was delayed. On 26 August the DPRK Ambassador to Budapest declared that if a third state proposed the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and the ROK to the UN, Pyongyang would not object (see Documents No. 20, 22, and 23). On 5 April 1961, Paek Chong-won stated that the DPRK would agree to the admission of both Koreas to the InterParliamentary Union, and as late as 15 June he still stressed that North Korea would eventually become a member of the UN, 122

Pyongyang's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to international organizations shows that the aforesaid proposals were not merely propaganda exercises. Since Beijing and Hanoi consistently rejected any similar suggestions concerning T'aipei and Saigon, respectively, the idea of simultaneous admission should not be taken lightly. Moreover, North Korean domestic policies also seem to have been influenced by the prospect of cooperation with Seoul. Pyongyang took various steps to reassure southern public opinion. In March 1961 the DPRK Ambassador to Prague stated that it was high time to improve the quality of North Korean consumer goods, for if the South Koreans visited the North, these products would hardly make a good impression on them.123 Following the April Revolution, the leadership repeatedly called upon cadres not to resort to oppressive measures. Forced resettlement from the capital came to a temporary halt. Still, real de-Stalinization remained out of the question, since Kim Il Sung regarded the overwhelming majority of the population as potential suspects (see Documents No. 21 and 25). The accelerated recruitment of southern-born cadres, whose future task was to deal with local administration in the South, indicated that Pyongyang's ultimate aim was the establishment of a Communist regime in South Korea.

The DPRK and the Sino-Soviet Rift

The April Revolution coincided with the first open SinoSoviet clashes, and influenced the DPRK's reaction to the latter. Since the new leaders in Seoul repudiated Rhee's commitment to military unification, the prospect of a rapprochement between North and South temporarily convinced Kim Il Sung of the usefulness of Soviet diplomatic methods, and he eagerly adopted Khrushchev's confederation plan. On the other hand, Beijing probably considered Kim's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to the UN a dangerous precedent. On 1 July 1960 the Czechoslovak Ambassador told Práth that Pyongyang had recently moved a bit closer to the Soviet standpoint, while Chinese influence in the DPRK was decreasing (see Document No. 17). Nonetheless, Kim's attempts to make a good impression on South Korean public opinion were not always welcomed in Moscow. Aware of being regarded in the ROK as Soviet puppets, the KWP leaders reinforced nationalist propaganda. Following the April Revolution, North Korean music broadcasts seldom included foreign compositions. 124 Pyongyang did its best to hide the fact that it had received aid from the "fraternal" countries. Nationalist propaganda and the condemnation of "flunkeyism" also served as a means to isolate the North

Korean population from the effects of the Sino-Soviet rift. Following the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the PRC, the regime took measures to prevent its citizens from visiting the foreign embassies (see Document No. 23).125

Although Kim Il Sung was hardly fond of Khrushchev, he had good reason not to give Beijing his full support. In October 1960 a Chinese delegation headed by He Long tried to win Pyongyang over to China's cause, but the attempt ended in failure. In fact, in early 1961 a certain tension appeared in Sino-North Korean relations. The KWP leaders were clearly aware of the PRC's economic difficulties (see Document No. 24). In 1960 P'yongyang purchased 300,000 metric tons of grain from the USSR, whereas China proved incapable of exporting grain to the DPRK.126 Due to the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, by September 1961 some 30,000 Koreans had fled Manchuria, seeking refuge in the DPRK.127 On 5 February 1961 a section head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry told a Hungarian diplomat that while in North Korea the correct policies of the KWP had more or less solved the problems of agriculture, this was not the case in South Korea and China. 128

In fact, Kim Il Sung had little inclination to look up to the CCP leaders. "These Chinese are too sluggish. If I had only one division, I could destroy the Central [Nationalist] Army right now," Kim had commented regarding the CCP's efforts in 1946.129 In August 1957 Kim told Práth that the DPRK's rice crop was 300 kilograms per capita, while in the PRC it never exceeded 200 kilograms per capita. 130 From 1958 on, Pyongyang began to downplay the military and economic assistance it had received from China since 1950.131 Although the North Korean and Chinese regimes had much in common, their policies were often nonetheless dissimilar. In 1954-1955 KWP cadres emphasized that there was no need to launch an anti-"kulak" campaign. By contrast, in 1955 Beijing declared that the struggle against "kulaks" was of great importance. 132 Moreover, Kim's actions sometimes preceded, rather than imitated, comparable measures by the CCP. In labor-short North Korea the peacetime mobilization of officials for physical work began in 1953-1954. Beijing introduced a similar policy as late as 1957.133 Early in 1955, as the regime's control over artists loosened a bit, many North Korean painters returned to the traditional Korean style of painting. In the PRC the similarly temporary "rehabilitation” of traditional Chinese painting took place only in mid-1956.134 Although the Great Leap Forward had certainly influenced the Ch'ollima movement, Kim began to re-examine his economic policies in 1959, while Mao pressed on until December 1960.135

