Sri Lanka, T. Sri Abraham. He passed on to Abraham information supplied by Service A of the FCD, and the latter expressed unfailing interest in this. Thus, at a regular meeting on 10 January 1981, the agent passed on information on a US plan covering a 20-year period to establish its domination in the Indian Ocean to the detriment of India's interests. Abraham saidthat he would discuss this information with E. Gonsalvez, the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was due to visit Sri Lanka on 12 January.

Conveying information in this manner is termed 'the method of special positive influence.' It involves passing slanted information of various kinds and content, and disinformation, in conversations designed to influence governments, parties, individual political, public and state personalities, through agents, foreign confidential contacts, intelligence officers, and agents or cooptees of Soviet nationality. 'Special positive influence' presupposes continuous work for the purpose, constant study of its results and of the reaction to the measures which are taken.

The KGB carried out Active Measures jointly with the Hungarians, who were in operational contact with a prominent Indian journalist in Vienna; they supplied him with KGB disinformation materials, which he published in the press under his own name.

Another agent of the Hungarians, codenamed 'OTTO PALMA,' was used to convey slanted information to government circles of Western countries. Service A themes were sent to the Head of the Disinformation Department of Hungarian Intelligence, Josan, for action.

KGB Residencies in Pakistan, India, and Iran were instructed to react to any press reports of gastric diseases and to inform the Center with a view to discrediting the US as part of a complex Active Measure codenamed 'TARAKANY' [Cockroaches]. This was designed to discredit the American bacteriological laboratory attached to the Lahore medical centre and its personnel, and was a continuation of the operation to compromise the US and NATO over chemical and bacteriological weapons. In 1980-82, items appeared from time to time in the press of India, Iran, Bangladesh, and Lebanon, alleging that preparations were in hand in Pakistan for bacteriological warfare and subversion against Afghanistan, Iran and India, with the involvement of American specialists. ["]Cases of intestinal diseases in humans in the area of Pishin, Surkhab, Muslimbagh and adjacent districts of Afghanistan, and of cattle plague and infectious diseases in Western districts of India (in the states of Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan) were caused by the migration from Pakistan of people and animals infected by American specialists. Through the seasonal- and often encouraged - migration of cattle-raising tribes from Pakistan to Afghanistan, Iran, and India, carriers of new types of mass infection could be infiltrated into these territories; this, according to the schemes of the Americans and Pakistanis, would promote anxiety, chaos and disorders in these countries.["]

[“] In Iran, a rumor was spread that in Pakistan the Americans were using fellow Shiites as guinea pigs to study

the effects of new chemical and bacteriological products on humans, as a result of which many either died or were crippled. The Pakistani regime's decision to allow the Americans to conduct such experiments on human subjects was evidence that the Pakistani leadership was conscious of the danger which the local Shiites represented, and therefore decided to rid itself of a potential internal enemy.["]

[“] In these same countries, steps were taken to inspire applications to the World Health Organization, urging it to set up a commission to investigate the activities of American specialists who had turned Pakistan into a testing ground for experiments on human subjects and animals, using products which were part of the chemical and bacteriological arsenal.["]

["] In Kabul, there were press, radio and television references to the exploitation of Pakistan's territory to conduct. dangerous experiments to develop methods of bacteriological warfare against Afghanistan, Iran, and India.[”]

[“] In Dakha, a number of newspaper articles demanded an investigation into the true nature of experiments conducted by American specialists in the country, under the aegis of the International Center for the Study of Intestinal diseases and in cholera hospitals in Dakha and other cities. ["]

The KGB succeeded to mold public opinion against the American bacteriological services in these countries. The head of the bacteriological laboratory was expelled from Pakistan. The Indian government cancelled a joint Indo-American commission on healthcare and an Asian conference on intestinal diseases which were to take place in India.

The Karachi 'Daily News' of 11 February 1982 printed a report from its Washington correspondent about the Pakistani authorities' expulsion of an American, Dr. David Nelin, the leader of a group of scientists from Maryland University attached to the Lahore medical center. Nelin stated that his expulsion was the result of intrigues by his Pakistani colleagues. The American said that his ill-wishers included Professor Aslam Khan and Brigadier M A Choudri. The KGB instigated the dispatch of protest letters to World Health Organization headquarters ostensibly from Pakistani medical scholars, and anti-American articles with fierce condemnations were planted in many countries.

