10 Aid of the socialist states to the DPRK during and after the Korean War. GDR Embassy in Pyongyang. Undated. PolArch, MfAA, C 152/75. "Kim Il Sung to Otto Grotewohl, July 1954. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 15148. 12 Protocol on the visit of the DPRK Prime Minister in Hamhung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 18 May 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10211. 13 Protocol on the meeting with DPRK Prime Minister Kim Il Sung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 1 February 1958. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10257. Cf. also Rüdiger Frank, Die DDR und Nordkorea: Der Wiederaufbau der Stadt Hamhung von 1954 bis 1962 (Aachen: Shaker, 1996). 14 Christian Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain (New York/Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001). 15 Werner Meissner,ed., Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990. Eine Quellensammlung (Berlin: Akademie, 1995): 74-76. 16 Protocol of the extraordinary Session of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Politburo. January 2, 1956. Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archive (SAPMO-BA), SED Archive (DY 30), J IV 2/2A/464. 17 Protocol of the Session of SED Politburo. 17 April 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2 A/491. 18 On the Draft of the KWP Statute. 11 April 1956. SAPMOBA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/135. 19 Cf. an East German assessment of an internal KWP brochure from July 1962. Although the GDR Foreign Ministry could not imagine at that time that those distortions would become ever more fantastical, it bluntly called them in 1963 a ‘new link in the chain of misrepresentations of Korean history between 1930 and 1945'. Commentary on the internal party brochure "Our party's revolutionary traditions, acquired during the period of the armed antiJapanese struggle." GDR Foreign Ministry. 16 May 1963. SAPMOBA, DY 30, IV A2/20/250. 20 Hans Maretzki. Kim-ismus in Nordkorea (Böblingen: Tykve): 13, 14, 17, 33, 43, 45. The author was the last ambassador of the GDR in the DPRK, serving from 1987 through 1990. 21 Protocol of the Session of SED Politburo. 15 May 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2 /2A/496. 22 Protocol of the Extraordinary Session of SED Politboro. 12 June 1956. Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo with the Korean comrades. 8 June 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/500. 23 The DPRK had joined Comecon in 1957 as an observer, but withdrew from the organization for good in 1964 to avoid too much foreign knowledge of North Korean affairs and outside "interference" with the DPRK's “independence." 24 Report on the Negotiations conducted in Berlin during the visit of the DPRK Government Delegation. GDR Foreign Ministry. 29 June 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10276. 25 Protocol of Session of SED Politburo. 2 October 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/521. In 1960, when the GDR ran into serious economic trouble due to the increasing migration of East Germans to the West, Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl sent a letter to Kim Il Sung asking for his understanding of the GDR's inability to fulfill its aid obligations regarding rebuilding the North Korean city of Hamhung (Telegram from Ambassador Kurt Schneidewind to Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp Schwab. 11 November 1960. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646). In May 1961 the DPRK Ambassador in Berlin urgently asked the GDR for 20,000 tons of wheat flour and offered 1,000 kilograms of gold in early 1962 in return. At that time, however, the GDR had no flour itself, nor hard currency to buy it in the West, nor money to grant the DPRK a credit (Notice on some problems of economic aid for the DPRK. 29 May 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/134). 26 Overview on the relations between the GDR and the KDVR. GDR Foreign Ministry. 9 April 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/ 20/253. 27 Note on a conversation between Ambassador Fischer, USSR Ambassador Ivanov and Romanian Ambassador Tatu Shianu on 30 October 1956. GDR Embassy in Pyongyang. 27 November 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 5651. 28 For a discussion of this revolt and purge, see the article by Balazs Szalontai in this issue. 29 Maretzki, p. 45. See also Overview. The sessions of the KWP Central Committee between the 3rd and 4th Party Congress. GDR Foreign Ministry. 4 September 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/ 20/136. 30 Transcript of handwritten Memorandum of GDR Embassy Attaché Glückauf on his conversation with First Secretary of USSR Embassy, Pimenov on 8 November 1956. Pyongyang, 28 November 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646. 31 Information. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 16 February 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646 (Information from CSSR Ambassador Kohousek to GDR Ambassador Schneidewind). 32 By 1964 there were only twelve foreign embassies in the DPRK. 33 Memorandum on a Conversation in the Soviet Embassy with Comrade Pusanov. GDR Embassy Pyongyang, 30 August 1960. