establish correspondence and transportation connections. There are several parties being formed in South Korea, which is progress compared to the past situation and offers a possibility for uniting the progressive forces. The South Korean movement is deepening and intensifying, and it is increasingly acquiring the character of a class struggle. The task of the DPRK is to accelerate the building of socialism, so the Party is now devoting great attention to further developing the national economy. The most important task now is the intensification of mechanization, especially in agriculture (they need approx. 20,000 tractors), and to raise the workers' living standards. In the DPRK, for example, the average production is 17 meters of textile per person per year, but the army and industry use a significant share of this amount. They want to raise the average amount to 30 meters per person. Therefore, the government has recently passed a resolution concerning the development of the vynalon production. At the moment, they are having difficulties concerning machines. At the end, the comrade deputy foreign minister expressed his thanks for the technical support provided by the Hungarian foreign ministry (cde. Bozi and Balogh), which he highly appreciated. Then he mentioned that recently the Hungarian periodical “Ország-Világ," in one of its Korean reports, evaluated the "Chollima" movement in a different way than the Korean position. "We do not have any objection to this, our embassy raised the issue. It is possible that a foreign visitor might not understand this [movement] a hundred percent as a Korean might," said the comrade foreign minister. In my response, I promised to look into the issue. signature Ambassador Károly Práth 1 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The literal translation of the term used here would be "Black Africa,” which refers to the non-Arab part of the continent, that is, Africa south of the Sahara. DOCUMENT No. 7 Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 1 March 1961. [Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/e-0027/1961 13.d. Translated by Jószef Litkei.] The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic. Top Secret. 6/1961 Pyongyang, 1 March 1961. Subject: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov on the position of the Korean Workers' Party concerning the Moscow conference. In the course of my conversation with Comrade Puzanov on the first of March (see my top-secret report No. 5), the position of the Korean comrades concerning the debate between the CPSU and CCP also arose. Comrade Puzanov told me that the issue was raised during the consultation between Comrade Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung in Moscow in June 1960, during which Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed entirely with the position of the CPSU. A few days later, at the Bucharest conference, Comrade Kim Ch'ang-man took a similar position. During the June consultations, Comrade Khrushchev did not engage in detail with the question, and only referred to several documents issued by the Chinese comrades, among them the well-known article “Long live Leninism!" by "Hongzhi” (By the way, Comrade Puzanov remarked that he is not sure whether Comrade Khrushchev was aware that Korean newspapers also published this article). Without being asked, Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned that Korean newspapers had published this article on his personal advice, because the article sharply criticized revisionism. Comrade Puzanov assumed that on account of this latter factor [revisionism], the Korean comrades might possibly not have entirely comprehended the other messages of the article, or that they did not pay enough attention to them. Over the course of time, the position of the Korean comrades has changed somewhat. In October, the November conference's Editorial Committee was working in Moscow. A Korean delegation, headed by Comrade Yi Hyo-sun, also participated [in this work]. Here, the Korean delegation, together with some other delegations (Vietnamese, etc.), sought to find a mediating solution or a compromise that could be accepted by both parties. Due to his illness (kidney stone), Comrade Kim Il Sung could not take part in the November conference; the speech of the Korean delegation [that would have been] headed by Comrade Kim Il was originally scheduled to come after the Chinese delegation, but the Korean comrades requested to give it earlier. So they actually did not address the questions under dispute, but [later], together with other delegations, [they] visited Comrade Khrushchev in order to convince him to make a compromise. He, however, held onto the only correct position and said that they should rather try to persuade the Chinese delegation. The delegation indeed visited the Chinese comrades. In Comrade Puzanov's view, the Korean editorials published after the Moscow "declaration" and "appeal,” as well as the later December resolution of the Korean Workers' Party CC, correspond to the spirit of the Moscow declaration, although they omitted-for understandable reasons, remarked Comrade Puzanov-the issue of the cult of personality. He mentioned that contrary to other friendly states, the Korean comrades did not deal with the Moscow conference in detail. Before traveling to the January plenum in Moscow, Comrade Puzanov met Comrade Kim Il Sung. Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke very positively about the November conference and especially about the steadfast and faithful behavior of the CPSU delegation headed by Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Kim Il Sung remarked that continuing the debate between the CPSU and CCP would have caused commotion among the members of the Workers' Party. One has to understand, he said, that China is Korea's great neighbor, and that the Chinese people sacrificed their blood for the freedom of the Korean people. According to Comrade Puzanov, the Korean comrades are apparently happy that the issue is closed, and would not like to engage with it [further]. signature Ambassador Károly Práth DOCUMENT No. 8 Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 16 March 1961. [Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/ca-003645/1961 5.d. Translated by Jószef Litkei.] The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic. Top Secret. 90/1961 Pyongyang, 16 March 1961. Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the Korean question and the forthcoming visit of Comrade Khrushchev to Korea. During my conversation with Soviet ambassador Comrade Puzanov on 15 March, I asked his opinion concerning Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea, and whether he thinks that such a visit would be timely now. At the same time, I mentioned that a visit by Comrade Khrushchev would place Korea and the Korean question into the focus of international relations, and the Korean comrades, who are inclined to push their cause excessively into the foreground, could misunderstand this and perceive it as the justification of their position. In his answer, Comrade Puzanov told me that the visit of Comrade Khrushchev was already timely in 1959, but at that time, during his [Khrushchev's] negotiation with Comrade Kim Il Sung in Beijing, they both came to the conclusion that due to the international situation of that time (immediately after Comrade Khrushchev's visit to the USA), this would not be advisable. Comrade Khrushchev would have visited Korea last October, but this was canceled solely due to the lack of time: according to original plans, Comrade Khrushchev was scheduled to arrive back from New York at the end of September, but his trip to the US lasted longer, and after his return he was absorbed with preparing for the Moscow conference. The CPSU CC sent the KWP CC a very warm, comradely letter concerning the postponement of the visit to Korea, and upon receiving it, Comrade Kim Il Sung immediately told him (Puzanov) that he understood perfectly and also agreed with it from party-minded point of view. During their visit to Moscow (in November 1960), the Korean party delegation visited Comrade Khrushchev, and Comrade Kim Il Sung inquired when [Khrushchev's] Korean visit could take place. In his answer, Comrade Khrushchev stated his great wish to come to Korea, but asked at the same time to examine this question at a later point in time, since due to the preparation for the Twenty-second Congress, he could not give a concrete answer at that moment. According to Comrade Puzanov, there is no danger that the Korean comrades would present the Korean question as the central question of the international situation. He told me that during his Moscow visit in June 1960, Comrade Kim Il Sung gave Comrade Khrushchev an account of their policy towards South Korea. Comrade Khrushchev agreed with this [policy], and asked whether they [the Koreans] would want to elaborate a proposal of confederation as the Germans had done. Kim Il Sung answered positively, and the Korean comrades did the further work, and did it well in his [Puzanov's] opinion. It is apparent that the Korean comrades are now seeking to win public opinion in South Korea, and they have achieved some results in this respect. An increasing number of people support the proposals of the DPRK, and the anti-American mood is increasing as well. According to the opinion of Comrade Puzanov, the policy of the DPRK corresponds to the common policy of our camp regarding peaceful coexistence. Of course, the unification of the country requires a lot of further work, and this will not happen in the near future. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have offered, and continue to offer, serious assistance to the DPRK in making its position known and accepted. The Korean comrades well know that without this assistance they cannot achieve results; international power relations have changed so much in our favor that the governments of capitalist countries cannot dismiss the opinion of the socialist camp. Comrade Puzanov mentioned that the Soviet foreign ministry recently instructed ambassadors working in neutral countries to inform the leaders of their host country of the position of the DPRK during their conversations with them [the host country]. This has achieved positive results in many places. The content of the DPRK government's "Memorandum," which was issued on the Korean question prior to the opening of the second half of the UN General Assembly's 15th session, was also delivered through the above-mentioned Soviet ambassadors to the governments of neutral states. Comrade Puzanov did not rule out the possibility that, depending on how the South Korean situation evolves in the future, the DPRK might take a new position and make new proposals, which we all will support. I informed Comrade Puzanov of my conversation with Comrade Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tae-hui during which he told me that they will not protest against the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and South Korea into the Interparliamentary Union. Comrade Puzanov said that the DPRK had already practically acknowledged South Korea at the 1954 Geneva conference, even if this fact was later somewhat withheld by the DPRK, or rather, one could observe irresolution [in this regard]. So, for example, when publishing an earlier speech Comrade Zorin gave at the UN, Korean newspapers omitted that part which concerned the two states formed on the Korean peninsula. On another occasion, upon receiving in advance a Soviet government communique supporting the proposals of the DPRK, they requested replacing the expression "two states" by "two governments." The conversation lasted for approximately three hours, with Comrade Fendler present as interpreter. signature Ambassador Károly Práth DOCUMENT No. 9 Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 16 March 1961 [Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/bc-0030/1961 5.d. Translated by Jószef Litkei.] The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic. Top Secret. Subject: Chinese policy toward the DPRK and behavior of the Chinese ambassador in Pyongyang. Pyongyang, 16 March 1961. During my visit to Comrade Kohousek on 15 March, I informed him of my conversation with the Chinese ambassador (see my top secret report no. 95). The Comrade Czechoslovakian ambassador fully agreed with me, and he found it highly incorrect that the Korean comrades organized a separate presentation for the government and another for the ambassadors. In the course of the conversation, we both remarked upon the fact that Chinese ambassador doyen Qiao Xiaoguang has recently not been attending the programs organized for the D[iplomatic] C[orps] by the Korean comrades, under the excuse of being busy. In addition to other [examples], he did not participate in the visit to the steel complex in Kaesong, nor did he attend the performance of the Cuban ballet ensemble or the cultural presentation of Comrade Han Sol-ya, etc. According to Comrade Kohousek, the Chinese ambassador might be dissatisfied because in the course of last year he failed to convince the Korean comrades to support the Chinese position. Comrade Kohousek stated that earlier (last summer) he was of the opinion that the Korean comrades are under Chinese influence; however, recently he had to change his position. It is true that earlier there were attempts by the Korean side to adopt Chinese methods: for example, according to his information, they planned to establish two people's communes, etc., but they soon realized the negative [effects] of this, and gave it up. The so-called "Chongsan-ri method" radically opposes the earlier Chinese position, and, at least recently, the Korean comrades are devoting great attention to maintaining the principle of material interest and socialist distribution. The Chinese comrades exerted pressure in order to bring the KWP to their side in the debate between the CPSU and CCP last year. The invitation of Comrade Kim Il Sung to China last year (before his incognito visit to Moscow) also proves this. Comrade Kim Il Sung, however, informed Comrade Khrushchev of this [invitation]. Last October, on the occasion of the 10th year anniversary of the Chinese volunteers entering the war, a Chinese delegation headed by General He Long [vice-premier of the State Council] visited Korea and tried again to win Korea over to the Chinese side. Despite this, the Korean delegation did not support China at the November conference, although, together with other delegations, [they] sought to find a compromise solution. To sum up, the Chinese did not reach their goal, despite a further credit of 420 million rubles offered to the DPRK last autumn, so it is not impossible that this is the reason that the Chinese ambassador is so displeased. In confirming this, Comrade Kohousek told me that although the Chinese side enjoys a position of equality with the Korean side in the armistice committee in Panmunjon, the speeches are always given by the head of the Korean delegation. A recent event, when the new heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations paid an introductory visit to the heads of the Korean and Chinese delegations, was characteristic of this. The head of the Chinese delegation wanted to return these formal calls, but the Korean comrades did not consent to this, saying that they were not going to return them either. Similarly, a Chinese general came recently to Panmunjon to pay his usual yearly visit and was received by the heads of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations. Contrary to previous custom, however, the head of the Korean delegation did not show up, nor did he meet the Chinese general later. The latter left pretty soon without any notice. The same afternoon, I also talked to Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, and informed him as well of my conversation with the Chinese ambassador. Comrade Puzanov agreed with me, the more so since I was the one to inform him that the performance in question was organized for the DC (he was not present due to the Women's Day celebration at the Soviet DOCUMENT No. 10 Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's [Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/a-0042/1961 13.d. Translated by Jószef Litkei.] Top Secret. 9/1961 embassy). He agreed that, under the pretense of discussing Concerning this question, Comrade Puzanov made the final comment that Chinese Ambassador Qiao [Xiaoguang] "offended against his own party-consciousness" when he put the blame for their difficulties on the weather alone. signature Ambassador Károly Práth Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the cult of personality and the policy of the DPRK. On 15 May, I made a farewell visit to Comrade Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador. During the friendly conversation, the topic of the May Day parade also came up. I mentioned to Comrade Puzanov that in my opinion the Korean comrades organized the parade well, the small number of Kim Il Sung portraits was striking, etc. (See my report No.