In February 1982, the Soviet 'Litterary Gazette' published an article by I. Andropov under the heading: 'An incubator of death.' This replayed KGB disinformation materials about the Lahore research center.

'Pravda' of 27 February 1982 reported that the Indian authorities had cancelled a meeting of the joint Indo-American commission on health care and the Asian conference on intestinal diseases. It linked this with facts about the activities of American specialists in Pakistan and Bangladesh who were studying the effects of new products and conducting experiments related to the development of biological weapons. According to the 'Patriot' newspaper, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs intended to hold an investigation into the activities of American scientists and doctors in India. The Bangladesh authorities were also thinking of examining what the so-called international research institutes, such as the

one headed by Dr. Nelin in Lahore, were up to in the country. (Note: 'Patriot', a weekly journal, was controlled by the KGB Residency in Delhi.)

The Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn' of 23 February 1982 reported a meeting between representatives of the US's National Health Institute, Paul Ahmed and Douglas William, and Pakistan's Minister of Health, Dr. Nasiruddin Jogezai.

This led to the production of the following press release:

["]In connection with the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr D. Nelin for conducting dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American medical delegation has gone urgently to Islamabad. in order to hush up the scandal which has blown up unexpectedly over the Lahore medical research center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to disclose what researches are carried out by the Center. The American delegation is headed by Paul Ahmed and Douglas William. The sudden appearance in Pakistan of a group of American medical specialists provides confirmation that Washington fears that their dangerous experiments with new biological components of weapons of mass destruction will be exposed, and it confirms the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue their dangerous experiments, in view of the probable use of the new weapons against India, Iran and Afghanistan.["]

In May 1982 reports date-lined Islamabad appeared in the Indian press about the deployment of American chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.

"According to information obtained from local military sources, chemical reagents have recently been brought to Pakistan from American chemical weapon arsenals located on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and in Japan; these are to be stored in areas close to Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. As for the characteristics of these reagents, according to the sources they are similar to those used previously by the Americans during the Vietnam war. According to the same sources, the build-up of US chemical and bacteriological stocks in Pakistan is designed for potential use by American rapid deployment forces in the broad region of South and South-west Asia.

An understanding between Washington and Islamabad on the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the territory of Pakistan was reached as far back as August 1980, when the agreement on the activities of the American bacteriological service in Pakistan was officially extended. Item 2 of Article 5 of that agreement in particular gives the Americans the right, through the US's International Development Agency (USAID), to review the results of the work periodically and to put forward proposals for its modification. In practice, this means that the Americans exercise complete control over all aspects of research in Pakistan on the development of new types of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons. This formulation gives the US the possi

bility of determining unilaterally that it is essential to stock up and use chemical reagents on Pakistan territory. Clear confirmation of this can be found in the widely known facts relating to the activities of the Lahore Medical Centre, where American specialists were engaged in developing new forms of bacteriological and chemical weapons."

Published items of this kind were picked up by TASS and reprinted in the Soviet press; the press cuttings were filed with the original disinformation material. To some extent they eclipsed reports in the Western press about the Soviet Army's use of chemical weapons against the Afghan people. The Soviet propaganda services denied such reports, attributed their publication to American pressure on the Western press, and blamed the Americans for the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

The KGB Resident in Pakistan, Akim, was awarded a testimonial by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov for the 'TARAKANY' Active Measure.

The Active Measures work of the KGB Colombo Residency in 1977-81, and that of the Resident, Grinevich, himself won a positive assessment: the Resident made skillful use of intelligence means and methods, the whole operational staff of the Residency was involved, and the output of agents was substantial. The 'Lanka Guardian' and 'Tribune,' periodicals controlled by the Residency, won high praise.