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 34 Notice on a conversation with CSSR Ambassador, Comrade Kohusek, on February 3, 1961. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 8 February 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 35 Information on a few problems in the KWP and in the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 14 March 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 36 Some remarks on developments in the DPRK and its relationships. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 13 June 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 37 Some problems in the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 8 August 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J UV 2/20/136. 38 Ambassador Schneidewind to Deputy Foreign Minister Schwab. Report on the 4th KWP Party Congress. 20 September 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/135. 41 Notice on a conversation of Comrade Stark with Comrade Torbenkov, counselor at the USSR Embassy in the DPRK on 28 March 1962. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 29 March 1962. SAPMOBA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137; Information on the reunification policy of the KWP. GDR Foreign Ministry. 5 May 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136. 42 Information on the DPRK position regarding the measures of the Soviet government on peacefully solving the Cuban conflict and on the Chinese-Indian border conflict. GDR Foreign Ministry. 16 November 1962. SAPMO-BA, IV 2/20/136; Information on the 5th KWP Plenary Session from 10-14 December 1962. GDR Foreign Ministry. 22 December 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136. 43 According to the Czechoslovak Ambassador, who returned to Pyongyang on the same airplane as the North Korean delegation, Yi Chu-yon was nervous during the flight about the consequences awaiting him at home because of his frank political demonstration with the apples. Information on a conversation with the Czechoslovak Ambassador in the DPRK, Comrade Moravec., in the GDR Embassy on 21 December 1962. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 7 January 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 44 The influence of the Communist Party of China on the policy of the KWP. GDR Foreign Ministry. 8 April 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/250. 45 Information on the governmental statement of Comrade Kim Ir Sen [Kim Il Sung] at the 5th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on 23 October 1962. GDR Foreign Ministry. 17 November 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136. 46 Memorandum on a conversation with Comrades Pimenow, Witek and Cicha on 27 October 1963. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 8 November 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/253. 47 Notice on a conversation with deputy premier and candidate of the Politburo of the KWP Central Committee, Comrade Yi Chuyon, on 9 January 1964. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 10 January 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/253. 48 Information on positions of KWP leadership concerning the German Question and results of KWP policy on relations between the GDR and the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 2 September 1964. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 1087/70. 49 Information on incidents concerning the GDR Embassy in P'yongyang and the DPRK Embassy in Berlin. GDR Foreign Ministry. 3 April 1964. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 7131. 50 Short Version of the Report on Relations by the Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK for the Year 1963. GDR Foreign Ministry. 20 February 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. 51 Memorandum on information from 29 April 1965. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 19 May 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/ 251. Quite spectacular were the attack on the dark-skinned Cuban ambassador in Pyongyang in March 1965 and the brutal reaction of the DPRK government to the incident. The GDR ambassador and his wife were immediately informed of the event by the shocked Cuban ambassadorial couple. See Incident with the Cuban ambassador and the delegation of physicians from Cuba. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 2 April 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. 52 Memorandum on a conversation with the Ambassador of the USSR, Comrade Moskovski, on 27 June 1964. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 2 July 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. 53 Unofficial Translation of a Copy of the Letter from the KWP Central Committee to the Central Committee of the CPSU. 28 August 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646. 54 Memorandum on the first visit of the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Gortschakov, on 6 June 1965. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 11 June 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. 55 Lerner, Failure of Perception, pp. 663-664. 56 Evaluation of the KWP Conference from 5-12 October 1966. GDR Foreign Ministry. 18 November 1966. MfAA Archive. 57 Lerner, Failure of Perception, pp. 664-665. 58 Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8 to 11 December, 1977. 