ons in a critical situation. On 27 October he sent an urgent telegram to Pliev "categorically confirming that you are prohibited to use [tactical] nuclear weapons." The cable might have been prompted by the shooting down of an American U-2 plane that day, despite the fact that Soviet commanders did not have the authority to do so. According to the newly declassified Presidium materials, in anticipation of President Kennedy's addresss to the nation on 22 October 1962, the Soviet leadership discussed the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons if the U.S. paratroopers landed on Cuba immediately after President Kennedy's speech. Specifically, Malin notes Khrushchev saying "To give instructions to Pliev-to bring the troops to combat readiness. To make every effort not to use atomic of the military agreement with Moscow, which was supposed to be signed during Khrushchev's visit to Cuba. Moscow was silent regarding the agreement. The discussions in the beginning of November in Moscow apparently came to no conclusion. The Malinovsky-to-Pliev telegrams dated early November tentatively assumed that the tactical nuclear weapons would stay in Cuba. On 8 November, Mikoyan sent a telegram to Moscow prompting Khrushchev to make a decision regarding the military agreement and suggesting his version of the solution— transferring the remaining weapons to the Cubans after the Soviet specialists trained them, and then gradually withdrawing most of the Soviet specialists so that the USSR could not be accused of having a military base in Cuba (Soviet official [weapons] in the early stages. If there is a landing [of U.S. forces] tactical atomic weapons, and strategic-[wait] until instructions (excluding the use of the means of Statsenko's equipment). After Khrushchev's decision to remove the strategic weapons from Cuba, the available cable traffic between "Reed" (Malinovsky) and "Pavlov" (Pliev) reveals that there was considerable ambiguity regarding the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear warheads. At the beginning of November, Malinovsky suggested that warheads for cruise missiles, Lunas and the Il-28 bombs should be left in Cuba because "so far their withdrawal was not discussed." The Cubans, of course, were very interested in the fate of the remaining military equipment and fully expected that those weapons that were not a part of the KennedyKhrushchev exchange would remain in Cuba. This interest was expressed repeatedly in the Cuban leaders' inquiries about the fate of the unsigned military agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba in the conversations with Mikoyan. policy at the time was to have no military bases on foreign soil). The telegram does not even mention the tactical nuclear weapons, and it is unclear whether Mikoyan included them with the "remaining weapons." Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko responded to Mikoyan's telegram approving his suggestion on the part of the Presidium. Between 6 November and 12 November, all available evidence indicates, tensions between the USSR and Cuba were declining, and Mikoyan's conversations with the Cuban leaders were quite friendly and cordial. They visited state farms and educational centers and discussed various issues concerning Soviet-Cuban cooperation. But on 12 November, the emerging fraternal bliss was shattered by the confrontation over the Soviet decision to withdraw the I1-28s. Although Mikoyan tried to be as sensitive as possible in framing the issue of withdrawal by seemingly asking for Cuban consent, the Cuban leader quickly realized the decision had already been made in Moscow." The Cuban reaction to the Soviet decision to withdraw the I1-28s was so openly negative-Castro even refused to meet with Mikoyan for several days-that it surprised and alarmed the Moscow leadership. In addition, on 15 November, Castro, while visiting his troops and without consultation with the Soviets, issued an order to shoot at any low On 6 November, Mikoyan sent a long letter to the CPSU Central Committee summarizing his first conversations with the Cuban leaders.' In that letter he described an episode during which Fidel Castro alleged that the Soviet Union had promised the Americans in the Khrushchev letters to "with-flying US reconnaissance aircraft. That move surprised the draw all weapons and all military specialists from Cuba," to which Mikoyan replied, reassuring Fidel: "And you know that not only in these letters but today as well, we hold to the position that you will keep all the weapons with the exception of the offensive weapons and associated service personnel, which were promised to be withdrawn in Khrushchev's letter." Not fully reassured by Mikoyan's clarifications, the Cubans kept pressing the Soviet representatives about the fate Kremlin, which at that moment was engaged in difficult negotiations with the United States over the conditions of withdrawal and inspections of weapons. Khrushchev once again realized that he could not control his independent and emotional ally Fidel Castro, and that such an alliance, given the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on