ment was apparently disputed within the KWP, at the plenary session held 28 June to 3 July 1963 Kim Il Sung succeeded in purging the Central Committee of opponents voicing such concerns.64 In the aftermath of that event the personality cult around Kim Il Sung reached new heights. He was portrayed as having been the sole leader against the Japanese occupation before 1945. In the forest of the Paekdu Mountains historic fireplaces and trees were "discovered" where Kim Il Sung allegedly led the partisans in their struggle against the Japanese. North Korean propaganda announced that in the whole world there was no mother with such a magnificent son as Kim Il Sung. When the Foreign Minister of Cambodia visited the DPRK, he was encouraged to lay memorial wreaths at the graves of Kim Il Sung's parents and grandparents.65

The DPRK instigated numerous violent border incidents, and infiltrated special forces into South Korean territory as far as seven to ten kilometers south of the armistice line. These acts were accompanied by claims that "revolutionary uprisings" by "armed partisans" had occurred in the South and "patriotic forces" would further gain strength there. "Liberation" was near, and the North Korean masses were ready to "destroy the enemy" in the South whenever Kim Il Sung ordered them to do so.66 North Korea gained international notoriety for the spectacular seizure of the American electronic intelligence ship USS Pueblo in January 1968.67 For domestic consumption by the KWP membership and the North Korean population, official propaganda invented fictitious American and South Korean attacks and heroic stories about how those had been successfully repelled by the vigilant DPRK. Foreshadowing the seizure of the Pueblo, Yi Yongho had already announced to the East Germans in July 1967 the DPRK's readiness to strike at the Americans when they were "doing dumb things." As he explained, "now and then we have to break their bones so that they don't get even more fresh. [...] The Korean People's Army is trained as cadre. The people are armed. [...] More than 30 percent of the budget annually goes to military purposes. If our enemies attack us again, we fully intend to liberate South Korea."68 The GDR

joined the ROK in an unprecedented joint unification statement issued 4 July 1972, surprising both the communist and the non-communist worlds. In a conversation with East German communists on 31 July, DPRK ambassador to East Berlin, Lee Chang Su, explained this move as a "tactical measure" intended to reunite Korea by forcing American troops and Japanese investors out of the South. He claimed this new strategy had been authorized at a KWP meeting in November 1971,70 shortly after Henry Kissinger's second and "open" visit to Beijing that year. Regardless of their provenance, the plans for a confederation quickly fell apart over the insurmountable differences between the two Korean states and their rulers, as well as over the all too obvious strategy of the DPRK to gain everything while yielding little. Kim Il Sung explained the turn back to confrontation in a lengthy letter to the leaders of the communist parties in July 1973," predictably placing blame exclusively on the Americans and South Koreans. [See Document 5]

Bilateral relations between the DPRK and the GDR went smoothly and unspectacularly after the early 1970's. Berlin and Pyongyang maintained a rather low key but constant exchange of delegations, conducted negotiations on trade issues, signed agreements and sometimes implemented them. Since the socialist countries loyal to Moscow came to view the PRC as an ever more dangerous enemy, the GDR considered its relations with the DPRK as a contribution toward helping the North Koreans steer the proper course between Moscow and Beijing."2

In 1977 East German Secretary General Erich Honecker made the first visit ever by a GDR leader to East Asia, staying in Mongolia, Vietnam, and North Korea. In Pyongyang" he issued a joint declaration with Kim Il Sung [See Document 6]. His delegation signed a Consular Treaty and a carefully crafted Agreement of Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation for 1978 to 1984, which was based on a pattern of reciprocity proposed to Honecker by Kim Il Sung himself: East German technology and facilities vs. North Korean raw materials and labor. Besides the official talks, the GDR visitors received an "impressive reception by the people of

Pyongyang," toured a tractor plant, attended an opera performance, and enjoyed a rally staged for both leaders in the Sports Palace, attended by 20,000 people.

As a matter of course, during their personal meeting, Honecker and Kim boasted to each other about the successful performance of their respective countries on the path towards socialism. Kim, the absolute ruler of a country famous as an economic laggard made the astonishing claim that "the higher the standard of living climbs, the more ideologically lazy and the more careless the activity" of the people is—a statement no East German leader could have gotten away with making. Concerning foreign policy, Honecker emphasized the leading role of the Soviet Union and the close and unshakeable ties between the GDR and the USSR. In harsh words the East German leader criticized the PRC, which had characterized the Soviet Union as the "number one enemy." Beijing's criticism of NATO for not building up enough arms against the Soviet Union was tantamount to “an encouragement to wage war against the GDR,” Honecker declared. Kim Il Sung was less willing to commit himself, invoking North Korean non-interference in the polemics between the PRC and the USSR. He cautiously put some distance between the DPRK and China, but also reminded Honecker that Korea had a 1,500 kilometer-long border with China. Although acknowledging that their bilateral relations had improved after the "Cultural Revolution," Kim declared that the DPRK would "not agree with everything China does," would not be a "blind follower" of the PRC and would not accept "Chinese assertions such as the characterization of the Soviet Union as Social Imperialism." Noting that "there are people who believe the DPRK is more on China's side," Kim emphatically asserted that "this is not the case."

