TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I should like to do that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Secretary ACHESON. I will have to postpone my prepared statement because that statement does not deal with the classification of the document in question. I trust at some proper time I shall be permitted to make that general statement.

TEXT OF DOCUMENT AT ISSUE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, if it is in order and I may ask it, would either the Secretary or yourself describe as accurately as it is possible or proper to describe what the statement is, and what is allegedly in it, and what the issue before this committee is.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest as a procedural matter, because these documents are not-except in the yellow bound books are not-available, might I suggest that one of the clerks of the committee-it will not take long-read the document so that all members will have the information.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection, the document at issue will be read.

Mr. DARDEN (reading):

I. Problem

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA-POLICY ADVISORY STAFF

(Special guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949)
POLICY INFORMATION PAPER-FORMOSA

To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

II. Background

A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three principal elements:

1. Communists, world-wide, who charge the United States with conspiring to build the island into a fortress to be taken over by the United States (if it does not already control it), thereby trying to brand the United States with the mark of aggressive imperialism, and also hoping to get us involved in a risky and unpromising venture;

2. Pro-Nationalists (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government could survive, and who tend to create an impression the United States is delinquent if it fails to "save Formosa";

3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

B. Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the matter in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. Its fall would threaten :

1. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent we have become committed in the public mind to hold it;

2. Damage to the morale of other nations, particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by the Communist gains and fear its possible further advances. C. Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is part of China in

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no way especially distinguished or important. Although ruled by the Japanese (as "Taiwan") for 50 years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility.

It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam declaration and the surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China and the United States facilitated its take over by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.

Even the small United States military advisory group sent there at Chinese Government request was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely a handful of military attaché personnel with diplomatic status remains. The United States never has had military bases there, and never has sought any special concessions there.

ECA work done on the island, particularly through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and technical nature for assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid pro quo has been sought. D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions. Rather public opinion obviously is divided and uncertain, and there is no apparent consensus for a particular course of active intervention. III. Treatment

A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing attention may be paid Formosa, to establish, publicly the facts indicated below. Overseas use should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis and comment appearing both at home and abroad, as well as official statements as they may appear. Label conflicting public statements properly as "individual expressions of opinion," as "unofficial," etc.

B. All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that:

1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government;

2. The United States has a special interest in or "designs on" the island or any military bases on Formosa ;

3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism;

4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government:

(a) Historically and geographically a part of China;

(b) The national government has run the island's affairs since the take-over and is responsible for present conditions there;

(c) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obligations, actual or moral.

2. Formosa has no special military significance:

(a) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast;

(b) Other potential objects of Communist aggression are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa ;

(c) China has never been a sea power and the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.

3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social purposes, has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern for the welfare of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought of special concessions for the United States.

4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would:

(a) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime; (b) Involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new area of bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare; (c) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage and to reaction against our "militarism, imperialism, and interference" even from friendly peoples, and particularly from Chinese, who would be turned against us anew;

(d) Eminently suit purposes of the U. S. S. R., which would like to see us "substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies and weaken effectiveness of our policies generally by such action.

5. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually individual) source, and make clear that the total of such demands evidences concern and frustration in some quarters but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

D. Avoid:

1. Speculation which would show undue concern with whether Nationalists can hold the island or when Communists may take it;

2. References which would indicate important strategic significance, or that the island is a political entity;

3. In output to China, any emphasis on bad conditions in Formosa under the Nationalists, although to other areas reference can be made among reasons why Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere;

4. Statements that Formosa's final status still is to be determined by the Japanese peace treaty;

5. Name "Taiwan"; use "Formosa."

TEXT OF LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

There is also the letter of transmittal.

Would you like for me to read it?

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think that is necessary, unless some of the committee members desire it.

However, I think it will be well to read it.

Mr. DARDEN. April 26, 1951.

My Dear Senator Knowland

Chairman RUSSELL. I mean the one transmitting the document, with respect to classification.

Mr. DARDEN. Here is a letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated May 22, 1951:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed herewith are documents which I have received today from the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State's letter which accompanies them.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LOVETT.

Senator MCMAHON. Who signed that?

Mr. DARDEN. Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of Defense. Chairman RUSSELL. I want the letter from the State Department, transmitting it to the Defense Department. Mr. DARDEN. All right, sir. [Reading:]

Hon. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Secretary of Defense.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D. C., May 22, 1951.

MY DEAR SECRETARY MARSHALL: I have your letter forwarding a letter of Senator Russell, dated May 7, 1951, requesting that certain documents specified by Senator Knowland be furnished for use in the investigation now being conducted by the Committee on Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate.

Senator Knowland, in his letter of April 17, 1951, made six requests; replies to the first four requests follow:

1. "The Wedemeyer report on Korea submitted to the President under date of September 19, 1947, along with the report on China which has been published in the so-called China White Paper."

The Wedemeyer report has already been made available to the committees. 2. "The memorandum issued by the State Department on December 23, 1949, circulated among United States diplomatic missions abroad stating among other things that 'Formosa has no special military significance.' Also please furnish the names of the group or committee in the State Department who participated

in the formulation of this document as I shall desire some, or all of them to be called before the combined committee."