13 December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123, p. 40. 59 Memorandum of the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 60 See details on the Soviet aid pledged and delivered in Memorandum on a conversation between Comrade Herrmann and Comrade Putivez, 2nd Secretary of the USSR Embassy, on 12 December 1968 in the USSR Embassy. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 23 December 1968. MfAA Archive. 61 On the relations between the GDR and the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 19 April 1967. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 1089/70. 62 Memorandum of a meeting between Comrade Hermann Matern, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate for the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, and the delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3 July 1967. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 18 July 1967. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035. 63 Agreement on the development of economic and scientifictechnological cooperation between the government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/ 2A/2123. 64 Information on the plenary session of the KWP Central Committee from June 28 to July 3, 1967. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 4 July 1967. MfAA Archive. 65 Information on some new aspects of the KWP position in domestic and foreign policy matters. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 18 August 1967. MfAA Archive. 66 Ibid. See also Memorandum on a conversation of Comrade Werner Lamberz, secretary of the Central Committee, with the ambassador of the DPRK in the GDR, Comrade Ro Su Ek, on 26 February 1968. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 26 February 1968. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646. 67 See Lerner, Failure of Perception; and James Bamford, (New York: Doubleday, 2001): 240-282. 68 Memorandum of a meeting between Comrade Hermann Matern, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate for the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, and the delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3 July 1967. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 18 July 1967. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035. 69 Note on the conversations between the Party and Government Delegations of the GDR and the DPRK in Pyongyang on 12 April 1968. Note on Visit of GDR Party and Government Delegation led by Comrade Prof. Kurt Hager with the General Secretary of the KWP and Prime Minister of the DPRK on 16 April 1968. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 23 April 1968. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 159/75. 70 Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas, A Contemporary History (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997): p. 25 (Conversation with SED Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, Hermann Axen. 31 July 1972). 71 Information for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED. 3 August 1973. Subject: Correspondence from Kim Ir Sen [Kim Il Sung], Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, to Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party. 7 July 1973. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 72 Continuous Chronology DPRK, 1973 (1972, 1971). GDR Foreign Ministry. 15 May 1973 etc. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 161/ 75. 73 The following paragraphs are based on "Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8-11 December 1977." 13 December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/ 2A/2123. 74 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 18. 75 Stenographic record. Official friendship visit to the GDR by the Party and State Delegation of the Korean Democratic People's Republic led by Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK. 30 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 76 Memorandum on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. "Memorandum on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 1 June 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 78 Maretzki, Kim-ismus in Nordkorea, p. 101. 79 Joachim Herrmann to Erich Honecker, Enclosure: On the meeting with Kim Il Sung (Report by Manfred Gerlach, ordered by Erich Honecker to be forwarded to all members and candidates of the GDR Politburo). 26 May 1986. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 80 Report on the official friendship visit by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, to the DPRK from 18-21 October 1986. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 81 Stenographic report on the official negotiations between Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK, on 19 October 1986 in the Presidential Palace in Pyongyang. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 82 Memorandum on the meeting between Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the KWP, and Comrade Günter Schabowski in Pyongyang on 10 May 1988. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2205. 83 Report on a visit of an official GDR military delegation in the DPRK in July 1988; Erich Honecker to Kim Il Sung. 18 July 1988. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2508. 