stuck with the Afghan leader: “who can we work there if not with Najib?"

Washington's (and Islamabad's) unwillingness to cease military assistance to the mujaheddin as part of a Afghanistan settlement added to the frustrations of the Soviet leader, as Chernyaev's notes of Gorbachev's conversations demonstrate. Najibullah's far-flung proposals for joint operations against Pakistan, and Gorbachev's references to fall-back options notwithstanding, the Kremlin chief remained committed to withdrawal from Afghanistan “without fail.” Though massive economic and military aid from the USSR continued through 1991 (as Gorbachev promised Najibullah as late as 1989), the last Soviet military units departed Afghanistan in February 1989.

The documents printed below illuminate Soviet policy not just toward Afghanistan but offer fascinating insight into Moscow's dealings with the subcontinent as a whole, particularly the dynamic of relations among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Particularly striking in this regard is Gorbachev's 20 July 1987 conversation with Najibullah about joint retaliatory actions by India and Afghanistan against Pakistan. To cover the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and relieve pressure on the Kabul regime Najibullah suggested the "risky” idea of provoking serious "disturbances" in the border regions of Pakistan in case India launched “a preventive attack, as a sort of demonstration, on Pakistan. Not to occupy its territory but as a show of force." According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev "unceremoniously ridiculed" such suggestions, yet at the time, according to the transcript, Gorbachev's response was far more equivocal. 10 The release of additional documentation from the Gorbachev Foundation and other archives will help to further clarify the broader regional context of Moscow's policy in Afghanistan.

Christian Friedrich Ostermann is the director of the Cold War International History Project.

NOTES

I owe thanks to Samuel F. Wells Jr., James G. Hershberg, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Gary Goldberg for contributing to this introduction and document edition.

2 The conference—one in a series of “critical oral history” conferences being organized by CWIHP and its partners on key Cold War flashpoints-followed an earlier meeting on the Soviet invasion and the fall of detente in the context of the multi-conference “Carter-Brezhnev Project,” sponsored by the Norwegian Nobel Institute and Brown University's Watson Institute for International

Studies in October 1995. For further information and documentation see CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 133-184.

3 The full conference document reader, "Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan,” is available at the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the original Russian and other archival documents are accessible at the CWIHP/National Security Archive collection (Russian and Eastern European Documents Database (READD)) at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. (Contact Svetlana Savranskaya at the Archive by phone: 202-994-7000, fax: 202-994-7005, email: Svetlana@gwu.edu).

"For prior CWIHP publication of documents on the Afghan War, see Odd Arne Westad, "Concerning the Situation in 'A:' New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," CWIHP Bulletin No. 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 128-132; for further documentation, see ibid., pp. 133-184.

'See James G. Hershberg, “The War in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra Affair: Missing Links?" Cold War History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 2003), pp. 23-48.

"Gorbachev, quoted in Chernyaev's notes of CPSU Politburo meeting of 23 February 1987, printed below. 7 Ibid.

8 Gorbachev, quote in Chernyaev's notes of Gorbachev's meeting with Najibullah, 20 July 1987, printed below.

Gorbachev, quoted in Chernyaev's notes of CPSU Politburo meeting of 21-22 May 1987, printed below. 10 Chernyaev, My Six Years, pp. 161-162.

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 29 May 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. Concerning Afghanistan. We've replaced [Afghan President Babrak] Karmal with Najib[ullah]. But this is not a "fait accompli," but a justified action on our part. How are we behaving? [USSR] Ambassador [Fikryat A.] Tabeyev told Najib point blank: “I made you the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA)] General Secretary." It's time to recall him since he's acting like a governorgeneral. Tabeyev is, of course, a serious, important person, but it's time for a change together with a change of policy.

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 25 September 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Have a secret exchange of opinions with the Pakistanis about expanding the Kabul government with exiles.

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 13 November 1986' (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. Intuition advises [me]-something is threatening [us]. I'm afraid we've lost time! We've become accustomed [to the situation]. Why?—“a war is going on, it's business as usual, life goes on." "A strange war!"-they'll soon stick this term on us.

Comrades, once you adopt a policy you need to follow it. After all, this is war! We've been fighting six years already! Some people say: if you act this way it can go on 20 or 30 years. And it will be so!

People ask: what are we doing there-will we be there endlessly? Or should we end this war? Otherwise we'll disgrace ourselves in all our relations.

The strategic objective is to conclude the war in one, maximum two, years and withdraw the troops.