Nevertheless, the CCP leaders proved more tolerant of North Korean nationalism than did their Soviet counterparts. In the wake of Park Chung-hee's coup, Pyongyang signed treaties of mutual friendship and cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing. In June 1961 Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited the DPRK. He assured Kim Il Sung of the full support of the USSR, but criticized certain North Korean economic policies. Having inspected several factories, Kosygin, ever the technocrat, told Kim that the North Koreans should not have wasted time trying to invent everything themselves,

since in some cases the adoption of foreign patents would have been more economical.136 By contrast, at the 4th KWP Congress in September, Deng Xiaoping explicitly appealed to Korean nationalism. "The Chinese leaders must learn from the Korean leaders," he declared, calling Koreans a "mighty people of 30 million." This certainly pleased Pyongyang,. Deng's words were often quoted in intra-party propaganda.137

Confrontation with Seoul and Moscow

Much to the Soviets' surprise, on 16 May 1961 Deputy Foreign Minister Kim T'ae-hui told the foreign ambassadors

assumed an interstate character. On 3 December all Soviet diplomats were recalled from Tirana. Henceforth Kim took the Soviet attack on Stalinism personally. As he put it at a CC plenum held in March 1962, "we must prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union will cast us aside in the same way as it did Albania." (see Documents No. 27 and 30).146

On 10 December Radio Pyongyang ceased to broadcast the Korean language programs of Radio Moscow. The post office withheld those copies of Pravda and Kommunist that dealt with the issue of Stalinism. 147 The diplomatic corps was told that from 1 January 1962 on, foreigners were forbidden

that Park's coup was a favorable development. 138 As did certain US observers, some KWP leaders considered Park, who had been arrested by the Rhee regime for his role in a 1948 rebellion, to be a leftist. Park's initial policies apparently confirmed this view. 139 Pyongyang, prepared for all emergencies, put the KPA on alert, but considered the South Korean situation rather unstable. On 15 June Paek Chong-won highlighted Park's conflict with Chang Do-young, calling it a clash of pro-Japanese and pro-US officers.140 In September P'yongyang asked the Hungarian press not to criticize the southern leaders too harshly.141 As recently disclosed South Korean sources attest, at that time secret talks took place between the two regimes. Since these meetings proved fruitless, Kim Il Sung lost his patience. On October 2 Yu Changsik stated that because Park had cracked down on the southern proponents of unification, Kim dropped the matter of DPRK-ROK cooperation. 142 Following Park's visit to the US, the northern media began to attack him by name.143

Having failed to establish contacts with Seoul, Kim lost his interest in the "peaceful co-existence" proposed by Khrushchev. The 22nd CPSU Congress, with its renewed emphasis on de-Stalinization, also alarmed him. Still, at first Pyongyang seems to have tried to avoid an open confrontation with Moscow. During the Soviet-DPRK "month of friendship" (15 October-15 November), both sides stressed the importance of cooperation, and the North Koreans spoke about their economic problems with remarkable frankness. 144 Although at the end of October a few Albanian students arrived in the DPRK, North Korean students were told not to put questions to them about the Soviet-Albanian dispute.145 On 27 November Kim Il Sung forbade party members to discuss Stalinism and the "Albanian question." However, the inter-party conflict between Khrushchev and Hoxha soon

to visit the three southernmost provinces without special permission.148 In January Pyongyang flatly refused to sell copper and salt to the GDR, though the latter badly needed these materials. 149 From February on, intra-party lectures criticized Soviet policies and the COMECON. A wave of repression swept the party and state apparatus, and the half-hearted "thaw" of 1960-1961 came to an end. In fact, Kim Il Sung had good reason to worry about the effect Soviet de-Stalinization might produce on North Korean public opinion, for in the early 1960s dissenting voices were by no means non-existent among the intelligentsia and the masses (see Documents No. 27, 30, and 36). By contrast, the CCP leadership did not halt the process of political and economic "corrections," including the rehabilitation of "rightists," after the 22nd Congress. While Soviet-Chinese relations began to improve in February, Soviet-DPRK friction continued until May.151

