IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENT IN UNITED STATES POLICY

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I place an entirely different aspect on this document than the Secretary of State does. I think it is a key document of the foreign policy of this country, which led up to the situation, the statement of the President on January 5, that the United States would give no further military aid to Formosa, and which many of us, at least, believe led up to the situation where the United States Government was prepared, both to recognize the Communist regime of China and ultimately to turn Formosa over to them.

I call your attention to the fact that in the background information they tried, I believe, to undermine and to cast reflection upon those who may disagree with the policy, which would have led to the fall of Formosa, by saying in subparagraph 2:

Nationalists, principally in the United States, who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government would survive, and tend to create an impression that the United States is delinquent if it fails to save Formosa.

Mr. Chairman, I have felt that way for a number of years. I have stated it publicly on the floor of the Senate of the United States; I am pleased to say that in the hearings before this committee, the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Marshall, General Marshall; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley; each member of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman, all testified to the fact that in their military judgment it. would be detrimental to the interests of this Nation to let Formosa fall into enemy hands.

I call the attention of the committee to the fact that General MacArthur, in his testimony before this committee, and in his statement before the two Houses of Congress, feels precisely the same way about it.

At no time did General MacArthur nor did any other person who felt that way, so far as I know, advocate that the United States seize Formosa or that we ask for bases on Formosa, but we have felt for a long time that it would not be to our national interest to permit Formosa to fall into unfriendly hands.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT

Now in the second section, B, which is more or less for the guidance and, I think, to be put out at proper places by the representatives of the State Department, they have this to say:

The loss of the island is widely anticipated and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. It's fall would threaten—

Now, first of all, I wish to say that I think there were representatives on Formosa at that time who were following a studied course to undermine the position of the Government of the Republic of China and had consistently sent back reports that the island could not hold out for a period of 90 days, perhaps. I believe that that was misinformation being sent to the Government of the United States, and I think in the Army we would call it false official reports.

Now you go on to paragraph 3, subsection 3, under "Treatment" and here is what it says:

All materials should be used best to counter the false impressions.

Now let me read you this. This is what they were to do, to put out to counter what the State Department says was false impressions:

1. Formosa's retention to save the Chinese Government.

Mr. Chairman, I say that is a false statement, because the last stronghold of the Republic of China has been on Formosa and, if the island fell, obviously the Government of the Republic of China would fall at that point.

2. The United States has a special interest in or design on the island or any military bases on Formosa.

I admit we have no design on the island or desire no military bases, but I do submit that the evidence before this committee is clear that our responsible military people in the Defense Establishment believe that it would not be in the national interests of this country to have Formosa fall into enemy hands.

In paragraph 3 it says:

Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or other countries opposing Communism.

Mr. Chairman, the information before this Committee is clear that it most seriously would damage the interests of the United States if the island should fall, and if this defeatist attitude of the Department of State had finally prevailed.

Now in subsection 3 it says:

Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points.

Then subparagraph 2:

Formosa has no military significance.

Mr. Chairman, this is contrary not only to the advice that we have received since then but, in my judgment, it can be shown that it was contrary to the judgment of the competent military opinion prior to the time the December 23 document was put out.

I call your attention further on that it says:

In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would, (a) accomplish no material good for China or its national regime.

I admit it would accomplish no material good for Communist China; I deny that it would accomplish no good for the National Government of the Republic of China, which we then recognized, which we now recognize, and which is a permanent member of the United Nations.

In subparagraph E it had this to say:

In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited, usually individual, source and make clear that the total of such demands evidence concern and frustration in some quarters, but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

In other words, anyone who questioned this fatal policy, which I believe the State Department had clearly outlined in this document,

was frustrated and was not speaking for any considerable body of American public opinion.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is not only contrary to the best military advice in this Nation, but I want to read to you from a State Department official bulletin put out on June 3, 1945, the following language from page 1019, United States Department of State bulletin. It reads as follows:

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Strategic factors greatly influence the problem of Formosa. With the exception of Singapore no location in the Far East occupies such a controlling position. Formosa is separated from the continent of Asia by 100 miles, from the main island of the Philippines by 200 miles, and from Kyu hu, the nearest home island of Japan, by 700 miles. Flying distance from military airports in Formosa is 559 miles to Canton, 428 miles to Shanghai, 1,290 miles to Tokyo.

Formosa, larger than the State of Maryland, stands in a strategic relation to the China coast comparable for the United States to an imaginary island of such size 100 miles off the coast of North Carolina, 400 miles from New York City. Every point of the entire coast of China falls within a radius of 1,100 miles. A radius of 2,000 miles includes Burma, Singapore, Borneo, Guam, and Japan, including Hokkaido.

IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENT AND ITS DECLASSIFICATION

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I submit that here in the face of the State Department's own document saying that with the single exception of Singapore the island was the most strategic location in the Far East, in face of the testimony before this committee that the island has great strategic value and under no conditions should be allowed to fall into Communist hands, I submit that this is a basic document, not merely a guidance of those overseas, but a basic revelation of the defeatist attitude of the Department of State in being prepared to let Formosa fall into unfriendly hands.

