politics behind the façade of the Turkish and Iranian crises. He described how a small Georgian minority in Iran, the Fereidans, were caught in the pressures and counter-pressures of the rising Cold War. In 1945 this compact ethnic community, along with other ethnic minorities that populated northern Iran, came to Moscow's attention as a possible instrument for fomenting unrest in Iranian domestic politics. Mamulia discovered differences between Tbilisi and Moscow in their position towards the Fereidans; while the Georgian leadership wanted to repatriate the Fereidans to Georgia, Moscow clearly preferred to keep them in Iran. The future of the Fereidan Georgians was sealed only after Stalin realized that his plans to obtain influence in northern Iran were foiled by both Iranian intransigence and US pressure.

Mamulia's paper also focused on other pawns of the rising Cold War tensions—the Meskhety Turks and other minorities that moved to Georgia after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's drift to the West resulted in a campaign against potential "Turkish agents" and massive ethnic cleansing of Turkic elements in the Soviet borderlands (Document No. 2). On orders from Stalin, the Georgian Interior Ministry carried out "Operation Volna" (Wave) in 1949: 36,705 Meskheti Turks, Greeks, and repatriated Armenians were exiled into Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics.

In the discussion of these findings, the participants, many for the first time, were able to transcend the boundaries of narrow "national projects" that have dominated historiography in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for decades. In his comments Ronald Suny pointed out that, in a broader historical perspective, the Armenian territorial demands were more serious and far-reaching than Azeri and Georgian demands which seemed to be inspired largely by Moscow and by educated, local elites. The Armenian repatriation offered more potential, but also greater risks for the Soviet regime. Other participants pointed to the Soviet secret police documents from the Georgian, Armenian, and Azeri archives that reflect the strong inter-ethnic tensions in South Caucasus at the end of World War II, which extended into later periods (Document No. 3). Contrary to the myths about "one Soviet people," these documents capture many cases of conflict

sonalities in the republics of the Southern Caucasus during the Cold War. Thom presented a richly researched paper on the role of Lavrenty Beria and the significance of the "Mingrelian Affair" (1951-1953). In addition to archival research in Moscow, Tbilisi and Paris, she also interviewed veterans of the Menshevik Georgian émigré community in France. Traditionally, the "Mingrelian Affair" was held to be primarily about rampant corruption in Georgia involving Mingrelians, an economically active minority in Georgia, many of them connected to Beria. But, as Thom's paper demonstrated, the "Mingrelian Affair" was a multi-layered phenomenon, and the fight against corruption was not its most important dimension. The "Mingrelian Affair" gained prominence due to Stalin's growing mistrust of several of his lieutenants (Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan), who had came to power after the purges and had consolidated their positions during the World War II. To his immense irritation, Stalin found that they had developed solidarity and collective survival tactics that fended off Stalin's attempts to eliminate any one of them. Most ambitious and influential within this group was Beria, an ethnic Mingrelian.

Thom discovered heretofore unknown facets of the "Mingrelian Affair." One was the "Gegechkori case." E. P. Gegechkori was a prominent leader of the Menshevik Georgian government-in-exile based in Paris, which was heavily penetrated by Soviet intelligence. He was also father of Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. Stalin knew and tolerated these circumstances, considering them a political vulnerability that could be used against Beria, if need be, in the future. With Stalin's consent and permission, Beria ran all contacts with the Menshevik exiles in Paris through his personal intelligence network. But when international tensions mounted after the beginning of the Korean War, Stalin grew suspicions of Beria's special ties to the Georgian exiles and decided to cut them. The affair contributed, as Thom demonstrated, to Stalin's growing irritation at his powerful lieutenant.

