syngman Rhee indeed fled from it.

The reasons for the non-appearance of the workers and peasants in April were the following:

1.) There is no Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea. The working class lacks a vanguard, either in a legal or an 2.) The South Korean working class does not constitute an illegal form. The revolutionary guiding force is missing.

organized force, partly because of the absence of the party, and partly because of its divided character. In South Korea, industrial enterprises employing no more than 20-30 workers make up 95 percent of all...industrial enterprises.

3.) The peasantry is also divided. At present there are 2.2

million peasant families registered in South Korea, and 70.5 per cent of them own no more than 1.5 chongbo (approx. 1 Hungarian acre) per family. In South Korea, the oppression of the peasantry takes place primarily in an indirect way, that is, through the landlords. Therefore, the main thrust of peasant discontent is directed against the landlords instead of the government. [...]

Since 1 May, a qualitative change has taken place in the South Korean mass protests. According to the news, workers' strikes have become increasingly frequent. Their main demands are the observance of the eight-hour workday and rising wages. All kinds of parties are mushrooming, and they are demanding new parliamentary elections in addition to the new presidential election. The masses (now even the workers and the peasants) are pressing for punitive measures against Rheeist officials. A mass movement to take the Rheeist murderers to task is in the making in South Korea. Its initiators are the relatives of the slaughtered. [...] The movement started in Koch'ang district.

So far the Korean Workers' Party and the government of

the DPRK have not supported any of the South Korean parties, they are just following their activity with close attention. [...] The transitional government, though it is barely different from that of Syngman Rhee in its composition and aims, no longer emphasizes the military unification of the country; it prefers unification through so-called "free elections" under UN supervision. "As is well-known, the government of the DPRK cannot agree with the idea of [holding] all-Korean elections under the aegis of the UN while it is in essence at war with the UN," Com. Paek Chong-won emphasized. Then he went on to say the following:

Now more and more people in South Korea are pressing for the establishment of postal, travel, economic, and cultural contacts between the South and the North. This mainly results from the fact that since the April events, more and more people in South Korea are listening to the North Korean broadcasts directed toward South Korea.

South Korean parliamentary elections are due to be held this July. Of the 233 seats in parliament, Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party has hitherto occupied 150 seats. In April, 110 Liberal deputies resigned their seats in the wake of the events. The recently formed South Korean Renovation Party has begun to voice remarkable slogans:

On my part, I in

formed the Comrade Ambassador of the DPRK's Seven-year Plan and certain economic issues related to the June visit of

Comrade Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my other related reports). Concerning the latter issue, the Ambassador confiden

tially told me that according to the information received from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, Comrade Khrushchev is going to visit Korea around 810 September. Concernhe referred to Comrade ing the Seven-year Plan,

Kim Il Sung and informed Source: National Archives me that the objectives of

that plan will naturally be

higher than that of the five year plan in order to achieve greater effect among the South Korean masses.

During the informal and friendly conversation that lasted for several hours, the Ambassador expressed the following:

Lately, there has been a certain palpable hidden difference between the views of the Chinese and the Soviet com

rades, especially concerning the interpretation of the slogan of peaceful coexistence and the issue of people's communes. To his knowledge, in the past the CC of the Chinese Communist Party had already pointed out some excesses and deficiencies in relation to the organization of communes. Despite this according to the information he received