Finally, the North Korean leader agreed to the drafting of a treaty of mutual friendship between the two countries in preparation for his forthcoming visit to the GDR. Although this visit would not take place any time soon, allegedly for reasons of Kim's health and the situation on the Korean peninsula, drafting the various agreements between the two countries kept political and technical delegations busy. As a result of Honecker's stay in Pyongyang, the GDR Politburo even followed suggestions from Pyongyang to change, effective immediately, the official German name for North Korea from KVDR (Korean People's Democratic Republic) to KDVR (Korean Democratic People's Republic). The newly emerged personal ties between the two leaders also sent a clear message to the East German embassy in Pyongyang and the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. Internal criticism of Kim Il Sung and his personality cult or open hints at the poor North Korean performance with regard to trade were from now on the equivalent of doubting the judgment of Erich Honecker, and thus suicidal for a political career in the GDR. An era of reciprocal byzantinism in North Korean-East German relations was emerging.

Byzantinism and the Embrace of the Autocrats, 1978-1989

Even though the exchange of delegation visits contin

ued, as did GDR economic and technological assistance to the DPRK, it nonetheless took almost seven years for Honecker and Kim to resume where they had left off in December 1977. In May 1984, Kim Il Sung departed on an extensive tour to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, his first stay in Eastern Europe since his visits in 1956. Everywhere during his journey, the 72-year-old Kim had his special bed, his personal toilet, and his personal doctors from Eastern Europe.74 In addition he received a staged North-Korean-style welcome, especially from the East Germans, with "enthusiastic masses" lining up along his travel route. Taking this organized demonstration of devotion at face value as an expression of friendship, he was even more deeply impressed that the people had gathered despite the rainy weather. Kim Il Sung mentioned the GDR "masses in the rain" frequently during his visit and over and over again years later to East German political visitors in Pyongyang.

In his first political talk with Erich Honecker on 30 May, [See Document 7] Kim Il Sung focused on the achievements and prospects of his country. With the achievement of the goals identified at the 6th Party Congress of the KWP in 1981, the DPRK would approach the economic level of developed nations by 1990, Kim declared. In order to fulfill these ambitious plans, the KWP set as its first task the reclaiming of marshland from the sea, to overcome the problem of limited arable land. "The entire party and all of the members of the army are engaged in realizing this," Kim informed Honecker. Once the problem of water supply has been resolved, the North Korean slogan encapsulated all that would come true: "Rice-that's Communism!"

If the planned output level of non-ferrous heavy metals. was also achieved, then, according to Kim, the "currency" issue would be solved as well, and the DPRK could repay its foreign debt of 400 million dollars, which it owed primarily to France, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. For exploiting brown coal deposits, constructing electrical power plants and automating its industry, however, North Korea would rely on support from its socialist friends. According to Kim, the DPRK currently suffered from a shortage of labor because so many young people had to join the army to "confront imperialism." With some East German help in setting up automated production, this problem could also be overcome. Since South Korean forces combined with the American troops stationed in the ROK would be militarily superior to the DPRK, there would be no way to attack them with any chance of victory. Therefore, with his vision focused on economic realities, Kim told Honecker how to bring about Korean unification: "We must also show the South Koreans the superiority of socialism, just as you show that to the West Germans."75

The second day of talks, 31 May, was devoted to a long presentation of East German achievements in building "socialism" and a discussion of foreign policy matters.[See Document 8.] Honecker primarily asked Kim questions about China, since the GDR had no "party relations" with the PRC, nor did the East Europeans or Soviets. Kim used this opportunity to praise his "long-time friend" Deng Xiaoping and the new party chairman Hu Yaobang. According to Kim, the

latter had a sincere desire to improve relations with Moscow and had asked him to convey that message to the Soviet leadership. The Chinese, Kim stated, "did not want war." They would instead need time to overcome the negative consequences of the Cultural Revolution. For that reason, their relations with the United States and Japan were not directed against the Soviet Union, but rather toward "obtain[ing] developed technology and credit" from the capitalist countries. Every time the Chinese had met with the Japanese and the Americans, they had conveyed such an explanation to the DPRK, beginning with Mao and Zhou Enlai back in 1972. Urging that all socialist countries improve relations with the PRC, Kim Il Sung pleaded, "If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China's face [...] How good would it be for all of us if the Soviet Union and China would reconcile."76