84 Stenographic report on the official negotiations between Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK, on 19 October 1986 in the Presidential Palace in P'yongyang. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. 85 Maretzki, Kim-ismus in Nordkorea, p. 34. DOCUMENT No. 1 Report, Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK to the [Source: SAPMO-BA, Dy 30, IV 2/20/137. Translated by Grace Leonard.] Foreign Policy and International 19 and 22 March 61 Relations Department Berlin, 14 March 1961 Confidential Democratic People's Republic of Korea Information on a few problems in the Korean Workers Party and in the Democratic People's Republic of China. (Prepared by the embassy of the GDR in the DPRK) Addressing the following issues: 3. So-called "experimental economies" were created in two areas that include regions of up to 12,000 hectars, and they are organized in precisely the same manner as the Chinese people's communes. They have even begun to establish a type of urban people's commune, called Housewives Street Brigades, in that housewives and family members form so-called homeworker cooperatives that decide issues of production, societal life, and other things. 4. The same managerial methods are applied in the army as in the Chinese army. The generals must serve as soldiers. There is no individual responsibility. Orders are decided in advance in the Party organization. The army is both a military unit and self-reliant in all areas. Chinese methods have been applied with even greater vigor, especially since the visit by the Chinese military delegation during the last months of last year. 5. There is a strong orientation toward "black and yellow" brothers. This leads to violation of the principle of proletarian Internationalism, especially with regard to the I. The influence of Chinese interpretations and theories in importance of the struggle by the worker class in Europe and the DPRK II. Kim Il Sung's cult of personality III. The status of repatriation to the DPRK of the Koreans living in Japan I. The influence of Chinese interpretations and theories in the DPRK 1. Corresponding to the Chinese theory of the national economy developing in leaps, our Korean comrades have also attempted to achieve Socialism in great leaps. The Korean version is the so-called "Ch'ollima" movement. As in China, the symbol for it is a winged horse on which a worker is mounted. (Ch'ollima = winged horse) Even after the publication of the Moscow declaration, there is talk of "new, even greater and more successful leaps" in reports on the satisfaction of the Five Year Plan and in the formulation of tasks for the Seven Year Plan. in other regions of the world. The roles of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are still seriously underestimated and the role of the Communist Party of China is overestimated. II. Kim Il Sung's cult of personality The cult of personality surrounding Comrade Kim Il Sung has been growing steadily for some time. Everything the Party and the Korean people earn is attributed to Comrade Kim Il Sung. There is no room, no classroom, no public building in which a photo of Kim Il Sung cannot be found. The Museum of the War of National Liberation is designed entirely around the role of Kim Il Sung. There are no less than 12 figures of Kim Il Sung in the rooms of the museum, each larger than the next. The history of the revolutionary war and the formation of the Communist Party of Korea are not correctly portrayed. The decisive role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of During the course of the Five Year Plan, this theory of Korea is completely downplayed. Its role is addressed on leaps led to major disproportions in the national economy, just as it did in the People's Republic of China, and these disproportions were considered legitimate occurrences linked to the building of Socialism. 2. Only in the last year there were measures implemented with the consent agreement of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party that amounted to over-centralizing the management of the national economy. Having eliminated nearly all of the ministries and established two super-committees for managing the national economy, now they are again undertaking to form ministries for the individual branches of the national economy. only a single panel. This is also expressed in the materials as well as in films and depictions. Thus, a legend of Kim Il Sung has been created that does not correspond to the actual facts if one considers what Comrade Kim Il Sung has actually done. Party propaganda is not oriented toward studying the works of Marxism/Leninism, but rather is solely and completely oriented toward the "wise teachings of our glorious leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung". Many rules of Party life, such as the link to the masses, are portrayed as if they were discovered by Kim Il Sung rather than by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There are almost no articles or events in which Comrade Kim Il Sung is not mentioned. It is also a fact that all of those who are not in agreement with such an approach are characterized as sectarians, and recently as revisionists. This demonstrates that criticism and self-criticism in the Party are very poorly developed and in many cases democratic rule is not guaranteed. This is particularly true of the army and state organizations. How the