to the United States, and did not concern occupying or using Formosa by the United States.

The third element of the policy, which never varied from October 1948 to January 25, 1950, was that, in the existing condition, and strength of the Armed Forces of the United States, it was not possible to commit or promise to commit any forces whatever, Armed Forces of the United States, to the defense of Formosa.

The next element of the policy was that the State Department should, to the best of its ability, by diplomatic and economic means try to keep Formosa from falling into hands which would be hostile to us.

Those are the main outlines of the policy.

I, in August 1949, as Secretary of State, reported that I could no longer guarantee that economic and diplomatic means would be successful in keeping Formosa out of the hands of a power which might be hostile to us, and I may say that this policy was reviewed very frequently during the whole time that I was there.

Senator SMITH. Pardon me; what was that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I was saying that this policy was reviewed frequently during the period.

Senator SMITH. I thought you gave a date.

Secretary ACHESON. I gave the wrong date, I am sorry to say. The period was October 1948 to June 25, 1950, when I reported that what I have just stated, that it was reviewed again.

BACKGROUND OF PREPARATION OF INSTRUCTIONS OF DECEMBER 1949

While we were in this condition which I have just described, the Department of the Army, which was represented on the interdepartmental group which coordinated the information policies, suggested to the Department of State, the suggestion coming from General Wedemeyer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, to Assistant Secretary Allen, who is in charge of our Voice of America, that it might be very important to use the Voice of America and our international techniques to minimize any damage which might occur to us in event of the fall of Formosa.

The State Department said it was grateful for that suggestion and would go to work on the matter.

The Department did go to work on the matter.

First of all, there were two studies made, in September and October, as to the imminence and danger of this fall.

Those studies unanimously reported that the fall would occur, and would occur probably in the year 1950.

It was also unanimously understood in these policies, and reported, that, without American military support, support by our own Armed Forces, the island could not be held by those on it against serious attack from the mainland.

In the light of those studies, and those conclusions of probable fact, this document which you have before you was prepared, and, as the heading indicates, the purpose of the document was to solve the problem, if possible, of formulating policy which would minimize damage to the United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

MEANING OF VARIOUS PARTS OF THE DOCUMENT

Now, I should like to explain to you the document which you have heard read.

The document falls into three parts, the first part being entitled "Background."

That is information solely for those men who are preparing any broadcasts or public information which is to be put out through our Voice of America. All that part of the document has nothing to do with what that person has to say.

This part of the document which begins with "Background," and goes up to the subheading "Treatment," tells the officer working on this matter what is the importance of this question, and why do we want something said about it.

It also tells him what others are saying about this subject, so that he will know the information environment into which he is about to enter.

That covers all that part of the document.

Under the heading "Background," up to the point where we come to "Treatment," that is covered, and this, as I say, is solely for the information of the officers operating the Voice of America, or its various subdivisions, and is so understood.

When we come to "Treatment," the purpose of that section is to tell him the attitude that he should take and the things that he should

stress.

The final section of the paper is headed "Avoid," and that tells him things that he should not say.

Now under the heading of "Treatment," I will not bore the committee by reading that all over again.

There is very little, I think, that anyone would find to quarrel with in that part of the document, with one exception, and that is-in two places it says, "All material should be used to counter the false impressions that" and one of them is that "Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or other countries opposing communism."

Another place in the document is headed, under "Treatment," "The attitude shall be 'Formosa has no special military significance"," and it gives the reason why.

Now, it may be argued and undoubtedly will be argued that the policy of the United States, as I have described it, is not as stated in the parts that I have referred to.

MINIMIZING IMPORTANCE WHEN IN ADVERSITY

The answer to that, the reason that we adopt this attitude, is that it is the only attitude which will have the desired effect, which is to minimize the damage to the prestige of the United States and to the morale of others should Formosa fall.

It is a very common attitude in dealing with all matters of information, whether in the public or foreign information field, or in any other field. It is familiar to members of this committee that if a captain in command of a company finds that the companies on either side of him are falling back and taking punishment, what he says to

his men is, "Don't give it a thought. It doesn't matter at all. You are doing fine. Dig in. Hold it. It is all right."

You are all familiar with Mr. Churchill's great statement in 1940 that the British would fight on the beaches, fight in the streets, and fight in the hills. I don't think any of you thought that that was a scientific report on the military programs of the British General Staff.

This was an attitude and statement which had great effect.

In the field of politics we are quite familiar with statements which are made about the Gallup poll's report that this or that candidate or party is behind, that candidate or party says, "Why, it doesn't mean anything; I haven't started my campaign yet; wait until I get going."

Those are common attitudes. I don't know any other attitude which would be sounder to take if you believed, as we did believe— and rightly believed that an event was going to happen which would be damaging to our prestige, than to say, "Keep your chin up; it doesn't matter; this isn't important; we will go ahead and deal with it in some other way.'

That is what is behind this whole document.

QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION

I come now to the question of classification.

It is classified as confidential; it has been ever since it was written. In the letter to Senator Russell I told him that we could not agree to declassify it. It would have a very damaging effect, I hope you will agree, to take a document of the sort which I have described, which is a confidential instruction to your own officers as to how they shall deal with a situation which may develop, which fortunately did not develop, and make this public.