Kim Il Sung did not adopt a defensive posture vis-a-vis Seoul following his conflict with Moscow. On the contrary, he behaved as if he had finally been given a free hand. In March a high-ranking DPRK official told a GDR diplomat that Pyongyang would liberate the South by military means, for "we cannot wait until the population of South Korea starves to death!" (see Document No. 26). The belligerent statements of Kim Il and other KWP leaders startled certain East European diplomats, who had their doubts about the allegedly aggressive intentions of the US. 152 In April the slogan chonmin mujanghwa (arming the entire population) appeared in many places. 153 In mid-1962 the employment of soldiers on construction projects more or less came to an end, indicating that the KPA was permanently put on alert.154 At a secret meeting held on 19 June the leadership resolved to develop the defense industry. Kim seems to have tried not to place too heavy a burden on the population, since the other focal

point of the 1963 plan was agriculture, rather than heavy industry (see Document No. 30). While these steps gave the lie to the peaceful proposals the DPRK made in June 1962, it should be pointed out that in 1960-61 Kim's approaches to Seoul had not been accompanied by similar measures.155

Early in 1962, Sino-North Korean cooperation intensified remarkably, as Beijing supported Pyongyang's militancy towards Seoul.156 In April a Chinese delegation led by Peng Zhen arrived in the DPRK.157 Since Sino-Soviet relations were improving at that time, Peng may have asked Pyongyang to be less hostile to Moscow. In August Khrushchev made an attempt to conciliate Kim, who welcomed the initiative (see Documents No. 29 and 30). On 17 October Kim told Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky that he did not intend to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. He also emphasized that the KPA needed modern Soviet arms. Of the 500,000 troops, 300,000 were constantly in the trenches. The DPRK's defense expenditures, Kim said, were proportionately the highest in the whole Communist camp."

158

From the Cuban Missile Crisis to Khrushchev's fall, Soviet-DPRK relations steadily worsened, while Sino-North Korean contacts grew stronger. On 23 October, one day after the outbreak of the Caribbean crisis, Kim declared that no Communist country had the right to impose its will on others. He probably meant that the Kremlin had subordinated Havana's interests to its own, exposing Cuba to a potential nuclear attack.159 In November Khrushchev was depicted as an appeaser at a meeting in the DPRK Foreign Ministry, 160 Military buildup accelerated, while industrialization slowed down. In December a CC plenum designated 1963 as another "buffer year. By contrast, in 1965-1970 P'yongyang, in an attempt to compete with South Korea's rapid economic growth, tried to develop the military and civilian sectors of the economy simultaneously. The KWP leaders seem to have underestimated the danger of nuclear war, which worried Moscow, particularly when Pak Kum-ch'ol stated that a South Korean attack was unlikely for the time being (see Documents No. 31 and 37).

9161

In 1963-1964 Soviet-North Korean relations reached their lowest point. Harsh debates took place between the Soviet diplomats and the KWP leaders. The latter's actions often amounted to outright provocations (see Documents No. 35, 39, and 40). The authorities systematically harassed the Soviet and East European embassies, tapping their telephones and delaying their mail. While the Chinese diplomats were provided with vegetables and meat, their Soviet or Hungarian counterparts were not. 162 In Moskovsky's view, the KWP's intra-party propaganda outdid even the Chinese in reviling Khrushchev. 163 In turn, a Soviet diplomat called Kim Il Sung's "brain trust," which included Hwang Chang-yop, a "political Gestapo.' "164 Pyongyang launched a campaign against mixed marriages, compelling Koreans to divorce their European spouses (see Document No. 33). The GDR Ambassador described the speech of a party cadre, who had called such marriages a "crime against the Korean race," as "Goebbelsian."165 Ordinary citizens, with the exception of some children, seem not to have shared the cadres' hostility

to Europeans, but they were prevented from contacting the latter. 166 Although several North Koreans asked the Soviet Embassy for political asylum, the Soviets, who were rightly afraid of Pyongyang's agent provocateur tactics, refused to help. 167

Searching for scapegoats, Khrushchev and Moskovsky declared that Puzanov, Counsellor Kryukov, and other diplomats had not noticed Kim's hostility in time. This accusation was not completely justified, for Kryukov had become persona non grata in the DPRK because of his critical remarks. Khrushchev also seems to have misinterpreted Kim's motives. “You have no political line of your own, it is the Chinese policy that the leaders of the KWP imitate and carry out," Moskovsky told Yi Chu-yon in June 1964. Ironically, it was Puzanov, a person known for his Stalinist views, who understood that the KWP leaders, though they temporarily sided with the PRC against Moscow, did not trust Beijing either. Kim Il Sung may have preferred the smaller, nationalist, and usually hard-line Communist states, such as Romania, Albania, Cuba, and the DRV, to the Asian colossus, for the former posed no threat to the DPRK (see Documents No. 32, 35, and 39). 168 On the other hand, cooperation with these countries yielded rather meager results to both sides. Apart from chrome ore, Albania had little to offer the DPRK, while the latter could not extend credit to Tirana. 169 Of the 4,000 metric tons of steel North Korea exported to the DRV in 1963, Hanoi took merely 700 metric tons, since its quality was very poor. 170 During the Cuban crisis, Pyongyang organized meetings in order to condemn the US. Much to the surprise of the Cuban Ambassador, the speeches dealt mainly with the DPRK's economic achievements. Kim Ch'ang-man, however, told the ambassador, "the Cuban people do not know how intensely we are supporting Cuba."171