__) Comrade Puzanov agreed and pointed out that the slogans were chosen carefully as well; they did a good job of symbolizing the achievements and tasks of the DPRK, but he found the Kim Il Sung statue to be superfluous. Concerning the above issue, the question of the "cult of personality" was also raised. Comrade Puzanov expressed his view that the question cannot be decided merely based on the number of portraits, etc. What one has to look at, he said, is how the Leninist norms of inner party life prevail. In his opinion, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party holds regular meetings, and in its work often involves experts and functionaries from different fields. During the last months, there were a number of nationwide Korean professional meetings, in which leading comrades also took part. Comrade Puzanov also mentioned that Comrade Kim Il Sung and other leading comrades spend a lot of time in the countryside visiting factories and collectives, etc. The so-called Chongsan-ri method proved to be a good one. Following this, when talking about the policy of the Workers' Party, Comrade Puzanov told me that the party leadership is mature, and that it has learned from past mistakes and is correcting them itself. He did not experience mistakes being "hushed up" by the party leadership. As an example, he mentioned the "great leap." It is known that in 1958, Korean comrades adopted this slogan from the Chinese, and they wanted to double the plan target in 1959. The consequences were very negative, and a number of difficulties were caused in agriculture. The Korean party realized this, corrected the mistakes, and emphasized the necessity of the proportionate development of the national economy. I request that this report be sent to leading comrades. [To comrade foreign minister Budapest] signature Ambassador Károly Práth ' TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: That is, with participation from both North and South Korea. *** DOCUMENT No. 11 Letter to Wladyslaw Gomulka from Kim Il Sung, 3 [Source: Modern Records Archives, Warsaw, KC PZPR 2263/175-233, pp. 209-233. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.] To Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party Dear Comrade, and each one of them must first act in practice without waiting for the conference. The socialist countries must support even more actively the Vietnamese people in its heroic struggle against American imperialism and render it maximum assistance and moral support. At the same time, all socialist countries must develop their struggle against US imperialism from the position of principle. It is necessary to use all possible opportunities to unmask the aggressive policy of American imperialism and gradually isolate it, not allowing any compromise with it. At a time when the US imperialists are escalating their attacks on a socialist country-the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expanding the war, the socialist countries should not even hesitate to break all relations with American imperialism. If all socialist countries indeed take such common steps, they would deal a powerful blow to American imperialism, thus giving real help to the Vietnamese people. In the course of such action, the existing divergences among the fraternal parties could be gradually overcome and the conditions for convening the conference of the parties of socialist countries that you propose could be created. We believe that under the present circumstances this is the right way of both demonstrating support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people and defending the unity of the socialist camp. Our party will also in the future make every effort to strengthen the unity of our camp and the cohesion of the international communist movement. Kim Il Sung I have received your letter of 31 December 1965, in which you asked me to support the proposal by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party for the earliest possible convocation of a conference of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty as well as the socialist countries of Asia, with the goal of Party discussing the coordination of assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its war against US aggression. In the present situation of an expanding war by American imperialists against the Vietnamese people, we consider it appropriate to convene a conference of the parties of the socialist countries and discuss there the ways of providing assistance and support for the fighting Vietnamese people as well as the coordination of common action. Because of the serious disagreements that exist within the communist movement, however, it would be difficult at this time to convene such a conference without a consensus among the interested fraternal parties and careful advance preparation. If the conference were to be convened without adequate advance preparation it would not bring benefit to the struggle of the Vietnamese people nor would it enhance the cohesion of the socialist camp; on the contrary, it would cause further damage to the unity of the international communist move ment. The fraternal parties therefore must, above all, undertake sincere efforts to reconcile conflicting views and create conditions for convening the conference. At the same time, with regard to assisting the Vietnamese people in its struggle, all parties of the socialist countries Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Pyongyang, 3 February 1966 |