to force the US to make the first concession. They could not shrink before the American threats.99

After these talks, Kim did not again ask for a cease-fire, but instead focused on how to gain more material support from the Soviet Union. However, before the war ended, SinoKorean conflict again emerged over the question of whether or not to sign the ceasefire immediately. This was the last difference between the two sides during the war. After Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet leadership changed its policy and promoted the conclusion of a ceasefire in Korea. 100 South Korean leader Syngman Rhee, however, did not want to conclude a ceasefire and tried to sabotage an agreement by releasing prisoners without authorization from the UN command. In response, the Chinese side wanted to launch a new offensive in order to secure more advantageous conditions for a ceasefire. The North Koreans demanded that an armistice be signed immediately, but Peng Dehuai, acting with Mao's support, overruled Kim Il Sung and began a new military campaign. Peng's final campaign was successful.101 Nonetheless, since Kim Il Sung was no longer hoping to obtain victory in the war, he believed it would be best to end the war as soon as possible and push forward with economic

reconstruction.

In conclusion, the conflicts between China and North Korea during the Korean War were the result of a clash between the interests of the entire camp (as expressed by the Chinese) and local interests (as expressed by the Koreans). As a result, Stalin was generally inclined to support the Chinese, since the positions China advocated were more in accordance with his view of the overall interests of the socialist camp in Asia. However, common interests tended to be defined in accordance with the perceptions of the country that played the leading role in the socialist camp. As a result, as soon as a country within the camp ceased to recognize its interests as being in line with the common goals, or when a change in leadership occurred in the camp, the subordination of local interest to global interest no longer held, and the alliance ran the risk of breaking down. This was the case in Sino-Korean relations, as well as eventually in Sino-Soviet relations.

Shen Zhihua, an independent scholar, is a Fellow of the Modern History Research Center and Archives at Peking University and an Honorary Fellow of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Among his numerous publications on Sino-Soviet relations and Cold War history are Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 1995).

NOTES

'The most influential books and articles on this topic in the past decade include: Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Mineo Nakajima, “The Sino

Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1, 1991; S. Goncharov, J. Lewis, Xue Litai Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); O.A. Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945-1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu Mosike En En Yuan Yuan (Jiangxi: Peoples' Publishing Co., 1999); Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 1998)

2 During an CWIHP conference held in Hong Kong in 1996, Russian scholars discussed Soviet-North Korean relations during the Korean War, e.g., the paper by A. Mansourov, “Soviet-North Korean Relations and the Origins of the Korean War." Chinese scholars also discussed Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Vietnam War at the CWIHP conference held in Hong Kong in 2000 entitled "China, Vietnam and the Indo-China War." See, e, g., Li Danhui ed., China, and the Indo-China War (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 2000).

3 See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994); Yang Kuisong, "Zhongguo Chubing Shimo," Inchoen University conference, 1999; Shen Zhihua, “Lun Zhongguo

Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai,” (21" Century, Octo

ber 2000).

4 For the text of Stalin's telegram to Kim Il Sung on 30 January 1950, see Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack or Not to Attack?: Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 5 (Spring 1995), p. 9. For additional details, see Shen Zhihua, “ZhongSu Tongmeng Tiaoyue yu Sulian Zai Yuandong de Zhanlue Mubiao” (Dang Shi Yanjiu Ziliao, No. 9, 1997), and "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origin of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.2, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 44-68.

' E. P. Bajanov and N. Bajanova, The Korean Conflict, 19501953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century-Based on Secret Soviet Archives (manuscript), pp. 40-42. For a detailed discussion of the documents presented by Bajanov and Bajanova, see Kathryn Weathersby, "Should We Fear This?, Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 39, (Spring 2002).

'Ministerstvo inostrannykh del rossiskoi federatsii (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), "Khronologiia osnovnykh sobytiia na kanuna i nachal'nogo perioda koreiskoi voiny, ianvar' 1949-oktiabr' 1950 gg." (Chronology of basic events on the eve of and in the first period of the Korean War, January 1949October 1950) (Manuscript), pp. 30-31. From the collection of Russian archival documents on the Korean War obtained by CWIHP in 1995, available at the National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

7 Ibid. p. 31.

Li Haiwen "Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiujing Heshi Jueding Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan" Dangde Wenxian No. 5 (1993), p. 85.