In their concluding conversation the next day [See Document 9], Kim Il Sung and Erich Honecker agreed finally to sign the first Treaty of GDR-DPRK Friendship and Cooperation, originally drafted in late 1977. They furthermore agreed on a new Agreement on Economic and Scientific Cooperation between the two states covering the period up to 1990. Kim Il Sung was delighted about the prospective East German support, particularly the delivery of a semi-conductor plant. He admitted that the DPRK had purchased "through unofficial channels" an incomplete plant from Japan. This purchase would not have been necessary, Kim explained, if he had learned earlier, and not just during the preparation for his visit to the GDR, of the advanced status of electronics in East Germany. He also stated that he had not known of the East German production of synthetic rubber and herbicides, goods the DPRK had thus far purchased from capitalist countries. Unfortunately, the North Korean "cadres had not been provided sufficient guidance" on assessing the economic power of the GDR, so that Kim, the infallible leader, "had to criticize the comrades in our embassy for their lack of information" on the spot in Berlin. All that had to change, Kim concluded, and the technological cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK had to be significantly expanded."

78

What expanded even more were the heartfelt personal ties between the autocrats in Berlin and in Pyongyang, although the former still could not rival the absolute power of the latter, not to mention his unparalleled personality cult. According to the last GDR ambassador in Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki, Honecker felt attracted to Kim Il Sung's unrestrained personal power and was sincerely impressed by the orchestrated ceremonies during his second visit to the DPRK." When the Deputy Chairman of the GDR State Council, Manfred Gerlach, talked to Kim Il Sung during a trip to Asia in May 1986 [See Document 10], the North Korean leader expressed his impatience while waiting for the arrival of Erich Honecker, "his best friend and comrade-in-arms." Referring to the unforgettable "jubilation" of the East German people in 1984, Kim promised to receive Honecker "with extraordinary warmth and personally show him the progress that has been made over the nearly ten years since his last trip to the DPRK."

Since he had received such a warm visit in the GDR, Kim had asked Honecker to come to North Korea this time in the warm season.79

The East German leader reciprocated with an "official friendship visit" to the DPRK from 18-21 October 1986 [ See Document 11], which the GDR later called “an impressive and powerful demonstration of the friendship and fraternity between the two parties, states and peoples." Kim Il Sung pulled out all the stops orchestrating jubilation. In Pyongyang and Nampo hundreds of thousands lined up for Erich Honecker, who was totally taken aback. As he told Kim the next day: “I don't have the words to describe this. These hours will be unforgettable in the life of our peoples." The North Korean leader, who had pictures of his 1984 GDR visit shown beforehand on TV to motivate "his people," seconded: "I do know how guests are welcomed here. But never has it been like yesterday."

During his four-day stay in the DPRK the East German leader visited Kim's birthplace in Mangyongdae, the heavy machinery construction plant in Taean and the new West Sea barrage and locks complex. A political demonstration in a P'yongyang stadium and a sports exhibition by 50,000 athletes completed the visit. The two states agreed to intensify relations between the People's Assemblies and the Foreign Ministries, and signed a new trade agreement and a joint proposal for cultural exchange between 1987 and 1990. Finally, "Comrade Erich Honecker invited Comrade Kim Il Sung to visit the GDR. The invitation was accepted with great joy and sincere thanks."80

In their official meeting on 19 October in Pyongyang's Presidential Palace, Kim and Honecker displayed a cordial and fraternal harmony in every respect. This time the guest began with an hour-long talk on GDR successes across the board. Re-opening the conversation after a break, the North Korean leader referred to the high chairs especially designed for him because of his back problems and informed his guest that he had his doctor's permission to use airplanes to travel, for instance, to Moscow or the GDR. In contrast to Honecker, Kim began with a rather critical assessment of the conditions in his country. After almost 40 years of socialism and "juche" propaganda in the DPRK, he bluntly confessed in this intimate setting that North Korea is a "developing country confronted with three basic problems: supplying the population with food, housing and clothing." He described in detail the process of reclaiming land from the sea by having 300,000 soldiers build the West Sea barrage at Nampo to filter salt water and grow rice on newly acquired fertile soil. On and on Kim Il Sung went in laying out ambitious plans for producing textiles for clothing, building apartments and introducing automation in factories to relieve the people of hard physical labor. Every North Korean citizen would be required to acquire at least one special degree of higher education, since only when they have "achieved a high ideological level, can we train our people to think in collective terms.”

