tions are going on [?]. If we raise such conditions, we would have to implement it, i.e. begin to shoot down the planes. We believe that our people cannot participate in this, because, according to our deepest conviction, not all opportunities have been used for realization of mutual obligations of the sides, which arise from the exchange of correspondence with President Kennedy. To act in such a manner now would lead to a military conflict, and it could develop if one would follow such a course, it could not be justified by anything and would have no grounds. This is our understanding of the situation, and this is our assessment of the position of our Cuban friends on the issue of American flights over Cuba. All this puts us in a very difficult situation already, because there are our people [in Cuba] servicing these weapons. Of course, they will believe that these weapons would have to be used. But we cannot give an order to our people to use those weapons, because to give such an order would mean to start pulling ourselves into a war. And we do not want that and we consider it irrational. In addition, we believe-and this is very important-that, even if they opened fire against the American aircraft, and we would regret if such a development occurred, if that would have been done, that fire would not be effective. It would not result in a real strengthening of Cuban security by military means. But it could cause an onset of U.S. military actions against Cuba. And it is a fact that the United States possesses military capabilities which exceed the capabilities that Cuba has now many times, even though now it is much better armed than it was before. Therefore, to open fire against the American aircraft would be an irrational act, which would give the most notorious reactionary forces in America an opportunity to press Kennedy toward the extreme militaristic positions. They, those forces, do exactly that they put pressure on Kennedy and use the opportunities that the Cuban comrades' current position creates for them. We have done and are doing everything possible in order to shield Cuba from intervention and to arm Cuba. We undertook a great risk, and we knew that we were taking a great risk, because a danger of unleashing the thermo-nuclear war really did emerge at the most intense moment. Now with our diplomatic actions we have rapidly brought down this tension and put the negotiations of the two sides that are involved in the conflict in diplomatic channels under such conditions that present for both sides the mutually beneficial resolution of the situation. All this is being done primarily for Cuba and not for us. However, it looks like Cuba does not want to cooperate with us. Cuba, which now does not want to even consult with us, wants practically to drag us behind itself by a leash, and wants to pull us into a war with America by its actions. We cannot and will not agree to this. We will not do it, because we see the conditions that were created with our efforts and that allow us to resolve the issue of Cuban security without war, the issue of non-invasion guar antees. If the Cuban comrades do not want to cooperate with us on this issue and do not want to undertake measures which would help us resolve this issue and avoid being pulled into a war together with us, then apparently the conclusion that we see is that our presence in Cuba is not helpful for our friends now. Then let them state that openly, and we will have to make conclusions for ourselves. If our Cuban comrades undertake measures that in their opinion protect their interests it is their right. But then we have to raise the issue with them that we would be forced to remove from ourselves all responsibility for the consequences to which their steps might lead them. If they do not take our arguments into account, then it is clear that our side cannot bear responsibility for it. We regret it, and we regret it very much, but we will have to state the following-because our advice is not being taken into account, we disclaim any responsibility, because we cannot be attached by force to those actions which we consider irrational. In such a case, let the Cuban comrades bear full responsibility for the situation and for the possible consequences. What should be the conclusion and what would be the next step, if of course the Cuban comrades would agree to take rational steps? We believe, as we have already informed you, that we can give an oral assurance to President Kennedy that we are going to withdraw the IL-28s from Cuba under the condition that the President promises to lift the quarantine immediately, which he expressed willingness to do. The issue of non-intervention guarantees is more complicated now. As you can see from Kennedy's latest confidential letter, he ties this question to the realization of our promises regarding inspections. Therefore, the question of lifting the quarantine and our obligation to withdraw the IL28s is not the main question now, but realistically only an interim condition for the solution of the main issue, because of which essentially, as the Russians say, the whole mess had developed in the first place, is to squeeze out of the United States and to affirm through the United Nations an assurance of non-invasion of Cuba. The United States, of course, got into a difficult situation, taking into account the fact that they for many years after the revolution in Cuba had made statements that they could not tolerate a state of a different socio-political system in the Western Hemisphere. Now, as it clearly follows from the President's letters of October 27 and 28, they, i.e. the United States, stated exactly the opposite, namely: the United States agreed to tolerate a state of a different socio-economic system and is willing to undertake an obligation not to intervene in Cuba and to deter other countries of Western Hemisphere from intervention, if we withdraw the weapons, that President Kennedy