By Balázs Szalontai

Rby

ecent publication of Russian and Chinese documents by Evgenii Bajanov, Chen Jian, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Kathryn Weathersby, and other scholars has finally thrown light on many aspects of the North Korean/Soviet/Chinese alliance during the Korean War.' Less attention has been paid, however, to the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Andrei N. Lankov has uncovered numerous Russian documents related to the important events of 1955-1956, but without access to a broader base of documents from Russia, the Khrushchev era of the DPRK/USSR alliance has remained largely obscure. The documents presented below from the Hungarian National Archives help fill that gap. In general, Hungarian diplomats had more limited access to highly confidential information on North Korea than did their Soviet counterparts, receiving most of their information on SovietNorth Korean relations from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, thanks to the assistance of North Koreans who had been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with the Hungarian Embassy after their return to the DPRK, Hungarian diplomats often matched the Soviets in acquiring information about North Korean domestic policies.

Peculiarities of the North Korean Regime and the Roots of Isolationism

As emphasized by Bruce Cumings, Brian Myers, and others, North Korea was by no means a typical "people's democracy," and its peculiarities influenced the character of Soviet-North Korean relations from 1945 on.3 For one thing, the relative backwardness of the North Korean economy either retarded the adoption of certain Soviet institutions or necessitated an inordinate dependency on Soviet expertise. For example, the limited financial resources of the North Korean state led it to establish unpaid security organs, whose members were present in every village. In 1953-1954 work cards and Stakhanovism were still unknown to most North Korean workers." The DPRK's agricultural tax system seemed far less complex than its Hungarian counterpart, and the circulation of newspapers remained a fraction of that of their East European equivalents. Because of the deficiencies of the country's motion picture industry, as late as 1957 some 60 per cent of the films shown in the cinemas were of Soviet origin, whereas the proportion of North Korean films did not exceed 10 per cent.' Due to the paucity of North Korean authors, translated Soviet works constituted the largest share of the books published in 1955. By contrast, most of the plays staged in 1955 were classical Korean works like the Tale of Ch'unhyang. In 1956 North Korean higher education still lacked adequate textbooks, a problem the authorities proposed to solve by placing greater emphasis on teaching Rus

sian so that students could use Soviet textbooks until Ko

rean ones could be published. In primary and secondary education, on the other hand, Soviet and Communist influence gained ground at a much slower pace. In the mid-1950s the majority of teachers continued using the pedagogical methods of the pre-liberation era. The history of the Three Kingdoms was taught in a rather "romantic” style, and the teaching of Russian was less emphasized than in Hungary.10 The similarities and differences between Soviet and North Korean institutions did not, therefore, necessarily indicate political sympathy or aversion; in a number of cases they simply reflected the specific realities of North Korea.

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From the very beginning, Hungarian diplomats were aware of the "special relationship" between Moscow and Pyongyang. On 30 April 1950 Hungarian Envoy Sándor Simics flatly told Kim Il Sung that Hungary could not afford to sell goods to the DPRK below world market prices. He also noted in his report that "they took a liking to the fact that the Soviet Union had given them long-term credit... this is the generosity of the Soviet Union that overlooks everything they do. We cannot do it yet, for we are small and poor."'" This emphasis on Soviet generosity may have been an overstatement, but in the mid-1950s the character of Soviet-North Korean economic relations certainly differed from the common East European pattern. Like Albania, the DPRK received aid from the other Communist countries, whereas its export capacity remained quite negligible until the end of its Threeyear Plan (1954-1956).12 That Moscow assumed an obligation to such a small developing country greatly boosted the self-confidence of the North Korean leaders, who felt that the DPRK was entitled to preferential treatment.

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Pyongyang took little interest in establishing contacts with Communist countries not capable of rendering concrete assistance. In 1954 its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were still at the ministerial, instead of ambassadorial level. 13 Neither these two countries nor Romania carried on substantial trade with the DPRK in the mid-1950s. 14 Pyongyang set up a Ministry of Foreign Trade as late as the last months of 1952, which demonstrated North Korea's isolation within the "Soviet bloc." Until that time, the DPRK had exchanged goods only with the USSR and China.15 To be sure, the disinterest often proved mutual, since the DPRK had little to offer the East European "people's democracies." Moreover, many North Korean leaders knew little about Europe or the "ways of the world" (see Document No. 1), which also inhibited the improvement of relations.