Eldar Ismailov provided a political profile of a crucial player in the southern Caucasus, Mir Jafar Bagirov of

Azerbaijan. Considering his central role in 1945-46, it was fascinating to learn how Bagirov managed to survive the failure of Stalin's gamble in northern Iran. Besides his friendship with Beria, the key to Bagirov's survival was the fact that he was the first ethnic Azeri to hold the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Historically and culturally, the population of Azerbaijan was a potentially explosive ethnic mix. Moreover, because of its oil, the republic was also of special strategic significance to the Soviet Union. Ismailov portrayed Bagirov as a man of limited education, but with great acumen and political instincts. New tensions over Iran and Turkey could have presented a threat to Bagirov's position. Stalin's ever suspicious plot-seeking mind could have conceivably turned against leaders of Turkic ethnic origins, as Turkey came to be seen as a possible base for infiltration of Azerbaijan. Bagirov understood this danger well and pre-emptively decided to lead the campaign to denounce pan-Turkic tendencies. In 1949 he launched a campaign to denounce Imam Shamil, the leader of the anti-Russian independence movement in the Caucasus in 1840s and 1850s. According to documents found by Ismailov in the Baku archives, during the Azeri leader's meetings with Stalin, Bagirov proposed that the history of Islamic peoples living on Soviet territory be rewritten. Subsequently, Bagirov moved to eradicate Turkic cultural ties among Azeri educated elites and stressed an "Azerbaijani identity" quite distinct from a pan-Turkic identity. In the context of the propagandist preparations of the early Cold War, Stalin could not have but appreciated Bagirov's efforts to create anti-Turkish sentiments in Azerbajian.

To pre-empt Stalin's potential suspicions, Bagirov also unleashed massive repression against those party members who had any connections with Iran or Turkey-having relatives in those countries or even having visited them was considered sufficient grounds for a person to be forcibly relocated away from the border areas to other regions of the country. Finally, Bagirov proposed to Stalin that veterans of❘ the ADP and other separatist movements, who after 1946 had found refuge in Baku, should be relocated to Siberia or Kazakhstan.

Georgy Kldiashvili and Levan Avalishvili, two young historians from Georgia, examined Georgia's role in the USSR's military preparations during the Cold War. Chronologically this paper was broad, covering the period from 1946 through the 1970s. During the early phase of the Cold War, particularly when tensions between the USSR and Turkey remained high, military installations were constructed in Georgia on a significant scale. The paper did not provide any conclusive evidence on war preparations against Turkey. Much more significant was the material on the readiness of Georgia for a possible aerial attack and atomic warfare. As Georgian archival documents show, the republic did not have a functioning civil defense system in 1950. A spate of measures intended to correct this situation were planned for 1951-1952. But the Georgian authorities failed to implement the plans for aerial and atomic defense after Stalin's death, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caught them totally unprepared. Beginning in

1963 new allocations of funds and prodding from Moscow forced Georgian leaders to address their previous slacking and neglect. For instance, construction of a communication center for "special conditions" (i.e., war), planned as early as 1958, finally began in 1963. This haphazard approach, as the available documents suggest, continued until the end of the Soviet Union.

What happened to a considerable part of the military construction allocations in Georgia can be deduced from the paper of Ketevan Rostiashvili on the growing corruption in the republic. By the end of the 1960s, the Georgian economy was choked by corruption. Rostiashvili estimated that 50-60 percent, perhaps as much as 70 percent of the Georgian economy moved into the "gray" or black market. Official reports of the Union ministries (including the USSR Ministry of Finance) acknowledged, for example, that 72 million kilowatts of electric power had been stolen. But efforts to check corruption, most significantly the campaign spearheaded by the head of the Georgian KGB, Eduard Shevardnadze, only led to a mushrooming of the controlling agencies. The number of "people's controllers" in Georgia reached the grotesque figure of two hundred thousand people. There were 10,000 to 12,000 "inspections" annually that achieved no results and only kept increasing the amount of paperwork. Rostiashvili concluded that corruption and inefficiency seriously undermined mobilization and military-construction efforts in this strategically-exposed republic. These conclusions remain relevant, as the independent Republic of Georgian remains mired in all-pervasive corruption, until recently ironically under the leadership of the same Eduard Shevardnadze.