Conclusions

From the new sources discussed here, we may conclude that in the 1953-1959 period Soviet-DPRK relations were based on a certain mutuality, rather than subordination. The Kremlin was still capable of intervening in North Korean domestic policies, but Kim Il Sung skillfully countered these steps by appaaring to play along while gradually depriving the Soviets of their Korean allies and informants. Pro-Soviet gestures, such as Kim's approval of the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary, and of the 1957 purges, often served as justification of Kim's own policies. Moreover, Kim usually tried to conceal the anti-Soviet nature of his actions. Whenever the DPRK authorities prevented people from visiting the embassies or dismissed the latter's Korean employees, they referred to "security reasons," i.e. the American threat. In 1959 Kim Il Sung replaced Foreign Minister Nam II, one of the few Soviet Korean leaders who had survived the purges of 1955-1958, but he was careful enough to tell Andrei Kirilenko CPSU Central Committee Secretary that Nam Il might be promoted to Premier a bit later. 172

From 1959 on, however, the nature of the Soviet-DPRK relationship began to change. By that time Kim had broken the influence of the Soviet and Yan'an factions, thus pre

venting the Kremlin from playing off his fellow Politburo members against him. In addition, the Soviet aid program had come to an end. Kim continued to press Moscow for economic and military assistance, but he was less and less willing to offer anything in return. In 1961 Pyongyang failed to meet its foreign trade obligations to Moscow, whereupon the North Koreans asked the Soviets to cancel their debt. As they put it, "Your country is rich, you can afford that.”173 This attitude was combined with a feeling of superiority. As early as 1960 some KWP cadres made statements such as "It won't be long before the Europeans come here to learn from us."'174 While in the pre-1959 period the DPRK took little interest in establishing contacts with developing countries, from the 1960s on it strove for a dominant role in the Third World. When the authorities showed factories built with foreign assistance to African or Latin American guests, they described them as achievements of North Korea's self-reliant development. 175

Despite the regime's extreme despotism and "national solipsism," Kim's policies did not lack an element of pragmatism.176 In 1963-1964 the DPRK, while condemning "flunkeyism" and "modern revisionism," laid increasing stress on economic cooperation with Japan.'77 Kim also consented to the systematic translation of articles published in Soviet, Japanese, and US scientific journals.178 In certain cases the KWP leaders even proved more rational than Khrushchev. Pak Song-ch'ol's frank analysis of the problems of North Korean agriculture stood in sharp contrast to the utopian educational scheme concocted by the Soviet leader (see Document No. 34). Due to this underlying pragmatism, Kim proved able to let bygones be bygones, and in 1965 readily accepted Moscow's offer of reconciliation. The Soviets also tried to avoid a complete rupture with the DPRK. In November 1964 Kosygin told Kim Il that the Soviet media had consistently refrained from criticizing the KWP by name.179 In essence, the Soviets were compelled to put a good face on Kim's domestic and foreign policies in order not to push North Korea toward China. While Khrushchev eventually declined to make that sacrifice, his successors did not.

Balazs Szalontai completed a Ph.D. in History in 2003 from Central European University in Budapest. His dissertation, "The Failure of De-Stalinization in North Korea, 19531964: The DPRK in a Comparative Perspective," draws on the extensive records available in the Hungarian National Archives to place North Korean history in the context of the development of other small states within the communist camp, particularly North Vietnam and Albania. His publications include: “The Dynamic of Repression: The Global Impact of the Stalinist Model."

NOTES

See, among others, K. Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995); Evgeni Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51;" Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of SinoAmerican Confrontation; Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives;" Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996); Milton Leitenberg, "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis;” Kathryn Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,” CWIHP Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998).

2 Andrei N. Lankov, "Kim Il Sung's Campaign against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of Chuch'e," Korean Studies 23 (1999), pp. 43-67.; A.N. Lankov, "The Demise of NonCommunist Parties in North Korea (1945-1960)," Journal of Cold War Studies 3:1 (2001), pp. 103-125.