In the spring of 1950, as the DPRK prepared for its military campaign against the South, diplomats at the recently established Hungarian Legation found the North Korean Foreign Ministry anything but cooperative. "They received ev

ery request completely uncomprehendingly, and whenever possible they dragged out its fulfillment until the requests became out of date," Simics complained. On 21 August 1950 the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing frankly told his Hungarian counterpart that soldiers of the Korean People's Army [KPA], infuriated by the US air raids that killed many civilians, often killed American POWs in defiance of repeated orders of the high command. The DPRK authorities prevented the Hungarians from acquiring photos of war-related events, even though the very same pictures were widely displayed in Pyongyang. Simics also stressed that the relationship between the North Koreans and the Soviet Embassy was “of a wholly different nature.”16

Throughout the 1950s the leaders of the Korean Workers' Party [KWP], compelled to provide Soviet and Chinese diplomats with confidential information, apparently compensated by curtailing as much as possible the freedom of action of the East European embassies. China pursued a similar policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites. In 1951 Beijing forced the recall of Czechoslovak Ambassador Weisskopf and expelled a Polish diplomat, Lewandowski. In the mid1950s the PRC did its best to increase its trade with the USSR and the Asian non-Communist countries, but cut back its exports to East Europe in order to retain more agricultural products for domestic consumption."7

Kim Il Sung's tight control over North Korean society was one of the factors that enabled him to keep the "fraternal" Communist states at arm's length. DPRK authorities, like their counterparts in China, limited their citizens' contacts with foreign embassies to prevent the latter from recruiting clients, confidants, and informants. They also attempted to keep their intra-party affairs secret. As the purge of Communists of South Korean origin gathered momentum in November 1952, the Foreign Ministry emphatically told Hungarian diplomats not to visit anyone without prior approval from of the ministry.18 (By and large, the North Vietnamese authorities did not resort to such measures until July 1963.1) Domestic despotism thus became a diplomatic tool.

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In fact, North Korean despotism had few equals in Eastern Europe.20 With the possible exception of Tito's Yugoslavia, nowhere else did a leadership cult emerge as quickly as in North Korea. In 1946 the regime named the country's sole university for Kim Il Sung, and in 1947 it established schools for the orphans of revolutionary martyrs in Man'gyongdae, Kim's home village. By contrast, the Hungarian dictator Mátyás Rákosi, hardly an opponent of a personality cult, never took comparable measures. In Romania, the cult of Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej bloomed only in 1952. In January 1946 the North Korean authorities merged the various youth leagues into a single organization, whereas similar events would take place in Hungary only three years later. The membership of the new organization was proportionally far greater than that of the Soviet Komsomol, and it had a unitary structure, while China and North Vietnam created two youth leagues, one for devout Communists and another for sympathizers.22 In 1946 only party members gained admission to Kim Il Sung University, and even the janitors employed there

had to possess a party card.23

While these distinctive characteristics-dependence on foreign assistance, a particularly despotic political system, and an inclination for isolationism-all played a central role in the clashes between Kim Il Sung and the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, the unresolved issue of Korean unification complicated the situation even more. Unification plans had influenced North Korean domestic policies from the very beginning. For example, in contrast with its East European allies, the DPRK did not collectivize agriculture during Stalin's lifetime. In 1952 Minister of Foreign Trade Chang Si-u plainly told the Hungarians that the government had decided to postpone collectivization until unification in order not to alienate potential South Korean supporters.24 Also, unlike the pattern in most East European countries, the 1948 purge of O Ki-sop and other party leaders did not lead to show trials that might have produced a negative effect on South Korean public opinion. The policies of the East German and North Vietnamese regimes also included the temporary postponement of certain unpopular domestic measures in order to facilitate national unification.

Pyongyang Seeks to Control the Diplomatic Corps

While the North Korean regime apparently welcomed the eagerness of Stalin's successors to put an end to the Korean War, the Kremlin's decision to call off the campaign accusing the US of germ warfare may have angered Kim Il Sung. The first signs of political liberalization in East Europe were certainly greeted warily in Pyongyang. The replacement of Rákosi in June 1953 shocked the North Korean leadership, as it quickly understood that Hungary was moving away from the Stalinist path.26 In the last months of 1953 the Foreign Ministry systematically obstructed attempts by Hungarian diplomats to communicate with the DPRK's Academy of Sciences (see Document No. 2). These measures may have been designed to isolate North Korean intellectuals, who were eager to establish contacts with European colleagues, from the new political ideas that had gained ground in Hungary under Communist Party leader Imre Nagy. Such restrictions may also have been aimed at keeping secret the details of the purges that continued throughout 1953. As one Hungarian diplomat put it, "the masses did not understand" why Yi Sung-yop and the other SKWP leaders had been arrested. In June the regime thought it necessary to launch a 40-day campaign in order to convince the population of the guilt of the accused.27

