thousand Chinese prisoners, but according to the American announcements, there are 20 thousand. The number of Korean prisoners is greater because Americans managed to take a great number of Korean prisoners before October 1951. During their offensive attacks Americans also captured a significant number of prisoners from reserve brigade forces.

Since Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War, a total of 12 thousand troops were taken prisoner, 8 thousand of which were Americans. The number of lisynmanovskikh [North Korean] POWS is 40 thousand. However, due to difficult living conditions, many foreign POWs have died.

STALIN. Have Chinese pilots mastered jet-planes?

PENG DEHUAI. Chinese pilots can take part in combat operations when they are guided by Soviet pilots.

STALIN. So what, are they afraid?

PENG DEHUAI. They have enough courage, but they cannot fly in formations.

STALIN. You should let them fly more, only in the air they can train. There was a time when Soviet pilots also did not want to fly, they preferred to sit in schools. But gradually they began to fly, they learned to fly. Now we evaluate pilots by the number of flights. Those who have more flights get decorations. School training gives little. Combat training provides real experience. You should not be afraid to be in the air; on the contrary, you should feel in the air like at home. [STALIN, of all people, had real phobia of flying - trans.] You should also train them to fly at night. Otherwise you will not have aviation. You also need to have a system of rewards and decorations.

Do you have orders and medals?

PENG DEHUAI. Not yet. We would like to introduce them in 1953.

STALIN. You cannot go on like this. In my opinion, they [the Chinese] have an anarchist-like disregard of orders and medals. They did not even have generals. They believe that all this is against [the principles of] communism. In reality, the system of ranks, insignia and the system of rewards in the army is of enormous importance; you cannot build a real army without them. Otherwise, only partisan formations can exist like that. For 15 years they waged a civil war, expelled American imperialists, scored victory, but there are no military ranks, insignias and orders in the army. This is wrong. You should give a serious thought to it. The officer corps should be well taken care of, there should be salary, etc. The

KIM IL SUNG. Yes, they act, although conditions are very hard.

STALIN. Are there Japanese among prisoners?

PENG DEHUAI. There are only American Japanese.

MALENKOV. How you could explain that during the carpet bombing raids of American aviation in North Korea so few planes are shot down?

PENG DEHUAI. We believe that not a few [were shot down]. Since the beginning of war 5,800 American planes were shot down.

create all necessary conditions for them, for they are military specialists.

DOCUMENT No. 9

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, 4 July 1953

Ciphered Telegram # 13464

Tenth Department of the MFA SSSR Top Secret

Received; 19:20 on 4 July 1953

Sent: 21:20 on 4 July 1953.

To: Beijing, Soviet Ambassador

URGENT [vne ocheredi]

1211-1220. Pay a visit to Siu-Tsuan and tell him the following.

1. The Soviet government regards the measures planned by the government of the PRC as correct. The Soviet government is also in agreement with the draft answer to [U.S. General Mark] Clark from Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

2. The Soviet government believes that the entire course of armistice negotiations testifies to a resolute success of the tactics employed by the Sino-Korean side in these negotiations. The Sino-Korean side demonstrated to the whole world its striving for peace and readiness to conduct negotiations and find the ground for a compromise while protecting their state interests. American ruling circles became isolated in their policy that leaves the blame for the delay of the armistice negotiations and for the continuation of war in Korea in the eyes of the world public opinion at the door of the US.

3. As to Syngman Rhee and his recent provocative actions aimed at complicating the negotiations and at delaying the end of the war, we believe that it is not his independent policy. It is absolutely obvious that all the recent actions of the Syngman Rhee clique and the fuss around them were done in execution of certain tasks set by the US ruling circles which act to please the most aggressive segment of American monopolists. Due to the successful tactics of the SinoKorean side all the obstacles to the conclusion of an armistice agreement have been removed. This put in a tight corner not only American foreign but also domestic policy, since there is no more possibility to refer to the aggravation of the international situation, to the Korean war, etc. Under the new circumstances the US ruling circles face serious political difficulties in sustaining the atmosphere of military hysteria, high military appropriations, etc. Therefore American ruling circles are taking advantage of Syngman Rhee and the noise around him in order to maintain in the US (and not only in the US) the unstable semi-military political atmosphere and to delay, in one way or another, the conclusion of an armistice. However, the thrust of public opinion in the US as well as in other countries has increased so much that the US ruling circles could hardly manage to put off ending the Korean war for long. This does not exclude that all kind of noise around Syngman Rhee continues and that, perhaps, there would be some new attempts to delay the conclusion of the armistice in Korea.

4. The Soviet government deems it necessary to return to the question about the trip of Kim Il Sung to Punmunjom to sign the armistice agreement. We cannot ignore the defiant conduct of the Syngman Rhee clique, for it may play some kind of dangerous tricks on Kim Il Sung. Therefore, Kim Il Sung should be advised against going to Punmunjom. Instead, he should order another responsible Korean com

4

See, e.g., Kim's comments to Shtykov on 17 January 1950, in Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950, in Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 8.

5 For a discussion of the rationale behind Stalin's withdrawal of Soviet advisors from the front line immediately before the invasion began, see K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): p. 31. For previously released Soviet evidence on this topic, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/ 1996), pp. 94-119.

8

See message from Filippov (Stalin) to Mao and Zhou Enlai, I October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin No. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 114. As early as July 5, Stalin had communicated with Zhou about the advisability of concentrating nine divisions of Chinese "volunteers" who could enter the war should the enemy crossing the 38th parallel, and had promised air cover in that event. See Filippov (Stalin) to N.V. Roshchin (with message for Zhou), 5 July 1950, see CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 112-113.