[President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Andrei] GROMYKO. Admits that there was an underestimation of the social conditions and all the other circumstances when "they agreed to military support" of Karmal. He proposes turning to the King (who is in exile in Italy)2 and persuade the Americans to [make] joint efforts, go to London, and get in touch with Pakistan.

The main thing is to halt the war and withdraw the troops. This will be necessary-we will conclude a treaty, etc.

[KGB Chairman Viktor M.] CHEBRIKOV. There won't be a resolution by military means; it's necessary to step up a search for political solutions. Najib has never been in Moscow but we met Karmal five times at a high level. This circumstance is in Karmal's favor among the opposition. We need to invite Najib and decide everything with him.

[Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] SHEVARDNADZE. We need to end the war. And we need to have talks everywhere to do this. We should designate a time for the withdrawal. If we do not, the talks will fall apart.

Our comrades, both here and there in Afghanistan, can't get used to the idea that we are dealing with a sovereign country at all. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of Defense nor other agencies have gotten used to this. Therefore things haven't worked out according to our design: let Najib himself decide everything.

We need to give him full freedom of action.

GORBACHEV. We have set a clear goal: help speed up the process so we have a friendly neutral country and get out of there.

[Fmr. Soviet Ambassador to the US and head of CPSU CC's International Dept. Anatoly] DOBRYNIN. We need to have an "Afghan Reykjavik.” Give Najib freedom of action (...)

GORBACHEV. Why is this issue on the table again? Why are you all not doing this? Why? In what office have they made decisions which contradict Politburo decisions?!

But we have a concept. We approved it at the Politburo. There is no implementation of the concept.

Seemingly turns to [Chief of Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei] Akhromeyev: they climbed in - they didn't calculate, they embarrassed themselves in all directions. And they could not use military force in a real way. And now it is necessary to climb out (...) We need to climb out!

AKHROMEYEV. (Makes a brilliant report.) In 7 years in Afghanistan there is not one square kilometer where a Soviet soldier has not trod. But he ought to go, as the enemy is coming, and he will restore everything as it was.

We have lost the battle. The majority of the Afghan people right now are with the counter-revolution.

We overlooked the peasantry; they got nothing from the Revolution. Eighty percent of the country is in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. And the situation of the peasants there is better than in government-controlled territory.

GORBACHEV. In accordance with the policy adopted in October 1985 a clear goal has been set-to speed up the process in order to have a friendly country and leave. But all our actions in all avenues-political, diplomatic, economic-have not given us any forward movement. And Karmal's policy was simple: sit and rule and leave the fighting to us.

They panicked in Kabul when they found out we intended to leave.

We replaced Tabeyev in order to let them know that we are oriented toward Afghan independence. But what happened? Again we are doing everything ourselves. Our people are only trained for this. They tie Najib's hands and feet. In a word, the implementation of the concept is going badly, but we need to get out of there.

But two points need to be clearly kept in mind:

1) Leave there over a period of two years; 50% of the troops per year.

2) Expand the social base of the regime; a real distribution of political forces in the leadership is necessary to do this. And have them stew in their own pot with all their eastern pluralism.

Deal with their entire Politburo. Approach Karmal and even those who consider one another bandits, although 80% of them are.

Put the issue of our withdrawal to them sharply and name the procedure for the withdrawal: 50% the first year, 50% the second.

Engage in direct talks with Pakistan since there are 3 million Afghans there who fled the country. It could be a

mess.

(...) We don't want socialism there. And the US will not climb right in with military force if we leave.

If there are no American airfields, military bases, etc. in Afghanistan, then what? Let the Afghans themselves deal with the rest.

AKHROMEYEV confirms that the US will not go into Afghanistan with troops.

GORBACHEV. Therefore we need courageous decisions and to involve the Americans in our policy.

Invite Najib in December.

We're creating a Politburo group on Afghanistan for two years, headed by Shevardnadze [and] including Chebrikov, [Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai V.] Talyzin, [Chairman of the State Committee for the AgroIndustrial Complex Vsevolod S.] Murakhovsky, [Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei] Sokolov, and [former Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Fikryat A.] Tabeyev.

He turns to [Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir] Kryuchkov: Is it an ordinary matter to withdraw troops once you have deployed them? Yes! But since no one objects. So do you see? We have agreed.

***

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 21-22 January 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

SHEVARDNADZE. Najib makes a very good impression, but not everyone supports him, even in the leadership. Some comrades are vacillating. But he speaks correctly when he says he has no other people. He has taken the initiative into his own hands. I think that the mujaheddin3 chiefs have mis

calculated in refusing to talk. The country's economy is in ruins.