9 "Research on Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," Zhou Enlai Nianpu (1949-1976), Vol. 1 (Zhong Yang: WenXian Publishing Co., 1997), p. 54; "Khronologiia," p. 38.

10 "Khronologiia," pp. 35-37.

14 July 1950, Memorandum of Roshchin's talks with Zhou Dapeng, quoted from O.A. Westad's "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the United States: Wars, Policies, and Perceptions, 1950-1961" paper presented at the 1996 CWIHP Hong Kong conference.

12 Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 5 July 1950, sending message for Zhou Enlai. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/ 7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 43.

13 Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. For full text see Ibid, p. 44.

14 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 51.

15 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. The memoir of Wang Dagang, Chinese deputy military attaché in North Korea, also describes how they learned of the military situation only through overseas Chinese and Korean soldiers who had served in the People's Liberation Army. See David Tsui, “Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact?" paper presented at the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference in 1996. Pak Il-Yu, whose Chinese name was Wang Wei, had worked in the Balujun Denghua Zhidui during the war against Japan and subsequently served as a county magistrate in the Pinxi base area.

16 In a military meeting on 26 August 1950, Zhou Enlai said that the main reason for not dispatching a military mission to North Korea immediately was due to Chinese considerations. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (CCP Central Bureau of Archives and Manuscripts), Junshi Kexueyuan (Chinese PLA Academy of Military Sciences), ed., Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian, Vol 4, (Renmin Press, 1997), pp. 45-46. However, he later told the Soviet Ambassador that the reason was that North Korea did not agree. See "Khronologiia,” pp. 52-54; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.163.

17 Gao Gang, Talks during the Shenyang military meeting of 13 August 1950, cited in Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi (The War to Oppose America and Aid Korea) ed. Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (Academy of Military Sciences Publishing Co., 2000), pp. 91-92.

18 "Khronologiia," pp.45-47.

19 Ibid, pp. 48-49; Chen Jian, Op.Cit., p.273. Lee Sang Cho confirmed this situation. See Sun Baosheng, "Mao Zedong ceng Yuyan Meijun Keneng zai Renchuan Denglu" [Mao Zedong had predicted that the US Army might land at Inchon] Junshi Shilin No. 5, 1990, p. 13.

20 This is based on recollections of North Korean officers. Soviet military advisers also suggested the possibility of UN forces landing in rear ports. See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.171.

21 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. 22 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

23 In a letter to Gao Gang, Mao Zedong said that based on the situation, we have to send our troops. You have to hastily prepare. See Chai Chenwen, Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan (The Panmunjom Negotiations), (Beijing: PLA Press, 1989), p. 79. 24 Khronologiia, pp.52-54.

25 Ibid. pp.56-58.

26 Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, pp. 1 .174-175. 27 A. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: September 16-October 15, 1950" CWIHP Bulletin 6-7, (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 97-98.

28 Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov and Matveev, 1 October, 1950. Collection of documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, obtained by CWIHP in 1995 and available at the National Security Archives, Washington, DC.

29 Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongtian, Op. Cit., p. 80.

30 Shen Zhihua, “Zhongguo Beipo Chubing Chaoxian: Juece Guocheng Jiqi Yuanyin," Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao, Vol. 1, 1996; Shen Zhihua, "Zhongsu Tongmeng yu Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian de Juece" (The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Decision to Send

Troops to Korea) Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu No. 5, 1996 and No. 1, 1997.

31 Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao Zedong, 8 October 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, 10 October 1950; Interview with Chai Chengwen.

32 Telegram from Filippov (Stalin) to Roshchin, 1 October 1950, transmitting message to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. For the full text see A. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 116-117.

36

Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 25 October and 2 November 1950.

37 Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 2, p. 167.

38 Interview with Chai Chengwen; Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed, Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol 2, p. 167; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, 11 November 1950; Wang Yan, ed, Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 449.

39

Telegram from Peng Dehuai via Central Military Commission to Kim Il Sung, 9 November 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 18 November 1950.

40 Interview with Chai Chengwen; Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol 2, p. 167; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong in 18 November 1950.

41 Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 2, pp. 167-168.