Attached is a copy of Special Guidance No. 28 issued on December 23, 1949, by the Policy Advisory Staff of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State. This copy is transmitted with the understanding that, as a classified document, it will not be made a part of the public record of the hearings now going on before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The series of information policy papers, of which No. 28 is one item, is designed primarily for the purpose of providing the necessary background and guidance to assist United States Government information media and United States missions abroad in interpreting major developments affecting United States foreign policy. Such guidance is necessary in order that the Government's information media may contribute effectively to the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives. Making information policy guidance public would adversely affect the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. Revelation of the detailed methods by which the United States conducts its foreign information program would be of assistance to the Soviets not so much in advising them of what our techniques are, but more in permitting them to take an information directive and use it for extensive counter-propaganda. By its very nature an information policy guidance paper has to include descriptions of the various attitudes on questions and instructions on emphasis and the attitude to take in answering questions. If a copy should be made public, the U. S. S. R. could use it to discredit the information program of the United States by arguing that the Voice of America is not interested in portraying truth, but rather thinks up its arguments (and by implication, its facts) as they may be necessary to support a preconceived foreign policy.

For the foregoing reasons, the Department of State cannot authorize the declassification for inclusion in the public record of the document in question. In this general connection I invite your attention to my reply of April 26, 1951, to Senator Knowland's original letter, a copy of which is attached. The following paragraph in my letter of April 26 constitutes the response to the second portion of Senator Knowland's second request:

"As to its preparation, you will recall that I stated to the Appropriations Committee that I considered it unwise and contrary to the public interest to indicate which officers in the Department participated, other than to state that 10 different officers in four offices within the Department participated in the drafting and clearing of this document. It must be recognized that papers of this kind are always the result of a give-and-take of views among the various persons on the working levels. If the names of the people who participated in drafting documents were to be made public, the inevitable tendency would be for each to keep a careful record of his precise contribution or attitude on any controversial subject. A department in which officers on the working level are busily engaged in making records against one another would, of course, not function as efficiently as one in which the principle of effective responsibility of the top officials is recognized."

In December 1949, Mr. Rowland H. Sargeant was Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

3. "Confidential document No. 84 dated November 27, 1950, from the American Minister at Taiwan (Formosa) to the State Department relative to the visit of the undersigned to Formosa."

Attached is confidential dispatch No. 84 of November 27, 1950, from Taipei, which is transmitted with the understanding that, as a classified document, it will not be made a part of the public record of the present hearings. Because of the special circumstances surrounding these hearings, the Department is, in this one instance, submitting a confidential document concerning prominent personalities, but this action is not to be considered a precedent to be followed in normal circumstances.

4. "Directive issued to the commander of the United Nations forces in Korea relative to United Nations policy regarding Republic of Korea officials being restricted from going north of the thirty-eighth parallel."

On October 12, 1950, the Interim Committee of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, established in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of November 7, 1950, passed a resolution advising the unified command to take over temporarily "all responsibilities for the Government and civil responsibilities of these parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective

control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities and which may now come under occupation by United Nations forces, pending consideration by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea of the readministration of those territories." Following consultation between the Departments of State and Defense, and with General MacArthur, there was transmitted to General MacArthur on October 29, 1950, a directive for the occupation of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel. This directive was approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President. A copy of that directive is attached.

Following discussions between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 2, 1950, transmitted a telegram to General MacArthur which had the full concurrence of the Department of State, to the effect that it was the understanding in Washington that he was prohibiting, for all practical purposes, the utilization of South Korean personnel in civil affairs matters in North Korea. The telegram informed General MacArthur that it was not intended so to restrict him; rather it should be emphasized that he should make use of South Korean personnel in the administration of North Korea.

With respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Senator Knowland's letter, a further examination of the files is required to determine what material is available on the two points and what reply should be made to Senator Russell. These two points will be covered in a subsequent communication.

The Department of State appreciates Senator Russell's assurance that the classified documents forwarded herewith will be "subject to the same security provisions that controlled the classified documents which the Department of Defense has previously provided for examination by members of the committee." Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

The letter bears the classification of confidential. Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, if you desire to make any statement now we will be glad to hear from you.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to address myself to the question of this document. It deals with information to be given out over the Voice of America to minimize the damaging effects to the United States of the possible fall of Formosa.

Senator WILEY. We do not hear you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. I was just describing, Senator, what the document was about.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA, OCTOBER 1948 TO JUNE 1950

In discussing the document which, obviously, relates to the policy of the United States, I have, first, to state what the policy of the United States Government was in regard to Formosa, and I should like to deal with the period from October 1948 to January 25, 1950.

Throughout that period there was one policy, and one policy only, which was adopted by the Government, and with the exception of one point in that policy, which I shall describe later on, a point which arose on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of December 1949, this policy was unanimously recommended to the President of the United States by all the departments concerned, and was approved by him.

You see, therefore, that it originated during the administration of the State Department by my predecessor, and was carried on by me, so far as the State Department participation is concerned.

That policy was as follows: First of all, it was understood and agreed that Formosa had strategic importance so far as the United States was concerned.

The second point was that that strategic importance related to keeping Formosa out of the hands of a power which would be hostile