3 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 291-376.; Brian Myers, Han Sorya and North Korean Literature. The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 49., 53-66., 78., 99107., 138-141.; Sung Chul Yang, The North and South Korean Political Systems. A Comparative Analysis (Boulder-Seoul: Westview Press, Inc.-Seoul Press, 1994), pp. 367-368. On the other hand, a number of other scholars consider the North Korean regime, at least in the 1945-1956 period, a Soviet satellite not different from the East European dictatorships, and describe it as an imitation of Soviet Stalinism. See, among others, Robert A. Scalapino and Chongsik Lee, Communism in Korea I-II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Okonogi Masao, "North Korean Communism: In Search of Its Prototype," in Korean Studies: New Pacific Currents. Ed. by Dae-Sook Suh (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 177-206; Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty. Politics and Leadership in North Korea (London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999).

4

Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1953, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents] Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth KA], 4. doboz, 5/cg, 04629/1/1953.

5 Hungarian Legation Documents] Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth KTS], 10. doboz, 24/b, 001132/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 14 September 1953, KA, 11. doboz, 24/b, 011219/1953.

6 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1956, KA, 8. doboz, 15/b, 025/25/11-6/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 November 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 22/a, 010968/ 1954.

'Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 May 1957, KA, 9. doboz, 18/f, 002756/1957.

8

Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 1 March 1956, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 003133/1956.

9 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 14 April 1956, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 025/25/4-5/1956.

10 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 December 1954, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 001140/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 June 1955, 025/25/3-28/1955, June 28, 1955. 11 Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 5 May 1950, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 00895/1950.

12 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December

1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 August 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 25/b, 09479/ 1954.

13 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 13 September 1954, KA, 6. doboz, 11/h, 09481/1954.

14 Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1956, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 April 1956, KTS, 11. doboz, 25/b, 004441/ 1956.

DPRK, Report, 16 July 1954, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/cb, 001201/1954.

31 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 September 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 010941/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 010929/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 October 1954, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001567/1954.

32 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 13 April 1955, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006054/1955. The term 'Soviet Korean' refers to Soviet citizens of Korean background who were dispatched to

16 Hungarian Legation to the PRC, Report, 23 August 1950, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Kína 1945-1964 [henceforth CTS], 10. doboz, 5/f, 001503/1950; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 December 1950, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 01075/ 1951.

17

Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 29 January 1951, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 028286/1951; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 18 March 1955, CTS, 5, doboz, 5/a, 003989/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 21 January 1955, CTS, 10. doboz, 5/f, 003995/1955.

18 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 25 November 1952, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 013952/1952.

19

Hungarian Legation to the DRV, Report, 16 August 1963, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Vietnam 1945-1964 [henceforth VTS], 3. doboz, 5/a, 006368/1963.

20 On the other hand, the North Korean land reform of 19451946 proved less violent than the ones carried out by the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist regimes. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War. Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 414-417.

21 Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 27 October 1951, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 01939/1952.

22

Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1953, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 011216/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 November 1956, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 1/25-5/1957; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 21 July 1955, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 007961/1955.

23 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 June 1953, KA, 10. doboz, 18/i, 001404/1953. On the 1945-1950 period, see Charles K. Armstrong, "Surveillance and Punishment in Postliberation North Korea," Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique Vol. 3 (Winter 1995), No. 3, pp. 695-722; Jeon Hyun Soo, Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia v Severnoi Koree v usloviiakh sovetskoi voennoi administratsii 1945-1948 (Moscow: Drevo Zhizni, 1997); Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone. Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989). 24 Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 19 July 1952, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/bc, 001024/2/1952.

25 Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the Deceivers," p. 180. 26 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 August 1953, KA, 1. doboz, 1/b, 02199/2/1953.

27 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 April 1954, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 00866/1954.

28 Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 6 December 1954, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 001131/1955.

29 Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 28 November 1955, VTS, 9. doboz, 27/d, 00426/1956.

30 Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1953, KA, 5. doboz, 5/f, 01202/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the

of a Communist regime. The most influential members of the socalled 'Soviet faction' were Ho Ka-i, Pak Ch'ang-ok, Nam Il, Pak Chong-ae, and Pang Hak-se. While some of them opposed Kim's policies in the mid-1950s, others took sides with him against Moscow. Those Korean Communists who had fought against the Japanese under CCP leadership in Yan'an constituted the 'Yan'an faction,' and its leaders were Mu Chong, Kim Tu-bong, Ch'oe Changik, Pak Il-u, and Kim Ch`ang-man. This group was also divided between Kim Il Sung's supporters and opponents.