42 Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan, (Selected Military Works of Zhou Enlai)Vol. 4 (Anhui: Renmin Publishing Co.) p. 100. It should be pointed out that Wenxuan published the words "command jointly by China Zhou Enlai,” but the personnel of the Central Archive who looked at the manuscript of Zhou's telegram stated that "Tongzhi lai” (meaning Chinese comrade) was misread as “Zhou Enlai” in the Wenxuan compilation. See Xu Hong, Liu Deping: “Dingzheng (Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian) Zhong de Liangge Suowu" Dangshi Yenjiu Zhiliao, No. 1, 2001, pp. 47-48.

43 Chinese Academy of Military Science ed. Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi. Vol. 2, p. 167.

44 Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan, Vol. 4, pp. 122-123. According to the agreement, the unified Sino-North Korean command gave orders only on the Corps and Division level. See, e.g.,Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 454.

45 Interview with Chai Chengwen; Telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 6 December, 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 7 December 1950; Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 453.

46 Telegram from Peng Dehuai to the 9th Army Corps, 13, 16, 19 December, 1950; Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 465.

47 Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi. pp. 178-79. [For a detailed discussion of the Soviet air force's participation in the Korean War, see] Shen Zhihua “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Kongjun," Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, No. 2, 2000.

48 Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 19 December 1950; Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 456.

49 For more detail, see Shen Zhihua, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu", Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, No. 1, 2001.

50 Mao Zedong Junshi Wenxian (Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 6 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 1993), pp. 245-246, 249-250.

51 Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Central Documents Publishing Co.,1988), p. 383; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Kim Il Sung, 3 January 1951; Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 464.

52 Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 4 January 1951. For full text see K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5354.

53 The report of the Volunteer Army Party Commission: “At this time our army does not have enough soldiers and re-supply is extremely insufficient. If there is no regrouping, re-supply, and no improvement of transportation and ammunitions, our army cannot fight anymore" Telegram from the Volunteer Army Party Commission to Central Military Commission, 8 January 1951. See Yang Fengcheng, Wang Tiancheng, Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng de Ren. (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1993), p. 222.

54 Peng Dehuai Zishu. [Peng's account, internal edition], p. 350. 55 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Telegram from Chai Chengwen to Peng Dehuai, 8 January 1951; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 1 January, 1951: Peng Dehuai Nianpu, pp. 465-466.

56 Wang Yazhi, "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Zhongde Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen”, Junshi Shilin, vol. 1, 1994, p.11.

57 Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 465.

58 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Record of talks between Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, 10-11 January, 1951.

59 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 466.

60 Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 461; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyilu, (People's Liberation Army Art Publishing Co., 1990), pp. 111-112; Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei Yuanchao Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi" Dang de Wenxian, 5 November 1994, p. 41.

61 Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 16 January 1951, transmitting message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 55-56.

62 Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 27 January 1951, transmitting 19 January telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao regarding meetings with Kim Il Sung. For the full text see K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," pp. 56-57.

63 For more details, see Shen Zhihua: "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu" Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, No. 1, 2001; Shen Zhihua, "Lun Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai" 21" century, October 2000.

64 In 1951, the loss rate of the Volunteer Army transportation was 84.6 percent, Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie. Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace (JinDun Publishing Co., 1987), p. 140.

65 Zhang Mingyuan, "Fengxue Zhanqin-Yi Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng de Houqin Baozhang" Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, 2000, Vol. 6, p. 34; Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace, p. 6.

66 Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 449; Fengxue Zhanqin, p. 29.
67 Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.
68 Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace, p. 6.

69 Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyen Zongjie Jiben

82

Peng Dehuai Zishu (Peng's account, internal edition), p. 352. 83 At least until November 1951, Mao still believed that the POW problem would not be difficult to solve; See Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 14 November 1951, in K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 70-71.

84 Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 8 February 1952.

85 The first quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, "Peregovor o peremiriia v Koree, 1951-1953 gg.,” Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, 2000 No.2, p.104.

86 Ibid.

87 The second quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, p. 104.

88 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol 1, p.249-250.

89 Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan, Vol. 4, pp. 289-290. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), p.78.

90 Zhou Enlai Junshi Huodong Jishi, p. 280. For an extended discussion of Mao's thinking regarding the need to continue fighting, see Zhang Shu Guang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), pp. 216-246.

94 Zhou Enlai Junshi Huodong Jishi, Vol. II, pp. 242.

95 A. Volokhova, pp.106 and 108.

96 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 250.

97 Telegram from Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 16 July 1952. For the full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin, 6/7, pp. 77-78.