Little remains of the friendly feelings toward the Soviet people which existed for decades. A great many people have died and not all of them were bandits. Not one problem has been solved to the peasantry's advantage. The government bureaucracy is functioning poorly. Our advisers' aid is ineffective. Najib complains of the narrow-minded tutelage of our advisers.

I won't discuss right now whether we did the right thing by going in there. But we did go in there absolutely without knowing the psychology of the people and the real state of affairs in the country. That's a fact. And everything that we've done and are doing in Afghanistan is incompatible with the moral character of our country.

GROMYKO. It's incompatible that we went in?

SHEVARDNADZE. And this, too. The attitude toward us is more negative than it seemed to us.

And we're spending a billion rubles a year for all this. An enormous sum, and responsibility needs to be taken for it. And count up again in every detail how much Afghanistan costs us at the present time. [Soviet Premier] Nikolai Ivanovich [Ryzhkov] doesn't have such data right now. But in the United States they think we'll need 2 billion a year and the Japanese think 3 billion. I'm not talking about the lives of people.

GORBACHEV. We won't talk right now about how this revolution came into being, how we reacted, and how we vacillated about whether or not to deploy troops.

GROMYKO. Yes, yes.

GORBACHEV. Right now we need to proceed from what we have at the present time and what steps need to be taken.

GROMYKO. I agree with the description of Najib...

Probably with Najib's consent some kind of coalition government agreeable to us needs to be created...It would not be suitable to the pursuit of our new policy to recall our advisers.

RYZHKOV. The report by Eduard Amvrosiyevich [Shevardnadze] gives a realistic picture. Previous information was not objective. The situation forces us again to approach the problem in a serious way. Nothing needs to be simplified. Najib's personality is important, of course... But...

GORBACHEV. Each village there is full of such personalities.

RYZHKOV. It's an illiterate society. The Revolution led to a worsening of the people's situation. We need to pursue a firm policy of getting out of there in two years. It's better to pay with money and kerosene, not with men. Our people don't understand what we're doing there. Why we have been there seven years.

It is easy to leave, [but] we can't just throw everything to the whims of fate. Many countries would forsake us. We need to take steps so that, when we leave, affairs proceed toward the creation of a neutral, friendly Afghanistan.

What steps should be taken? An army. Why not a paid army? What will prevent it from deserting? - Good money. They don't believe in slogans (...) Generally speaking, I would not reject the idea of a mercenary army out of hand.

It is better for us to hand out weapons and ammunition. And have them fight themselves if they want to. Actively guide a parallel political settlement. Everything needs to be used: contacts with Pakistan and with the US.

[Yegor] LIGACHEV. We cannot bring them freedom by military means. We have suffered a defeat in this cause. And the information of Eduard Amvrosiyevich is the first objective [information], although it is grave. We didn't consider the consequences and set our hopes on the military way. I think the policy of national reconciliation is correct.

If the question is put before the people: is it better to let our people, our soldiers die, or to give every kind of aid? I think that every person to the last man will favor the second path.

And to work on the Pakistani avenue, with India, with China, and with America. But to leave like the Americans did from Vietnam-no, we still have not come to this, as they say.

[Marshal Sergei L.] SOKOLOV. The military situation has recently become worse. The shelling of our garrisons has doubled. They are fighting mainly in villages, counting on our not retaliating against population centers.

It is impossible to win such a war by military means. The first task is to force the Afghan leadership to actively bring the program of national reconciliation to the population. If this does not happen, the army will be of no use.

The Afghan army has cost us 3.5 billion rubles. And another 1.5 billion [rubles] are planned for this year. They have everything they need to fight.

In 1986 the 40th Army lost 1,280 men.

To analyze economic aid: they are asking for three times more than they need. Yes, we ought to help. But there must be a benefit. In 1981 we gave them 100 million [rubles] in free aid. And it all stayed with the elite. In the villages there is no kerosene, [there are] no matches, nothing.

CHEBRIKOV. We discuss the Afghan issue more than any other. The comrades have analyzed it well. It's as if we've received much new material. But if we lift the documents, all of this has already been described.

There are no [new] findings about the situation. Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev], you've been telling this to Karmal.

GORBACHEV. Thus, we confirm our firm policy. We will not retreat once we have started.

Act in all avenues. Seriously analyze where and how to use our aid, and start up foreign policy mechanisms through [UN Special Envoy Diego] Cordovez and Pakistan. Try to do