characterized as offensive, from Cuba. Our understanding is that all this means a significant important step in the interest of Cuba, in the interest of its independent development as a sovereign socialist state. Unfortunately, the Cuban comrades do not understand that. Now the Cubans by their stubbornness and, I would say, by their certain arrogance which shows in their statements about sovereignty, help the most extreme reactionary forces of the United States to reject the obligations stated in Kennedy's letters and help those forces to put pressure on Kennedy, so that he would be forced to disavow those obligations with a long-term target [in mind] - to ultimately embark on a military invasion of Cuba. It is clear that this would only be in the interests of the enemies of the Cuban revolution. Therefore, we believe that the Cuban comrades should gather their courage and reconsider their position in this issue. They should choose one of the options, which are presented to them: either U Thant's representatives, or ambassadors from five Latin American countries, or representatives of nine neutral countries. If they do not accept these proposals, the United States will be the only winner, and they will score this victory only because we could not rationally use [the bargaining chips] which we were able to obtain during the period of the most critical tension in our relations, when we were on the brink of war. their policy, but then they should not involve us in their business. If they do not want our cooperation, we cannot follow their policy, which in addition is irrational in this issue. In order to give Kennedy a response on this issue, we would like to know your opinion. At this point we do not know yet how the events will develop, but obviously if the negotiations get prolonged, then the Americans will complicate the whole issue more and more. They have such an opportunity, because they have a more favorable strategic and geographic situation. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, they could stall, and they do not suffer and do not lose anything from the prolongation of this conflict. But the losers here first of all would be Cuba and us, both in a material respect and in the political and moral sense. The President raises the issue regarding some guaranties for the future in regard to the issue of sending the socalled offensive weapons to Cuba. He even says that it allegedly follows from our correspondence that we undertook an obligation regarding inspections in the future with a purpose of not allowing further shipments of such weapons to Cuba. By the way, we have not undertaken such an obligation in our correspondence, although in Kennedy's letters that question had been raised. Presenting everything in such a light as if there existed a mutual agreement on that issue, Kennedy, of course, exaggerates. However, it follows that by doing it, he is trying to get the highest possible price from us for his confirmation through the U.N. of the pledge not to invade Cuba. This also complicates the issue. We consider it incorrect to open fire against the American aircraft in the present situation. If I was to use imaginative language, now after the tension has subsided, a certain type of truth emerged, when none of the sides opens fire. The Americans are flying over Cuba, but they were flying there before. To open fire against the U.S. aircraft now would mean to reject the diplomatic channels and to rely only on weapons, i.e. to make a choice of possibly unleashing a war. We believe that this is irrational, and we will not participate in it. We are negotiating with the Americans. We want to cooperate with Cuba, and if Cuba wants to cooperate with us for its own benefit, we will be happy. But if Cuba does Now to the question of U.N. posts. Earlier we presented not want to cooperate with us, then obviously our participa- this position to you and now we repeat that the idea of creattion in the resolution of the Cuban conflict would not bringing of such posts, as means of preventing an unexpected any benefit. In such a case, we would have to find out the opinion of the Cuban leadership and after that discuss the new situation, so that we could make appropriate conclusions for ourselves regarding our people who are presently in Cuba. Frankly speaking, we have deepest regrets that at the time when on our part we are making all efforts to use every opportunity with the purpose of achieving a confirmation of U.S. obligations not to intervene in Cuba through the United Nations, our Cuban friends do not exhibit any desire to cooperate with us in this cause. We do not believe that the Cubans would want to allow war, and if they do not want that, then it would be irrational to deny us and themselves an opportunity to quickly remove the remaining elements of conflicts on the conditions of the obligations that were already undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States in their correspondence. You should personally think it over once again, because you know the situation and the personalities of the people with whom you are going to talk. You need to bring our thoughts and our wishes to there comprehension. Let them respond to you and let them take the responsibility upon themselves. If they do not want to cooperate with us, then obviously the conclusion is clear that they want to take all responsibility upon themselves. It is their right-they are a government and they are responsible for their country, for attack, seems reasonable. Kennedy apparently is consciously trying to link our proposals on that issue, which we made during consideration of arms control issues, to Cuba. He even puts the question in such a way: that creation of U.N. posts in the region of the Caribbean Sea, including the corresponding area of the United States, allegedly requires organization of such posts in the Soviet Union as well. Of course, it is not difficult for us to explain that our proposals