The purges were discontinued in 1954, but the relationship between the regime and Hungarian diplomats failed to improve. On the contrary, the restrictions now affected every foreign legation, including the Soviet and Chinese Embassies. Hungarian Ambassador Pál Szarvas suspected that the policies were motivated by Pyongyang's antipathy to deStalinization (see Documents No. 4 and 5). "They would like to curtail the operation and activity of the whole diplomatic corps," Szarvas warned. In essence, Pyongyang downplayed the inter-party aspects of its relationship with other Communist regimes and instead placed great emphasis on state sov

ereignty. "It is customary in Korea that they speak little about the party in the presence of foreigners," Szarvas noted in December 1954.28 In contrast, on 25 November 1955 the North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Nguyan Duy Trinh willingly provided Hungarian diplomats with highly confidential information about the number of recently expelled party members and the social composition of the membership.29

After the armistice was signed in July 1953, North Korean security organs gained the right to subject Chinese soldiers to identity checks.30 Moreover, in the fall of 1954 the Foreign Ministry began to replace the embassies' Korean employees very frequently in order to prevent the latter from becoming loyal to their foreign employers. On 21 October 1954 Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev told Szarvas "one may raise the issue of ... the Korean employees in the Foreign M[inistry], but in any case they will reply that the replacement of the employees occurred for political reasons."31 The North Korean authorities knew that the diplomats were neither willing nor able to verify the unspecified charges the Foreign Ministry's Cadre Department brought against the dismissed employees. Little by little, the North Korean Lilliputians enmeshed the foreign Gullivers.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Embassy proved a hard nut to crack. So-called "Soviet Koreans" who disagreed with Kim II Sung's policies frequently met Soviet diplomats without officials of the Foreign Ministry being present, and they provided the Soviets with precious information about the North Korean situation.32 Kim's subsequent campaign against the Soviet faction thus constituted, among other things, an attempt to deprive the Soviets of their allies and informants.

Discord over Unification Tactics

As early as 1954 Hungarian diplomats noted that their Soviet colleagues criticized certain North Korean actions related to unification. To be sure, Moscow agreed with Pyongyang that a general election under UN supervision would only benefit the Syngman Rhee in Seoul, regime, since the population of the ROK was twice that of the DPRK (see Document No. 3). Neither Kim Il Sung nor Rhee wished to dismantle his political system for the sake of national unification, and the Chinese also made it clear that a UN-supervised referendum would "give up North Korea to the Americans.”33 On 3 July 1954 DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il told Szarvas that a South Korean attack on the DPRK was unlikely at that time—a view shared by Moscow and Beijing.34 However, the North Koreans seem to have had higher hopes for the Geneva conference than did the Soviets and the Chinese. Whereas Suzdalev was pessimistic about the conference, Nam Il told Hungarian Envoy Extraordinary Károly Pásztor on 23 March❘ that while the Americans helped Seoul to expand the ROK Army, they might withdraw their own troops from South Korea by 1956.35 This conclusion was based on knowledge of the American intention to replace a part of its ground troops with South Korean divisions in order to reduce military expenditures. The reality, however, was that a complete troop withdrawal remained out of the question.3

In the summer of 1954, war-torn North Korea offered

economic aid to the ROK, a proposal Suzdalev rightly described as irresponsible.37 Pyongyang then concluded that it was pointless to make any approach to South Korea, and kept silent for months. While Suzdalev admitted that Rhee's inflexibility and hostility constituted a formidable obstacle, he disapproved of the passive attitude of the KWP leadership.38 On 9 September Soviet diplomats told Szarvas that the Soviet Embassy considered the data Pyongyang published on the South Korean situation to be unreliable. Since the Soviets subscribed to several South Korean newspapers, they were able to verify the information provided by the North Koreans.39 GDR Ambassador Richard Fischer also complained of the uncooperative attitude of the North Korean Foreign Ministry regarding unification matters. While he provided P'yongyang with many documents related to the issue of German unification, the North Koreans did not give him anything about South Korea and Japan in return.40

Conflict over Economic Policies

North Korean economic policies were another source of tension between Pyongyang and Moscow. As early as November 1954 the Romanian Ambassador to Pyongyang questioned the advisability of rapid collectivization, which might alienate the South Korean peasantry and middle classes from the DPRK.41 "The [North and South Korean] populations are equally familiar with the South and North Korean economic situation, since the borders are not hermetically sealed," the new Soviet Ambassador Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov stated in July 1955. He also criticized North Korean propaganda that depicted the ROK as a living hell (see Document No. 8). Informal relations indeed existed between the two Koreas at that time. The North Koreans succeeded in establishing some contacts with the ROK through Japan. They also carried on a contraband trade with the South across the DMZ in order to obtain wolfram and other goods indispensable for the DPRK's electrical industry.42 Under the circumstances, the Soviets thought, Pyongyang should not have ignored the negative effect its domestic policies might produce on South Korean public opinion. Actually, Kim Il Sung's economic strategy did not overlook the question of unification. However, he wanted to overtake the South instead of adjusting to it, which led to further disagreements with the DPRK's patrons (see Document No. 10).