the island, could be downright dangerous. Castro's order led to an unprecedented outburst of anger and irritation on the part of Khrushchev, who called the Cuban leader "unreliable" and threatened to withdraw all of the Soviet forces from Cuba if Castro did not immediately correct his course.10 Khrushchev's long telegram to Mikoyan on 16 November signified a turning point in the Soviet-Cuban story of crisis resolution. Although we will only know for sure when the Soviet Presidium minutes become available, one may hypothesize that the decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba was made between 15 November and 21 November. On 20 November, Malinovsky ordered Pliev to load all tactical nuclear weapons on the ship "Atkarsk" and return them to the Soviet Union. Gribkov stated at the October 2002 conference in Havana that the last nuclear warhead left Cuba on 20 November."1 On 21 November, Mikoyan sent a telegram to Moscow, in which he concluded that all tactical nuclear weapons should be removed from Cuba. This telegram read in stark contrast to his telegram of 8 November. On 22 November, the CPSU Presidium issued instructions to Mikoyan in connection with the Cuban Foreign Ministry's message to the Cuban representative at the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, that “we should keep the tactical nuclear weapons." Mikoyan was instructed to make sure that the Cubans stop talking about any nuclear weapons and to inform them that "these weapons belong to us, and are to be kept in our hands only, we never transferred them to anyone, and we do not intend to transfer them to anyone. In addition, as we have told the Americans, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba." 12 The issue reached its culmination during the meeting between Mikoyan and the Cuban leadership on the evening of 22 November, at which Mikoyan confronted the Cubans with the fact that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from Cuba even though they were not part of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. This unexpected turn of events was clearly hard for Castro to accept, but eventually he stopped trying to pressure Mikoyan into finding some way to keep those weapons, or even any significant Soviet military presence on the island. According to the available documents, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba was never raised again after 22 November. Most likely, the decision to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons resulted from "nuclear learning" on the part of the Soviet leadership. Although the Khrushchev initially intended to leave the tactical nuclear weapons along with the rest of the equipment not covered in the exchange of letters in Cuba, he soon began to appreciate the danger of an inadvertent nuclear conflict and some time in the second half of November 1962 Moscow apparently resolved to withdraw them. However, more evidence is still needed to be able to state conclusively when the final decision was made and what the main argument was for removing the tactical nuclear weapons. The documents below became available as a result of international collaboration between the National Security Archive and the Russian scholars, military veterans of the Cuban missile crisis and archivists. For a more extensive look at the new Russian documentation on the Cuban Mis sile Crisis, consult the websites of the National Security Archive (http://www.nsarchive.org) and the Cold War International History Project (http://cwihp.si.edu) as well as the forthcoming book by Sergo A. Mikoyan. Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya is director of Russian programs at the National Security Archive at The George Washington University. DOCUMENT No. 1 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED-USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 22 October 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] TOP SECRET TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV In connection with the possible landing of Americans participating in the maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea on Cuba, undertake urgent measures to increase combat readiness, and to repel the enemy by joint efforts of the Cuban army and all units of the Soviet troops, excluding the weapons of Statsenko's and of all Beloborodov's cargo. Director # 4/389 22 October 1962 23.30 *** DOCUMENT No. 2 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED-USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 23 October 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] TOP SECRET TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV From 00 Moscow time on 24 October establish twoway radio connection on two directions on radio station R In connection with the fact that US Navy is blockading approaches to Cuba, we made a decision not to send 665 and 668 RP [missile regiment] to you. You should not unload warheads for R-14 from transport ship "Alexandrovsk." If they are already unloaded, organize secret loading back onto "Alexandrovsk." Transport ship "Alexandrovsk" with the warheads for