Another highlight of the conference was the discussion on the state of the archives and prospects for new archival discoveries. Participants emphasized the special significance of the personal “funds" (collections) of M.J. Bagirov in Azerbaijan as well as “special dossiers” in the Armenian State Archives. The head of the Armenian Archival Service, Amatun Virabian, presented a brief analysis of the "special dossiers" and their content.

Finally, the participants became engaged in a discussion of the international and national contexts of contemporary history of the southern Caucasus. It was stressed that the Cold War remains a potentially fruitful context for re-integrating disparate historiographic projects developed in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. Andrei Zubov proposed a comparative analysis of imperial policies in the southern Caucasus, implemented by Tsarist Russia, the early Soviet state in the 1920s, and the late Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Suny shared his experience of debates among American historians on Stalin's state-building and Soviet social and cultural developments with the participants.

The Tsinandali conference demonstrated a great potential of cooperation between Western historians and the scholars from the republics in the southern Caucasus. Starting from scratch, the project “Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War" is developing into a productive international network of scholars working on topics of contempo

rary Soviet history. Within two years the project's participants studied and analyzed an impressive amount of archival information in the state and party archives of Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku. Their papers provide the first drafts of what will eventually become the contemporary history of the region during Soviet rule. Preliminary results and conclusions demonstrate that scholars from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan greatly benefited from international cooperation, as well as from personal interaction with leading Western scholars. At the same time the detailed regional research makes an important contribution to the new Cold War history as it begins to abandon its traditional focus on the "two towers" of superpower confrontation and deal with a more diverse set of topics, among them the role of satellites and clients, their "subaltern strategies" to make their voices heard in the great power game, the spill-over effect of Cold War crises, and the national, cultural, and social developments inside the Cold War "home fronts."

We plan to develop and support this research network with all available means, promote close ties with archivists in all three republics, and organize periodic workshops. We also intend to bring the results of this project to the attention of Cold War scholars and a broader Western scholarly community. For further information, contact Svetlana Savranskaya at Svetlana@gwu.edu or CWIHP at coldwar1@wwic.si.edu.

their jobs and takes an active part in productive activities. A significant part participates in the socialist competition-for early fulfillment of the plans, and many of those exhibit high standards in their work.

There is a small part of the repatriated, who initially switched from one job to another and subsequently engaged in trade and speculation on the markets. The number of [those individuals] reaches 600 to 700 people.

Among the members of this group exists a sentiment in favor of re-emigration. According to our information, 21 persons crossed the state border into Turkey at various times. 110 people were detained in the border zone for violations of the border regulations, and they are charged with attempting to cross the border [illegaly]. In addition to that, we know of up to 300 people who are inclined to re-emigrate. Usually, under interrogation, the detained persons explain their motivation to flee the Soviet Union as due to economic factors.

The analysis of their situation on the part of the CC CP(b) of Armenia shows that all of them were given employment upon their arrival, were provided with housing, and received assistance at their workplaces both in food and money. All this notwithstanding, they have not settled into their jobs, but engaged in sales on the market.

The majority of these persons are between 18 and 27 years of age. According to the statements of their parents and family members, they did not work anywhere before their arrival in Armenia and were “separated" from their families.

The repatriated almost unanimously condemn the behavior of this group of repatriates and call them traitors.

Taking into account the material difficulties of the first years after relocation, the government of Armenia provides systematic assistance to the needy.

Besides the provision of bread on the ration card system for all relocated Armenians and members of their families, they are periodically given [other] food products-flour, cereals, sugar and other goods-kerosene, soap, footwear etc. above the usual provision.

The government of Armenia provided 2,300 thousand rubles from the financial assistance fund to those repatriates who have large families and are needy.

Up to 30 million rubles was provided already for construction of individual houses from state credit. The repatriated persons are building 3,890 houses, and further selection of plots for such construction is in progress.