Korean Comrades view the fight against domination is evident from a statement by Comrade Pak Tin Tsches (spelling from original German document) which he made in his lecture at the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the KWP: "We as Korean comrades have always fought the battle against dogmatism, we have always pursued our own standpoint against that of others". That is naturally a vulgar and false interpretation of the battle against dogmatism. Dogmatism in the Korean Workers Party is closely linked to the mystic ideas of Confucianism, which extend to certain nationalist tendencies. It is frequently stated that only a people like the Korean people is capable of such feats and heroism. All successes, not the least those achieved with the great assistance of the fraternal Socialist nations, especially with the aid of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, are portrayed as their own successes. Great feats that were accomplished by the Soviet Union, the CSSR, Poland, and the GDR are portrayed as accomplishments of the Korean workers "without foreign" assistance. It is not coincidental that even after the Statement of the Communist and Workers Parties, neither international cooperation in all fields nor fraternal assistance from the Socialist nations were mentioned or shown any appreciation. Connected to this are also certain efforts not to take part in Socialist works and to underestimate the successes of other peoples in the Socialist camp. These nationalist tendencies are particularly prevalent in films, in the theater and performances, and in lectures. III. The status of repatriation to the DPRK of the Koreans living in Japan By the end of 1960, the DPRK had sent 54 repatriation ships to Japan to bring about 53,000 Koreans back to the DPRK. 94% of them had lived in South Korea prior to emigrating to Japan. Among these Koreans are 700 specialists, 300 scientists and artists, 3 doctors of medicine, and 1 doctor in another field. In addition, this group includes 1500 Japanese who also emigrated to the DPRK. (These were primarily Japanese spouses.) By January 1961 there were markedly fewer announcements and reports on repatriations in the press and on the radio in the DPRK than there had been previously. On 3 February 1961 the Japanese Red Cross announced that the Red Cross of the DPRK had sent a telegram to its Japanese counterpart which read: “To prevent an epidemic of the flu that is in Japan, the repatriation transports are being temporarily suspended." (Announcement in Vertr. Bulletin of the Ztak.) On 8 February 1961, the Tokyo-based Japanese broadcaster "International Radio" reported that the Japanese Red Cross had sent a telegram to the DPRK that contained the following: • Request for immediate dispatch of the 55th repatriation ship • There are 735 repatriates in Niigata, none of whom are ill with the flu Proposal that the repatriates be provided prophylactic inoculations • Proposal that the DPRK send with the 55th ship physicians whose duties would be to conduct examinations and administer inoculations. The reasons the repatriation activities were halted are as follows: 1. The repatriates who are already in the DPRK have sent word to those still living in Japan not to come to the DPRK due to the living conditions. 2. Keeping track of the repatriates has proved difficult for DPRK organizations. For instance, our embassy has been able to observe that the younger repatriates, in particular, form groups and show up in Pyongyang, for example. They have their meeting points in the city and in some cases turn out to be "troublemakers". 3. Their clothing, attitude, and manner of personal appearance make them immediately recognizable in the DPRK. Some amenities that were commonplace for them in the past portable radios, record players, etc., reach the Korean populace this way and lead to inconsistencies and complications in the education of the people, particularly the youth. (Tasks set forth for the youth at the last Central Committee meeting of the Democratic Youth Association: "Resolve difficult and complicated issues Members of youth organization must be developed into "red soldiers of the Party”. 4. The so-called Order Shops (purchasing centrals) currently offer items repatriates brought with them from Japan. Especially bicycles, portable radios, watches, leather jackets, suits, record players, leather purses, records, etc. These things are sold for cash to provide the so-called "material foundation" for the repatriates. Young repatriates in particular sometimes live up to six months on this money and do not pursue any regular employment. They use this time to make deals. This results in perceptible stimulation of the "black market" in the streets. 5. The repatriates, settled by DPRK organizations across the entire country, even in the most remote villages, frequently leave, migrating primarily to major cities. 6. There is dissatisfaction among the women repatriates, as well. In Japan, they were accustomed to having access to a broad range of products in shops and department stores, which is currently not the case in the DPRK. 7. The independent Capitalists and former owners of small and mid-size businesses adapt best and most rapidly to life in the DPRK. The sale of the of the complete factory equipment they bring with them and models (machines, |