regarding the posts were made at the time when negotiations on the issue of general and full disarmament were conducted in London and later during the negotiations in Geneva on prevention of surprise attacks. Therefore, those proposals concerning with the ports of the Soviet Union do not have and cannot have any relationship to Cuba, because at the time when they were made no Cuban issue had existed. We are hoping that Kennedy will understand the inappropriateness of raising the issue about the U.N. posts in the territory of the Soviet Union in connection with the Cuban issue and would not insist on that. Now we are moving toward the Plenum. We have already informed you of our opinion, and we are now even more convinced that we made the right choice when we recommended that you should stay longer in Cuba, even while we understood that your long stay there is beginning to outgrow the framework of necessity. As you have probably noted, the Americans are already saying that apparently the NOTES difficulties in our relations with the Cubans are so substan tial that Mikoyan has to stay in Cuba for a long time and cannot leave yet. We even admit that it might be possible that the Cubans are beginning to feel certain awkwardness as a result of your prolonged stay in Cuba. In short, we obviously have to reach an agreement now: if there is no hope for Cuban cooperation, then probably you will have to leave Cuba. But then we will say that since our Cuban friends do not need our cooperation, we have to draw appropriate conclusions from all this, and we will not impose ourselves. In any case, we believe today that the decision about your trip to Cuba was correct, and your stay there was useful. Now, when you have these important and serious conversations with the Cuban friends, we would like you to take all the circumstances into account and to test the grounds regarding your further stay in Cuba. If you feel that the Cubans are not inconvenienced by your further presence, it would probably be useful for you to stay there longer. Your presence in Cuba represents, one can say, a deterrent factor both for the United States and for the Cubans. N. Khrushchev 12-yav, ll DOCUMENT No. 14 Telegram TROSTNIK (REED-USSR Defense [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.] TOP SECRET From TROSTNIK to comrade PAVLOV Missiles with conventional loads for "Luna" and FKR [cruise missiles] should be left in Cuba. Send 6 nuclear bombs, 12 warheads for "Luna" and 80 warheads for FKR to the Soviet Union on steamship "Atkarsk." Director November 20 1 See Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev Nuclear Weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 11, Winter 1998, pp. 251-262 2 "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 40th Anniversary Conference" Havana, Cuba, 11-13 October 2002, co-sponsored by the National Security Archive at George Washington University in partnership with Brown University's Watson Institute for International Affairs and Cuban institutions. The conference was the latest in a series of critical oral history meetings on the Cuban Missile Crisis and generated worldwide headlines by gathering U.S., Russian and Cuban veterans of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis for two days of discussions in Havana on October 11-12, 2002, followed by a tour of the last surviving remnants of the missile emplacements on the island. Cuban President Fidel Castro hosted the 40th anniversary conference and participated fully in both days' deliberations. 3 See Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Tactical Weapons Disclosure Stuns Gathering," CWIHP Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 2-4 4 Editor's Note: Certain portions of the "Malin Notes" have been published recently in Moscow: Prezidium TsK KPSS 19541964: Chernovye zapisi zasedanii, stenogrammy, ed. Aleksandr A. Fursenko (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003). See also Mark Kramer, "The "Malin Notes" on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” CWIHP Bulletin No. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 385-410. 5 Operation "Anadyr," as the operation for transporting Soviet military personnel and qeuipment was codenamed, was given its name to disguise the actual final destination of the cargo. Anadyr is a river in north-eastern Russia, and military personnel assigned to the operation were issued winter uniforms to create an impression of an operation that would take place in the northern regions. See Anatoly Gribkov and William Y. Smith. Operation Anadyr: US and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: edition q, 1994). 6 Telegram from Malinovsky to Pliev, published in On the Brink of Nuclear Precipice. (Moscow: Gregory-Page, 1998), p. 365. The author thanks Jim Hershberg and Raymond Garthoff for locating and supplying this manuscript. 1 See Vladislav M. Zubok, "Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union: Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban Leadership, November 1962." in CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 59-77. 8 Mikoyan's telegram to Politburo, 6 November 1962, Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. 9 See Memorandum of conversation between Castro and Mikoyan, published in Operation Anadyr. 10 Khrushchev's telegram to Mikoyan, 16 November 1962, printed below. "Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali note the same uncertainty regarding when the weapons were actually withdrawn in their book One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 12 Presidium Instructions to Mikoyan in Cuba, 22 November 1962. Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. CONFERENCE REPORTS, RESEARCH NOTES AND ARCHIVE UPDATES Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference By Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok n the summer of 1999 the National Security Archive at the Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. The archives of the Central George Washington University in cooperation with the Commite of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan contain a Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), launched a new initiative, "Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War." The main goal of the project was to explore the archives in Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku to determine to what extent Cold War era documents, including materials still classified in the central archives in Moscow, would be accessible there. The Caucasus Initiative also aimed at bringing scholars from these three republics into the larger international network of Cold War scholars and at incorporating the results of the regional scholars' research into the wider canvas of historiography of Cold War and Soviet history. The first meeting of scholars from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the United States took place in Tbilisi in October 2000.' The workshop was one of the first meetings between Armenian and Azeri historians after the years of war and alienation that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. It demonstrated that scholars from the three countries were greatly interested in exchanging research results and archival information among themselves and with their Western colleagues. After some discussion, the participants agreed on the agenda for a future conference. detailed and apparently complete set of documentation on the implementation of Stalin's plans to extend Soviet influence and to acquire oil in northern Iran. The documents demonstrate how Stalin worked to achieve his expansionist goals by exploiting the nationalist feelings of Azeris living on both sides of the Soviet-Iranian border.2 Throughout the Soviet occupation of Iran (1941-1946), as Hasanli's research shows, there was an unresolved ambiguity, perhaps even tension, between Stalin's strategic goals in Iran and the Azeris' nationalist agenda. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Mir Jafar Bagirov said in his instructions to a team of Soviet officials leaving for northern Iran in 1941: "By fulfilling your task, you will do a great service to the people of Azerbaijan. By implementing this honorable task, you will satisfy the desire of brothers divided for centuries." Most Soviet officials thought that support for the Iranian Azeri minority had to be placed at the center of Soviet policies. Stalin, however, equivocated. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 officials, only 600 men were commandeered from Soviet Azerbaijan into Iran in 1941-1942. Soviet occupation authorities also sought support from much smaller Kurdish, Armenian, and even Georgian minorities in northern Iran, possibly to counterbalance Azeri influence there. After he proclaimed the reunification of Ukraine and Belarus in May 1945, Stalin found it expedient to respond positively to national expectations in the Southern Caucasus. Moscow urgently instructed the commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Azerbaijan to prepare a memorandum about northern (Soviet) and southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan, demonstrat This next meeting took place on 8-9 July 2002 in the Tsinandali Conference Center at the foot of the Big Caucasus Range in the Kakhety Valley in Georgia. Seventeen scholars participated in the conference, including Laura Abbasova (Baku State University), Levan Avalishvili (Tbilisi State University), Jamil Hasanli (Baku State University), Eldar Ismailov (Baku State University), Georgi Kldiashvili (Tbilisi State University), Marziya Mammadova (Baku State University), Georgy Mamulia (Black Sea University), Eduarding that they were historically and culturally identical. The Melkonian (Institute of General History, Armenia), Karen Khachatrian (Institute of General History of Armenia), Ketevan Rostiashvili (Tbilisi University), Ronald G. Suny | (University of Chicago), Francoise Thom (Sorbonne University), Amatun Virabian (Archival Department of the Republic of Armenia), and Andrei Zubov (Institute of International Relations, Moscow). The most archive-intensive and potentially significant part of the conference focused on the relationship between local nationalist aspirations and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's plans at the end of World War II. Jamil Hasanli presented a paper based on his extensive research on Soviet policies in memorandum was to emphasize that it was an opportune moment for the "liberation" of southern Azerbaijan. On 21 June and 6 July 1945 Stalin's Politburo secretly ordered the exploration of oil fields in northern Iran and, simultaneously, the creation of separatist regimes in that area based on the Kurdish and Azeri nationalist movements. In Moscow, the troika of Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrenty Beria, and Georgi Malenkov was responsible for the implementation of these plans. Stalin met with Bagirov, a close friend and protégé of Beria, and personally instructed him to take charge of both operations.3 By December 1945, the newly founded Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (ADP) claimed political control over the ethni- | ing “justice.” Khachatrian found that the leadership of Socally Azeri territories in northern Iran. In combination with Stalin's refusal to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran, this effort unleashed one of the first international crises of the Cold War. Pressed by the United States and the United Nations, Stalin pulled his troops out of Iran in 1946. Subsequent events showed that the Soviet leader coldly sacrificed ADP leaders, Kurdish separatists, and other nationalist activists had cast their lot in with the Soviets. While Hasanli persuasively argued that Soviet goals in Iran were a combination of economic (oil) and security interests, the importance of regional nationalist aims during the crisis should