I do not believe that the Secretary has made a case that this in any sense violates the security of our troops operating in Korea today, largely because, I believe, of this misguided policy. It does not in any sense threaten or undermine the cryptographic security of this Nation. I again submit, Mr. Chairman, the document should be made a part of our public record so that the Congress and the Nation may have a better understanding of the events which led up to the war in Korea.

I think it is far better if the State Department would frankly acknowledge they made a serious mistake in the document and start out fresh, as Mr. Rusk has indicated in his speech the other night. But if that is not to be done, I think that now is the time and here is the place for us to get a clear understanding of just what policies have led to the Korean war.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; I yield.

Senator WILEY. Would you tell me what the date of that newspaper release was?

Senator KNOWLAND. January 3, 1950, which was 2 weeks after the December 23 document of 1949.

Senator WILEY. And does not that release itself substantially tell the contents of the document?

Senator KNOWLAND. I think that it does, except that I think there is more information in the document itself, and I think it is better, in fairness to the Department and otherwise, to have the full document made available rather than merely extracts from it. Otherwise a person might think that the extracts were taken out of context.

I think that the extracts fairly represented at least the spirit of the document, but I think that it woud be better to have the entire background made available.

PRESS REPORTS OF DOCUMENTS

Senator WILEY. Was that release published generally in the American papers-what services?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Under whose authority was it published?

Senator KNOWLAND. I do not know. There were many articles run through the country based on that, and subsequent articles which have been published.

Senator WILEY. You got it out of a Washington paper?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have gotten clippings out of the Washington papers. That particular thing I read from was the original dispatch which came in over the ticker. You know we have a United Press and Associated Press report right off the Senate floor, and as soon as it came in I tore it off, and went over to my office and wrote this first letter of January 3, which was the same date that the dispatch came off the printer.

Senator WILEY. That was my question-it came over the UP and AP?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right; that is my recollection.
Senator WILEY. Thank you.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly.

Secretary ACHESON. I would like to make three points.

AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENT BEFORE NOW

I would not want the committee to believe, and I am sure Senator Knowland did not wish the committee to believe, that the State Department had ever attempted to keep this document from Senator Knowland. If my recollection is right, I believe I showed Senator Knowland the entire document and he read it in my office.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, would you mind? I had not seen this document before. I understand that you did submit it to some committees but I have no recollection of ever having read the entire document.

Secretary ACHESON. My recollection is different. I thought you and Senator Smith, or you alone, called on me in my office and I showed you the document. However, I may be wrong about that. The next point that I should like to make is that the State Depart

ment

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I might say there, I do not ever recall seeing this document. Senator Knowland did ask to see it when we were there, but I am sure we did not see it.

it.

Secretary ACHESON. My recollection is quite possibly wrong about

NO STATE DEPARTMENT LEAK

The next point that I should like to make is that the State Department had nothing whatever to do with the leaking of this guidance paper to the press. This paper, in addition to being sent to State Department officers who run the Voice of America, is furnished to people in the military service who have the same sort of service in Germany and in Japan. That is one of the reasons why there is a group representing the services which coordinate information.

In due course it was sent in, among other places, to Tokyo, and the leak occurred there, and the people in Tokyo are not under the jurisdiction of the State Department.

EXTENT OF DIFFERENCES ON FORMOSA POLICY BEFORE JUNE 1950

The last point that I should like to make is that you might have gotten the impression from what Senator Knowland said that during the period I have been discussing, which is October 1948 to June 1950, that there was some difference in this regard between State Department policy and that of our military services.

With the exception which I have already mentioned to you, that is not the case. It was the clear unequivocal recommendations of the military services that we could not employ any of our forces for the defense of Formosa.

That policy was unanimously changed at the meetings which occurred on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of June 1950, following the attack in Korea.

During the time we are discussing here, there was absolutely no difference on that point.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would the Secretary mind a question? Wasn't that our same policy in regard to Korea prior to June 25 also, that we would not become involved? Did we not feel that was no place to become involved in war?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think there was any formulation of policy. We had withdrawn our forces from it. Our attitude toward Korea was fundamentally based on the charter of the United Nations, and in my speech on the 15th of January 1950 I pointed out that while there was no American commitment outside of the areas that I have discussed in that speech, there were United Nations obligations and that those had not proved in the past to be weak reeds for countries who wanted to so defend themselves.

But in connection with the appraisal of the situation, I mentioned sometime ago that there was a joint study made by all the departments concerned as to what the fact was going to be, or was likely to be; what the conclusion was likely to be, regarding the fall of Formosa, and that conclusion was that it was estimated that no amount of United States aid, short of military occupation and control, would insure Taiwan's indefinite survival as a non-Communist area.

It was concluded, therefore, that even with extensive United States support, short of major armed intervention, involving the use of United States combat forces, none of the non-Communist regimes in China could survive beyond 1950, except on Communist sufferance. Without United States military occupation and control, Taiwan, like