In his foreign policy remarks Kim maintained firmly that the DPRK had no intention of invading South Korea: "We could not do that anyway and we are not going to do it."

According to Kim, the American forces in the South had stationed 1,000 nuclear warheads and just two of them would be sufficient to completely destroy all of North Korea. He supported Soviet leader Gorbachev's disarmament proposals and enthusiastically welcomed the upcoming visit of Honecker to the PRC: "How nice that is, how positive for socialism," he exclaimed.81

In the following years several high level talks further deepened the GDR-DPRK relationship. When the First Party Secretary of the District of Berlin, Günter Schabowski, visited Pyongyang on his Asian tour to China, Mongolia, and North Korea, he met Kim Il Sung on 10 May 1988. [See Document 12] At that meeting byzantinism with greetings from and to Honecker continued as well as the relatively open talk by the North Korean leader. According to Kim's assertion, the explanation for the DPRK backlog in trade obligations, as he allegedly confided for the first time to a foreign delegation, were major floods in the DPRK in 1986 and 1987, which "had not been made publicly known internationally. All of the production facilities, railroad tracks, and roads were flooded in the valley where the sintered magnesite is found, production came to a standstill, and there was a great deal of destruction." But now, Kim maintained, all operations had fully resumed and everything that the DPRK had pledged

would be delivered. At the same time the massive construction in the capital would continue, as thousands of military personnel engaged in a "200-day-battle" to complete the sites in time for the 13th World Games of Youth and Students in P'yongyang in 1989.82

In July 1988 an official military delegation from the GDR led by Defense Minister Heinz Keßler visited North Korea for a full week, signed a mutual defense agreement, and enjoyed a tour of all the propagandistic sites of Kim Il Sung's regime. [See Document 13] Only the helicopter flight to the demarcation line at the 38th parallel had to be cancelled due to weather conditions. The East German delegation together with the DPRK Defense Minister even climbed 2,744 meters to the peak of Mount Paekdu at the Chinese border. When Minister Keßler handed a letter from Honecker to the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung asked: "How is my brother and best friend Erich Honecker doing?""83

During the meeting with his "best friend" in October 1986, Kim Il Sung had shared something that he personally claimed to have sensed among the North Korean people, after they had read Erich Honecker's curriculum vitae in their press. "People are sad that such deserving revolutionaries also grow older. We don't have to worry, however, since we have done everything to ensure that future generations will continue our struggle." It is difficult to imagine the shock and grief Kim Il Sung must have felt upon seeing Honecker ousted from power in October 1989, watching the GDR disintegrate and disappear from the map and seeing another close "friend" from Eastern Europe, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, being executed in December 1989.

As if to ensure that the Kim Il Sung dynasty was destined for a very different fate, Kim's distinctive cult reached new heights. The number of trees in the Paekdu Mountains

found with allegedly 50-year old inscriptions on their bark proliferated miraculously. The trees bore messages announcing to Kim Il Sung, the "Sun of Korea," in numerous variations, the birth of his son and worthy successor Kim Jong Il, the "Guiding Star of Korea." As the Soviet Union lost all of its former empire in Eastern Europe and all the socialist rulers of those countries fell from power, the official North Korean news agency announced on 6 January 1990 the discovery of 9,000 trees heralding the rise of Kim Jong Il—the next generation.85

Dr. Bernd Schäfer is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington and a Senior Research Scholar of CWIHP. His publications include American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2003); Staat und katholische Kirche in der DDR (The State and the Catholic Church in the GDR) (Köln/Weimar: Böhlau, 2nd edition 1999); The GDR in German Archives: A Guide to Primary Sources and Research Institutions on the History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation and the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2002). His current research is on American "Triangular Diplomacy” toward the USSR and China, 1969-1976.

5

' Report on the relations between the GDR and DPRK between 1950 and 1954. GDR Foreign Ministry. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 7077.

6 " DPRK Embassy in Beijing to GDR Embassy in Beijing. 14 January 1954. GDR Foreign Ministry. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10213.

7 In November 1954 the Korea Solidarity Committee's assignments were extended to Vietnam. It finally ceased such activity in October 1957, when other Soviet bloc countries also replaced their respective solidarity committees with regular bilateral trade relations.

8 Communique of the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam with the National Council. 25 October 1957. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 5599.

" Working results of the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam with the National Council regarding Korea. Undated. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 152/75.