9 See Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 114-116. This Russian document contradicted a previously released Chinese version of a Mao message to Stalin of the same date indicating that China had decided to enter the war; it appears that this earlier version was an unsent draft. See Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 100, 106-107 fn 30; Shen Zhihua, trans. Chen Jian, "The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply," CWIHP Bulletin no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 237-242; and Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 54-55, 303 fn 34-36.

10 See Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 116-117. See also K. Weathersby, "Should We Fear This?' Stalin and the Danger of War with America," CWIHP Working Paper No. 39.

"See esp. the paperback edition of Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 [& 1996]), pp. x-xii, 171-189, and Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, esp. pp. 55-58, 90.

12 See, e.g., Mao's comments to Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin on 22 July 1958 in Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging

Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents," CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 155, 156.

13 See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, passim. 14 See record of Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 12.

15 Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 12. For a detailed discussion of Russian documents on the armistice negotiations, see Kathryn Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the SinoSoviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Washington and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 1998): 90-116.

16 For the context of this discussion, see the record of the Stalin-Zhou conversations on 20 August 1952, 3 September 1952, and 19 September 1952, in CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/ 1996), pp. 9-20. Zhou had raised the possibility of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai coming to Moscow during his talk with Stalin on August 20.

17 Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 13.

By Svetlana Savaranskaya

T

1

The most studied crisis of the twentieth century-the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962-never fails to provide researchers with new puzzles. As Raymond L. Garthoff pointed out in CWIHP Bulletin 11, “Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban Missile Crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones." One of the most interesting questions still remaining concerns Soviet intentions regarding the weapons not explicitly covered in the exchange of letters between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, and the evolving nature of the Soviet-Cuban military agreement.

The new documents from the Russian archives that became available at the Havana Conference2 ("The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 40th Anniversary Conference") in October 2002 shed new light on Khrushchev's decision to deploy and then to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba. They also invite further discussion on the following questions: what were the Soviet intentions regarding the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba? What was the nature of the debate in the Soviet Union on the removal of these weapons from Cuba? Were there differing positions between the military and the political leadership on this issue? When, and why, was the final decision to withdraw those weapons made? When did the last tactical nuclear warhead leave Cuba?

We know that Khrushchev's initial decision to deploy a nuclear-armed group of Soviet forces in Cuba included sending both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (80 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, as specified in the original plan for “Operation Anadyr” of 24 May 1962). In early September, Khrushchev augmunted the plan by adding 6 nuclear bombs for the I1-28 bomber and 12 short-range tactical nuclear missiles for the dual-use Luna complex. (Later in September he also revised the plans for naval deployment, drastically reducing the naval capability specified in the plan.)

Until January 1992, US officials had been unaware of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962.3 This type of weaponry had not been not explicitly covered in the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Khrushchev had promised Kennedy that the "the so-called offensive weapons would be removed," which referred to the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles SS-4 (R-12, with a range of 1,050 miles) and SS-5 (R-14, with a range of approx. 2,000 miles) capable of reaching US territory. Even if the Americans had known about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, it would have been hard for them to make an argument that tactical nuclear weapons were offensive since their short range allowed them to be used only as battlefield weapons against an invading force.

Exploiting the ambiguity of Khrushchev's phrase, the US demanded the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers declaring them an offensive weapon. After Moscow decided to withdraw the bombers, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan,

sent by Khrushchev to Havana, discussed the US demand with the Cubans. Mikoyan presented the issue in such a way that the Soviet government appeared to be consulting with the Cubans on the withdrawal of the IL-28s.

No such pretense was taken, however, on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons; there were no consultations with the Cuban leadership. Much to their surprise the Cubans were told that the tactical nuclear weapons were to be returned to the Soviet Union, even though they were not covered by the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange. A more definitive answer to the question of why the Soviets decided to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba may become feasible only after full access to the minutes of the CPSU Presidium sessions in the fall of 1962 (the so-called "Malin Notes"), which remain classified in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow. Unfortunately, the selections of the Malin notes declassified so far do not contain any references to the discussion of whether to remove teactical nuclear weapons, which one would suspect, must have taken place at the Politburo some time in November 1962.

Nevertheless, the newly declassified documents from the Presidential Archive ("Special Declassification," April 2002) and from the personal archive of Mikoyan's son, Sergo Mikoyan, show that Khrushchev was ambivalent about the tactical nuclear weapons and their safety throughout the crisis, and that eventually he concluded that they were just too dangerous to be left in the hands of the Cuban ally. There are also some indications of differences between the Soviet military (who might have wanted to keep the weapons on the island) and Khrushchev.

The earliest sign of the Soviets ambiguity on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons emerged in September in discussions concerning the predelegation of authority to use the tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an US invasion of Cuba. The question was whether local commanders should have the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons if they were under attack, and if it was impossible to contact Moscow. Concerning the predelegation of authority to use the weapons in the event of an invasion of Cuba during which it was impossible that contact with Moscow. As General Anatoly Gribkov, the top Soviet military official in Cuba in 1962, explained in his 1996 book Operation Anadyr, a directive predelegating the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons had been prepared by the General Staff but, it was never signed by Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, likely reflecting Khrushchev's unwillingness to predelegate the authority to launch to the local commanders.

Even though the directive was never signed, Malinovsky apparently remained apprehensive as to whether General Issa Pliev, commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba, understood the procedures for using tactical nuclear weap