Document No. 3

Cipher Telegram from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to CPSU Central Committee, 26 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration.]

LS no.0692061-26

JS/BL

Russian

[handwritten: 1077/4367[?] [illegible]

TOP SECRET [illegible] 46 CIPHER TELEGRAM

[handwritten: 136 37 Copy no. WASHINGTON 54607 9

40 27 XI 63

54419 54417

Special no. 2005

HIGHEST PRIORITY

Please note [Lee Harvey] Oswald's letter of 9 November, the text of which was transmitted to Moscow over the line [?] of nearby neighbors.

This letter was clearly a provocation: it gives the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own. It was totally unlike any other letters the embassy had previously received from Oswald. Nor had he ever visited our embassy himself. The suspicion that the letter is a forgery is heightened by the fact that it was typed, whereas the other letters the embassy had received from Oswald before were handwritten.

One gets the definite impression that the letter was concocted by those who, judging form everything, are involved in the President's assassination. It is possible that Oswald himself wrote the letter as it was dictated to him, in return for some promises, and then, as we know, he was simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.

The competent US authorities are undoubtedly aware of this letter, since the embassy's correspondence is under constant surveillance. However, they are not making use of it for the time being. Nor are they asking the embassy for any information about Oswald himself; perhaps they are waiting

for another moment.

The question also arises as to whether there is any connection now between the wait-and-see attitude of the US authorities and the ideas conveyed by [US ambassador Llewellyn] Thompson (though he himself may not be aware of this connection) on the desirability of some restraint on the part of the Soviet press and gradually hushing up the entire matter of Kennedy's assassination. Perhaps that is exactly what the federal authorities were inclined to do when

they learned all the facts and realized the danger of serious international complications if the interested US groups, including the local authorities in Dallas, continued to fan the hysteria over the "leftist" affiliations of Kennedy's assassin and the exposés we would have to issue in this case.

The main question now is: should we give the US authorities Oswald's last letter if they ask for our consular correspondence with him (there is nothing else in it that could be used to compromise us). After weighing all the pros and cons, we are inclined to pass on this letter as well to the authorities if they request all the correspondence, because if we don't pass it on, the organizers of this entire provocation could use this fact to try casting suspicion on us.

properly appreciate our step and would act appropriately.

Rusk thanked me again for the photocopies. It was evident that Rusk was quite unprepared for this step on our part, while at the same time (judging form his general behavior) he was pleased with this development.

Rusk asked me, if I could, to find out in Moscow the reasons why the Soviet authorities had refused to grant Soviet citizenship to Oswald when he was still living in the Soviet Union. I promised to forward his request. Please instruct me how to answer Rusk.

Rusk noted in conclusion that he hoped for the Soviet side's cooperation if the Warren Commission had any requests or queries relating to its investigation. He, Rusk, would then want to turn to me confidentially.

Rusk also said he wanted to use our meeting to touch on ceretain other matters unofficially.

1. Rusk informed me that yesterday President Johnson had received FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] director [Najeeb E.] Halaby and instructed him to meet with Soviet representatives for a final settlement of technical issues related to a future agreement on the establishment of a New York-Moscow air route. The US embassy in Moscow has been instructed to consult the MFA on the USSR on this matter. Halaby would be ready to come to Moscow 10-11 December.

Rusk then noted that this entire idea belonged to him, since, apart from the issue itself, he thought it important to show that business was continuing under the new president in the same manner as under J. Kennedy. President Johnson agreed with this, according to Rusk.

2. Rusk them mentioned his meetings with [Soviet Foreign Minister] A.A. Gromyko in New York and Washington at which he raised the issue of the military budget. "I think," he told me, "that soon, in about 10-15 days, I will be able to tell you [the ambassador] in strict confidence the amount the US government plans to appropriate for the military in next year's fiscal budget. It will not be larger than the present amount and might even be less. "Rusk then wondered when we would be considering the budget. He did not pose the question directly, but one could gather that he would also like to get some information on this subject from us as well.

Rusk emphasized several times that his remarks did not mean the US government was now concluding some agreement with the Soviet government on this matter. It could not do this for the reasons that had already been set forth in talks with A.A. Gromyko. Nor could it guarantee that the figures Rusk intends to provide us soon in a strictly unofficial form would not be changed later in some way by the US Congress itself, which constitutionally and traditionally has its rights. But he, Rusk, is continuing to think about the usefulness of such an unofficial exchange of opinions "on mutual intentions."

3. Having mentioned his remarks in the talks with A.A. Gromyko "on the subversive activities of [Cuban leader Fidel] Castro's government," Rusk asked me to convey to him in this connection, in a strictly personal, unofficial form, that

it had been precisely determined that the three tons of weapons seized the other day in Venezuela had come from Cuba. (Rusk said: "We checked out in particular the numbers of the rifles purchased by Castro some time ago in Belgium and seized now in Venezuela.")

"I am saying this," Rusk noted, "not as any representation or comment. Nor can this be the subject of an official talk between us, since Castro's government exercises authority in its own country and it is unlikely that it consults with anyone when it decides to send weapons to one Latin American country or another, although the Chinese (Rusk added parenthetically, as it were) might be mixed up in this." Rusk said in conclusion: "I by no means wish to exaggerate the significance of this incident in Venezuela, it's not that great, but I would simply like to bring this last example to the attention of Mr. Gromyko, with whom I spoke about this matter before. Of course, I do not expect any answer in this matter, and please don't mention in official conversations and talks what I said today.

I told Rusk that the latest events in Venezuela were well known, and if one were to speak frankly, they clearly showed the world once more that the Betancourt regime had no popular support, especially now, on the eve of elections; therefore, would it not be logical to expect (and judging from everything, this is indeed the case) that this regime is prepared to stage any provocation, even an international one, just to remain in power?

Rusk smiled but said nothing more.

A fair amount of time was devoted to discussing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, Rusk did not say anything new compared to his previous statements on this subject. I reiterated our position.

Rusk noted in the course of the conversation that the upcoming NATO meeting in December of this year would be "routine in nature" and, judging from everything, issues relating to the establishment of NATO nuclear forces would basically not be discussed there (Rusk interjected that these issues "are generally discussed through other channels," but did not amplify on this theme).

Rusk said there were no plans yet for a trip to the upcoming NATO meeting by the new president, Johnson, but it has not been ruled out completely. "Evidently," Rusk said as though thinking out loud, "Johnson may instead travel to Europe this spring to meet with a number of heads of states that are US allies. But for the time being, no meetings have been planned specifically between the new president and other heads of state, although there is agreement in principle about such meetings with some of them."

In conclusion, Rusk asked me again to consider our meeting unofficial, as if held “in a family atmosphere." The entire conversation was between the two of us; nobody else was in the office.

Rusk looks very tired; his eyes are red from sleeplessness ("I'm sleeping 3-4 hours a day right now," he remarked), but he himself is animated, in an obviously good mood, and gives the appearance of a person secure about his present position in spite of the change in presidents.

Mongolian Archives

By Sergey Radchenko

I

In the spring 2003 issue of Cold War History I authored an essay on the Mongolian archives, lamenting the lack of access to historical documents, and incredible red tape suffered by rare researchers, and the fear and trembling of the archivists themselves when it comes to openness and freedom of information in Mongolia. In the six months that followed, in countless meetings with government authorities-faceless bureaucrats, enthusiastic listeners, and powerless sympathizers-I argued, persuaded, promised, threatened, appealed to democratic principles and quoted from Marx and Lenin to break through the ice of fear and indifference and open up Mongolian archives to research. But the archival ice proved to be firmer than the winter ice on the Tuul river that flows through Ulaanbaatar. On the other hand, I learned more about the Mongolian archives than I ever wanted to know.

The Khaan of the Mongolian archives is the National Archives Directorate (in Mongolian, Undesni Arkhivyn Gazar or UAG), which in reality exercises much less power than its promising name would indicate. The UAG officially oversees 34 archives, including all of the ministerial archives, the government archive and the provincial (or aimag) archives. But the lines of authority in this arrangement are severely compromised, because ministerial archives take instructions from their respective ministries and not from the UAG.

The only archive subordinate to the Directorate is the Central National Archive (Undesni Tuv Gazar), a vast depository of some 700,000 folders. The Central National Archive itself has 6 branches, including the general historical department, the audio and visual archive and the historical archive of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The general historical department would excite a Mongolia specialist; it holds, for instance, a large collection of ancient undecipherable documents, such as the 1675 border agreement between the Mongolian and the Manchurian khans. From more recent history, the department offers copies of documents on the Soviet-Mongolian relations from the 1920searly 1950s, obtained from Russia's RGASPI. There is little of interest to a Cold War historian in these collections. The audio and visual archive has a blockbuster collection of official films, celebrating the Soviet-Mongolian friendship. By far the most important place for Cold War research is the party archive. The MPRP, still in power, passed its old papers (everything up to 1990) to the Central National Archive in 1998. These materials include Central Committee plenums, documents from party departments, records of the Politburo discussions and the Mongolian leaders' personal papers. Some of these documents, for instance, Yumjagin Tsedenbal's personal papers, are stored without any order, still to be catalogued. Other materials, however, are distributed across fonds, subdivided into registers (tov 'yogs) and folders (khadgalakh negj or kh/n).

Researchers who managed to gain access to this archive are generally allowed to see materials from the Central Committee departments, records of plenum discussions, and politburo resolutions. Of these, plenum materials are of particular importance for Cold War historians, as MPRP plenums were often used as a podium for attack against Tsedenbal and the unbreakable Soviet-Mongolian friendship. Fonds 1 and 4 are also very useful, as they contain a large collection of Tsedenbal's memoranda of conversations with foreign ambassadors and politicians (for instance, Tsedenbal's meetings with the Soviet, Chinese and the North Korean ambassadors). Politburo transcripts and Tsedenbal's personal papers (including his personal diary and most important memcons) are all off limits to researchers. Yet, even access to "open documents" is highly problematic and depends more than anything on researcher's own connections.

The Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, only on paper connected with the UAG, is a treasure trove for Cold War historians; it holds extensive day-to-day records of Mongolia's foreign relations from the early 20th century until our day. The archive's 30,000 folders (kh/n), spread across some 145 fonds contain valuable evidence on Mongolia's relations with its closest neighbors, China and the Soviet Union, accounts of landmark events (such as the 1971 Lin Biao incident), countless records of conversations between Mongolian and foreign leaders and all diplomatic correspondence. Following the Russian usage, secret materials are marked by a zero in front of the fond number-for instance, "02" stands for the secret Soviet-related materials, and "05" for Chinese-related materials. Distinction between "secret" and "open" materials is purely philosophical. Access to any documents is difficult at best. Declassification is governed both by the 1998 Mongolian Law on Archives (with its thirty year rule) and internal directives, which prescribe much tighter secrecy, no less than 60 years for documents of any importance. One way or another, declassification in the Foreign Ministry Archive, as in many other Mongolian archives, works only on paper. After enduring considerable red tape, this author was allowed to look at some of the open materials— mundane diplomatic correspondence mingled with a few noteworthy items (for instance, Vyacheslav Molotov's original diplomatic credentials and hand-written records of Klement Voroshilov's talks with the Mongolian leaders in 1957). At the same time, several Mongolian scholars have benefited from a much better access to this archive.

Another interesting archive for Cold War research is the Government Archive, located in the magnificent main government headquarters, built (I am told) by the Japanese prisoners of war in the 1940s. As I mentioned in my earlier piece in Cold War History, the Government Archive is the central depository of the Mongolian Council of Ministers records, and its holdings mainly cover economic issues. However, the

archive also has a large number of Deputy Prime Minister's memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders and ambassadors, some of which touch on political issues. The Government Archive reportedly has an interesting collection of classified documents from the Cold War period, but this author has not yet been able to get access to them.

To mention a few other useful archives: the Defense Ministry Archive is halfway open to some researchers. It holds immensely interesting documents on Mongolia's relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and records of joint Soviet-Mongolian military exercises in 1979, in response to the Sino-Vietnamese War. More curious documents are found in the Central Intelligence Archive, including intelligence and reports on the Lin Biao incident (with many photographs). Access to this archive is utterly impossible, all the more so after recent scandals with unauthorized release of materials related to repressions in Mongolia in the 1930s, but experience suggests possible workarounds.

Since access to the archives in Mongolia remains difficult and frustrating, I frequently found it much easier to work with private document collections, eagerly shared by retired Mongolian policy-makers who also offered valuable commentaries to these documents, over a bottle or two of Mongolian arkhi. Some Mongolian historians have also collected important materials over the years and published them openly. The most interesting example is Tsedenbal's personal diary, published in abridged form in 1991 by B. Sumya.' Some records of conversations between Tsedenbal, Choibalsan, and Stalin were published in the early 1990s in the central newspapers, at the high tide of the Mongolian glasnost.?

Overall, Mongolian archives contain very important evidence on the Cold War, especially on the Sino-Soviet split. For decades Ulaanbaatar had been the Soviet voice in Asia. The Mongolians sided with Moscow in the quarrel with Beijing despite Chinese political and economic pressure. Indeed, Mongolian leaders were often more explicitly anti-Chinese than their Soviet comrades. This fact alone shows the tremendous role of cultural differences and antagonisms between neighboring Asian nations. Mongolian elites, however, were in disagreement over the country's future. Whereas some leading figures insisted on ever closer relations with. the Soviet Union, to the point of accession, others urged caution and even suggested to play on the Sino-Soviet differences to chart an independent course. These disagreements were often at the center of power struggles in Ulaanbaatar, indicating a much more complex political landscape of Moscow's relations with its closest allies than previously thought. Mongolian archives also reflect on Soviet foreign policy, evidenced in dozens of records of conversations between the Soviet leaders and Tsedenbal, for he had seemingly closer relations with Moscow than any other leader of the socialist commonwealth. Last but not least, Mongolia's unique geographic position at the heart of Asia allowed. Mongolian leaders frequent meetings with Asian. powerbrokers—Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh and others. Mongolian archives therefore hold valuable evidence on foreign relations of Asian countries at the time when many

Asian archives remain completely inaccessible to scholars.

In partnership with the Civic Education Project and the Mongolian Institute for Internal Studies, the Cold War International History Project and its partners, including the George Washington University Cold War Group, London Cold War Study Centre, National Security Archive, and the Parallel History Project, held an exploratory workshop on "Mongolia and the Cold War” in Ulaanbaatar, on 19-20 March 2004. The workshop will provide a forum for discussing Mongolia's evidence on the Cold War, exchanging views on freedom of information and access to historical documents in a democratic society, and for considering possibilities for future collaboration between Mongolian and Western scholars and historians. The workshop's local co-sponsors are the American Centre for Mongolian Studies, Civic Education Project Mongolia, National University of Mongolia, Open Society Institute, and the United States Embassy. Organizers hope that the workshop and the subsequent publication of selected Mongolian documents will contribute to the international Cold War scholarship, encourage research in the Mongolian archives, and advance the cause of freedom of information in Mongolia. For more information, please visit the workshop's website: http://serrad.by.ru/mongolia workshop.shtm or contact CWIHP Associate Sergey Radchenko at S.S.Radchenko@lse.ac.uk. Further information is also available at the CWIHP website at http://cwihp.si.edu where translated documents obtained for the conference are slated to be published.

Sergey S. Radchenko is completing his PhD as the London School of Economics. He is the author of CWIHP Working Paper No. 42, "The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split" (November 2003), available at http://cwihp.si.edu.

NOTES

1 B. Sumya (ed.), Gerel Suuder: Yu. Tsedenbalyn Huviin Temdeglel [Light and Shadow: Yu. Tsedenbal's Personal Diary], Ulaanbaatar, 1991.

2 For instance, "Conversation between Joseph Stalin and Yumjagin Tsedenbal" (5 September 1952), Unen N9 (23 January 1992), p. 2.