In 1980, the KGB leadership was told of 13 Active Measures carried out by the Residency. A complex operation to strengthen the international standing of thegovernment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and to develop a positive attitude to the work of Karmal within the Sri Lankan government and public won approval. The operations helped to moderate criticism of the USSR by Sri Lankan representatives and by the press with regard to the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In 1980, 5,000 leaflets were disseminated in Colombo in the name of a fictitious organization, the ‘Union of Muslim Youth,' in support of the Karmal government and condemning the actions of the US and the PRC against the DRA. The same aim was pursued through meetings, seminars, resolutions and conversations of influence.

Through the possibilities of the 'Sutra' Agency, a session of the Sri Lankan National Center of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress (ABPC) was arranged to condemn the policy of China and Pakistan, and to press for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Arrangements were made for sending letters of protest to the PRC Embassy, for an operation codenamed ‘OMICRON' against the Chinese in Sri Lanka, for leaflets exacerbating the schism between Albania and China, for anti-American posters, and appeals in favor of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

With the help of agents, a Sri Lanka-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee was set up: this was used to organize mass meetings in towns to condemn interference by the US, the PRC and Pakistan in the affairs of the DRA, and to support the revolutionary reforms in that country. It also organized

letters of protest to President Zia-ul Haq and to the Pakistan government's daily newspaper 'Dawn.' The letters. condemned the CIA's activities in Pakistan and interference by the US and China in the affairs of Afghanistan.

["]In Colombo and Kandy, seminars were held to criticize interference by imperialist forces in Afghanistan; many slanted conversations were held in the entourage of President J.R. Jayewardene and Prime Minister Ranasinha Premadasa, in leading circles of the ruling Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the criminal activities of mercenary groups sent into Afghanistan from neighboring countries. Conversations of influence were held among political, state and public figures in Sri Lanka with the aim of influencing the position of Jayewardene towards Afghanistan and the surrounding area. Through agents, influence was exerted on trade union and religious organisations to induce them to adopt resolutions and declarations expressing support for the USSR's policy in Afghanistan. Favourable articles on the Afghan issue, based on briefing from Service A of the KGB FCD, were printed in the 'Tribune', the 'Lanka Guardian' and the bulletin of the Sri Lankan Centre of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress.["]

In June 1980, the following disinformation was conveyed to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo:

["]In the view of French diplomats, Zia-ul Haq's policy towards Afghanistan amounts top laying dangerously with fire. Further delay in establishing direct contacts with the new regime in Kabul will have tragic consequences in Islamabad. India views Zia-ul Haq's policy of playing a leading role in the Muslim world with suspicion, and will not put obstacles to a change of regime in Pakistan. The US no longer believes in the durability of the government and seeks to establish undeclared contacts with the opposition.["]

["]At the same time, it was suggested to Pakistanis in Delhi that there was a real possibility of normalizing relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the so-called Durand line frontier, and that by delaying normalization Pakistan was

missing a favorable opportunity.["]

["]Taken together, this all moderated the negative attitude of Sri Lankan representatives and the press towards the actions of the USSR and of its forces in Afghanistan; it helped to raise the interest of government and political circles in the country towards Soviet proposals for settling the situation. in Afghanistan and the South-west region of Asia.[”]

NOTES

'New York: Basic Books, 1999. See the report by the British Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report (London, June 2000).

2 Available at http://cwihp.si.edu.

4

The Sword and the Shield, pp. 6-8.

Letter from Vasiliy Mitrokhin to editor, July 2000.

5 For Soviet and other East-bloc documentation on the Soviet war in Afghanistan see CWIHP e-Dossier No. 4: Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, http://cwihp.si.edu/; as well as: CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 67-69; CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 70-75; CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 124-127, 133-137, 145-184.

"Editor's Note: Baluchi, also spelled Balochi or Beluchi, group of tribes speaking the Baluchi language and estimated at about 4,800,000 inhabitants in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and also neighboring areas of Iran, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Punjab (India). See "Balochi," Encyclopædia Britannica (2004), http:// www.britannica.com.

expected a certain amount of initial criticism from the West but counted on the fait accompli being accepted by the world that after a short period of time. Brezhnev had hoped that the crucial matter of maintaining détente would override the problem of Afghanistan. However, after the surprisingly harsh US reaction was made public, Moscow took offense and decided to take counter-measures. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR were ordered to cancel imminent high-level talks with Western politicians."

