Bulletin, 第 14-15 期Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 100 筆
第 9 頁
... leadership received no prior notification of the launching of the attack on South Korea on 25 June . They , in fact , learned of it via foreign news services . Some Chinese leaders resented this lack of notification , but they nonethe ...
... leadership received no prior notification of the launching of the attack on South Korea on 25 June . They , in fact , learned of it via foreign news services . Some Chinese leaders resented this lack of notification , but they nonethe ...
第 10 頁
... leaders had ignored Mao's repeated warnings that US military interven- tion was imminent . He emphasized that if US ... leader wrote to Mao on 5 July , “ immediately to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Sino - Korean border for ...
... leaders had ignored Mao's repeated warnings that US military interven- tion was imminent . He emphasized that if US ... leader wrote to Mao on 5 July , “ immediately to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Sino - Korean border for ...
第 11 頁
... leader declared confidently that the Pusan campaign had already begun and that as soon as the highly should play ... leadership did not even understand the basic strategies of the KPA . China had once attempted to send a high - level ...
... leader declared confidently that the Pusan campaign had already begun and that as soon as the highly should play ... leadership did not even understand the basic strategies of the KPA . China had once attempted to send a high - level ...
第 26 頁
... leadership , the main problem seemed to have been to prevent Hamhung from becoming more ad- vanced and attractive than Pyongyang . To avoid this politi- cally unacceptable eventuality , they diverted substantial material designed for ...
... leadership , the main problem seemed to have been to prevent Hamhung from becoming more ad- vanced and attractive than Pyongyang . To avoid this politi- cally unacceptable eventuality , they diverted substantial material designed for ...
第 27 頁
... leadership , primarily because of Moscow's failure to send troops to Ko- rea during the Korean War . After the 1953 armistice , he turned against indigenous former partisans of Korea.20 Since Kim Il Sung had criticized many failed ...
... leadership , primarily because of Moscow's failure to send troops to Ko- rea during the Korean War . After the 1953 armistice , he turned against indigenous former partisans of Korea.20 Since Kim Il Sung had criticized many failed ...
其他版本 - 查看全部
常見字詞
activity Afghan Afghanistan American April Archive army Beijing Brezhnev Central Committee China Chinese Cold War Communist Party Comrade Kim conference conversation cooperation CPSU CC ČSSR Cuba Cuban CWIHP Bulletin Czech Czechoslovakia delegation Democratic discussed doboz documents DPRK Dubček economic enemy Erich Honecker forces Foreign Ministry Hungarian Embassy Hungary Iran issue Kabul Karmal Khrushchev Kim Il Sung Korean comrades Koscelanský KSČ KSČ CC leaders leadership M. S. GORBACHEV Mao Zedong meeting ment military Minister Moscow Najib NAJIBULLAH national reconciliation North Korean Novotný Oblast October officials organs Pakistan PDPA peace Peng Dehuai People's Republic plenum Politburo political Prague Presidium problems Pyongyang regime regional relations Report Rudé právo Russian Secretary Shelest situation Slovak Slovakia socialism socialist countries South Soviet Ambassador Soviet troops Soviet Union Stalin talks Telegram tion TODOR ZHIVKOV Top Secret Translated TRANSLATOR'S NOTE Ukraine Ukrainian USSR weapons