A major objective of post-1953 industrialization was the replacement of the regional specialization that had characterized economic development in Japanese-ruled Korea (the textile industry, for instance, was concentrated in the southern part of the country) with a self-sufficient industrial structure. Mining thus received less emphasis than machine-building, even though the Soviets understandably wanted to import raw materials such as non-ferrous metals rather than poor quality North Korean industrial products. The bulk of Soviet aid went to the chemical industry, non-ferrous metallurgical works, iron smelting, and power generation. It was the more developed East European countries that assisted Pyongyang in the construction of a few machine works.43 (By contrast, the Soviets had favored the development of an engineering

Soviet-North Korean disagreements over economic issues culminated in an open conflict in mid-1955. Pyongyang responded to the poor rice harvest of 1954, which had been. caused by adverse weather, by squeezing an even larger percentage of the crop from the peasants. The leadership also resolved to speed up collectivization and prohibited private trade in grain. North Korean authorities, as Soviet Counsellor A. M. Petrov reported, often "took as much as 50 per cent of the poor crop [...]from the peasantry by brute force." As a consequence, the DPRK faced a serious food crisis in the first half of 1955. The system of non-rationed food-supply ceased to function, and in certain regions there were deaths from starvation. Comparable CCP policies, by contrast, did not affect urban consumers to the same extent, since Chinese agriculture was in better condition at the outset of collectivization than was that of war-torn North Korea, which proved simply unable to bear the burden the government placed on it.47 Soviet diplomats harshly criticized the regime's disastrous policies (see Documents No. 6 and 7).

Pyongyang had no option but to appeal to the USSR and China for emergency aid. In April and May, Moscow and Beijing sent 24,000 metric tons of flour and 130,000 metric tons of agricultural products respectively. In May and June, Kim Il Sung and Nam II spent substantial time in Moscow, where they must have had some difficult moments during the negotiations with Soviet leaders. Kim finally had to bite the bullet and cancel some of the measures the Soviets held responsible for the economic crisis. During the summer the government increased investments in agriculture, cut the retail prices of certain goods, reduced workers' personal taxes, and, above all, rescinded the decrees that effectively prohibited private commerce (see Document No. 8). In December Pyongyang increased agricultural investments once more, and reduced the personal taxes of private merchants. 48

Pyongyang adopt more flexible methods on the basis of the experiences of these countries. Kim was determined to prevent any such development.

At a CC plenum held in December, Kim Il Sung launched an attack on the Soviet faction. The economic measures taken in December were probably intended to emphasize Kim's commitment to the "New Course" in order to prevent Soviet criticism of this purge. Since the economic crisis had provided a good opportunity for the Soviets to meddle in the internal affairs of the DPRK, Kim did not want to repeat that error. The Soviets, for their part, turned a blind eye to the purges, perhaps because they considered the Soviet Koreans useful informants and allies whenever Soviet and North Korean interests clashed, but did not want to rely on them in periods when Kim appeared cooperative.

Throughout the Soviet bloc, de-Stalinization in the long run favored "domestic Communists." As early as 1957 every East European country except the GDR was ruled by a "domestic Communist" leader. The influence Soviet Koreans, therefore, went against the tide. During the 1955 confrontation Moscow was much more interested in economic issues than in political ones and therefore did not attempt to force on Kim Il Sung unwanted political reforms, whether it would have been able to do so or not. As a consequence, rehabilitation of the unjustly persecuted remained out of the question in the DPRK, while all East European regimes except the Albanians began to release at least some of their political prisoners in 1954-55. Ironically, Moscow's attitude contributed to the decline of Soviet influence in the DPRK, since fewer and fewer North Koreans were willing to take sides with such an unreliable patron against a dictator as formidable as Kim Il Sung. On the other hand, it was quite understandable that the new Soviet leaders preferred Kim to the Soviet Koreans. since continued favoring of "Muscovites" might breed nationalist resentment that could destabilize their satellites.

Thus, in 1955 both North Korea and the Soviet Union made certain concessions. Pyongyang re-examined its eco

ing down on his intra-party critics, who may have played an active role in the Soviet intervention. At the April Central

goslavia, while Moscow equipped the North Korean Air Force with turbo-prop bombers and gave the Soviet-North Korean