The CC CP(b) of Armenia and the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR outlined measures to strengthen the border regime in order to prevent border crossings. Among those measures in the relocation of the repatriates, who settled in the villages adjacent to the line of the state border, to deeper regions of the republic.

Those people who express re-emigration sentiments are being relocated from the border regions and the city of Leninakan to the deep regions of the republic.

It was decided not to settle arriving Armenians in the villages located in the 5-kilometer border zone in the future. Joint measures for increasing the number of border posts and checkpoints, as well as the number of border personnel,

were outlined to the USSR Ministry of Interior.

area. In the exchange of fire, which occurred when they were

I report that the last months of 1956 were characterized by an increase infiltrations by Western agents from Turkey across the land border into the areas of deployment of the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, and by an increase in [the number of] visits to the Transcaucasus, and mainly the areas of troop deployment, by foreign tourists. and officials of capitalist diplomatic missions among whom persons engaged in intelligence work were noted.

Over the course of June, July and August, two Turkish agents and two American intelligence agents were dispatched from the Turkish side across the state border. All of them received meeting quarters on the territory of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

In addition, on 11 August of this year, an unimpeded crossing of the border from Turkey by four unknown criminals took place in the area of Akhaltsikhe in the Georgian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. On 22 August they crossed back into Turkey approximately in the same

ments, with which agents of foreign intelligence [services] are usually equipped, were found on him.

Military identity card number series GD No. 694861 issued by the Leninakan City Military Committee and passport series U-OF No. 676430 issued by the First Police Department of Kutaisi were confiscated from the body.

This attests to the fact that the Turkish intelligence [service] knows well the procedures of preparation and issuing of documents in the area.

The analysis of the instructions received by the abovementioned three agents from the Turkish and the American intelligence [services] shows that the intelligence [services] exhibit serious interest in obtaining detailed information about the location, number and equipment of the military units, and also pay attention not only to the general information, such as in what area a certain group [of forces] is located, but to detailed reports on the location of particular units.

For example, agent "VOLGIN," who arrived from Turkey in July of this year, pointed out that the Turkish intelligence [service], which had information about the location of the 4th army battalions, instructed him to find out precisely in which settlements the units of those battalions were quartered and with what weapons they were equipped with.

Agent Sochlyan, who arrived from Turkey at approximately the same time, was instructed to carry out reconnaissance of the units of the Yerevan garrison.

The [Western] intelligence [services] devote great attention to the collection of information about the air force units and to the changes in their equipment, which are taking place at the present time.

For example, the same Turkish agent “C” received an assignment to find out whether new secret airports were being built in the neighborhood of Yerevan.

The American agent Moroz, who was deployed in the area of Leninakan in July of this year, had orders to find the airport near the settlement Saganlugi (Tbilisi region), and to find out what kind of aviation was based at that airport, and to what extent this airport was equipped to handle modern aviation. He was also ordered to obtain by any means (to steal or to pressure the servicemen to sell to him) a catalog with the description of the front section of the MIG-17 airplane.

Regarding the issue of the [Soviet] Navy, these agents received the following instructions: agent "M" was instructed to go to Baku and collect information about submarines, and in particular, about missile and radar equipment on them.

Turkish intelligence instructed agent "B," mentioned above, to establish the location of the Navy headquarters in Baku, and as well as the types of ships based in the port of Baku.

It was recommended to the agents that they collect that information both by means of personal observation and from conversations with people who possess the relevant information.

For example, it was suggested to agent "B" that while he

collected information about the number [of troops in] a certain unit, quartered in the winter accommodations, he should also determine the length and width of the barracks, the number of floors, the number of windows, and how many guards were on duty. If [the troops] were quartered in camp conditions to count the number of tents.

It was recommended to determine the types of naval vessels by means of visual observation. For this purpose, the agent was shown pictures of various types of Soviet ships at the intelligence [service] offices, including several types of our submarines.

As was mentioned above, it was suggested to the American agent "M" that he should not hesitate to use violence or bribery of servicemen in order to obtain the catalog description of the MIG-17 plane.

All of the above-mentioned agents received the assignment to identify morally unstable people and individuals dissatisfied with the Soviet regime to encourage them to cross into Turkish territory, or to use them for intelligence purposes on our territory.

For example, Turkish agent "C" received an assignment to select such people from among those previously tried for various crimes, to collect biographical and personal information from them, to report it to Turkish intelligence, to encourage the most adversarily inclined of them to cross into Turkey, and to supply them with a pretext for that.

Agent "B" was assigned to escort one person to Turkey, to collect information about two residents of Baku, including one officer of the 4th Army, and to prepare one other person for subsequent relocation to the Crimea with an assignment from Turkish intelligence. It is characteristic that it was recommended to the agent that he should arrange his first meeting with the person under consideration [in order] to get to know him in a restaurant with some drinking, but to follow him beforehand by the means of outside surveillance. The same agent had the assignment to study the public mood of the population in connection with the struggle against the Stalin's personality cult and condemnation of Bagirov.

The efforts of Turkish intelligence to encourage Soviet citizens to betray their Motherland is expressed in other ways as well.

In 1955, and especially in the summer of 1956, numerous incidents were registered in which Turkish servicemen, and in some cases civilians as well, struck up conversations with soldiers of our border forces soldiers, and in the course of such conversations conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and encouraged them to cross over into Turkish territory, promising them safety and guarantees that these people would not be transferred back to the USSR.

Those facts were most often noted with regard to border troops units 38 and 39 on the section [between] Akhaltsikhe and Leninakan. Similar incidents were also noted on the section of the border with Iran. In certain cases those actions succeed, which was proven by the escape to Iran of three servicemen of the Azerbaijan border troop district between May and August, 1956. As interrogations of the traitors of the Motherland ROTANOV, BONDAREV, and

GORBUNOV have shown, all of them were subjected to intelligence interrogations in Turkey, and they have given the foreign intelligence [services] sensitive information about the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District. It is characteristic that all these persons were encouraged to cooperate with Turkish, American, and British intelligence [agencies].

Some unstable elements and adversarily inclined persons from among the Soviet citizenry also show an interest in the Soviet-Turkish border-they arrive at the villages located close to the border, including the areas of troop deployments, with treacherous designs and search for ways to cross into Turkey or Iran. Such incidents are most often, registered in the regions of Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Leninakan, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Lenkoran.

During the eight months of 1956, 22 people who attempted to betray their Motherland were detained in those

areas.

In 1955, and especially 1956, the influx of various foreign tourist and other groups and of official representatives of capitalist diplomatic missions, who systematically visit various regions of the Transcaucasus, has increased.

Most often, such foreigners are representatives of the United States, France, England, Turkey, and some other countries. These individuals, and especially diplomatic personnel, make visits to mainly strategically important regions of Sukhumi-Tbilisi, Kutaisi-Yerevan-Baku, and LeninakanBatumi. Groups of troops are stationed in those regions and along the highways leading to those [regions].

Observation of foreigners has registered their intention to collect information about the troops by means of visual observation, photography, and use of other technology. The foreigners devote great attention to investigation of highways important from the military point of view, such as the Georgian military road, the road through the Suram and other mountain ridges.

There were some noted incidents of meetings between the foreigners and re-émigrés, and people who moved to establish permanent residency in the Transcaucasus republics. from countries in the Middle East, from France, and other countries, and who mainly settled in the Armenian territory.

A large number of tourists visit the region of the Black Sea Coast, where in August of this year packages with NLF (National Labor Front) anti-Soviet literature were discovered, addressed to the population and servicemen of the Soviet Army.

The circumstances described above were pointed out to all KGB Special Departments in the region. They were instructed to conduct counterintelligence work taking into account the information presented above.

Head of Special Department of the KGB

At the USSR Council of Ministers for Transcaucasus
Military district
Lieutenant General

(ZHELEZNIKOV)