98 Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952. For full text, see CWIHP Bulletin, 6/7 (Winter 1995/ 1996), pp. 10-14.

99 Record of meeting between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August and 19 September 1952. For the full text, see CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 9-20. For differing interpretations, see Haruki Wada, paper submitted to the CWIHP Hong Kong conference; Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The

By Bernd Schäfer

T

he North Korean government has always been unusually secretive not only to the outside world and to the vast majority of its own citizens, but also to its supposed friends in the communist world. To the best of their ability, North Korea's rulers tried during the Cold War to hide “internal matters" from their comrades in the Soviet Union, China and the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc-the states on whom they depended for their country's existence. Nonetheless, banding together in the strange world of Pyongyang, the representatives of several of those allies learned much about their host country by exchanging pieces of information among themselves and puzzling out their meaning together.' Moreover, in the later years of his rule, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung spoke quite freely and frankly in his correspondence and conversations with leaders of other medium size communist countries. The archival record of the East European states' dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can therefore shed considerable light on this enigmatic country. The evidence presented below comes from the files of the embassy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Pyongyang, the East German Foreign Ministry, the Department of International Relations of the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR, and Erich Honecker's personal files on his meetings with Kim Il Sung, all of which became accessible to scholars following the demise of the GDR in 1989/90. In addition, the essay draws on the published memoir of the last East German ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki, which provides a vivid account of the DPRK during the final years of the Soviet bloc alliance.

Setting the Stage, 1949-1955

The establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the Soviet occupation zone three months after the founding of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the American zone resembled what occurred in Germany just one year later. In May 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in the West and in October the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed in the East, again transforming former occupation zones into states under the tutelage of their former liberators. On 11 November 1949, one month after the GDR came into existence, the DPRK exchanged letters of mutual diplomatic recognition with the German communist state, but the outbreak of the Korean War in June of the following year delayed the establishment of official relations. In April 1951, as communist forces mounted what was to be their final offensive of the war, the GDR and DPRK agreed to conduct diplomatic communication using the channels of their respective ambassadors in the People's Republic of China. They then established full embassies in the first

half of 1954, several months after the conclusion of the armistice ending hostilities on the peninsula.2 Kim Il Sung received GDR representative Richard Fischer on 5 August 1954 for a lengthy audience of three and a half hours, giving him lively demonstrations on ferrous metals and a lecture on cement. The North Korean leader predicted that Germany would be unified sooner than Korea due to its higher standard of living, which, according to Kim, made it easier to educate the population.3

The armistice signed in July 1953 created a heavily fortified demilitarized border zone between North and South Korea. Three years of intense fighting had left both Korean states in a deplorable condition, but the US bombing of the North had brought nearly total destruction of the physical infrastructure of the DPRK. Consequently, even though the Soviet Union, China, and most of the East European socialist states were themselves preoccupied with postwar rebuilding and economic competition with the West, they granted substantial aid and generous credits to the DPRK. Taken together, the result of this aid was enormous. To a large extent, the DPRK was rebuilt from the outside, with the North Koreans providing the labor force and their political leaders increasingly countering reality with an ideology of alleged self-reliance.

The GDR contributed its share to the reconstruction of the DPRK. Following Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in September 1953, a North Korean delegation headed by Minister of Finance Yi Chu-yon traveled to Berlin to negotiate the first of many bilateral agreements on economic and technological aid for the DPRK.5 The North Korean government sent an enthusiastic letter of thanks for this aid in December, signed by Kim Il Sung." East German support for the embattled North Koreans had in fact begun much earlier, when in September 1950, with UN forces advancing into North Korean territory, the GDR founded a Korea Solidarity Committee of the National Council, a mass organization representing all East German parties. The Korea Solidarity Committee channeled aid to the DPRK, raising a portion of the money by direct appeals to the East German population.' As will be discussed below, between 1950 and 1957 the GDR sent aid to the DPRK totaling 60 million East German marks, a remarkable sum for a country that was itself suffering from wartime destruction. Between 1954 and 1956 alone, six East German "solidarity trains" with more than 160 cars full of consumer goods and medicine rolled through the USSR and China into North Korea.

Most spectacular was the East German reconstruction of the city of Hamhung between 1955 and 1962. A group of 457 specialists from the GDR, headed by Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl's brother, directed a Korean workforce in con