All those who are hostile to the United States will use it for purposes which are very obvious, and which I described in the letter to Senator Russell.

Making it public has no bearing on any issue before these two committees, and I hope that you will not make it public.

There is one matter in fairness, having mentioned it, I think I should say to the committee, which has no bearing on this question at all, but you must know the whole question of Formosa policy.

DISAGREEMENT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FORMOSA IN DECEMBER 1949

I stated that at the closing days of December 1949 there was a point at which recommendations were not unanimous, and that point had to do with a proposal put forward by the Defense Establishment, that a mission, military mission, should be sent to Formosa, and that some military assistance in addition to the $125,000,000 program, which was in the Appropriations Act of 1948, should be different. That proposal was made by the Defense Department. It was disagreed with by the State Department. We took the attitude that since the very statement of our problem indicated that this could not be successful and that only the interposition of armed forces of the United States could save the island, what we would be doing would be making an effort here which was by hypothesis ineffective, and we would involve our

selves with further damage to our prestige and to our whole position in the Far East.

Those conflicting views-and this was not a matter of bitter or heated controversy-those views were laid before the President and the President decided to continue the policy as I have stated it before. Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment. In the early part of your remarks you said January 25, 1950.

Secretary ACHESON. I meant June 25, 1950.
Chairman RUSSELL. 1948 through--

Secretary ACHESON. October 1948 until June 25, 1950. That is the period that I am covering.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

UNITED PRESS STORY ON THE INSTRUCTIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think in order that the committee may have the full background of this situation, I should give some background to it. On January 3, 1950, there was carried by the United Press with a Tokyo date line the following article, and I read: The United States State Department has notified its attaches that the loss of Formosa, island redoubt of the Chinese Nationalists, to the Communists was to be anticipated.

The Department said the public must be sold on the idea that the island is of no strategic value in order to prevent the loss of prestige at home and abroad. A document containing the Department's instructions on how to erase the "false impressions" of those pro-Nationalists interested in a "save Formosa" drive has been circulated here, it can be disclosed today.

The document was prepared by the State Department's public affairs area policy advisory staff, and was dated December 23. The word was sent to members of the Department and of some other Government offices.

The document said there are "pro-Nationalists" (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government could survive, and who tend to create an impression that the United States is delinquent if it fails to 'save Formosa.'"

It said there are groups in the United States "who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent the loss of the island to the Communists." This is "largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to the United States defense in the Pacific," the document added.

"The loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation," it said.

The fall of Formosa, it continued, would threaten a loss of prestige by the United States at home and abroad "to the extent that we have become committed in the public mind to hold it.”

The fall, it continued, also would threaten damage to the morale of other nations, "particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by Communist gains and fear its possible further advances."

The document said Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is a part of China and “in no way especially distinguished or important." "Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility," the document said. "It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam declaration and [Japanese] surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China, and the United States facilitated its take-over by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.

"United States opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been an insistent demand from a few sources for miiltary action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions."

83797-51-pt. 3—2

The document said all available material should be used "to counter false. impressions" that the retention of Formosa would save the Chinese Government, and that its loss would damage seriously the interest of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism.

"Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject," it continued, "emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points.

"Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government. Formosa has no special military significance."

CORRESPONDENCE WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman, when that item appeared on the printer in the outside room to the Senate, I immediately went to my office and under date of January 3 addressed the following letter to the Secretary of State:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that under date of December 23 or thereabouts the State Department issued a memorandum to various military attachés and others, indicating that Formosa could not be held for long and to do everything possible to prepare the public for the loss of the island and to stress the fact it was not needed for the strategic defense of the United States.

As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, I desire to have a copy of this memorandum at the earliest possible date.

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

On January 7, 1950, I addressed the following letter to the Secretary of State:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I called the State Department this morning to request the names of the committee which had been responsible for drafting the December 23 memorandum advising the State Department personnel that Formosa had no strategic value.

I first attempted to get Mr. Peurifoy in the Personnel Division, but he was out of the city and I talked with Mr. Bryan and made the request of him. He said he had to take it up with higher authority. At about 11: 15 this morning, I received a call from Mr. George Kennan who stated both Secretary Acheson and Under Secretary Webb were out of the city. However, he stated that the State Department itself assumed responsibility for any such information sent out and that he felt that he must decline to give me the names of the persons constituting the committee which drafted the document.

I emphasized to him that I felt that as a Member of the Senate of the United States I was entitled to this information and that while there might be some basis for the Department's position to decline to release a document which they themselves had classified, I could see no excuse for not furnishing a Member of Congress the names of such committee.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

In reply to that on January 17 I received a letter from the Secretary of State reading as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: I have your letter of January 7 in which you refer to your effort to obtain the names of those responsible for drafting the December 23, 1949, memorandum, and to your conversation with Mr. George F. Kennan who advised you that he felt he could not furnish you with the information.

I fully agree with the position taken by Mr. Kennan that it would be inappropriate to release the names of the officials who participated in the drafting of this paper. I feel that I, as Secretary of State, have responsibility for this particular document, in my opinion, rests with me and secondary responsibility rests with Mr. Howland Sargeant, Acting Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Public Affairs.

I hope you will agree with the position I have taken in this matter. The responsibility is mine and I fully accept it.