The Soviet request created a very serious clash of interest between the Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries since all of these countries were, albeit to different degrees, interested in further developing their relations with Western Europe. In the case of Hungary, the Soviets asked that the visit of the Hungarian foreign minister to Bonn, due to occur in less than a week, be cancelled and that, similarly, the trip by a delegation of the Hungarian parliament to the United States be put off. At the 29 January meeting of the HSWP Political Committee, one of the most dramatic ones in the history of this body, the Hungarian leadership came the closest ever to making a political decision to defy openly Soviet will. During a heated debate, several HWSP Politburo members proposed that the Soviet request should be disregarded due to the extremely short notice and the country's economic interests; there seemed to be a clear majority for this position." It was Kádár's dramatic intervention that prevented the Political Committee from making an “irresponsible" decision. In a rather confused speech he argued that they had to choose between two bad options and declared that the visits had to be cancelled. He also warned the Political Committee that Hungary would, in fact, not lose anything by obeying Moscow (except for that he, Kádár, “would be called a Soviet satellite" in the West). By contrast, there was much to lose by undermining the confidence of the Kremlin leaders. In order to enlighten those who might have had any illusions concerning the nature of the Soviet request, he added: "...what do you think, how long will they be polite to us? Why with us, (.....) excuse me for the phrase, with our lousy life and country, (...) how long will they behave politely towards us?"

Eventually the visits were cancelled but, paradoxically, the humiliation that Kádár "suffered" had positive effects. At the same Political Committee session it was also decided that Moscow should be asked to urgently hold a multilateral consultative meeting regarding the impact of Afghanistan on East-West relations. A special envoy, Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs András Gyenes, was immediately sent to Moscow for personal consultation. Kádár himself sent a letter to Brezhnev,' arguing that in the present situation the allies had to be consulted regularly on the joint Soviet bloc policy and that the results of détente had to be preserved. This was possible only by maintaining and strengthening the relations of the East European countries with Western Europe. Only in this way could US influence over those countries be warded off.

Moscow accepted the Hungarian proposal. A meeting of the Central Committee secretaries for international rela

tions of the closely cooperating socialist countries took place on 26 February 1980 in Moscow (Document No. 5). At the conference Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee secretary for international relations, adopted and put forward the Hungarian position as the current CPSU line, emphasizing that "the socialist countries should make maximum use of the possibilities contained in existing relations with the Western European countries to counter-balance the United States' foreign policy line" (Document No. 6).

The decision was a significant achievement for Hungarian diplomacy, not in the least because Hungary received the green light to its preserve and even enhance Western relations. Kádár's personal intervention had in fact helped the liberal forces to overcome the hardliners within the Soviet leadership (Document No. 6). This, in turn, contributed to avoiding any further deterioration of East-West relations similar to what happened following the invasion of Afghanistan. It is one possible reason why no "Second Cold War" developed in Europe.

For Hungary, in fact, the period between the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of Gorbachev in 1985 was rather dynamic and fruitful in the foreign policy arena. Hungary was able to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982. As early as 1981 exploratory talks were underway concerning a potential agreement with the European Economic Community. (These discussions eventually failed due to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's concerns about the potential negative effect of such a step on the Federal Republic's relationship with the Soviet Union.)8 Moreover, high-level relations with Western countries had intensified during this period. Kádár paid visits to Bonn and Rome in 1977, to Paris in 1978, to Bonn again in 1982, and to London in 1985. Hungary, in turn, received French Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1977, and was visited by Schmidt in 1979, French President Francois Mitterand in 1982, US VicePresident George Bush in 1983, and Schmidt's successor Helmut Kohl, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi in 1984. As Poland lost the goodwill of many in the West after the introduction of martial law in December 1981 and Romania fell out of favor over its increasingly repressive internal policies, Hungary took on the lead role in promoting East-West dialogue. Only after Gorbachev entered the scene did the situation change: Moscow itself seized the role as the principal proponent of improved East-West relations. Even with its moderating influence on East bloc policy, Hungary now fell back to playing second fiddle.9

Csaba Békés is director of the Cold War History Center in Budapest and a former CWIHP Fellow. His most recent publication includes The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A History in Documents, co-edited with Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer (2002).