not be discounted. Even today some scholars in Azerbaijan see the outcome of the Iranian crisis as a setback for their republic. In her paper Laura Abbasova looked at another crisis that contributed to the rise of the Cold War: Soviet territorial claims on Turkey in 1945-1946, which eventually jolted Washington into action. Relying on archival evidence from Baku, as well as documents provided by other participants at the October 2000 workshop, Abbasova found, much to her surprise, that, behind the edifice of Soviet foreign policy, another "cold war" was being fought among the leaderships of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Soviet demands on Turkey revived the aspirations of Armenians, who remembered vividly their forced exodus from Turkish territories where they had lived for centuries. But the Soviet claims also intersected with the demands of the Georgian leadership to 'reclaim the historic lands' populated by the Laz in Trabezond along the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea. Authorized by Moscow (where Georgians were prominently represented in the Soviet leadership), Georgian historians Dzhanashia and N. Berdzenishvili published an article in December 1945 providing the historical and cultural justification for annexation of Trabezond. Their main rivals were the Armenians who argued that, out of 26,000 square kilometers (sq. km.) of the claimed Turkish territories, 20,500 sq.km. should be incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In response, Georgian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Kiknadze sent a memorandum to Moscow with a proposal to re-distribute the Turkish territories differently: while Armenia would receive only 12,760 sq.km., Georgia's share would grow to 13,190 sq.km. Abbasova wondered how such conflicting demands could emerge in Stalin's "totalitarian regime," and to what extent they were the product of local nationalism or inspired by Moscow. Karen Khachatrian presented new archival material on the Turkish crisis of 1945-1946 from an Armenian perspective. Earlier in Soviet history, Khachatrian stressed, the Soviet government had neglected Armenian national interests and made territorial concessions to Turkey and to the proBolshevik forces in Azerbaijan. Moscow's denunciation of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty on 19 March 1945 produced great enthusiasm among Armenians all over the world. The files of the Foreign Ministry of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in Yerevan contain appeals and letters from the Armenian émigré communities around the world, including those in the United States, appealing to "great Stalin" and demand viet Armenia became an intermediary between the voices of the Armenian diaspora and the central government in Moscow. The secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, Gregory Arutyunyan, repeatedly wrote to Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov encouraging them to include the issue of returning the “Armenian historical lands” in the negotiations with the allies about the post-war settlement. Stalin seemed sympathetic, and, in connection with his plans for Turkey, authorized a global campaign for the repatriation of Armenians émigrés to Soviet Armenia. The number of repatriates quickly exceeded Soviet expectations and Armenia's modest resources. Very soon the republic was flooded with hundreds of thousands of people; the authorities needed additional resources to house, feed, and "re-educate" the newly-arrived. As Khachatrian's research shows, by 1948 the problem of Armenian repatriates caught Stalin's attention. Soviet pressure on Turkey had failed to produce any territorial concessions and led Ankara to seek US protection. Many repatriates languished in Soviet Armenia in the less-than-comfortable conditions and began to think of returning home. Gradually, the repatriates turned from a diplomatic asset in Stalin's game into an economic burden and, for the paranoid Soviet leader, a growing security threat. There were signals to Stalin from both Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders warning that “a greater Armenia" might develop separatist plans and that Armenians should not be trusted. Soon the repatriates were resettled away from the state borders (see Document No. 1). On 14 September 1948, Stalin, then at his dacha on the Black Sea, sent a cable to Georgy Malenkov, instructing him to look into the case of a fire on board a Soviet ship bringing a group of Armenian repatriates to the Georgian port of Batumi. Stalin's suspicions that British-American agents were among the repatriates triggered snowballing investigations and repressions that resulted in the halt of Armenian repatriation and the exiling of thousands of repatriates into settlements and camps in Kazakhstan. In his paper, Eduard Melkonian looked at the Armenian repatriation and demands in 1945-48 from the perspective of the "Spyurk," the Armenian diaspora. Based largely on Western archival sources, Melkonian's presentation traced the sources of the split among the Armenians abroad between the anti-Communist Dashnaktsutyun faction and the Rankavar faction, which had reconciled itself to the incorporation of Armenia into the Soviet Union. During the 1920s and early 1930s the Rankavar Armenians and the network of charity organizations, one of which was chaired by Kallust Gulbenkyan, helped Soviet Armenia, but the repression of the 1930s ended this assistance. After the end of World War II the Armenian community in the United States began to lobby for the revival of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) that had granted a considerable part of Anatolia to the Armenian state. As the Truman administration adopted the policy of containment, Armenian demands clashed with American strategic interests. At a crucial meeting with representatives of the Armenian community, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson |