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mand after Chinese troops entered the war. It was only under Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily necessary joint command. He likewise resisted placing North Korean railroads under Chinese military management, agreeing to this important step only after he was pressured to do so by the Soviets-a capitulation that, in Shen's estimate, "left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il Sung."

In part two, the Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai analyzes North Korean relations with the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev years, drawing on extensive research in the Hungarian archives. Although Hungarian leaders did not develop a special relationship with Kim Il Sung comparable to that of the East Germans, their diplomats were able to gain excellent information on the internal workings of the Kim regime thanks to communications from Koreans who had been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with Hungarian embassy personnel after returning to the DPRK. Comparing North Korea to other communist countries, Szalontai singles out the DPRK's dependence on foreign assistance, despotic political system, and isolationism as its distinguishing characteristics. In addition, Pyongyang's continued rivalry with Seoul shaped North Korea's domestic and foreign policies in distinctive ways. Attributing Moscow's failure to ensure de-Stalinization in the DPRK to Kim Il Sung's skill at exploiting events such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Khrushchev's purge of 1957, as well as to Soviet arrogance, Szalontai presents a persuasive and original analysis of the roots of North Korea's remarkable autonomy. He examines in detail the conflict with Moscow in 1959-60 over Pyongyang's unification plans and the sharp deterioration in relations following the Sino-Soviet split. Szalontai concludes that Kim's victory over the Soviet and Yenan factions in 1959 marked a turning point in Soviet-North Korean relations, after which Pyongyang pursued an increasingly independent and despotic course. Translations of selected documents follow the article.

In part three, the German historian Bernd Schäfer presents a cogent history of North Korea's relations with the

proved of the ongoing cult of Kim Il Sung. They were shocked by the scale of Korean demands for economic assistance and were offended by Pyongyang's refusal to acknowledge the considerable aid it received from its allies. After the Sino-Soviet split erupted into the open, Pyongyang enjoyed the anomalous position of being wooed by both its giant neighbors. Since the GDR had to remain absolutely faithful to the Soviet Union, East German representatives in Pyongyang banded together with their Soviet counterparts to exchange information and discuss the disturbingly unpredictable actions of the North Koreans. East German documents therefore provide important insight into Soviet attitudes toward the Kim Il Sung regime as Moscow attempted to exert leverage over Pyongyang. Schäfer traces the twists and turns in the DPRK's foreign policy as Kim turned back toward Moscow in the wake of Mao's Cultural Revolution, and then opened negotiations with Seoul in response to the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972. The warm personal relations that Kim developed with Erich Honecker following the East German leader's visit to the DPRK in 1977 led to what Schäfer terms "reciprocal byzantinism," the record of which reveals the autocratic delusions of both leaders. Translations of selected documents follow the article.

Part four presents translations of additional documents from the Hungarian National Archives, provided to the Korea Initiative by Csaba Békés of the Cold War History Research Center in Budapest, and a letter from Kim Il Sung to Władysław Gomułka found in the Modern Records Archive in Warsaw by KI advisory board member Vojtech Mastny. A meeting with Hungarian Minister Károly Pásztor in March 1953, during the final phase of the Korean War, provides a starting point by revealing the warm relations that existed between the two countries during the war, buttressed by the material, technical, and educational aid provided by Hungary, and the increased stature Kim Il Sung had gained by the end of the war, despite his humiliating submission to Chinese military control. A meeting with Hungarian Ambassador Pál Szarvas in June 1955 suggests the extent to which domestic

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political affairs of any one state were at that time regarded as the common concern of all states within the Soviet bloc. Such solidarity deteriorated sharply in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, as revealed in Kim Il Sung's meeting include: "Should We Fear This?' Stalin and the Danger of September 1956 with Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth. A letter from Kim Il Sung a decade later to Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, rejecting the Polish proposal to convene a conference of communist parties to discuss coordination of assistance to North Vietnam in its war against the United States, reveals how seriously Kim regarded the disagreements within the communist camp, by then greatly exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet split. The reports from the Hungarian embassies in Pyongyang and Beijing presented in this section are in some respects even more revealing than the records of conversations at the highest level, since they provide more detailed discussions of Pyongyang's domestic and international policies. The Hungarian diplomats reported on issues such as North Korea's approach to the political conference following the Korean War, Kim Il Sung's cult of personality, DPRK relations with the Third World, the complexities of North Korea's unification policy, and the effects of the Sino-Soviet split on the DPRK.

(continued on from p. 7)

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Special Working Papers Series

#1 Mark Kramer, "Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981"

Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution

during the Korean War

By Shen Zhihua

Translated by Dong Gil Kim and Jeffrey Becker

S

cholarship on intra-alliance relations during the Cold War, particularly on the Cold War in Asia, has focused primarily on relations between great powers such as the Soviet Union and China.' Relatively little research has been done on the development of relations between larger and smaller countries within the communist camp.2 The subject of this case study, Sino-Korean relations during the Korean War, has been characterized as a friendship, forged by shared difficulties, that was "as close as lips to teeth." While this ancient description of relations between China and Korea aptly describes some aspects of the wartime alliance, the simile fails to capture the significant conflict that existed between the two countries at the highest levels. This paper, which is based on archival documents and the recollections of individuals involved in the events, explores the tensions in Sino-Korean relations at the highest levels during the Korean War and the methods used to mitigate those tensions, which were shaped by the larger pattern of Cold War relations in Asia. Space limitations prevent me from making a comprehensive analysis of the cultural and historical causes behind these tensions and their repercussions, which would shape Sino-Korean relations for the remainder of the Cold War. It is my hope that this paper will serve as a basis for broader future studies on this subject.

China's Deployment of Troops to North Korea

Based on research into archival materials that have become available in the past several years, scholars have reached a near consensus of opinion that the leadership of the PRC— or at least Chairman Mao Zedong-firmly intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began.3 What has not become well known, however, is that the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel.

As Russian archival documents have established, in January 1950 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin informed his North Korean protege Kim Il Sung that he would support the latter's request to mount a military offensive against South Korea and would allow Kim to visit Moscow to discuss the matter.4 In the three meetings between the Soviet and North Korean leaders that followed, held 10-25 April, Stalin emphasized two preconditions that had to be met before he would give his final approval for military action against South Korea: that he could be assured that the US would not interfere, and that China would agree to support North Korea. Kim assured Stalin that since the DPRK had the support of the USSR and the PRC, the US would refrain from interfering because it would not risk a major war. On the second point, Kim stated that

Mao Zedong had always supported the idea of liberating all of Korea. Kim explained that Mao had repeatedly expressed his view that China would help Korea once it completed its own revolutionary victory, and, if necessary, would provide military assistance. Kim insisted that his own forces were sufficient, however. Stalin nonetheless emphasized that the Soviet Union was not prepared to get directly involved itself in Korea, especially if the United States risked deploying troops, and that Kim therefore had to consult with Mao and obtain his support.5

Accordingly, on 13 May Kim secretly visited Beijing and informed Mao of his plan to attack the South. Mao was surprised by this plan, but after he received a telegram from Stalin the following day confirming that the Soviet leader had agreed to the campaign, he expressed his support. In a meeting with Kim on the fifteenth, Mao suggested that the Korean People's Army (KPA) should fight a quick, decisive war. It should outflank the larger cities, in order to avoid a protracted war, and concentrate instead on destroying the enemy's main areas of strength. Mao explained that he had intended to help North Korea attack the South once Taiwan was liberated, but since North Korea had decided to attack now and this was their common cause, China was prepared to provide the necessary aid. Mao promised the North. Koreans that if the Americans intervened in the war, China would send troops. He also asked whether it was necessary to deploy Chinese forces on the Korean border, and whether they should provide weapons and ammunition. Kim expressed his thanks for this offer, but did not accept it." In Kim's view, since Moscow had already agreed to give all necessary support, his trip to China was undertaken only to satisfy Stalin's order to secure Mao's approval to launch the war. Consequently, as soon as the meeting with Mao was concluded, Kim announced to Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roshchin, in Mao's presence, that he and Mao were in complete agreement on the matter.' It is easy to picture how awkward Mao's position was in front of the smug Kim Il Sung.

The Chinese leadership received no prior notification of the launching of the attack on South Korea on 25 June. They, in fact, learned of it via foreign news services. Some Chinese leaders resented this lack of notification, but they nonetheless expressed their support for North Korea once the US became directly involved. In early July, the Chinese government agreed to send to the KPA two hundred Chinese cadres of Korean descent who were stationed in China's Northeast Military Region. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai informed Ambassador Roshchin that China agreed to the Soviet government's requests to use the Chinese Changchun Railroad to transport military supplies and to

travel through Chinese air space en route to North Korea."

Chinese leaders also raised the issue of providing military support to the North Koreans during other conversations with Soviet representatives. In a meeting with Ambassador Roshchin on 2 July, Zhou Enlai relayed his government's estimate that the US might increase its forces in Korea by landing in southern ports and proceeding north via railroad. He thus recommended that the KPA hasten its southward push to occupy those ports. He also presciently recommended that the KPA strengthen the defenses around the western port of Inchon, both to protect Seoul and to prevent the US army from landing there. Zhou complained to the Soviet ambassador that the North Korean leaders had ignored Mao's repeated warnings that US military intervention was imminent. He emphasized that if US forces crossed the 38th parallel, China would organize an expeditionary force dressed in North Korean uniforms to engage the US army. Zhou reported that 120,000 troops of the 3rd Army Corps had already assembled in the Northeast, and he hoped the Soviet Union would be able to provide air cover for them.10 On 4 July, the head of the Chinese intelligence bureau, Zhou Dapeng, even described to Roshchin a plan to transport North Korean forces to South Korea via a port on the Shandong Peninsula, as well as to send Chinese military experts to South Korean battlefields to help the KPA."1

Stalin immediately expressed his support of the Chinese suggestions. "We consider it correct," the Soviet leader wrote to Mao on 5 July, “immediately to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Sino-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units."12 Since the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang, was still in China recuperating from illness, Stalin also urged Chinese leaders quickly to dispatch representatives to Korea to increase contact and to resolve the issues involved in China's intervention.13 In fact, Zhou Enlai had already on 30 June replaced Ni with Chai Junwu (who would later change his name to Chai Chengwen), with the goal of strengthening ties with North Korea. Before Chai departed, Zhou instructed him:

Right now, the Korean people are on the front lines of the struggle, and we must express support for our Korean comrades. If there is anything else they want us to do, tell them to ask and we will do our best. Maintaining contact between the two parties and armies, and quickly understanding the changing battlefield situations are currently the most important missions of the embassy.14

Chai Chengwen found it difficult, however, to fulfill this mission because North Korean leaders withheld all information from the Chinese embassy. According to Chai's recollections, Kim Il Sung received him with high protocol as soon as he arrived on 10 July, telling him "if you need anything else, just look for me at any time." He also instructed the Deputy Director of the Chief Political Department of the KPA, So Hwi, to give the Chinese Military Attaché daily briefings

on the battlefield situation. However, the Chinese embassy soon discovered that the briefings delivered by So Hwi were mostly just reports garnered that evening from the North Korean Foreign News Service. Moreover, Chai did not have regular access to top-level Korean leaders. DPRK leaders also declined to answer the Chinese embassy's request for permission to send a vice-attaché to study with the KPA. From his other contacts with North Koreans, Chai formed the opinion that they had been forbidden from sharing any military intelligence with the Chinese. Although Minister of Internal Affairs Pak Il-yu had worked in China and often went to the Chinese embassy for meals, Chai could never discuss the internal military situation due to the strict restrictions and discipline imposed by the North Korean government. At the same time, the Chinese Army's request to send a group of staff officers to North Korea for the purpose of understanding the current battlefield situation was refused. 16

15

As the KPA's position worsened, the Chinese leaders felt that they had to prepare for military assistance to North Korea. On 11 August, the 13th Army Corp, which had already assembled in the Northeast on Mao's order, conducted a meeting of cadres from all the attached Army Corps and divisions. Gao Gang, head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, thoroughly explained the purpose and significance of preparing troops to fight abroad, stating that China had to take the iniative and help liberate the North Korean people in order to make Korea an independent, democratic, and unified country. "Going to Korea will be done in the name of the Volunteer Army, [hereafter referred to as the Chinese Volunteer Army, or CVA] wearing North Korean uniform and using the North Korean unit numbers, and flying the flag of the Korean People's Army, and major cadres must adopt Korean names."17

In meetings with Soviet adviser Pavel Yudin on 19 and 28 August, Mao stated that if the US army continued to escalate its troop numbers, the North Koreans would be unable to cope and would need direct assistance from China. 18 That was the only way they could defeat the US army and postpone the outbreak of a third world war. Recent intelligence had made it clear that the US had decided quickly to increase its troop strength in Korea on a grand scale. Chinese leaders reminded the North Korean leaders that they needed to prepare for the worst in the war. Even though they did not directly refer to the issue of the entry of Chinese troops, the implication was clear. In August and early September, Mao met twice with North Korean representative Lee Sang Cho to discuss the progress of the war. Mao pointed out that the KPA's mistake was in not preparing sufficient reserve forces while deploying their troops on a broad front, and in conquering territory rather than destroying the enemy. Mao specifically pointed out that the enemy might suddenly attack the key areas from Inchon to Seoul and from Nampo to Pyongyang, and the Koreans should therefore consider retreating and redeploying their troops to protect these areas. CCP Politburo member Liu Shaoqi also pointed out that it would be necessary to prepare the people for the possibility

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