R-14 should be prepared for transportation back to the Soviet Union, accompanied by "Almetievsk." Remove the cannons with the crews. Carefully instruct captain of the ship and head of the echelon about their conduct on their way and their actions in accordance with their instructions. In case of extreme situation they have to sink the ship. Report on readiness of "Alexandrovsk" for departure. Director 25 October TOP SECRET TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV to # 8/154 We categorically confirm that you are prohibited from using nuclear weapons from missiles, FKR [cruise missiles], "Luna" and aircraft without orders from Moscow. Confirm receipt. Director #76639 27 October 1962 16.30 DOCUMENT No. 4 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED-USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 27 October 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] *** DOCUMENT No. 6 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED-USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 27 October 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] TOP SECRET TROSTNIK to Comrade PAVLOV to # 8/162 TOP SECRET Send your considerations. Director [early November 1962] DOCUMENT No. 11 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), ca. 5 November 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] TOP SECRET From TROSTNIK to comrade PAVLOV With regard to warheads for "Luna," FKR [cruise missiles] and IL-28 airplanes, so far their withdrawal has not been discussed. They should be left in Cuba under your command. Director # 76190/sh [circa 5 November 1962] DOCUMENT No. 12 Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 6 November 1962 [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Special Declassification April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya and Andrea Hendrickson.] TOP SECRET Making Copies Prohibited Copy No. 12 CIPHERED TELEGRAM CC CPSU It seems to me that it is now possible to go over some conclusions from the conversations I have had here. In connection with this I would like to cite a few characteristic mo ments. Several hours before my arrival in Havana the Cuban leadership had decided that two representatives of the leadership would meet me at the airport, [Ernesto “Che”] Guevara and [Defense Minister] Raoul Castro. However, two hours before my arrival, upon receiving the text of my statement at the airport in New York in support of Cuba, their intentions changed and the entire leadership (except for the president) with Fidel Castro himself greeted me warmly and in a brotherly fashion. They all came with me to the residence and we conversed for about 15 minutes. For the first conversation, Fidel received me in his private apartment. He went outside into the street and greeted me in front of the house where the car stopped and walked me to the upper floor. You received his statements, which he made in a calm, friendly tone, but in essence I could feel the acute dissatisfaction with our policy. The next second — meeting took place at the Presidential Palace. All six leaders participated in the conversation. Each time they met me in the corridors of the palace and accompanied me to the room where the discussions were held, and at the end of the discussions they all walked me to the car and we parted warmly. I was treated warmly everywhere. During the conversations they acted calmly and listened attentively when I, in the course of several hours, tried to dispel their doubts, citing all possible arguments, one point after another, trying to prove that our policy was correct. They all listened to me with great attentiveness and took notes. I had the impression that I was speaking persuasively except for two moments, about which Fidel Castro posed questions during the conversation, expressing his dissatisfaction and his alarm. 1. The American radio and press have disseminated information that there is allegedly one section in the confidential letter from [Nikita] Khrushchev to [John F.] Kennedy from 26 October that cannot be published. Apparently, that led him to entertain some suspicions. Fidel asked whether there was another message from Khrushchev in addition to what had been given to him. I said that there was not. Fidel said: "If so, why would Kennedy, in his response from 27 October to Khrushchev's 26 October letter already be mentioning the Soviet proposal to dismantle, and other things, although that was not directly mentioned in the confidential letter from Khrushchev from 26 October?” Apparently he suspects that there is another message from Khrushchev that was hidden from him, or a section of Khrushchev's letter of 26 October that was not shown to him. I explained that in his response from 27 October Kennedy formally responded only to the confidential letter of 26 October. However, in reality, he responded both to this one [26 October] and, mainly, to Khrushchev's message from the 27th, which was openly transmitted on the radio, although Kennedy's letter did not cite it directly. I said that all of the letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy, and everything that |