The alluring prospect for the Communist conspiracy in June 1950— the prospect of a quick and easy success which would not only win Korea for the Kremlin but shake the free nations of Asia and paralyze the defense of Europe-all this has evaporated.

Instead of weakening the rest of the world, they have solidified it. They have given a powerful impetus to the military preparations of this country and its associates in and out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We have doubled the number of our men under arms, and the production of matériel has been boosted to a point where it can begin to have a profound effect on the maintenance of the peace.

The idea of collective security has been put to the test, and has been sustained. The nations who believe in collective security have shown that they can stick together and fight together.

New urgency has been given to the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan, and of initial security arrangements to build strength in the Pacific area.

These are some of the results of the attack on Korea, unexpected by-and I am sure most unwelcome to the Kremlin.

HOW THE FIGHTING CAN BE BROUGHT TO AN END

The objective of our military operation in Korea is to end the aggression, to safeguard against its renewal, and to restore peace. There is wide agreement on this objective in the domestic discussions of this issue.

Both the administration and its critics have said that the object of the courses they propose is to end the aggression and restore peace. Both are willing-indeed desire to end the fighting by an honorable settlement which will end the aggression, provide against its renewal and restore peace.

Neither will purchase a settlement by allowing the aggressors to profit by their wrong. Neither believes that the destruction or unconditional surrender of the aggressor is necessary to attain the goal.

General Marshall, General Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given you, in detail, the reasons why they believe that the Chinese Communists will be defeated in Korea and must abandon their purpose.

They report that our forces are in excellent shape, that their morale is high and that they are in a good supply position.

They report not only that the mass attacks launched by the enemy have failed to break through the firepower of United Nations forces, but that the offensives of the enemy have been broken and thrown back with enormous enemy casualties.

These defeats in Korea, together with other consequences of this campaign, present grave problems for the Communist authorities in China.

While the manpower resources of China are vast, its supply of trained men is limited. They cannot cover up their casualties. They cannot gloss over the draft of more and more men for military service.

The Chinese Red leaders have betrayed their long-standing pledge of demobilization and the military demand for manpower has, instead, been increased.

Peiping has also broken its promises of social and economic improvement. In the great cities, dependent on imported materials, unemployment increases. The regime has not lightened the burdens of the people. It has made them heavier.

All of this is reflected in a sharp increase in repressive measures, and in propaganda to whip up the flagging zeal of their own people. In the light of all these factors, I believe that the aggression can best be brought to an end with a minimum risk and a minimum loss, by continuing the punishing defeat of the Chinese in Korea. This is being done.

No one can predict when the fighting will stop and when the aggression will end. It is also true that no one could have foretold exactly what would happen when we undertook action to end the Berlin blockade, but we did what we thought was right and the blockade was ended.

No one could have foretold how the aggression in Greece would be terminated, but again we took those measures which our best judgment and sense indicated were the right ones and the aggression ceased.

While the outcome of every course of action in the foreign-policy field cannot be predicted with certainty in advance, it is our responsibility in taking action to apply our best judgment on the basis of the best information at hand.

I think it is fair to say that all of the President's advisers believe the course we are now following gives us the best chance of stopping hostilities and ending the aggression in Korea.

THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course which was placed before this committee. This course would seek to bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of hostilities.

I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the previous witnesses before your committees.

It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities to an end. To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.

Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be measured the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention, and of world war III, as well as the probable effects upon the solidarity of the free world coalition.

The advocate of this program make two assumptions which require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Union will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.

As to Soviet reactions, no one can be sure he is forecasting accurately what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on this question.

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

I cannot accept the assumption that the Soviet Union will go its way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way. This view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble with the essential security of our Nation.

POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTERMOVES

In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number of courses of counteraction open to the Soviets.

They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with "volunteer" crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They might participate with the Soviet Air Force and the submarine fleet. The Kremlin could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping and intervene with a half million or more ground-force "volunteers"; or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.

Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possibilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.

EFFECT ON ALLIES

We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.

They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war in the Far East-one which holds the possibilities of becoming a world war-particularly if it developed out of an American impatience with the progress of the effort to repel aggresson, an effort which in their belief offers an honorable and far less catastrophic solution.

If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.

We cannot expect that our collective-security system will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose the people who are in the system with us. They would understandably hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.

In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective-security system.

The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the measures proposed, were to weaken that effect, particularly in the North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area which is vital to our own national security.

What this adds up to, it seems to me, is that we are being asked to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collectivesecurity system-all this in return for what?

In return for measures whose effectiveness in bringing the conflict to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military authorities.

ELEMENT OF TIME AND PREPAREDNESS

Before concluding, I should like to deal briefly with the related proposition that we may need to take extreme risks now because time may not be on our side. I believe this is wrong.

The basic premise of our foreign policy is that time is on our side if we make good use of it. That does not necessarily mean that time must bring us to a point where we can match the Soviet Union man for man and tank for tank.

What it does mean is that we need to use the time we have to build an effective deterrent force. This requires us to create sufficient forcein-being, both in the United States and among our allies, to shield our great potential against the possibility of a quick and easy onslaught, and to ensure that our allies will not suffer occupation and destruction. And back of this shield we need to have the potential that would enable us to win a war.

This is the measure of the force we need; as we approach it, we approach our objective of preventing war.

Can we do this? I believe we can. We and our allies have the capacity to outproduce the Soviet bloc by a staggering margin. There is no doubt about that. Our capacity to produce has been set in motion and is rapidly getting to the point where its output will be vast and its effect significant.

There is also the critical factor of our will. The future belongs to freedom if free men have the will to make time work on their side. I believe the American people and their allies do have the will, the will to work together when their freedom is threatened. This is the ultimate source of our faith and our confidence. A free society can call upon profound resources among its people in behalf of a righteous

cause.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF JUNE 25 AND 27

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, the military activities in Korea in the effort to drive the aggressors from Korea and to retsore peace there, are being carried on under the authority of the United Nations, I believe?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; the United Nations resolutions of

Chairman RUSSELL. The first resolution of the United Nations Security Council was adopted on June 25, and it called upon the aggressors to cease their aggression and withdraw above the thirtyeighth parallel, I believe?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The operative portions of that resolution are as follows, after the introductory paragraphs:

The Security Council determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.

That is the attack on Korea.

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirtyeighth parallel.

2. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea

(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;

(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and

(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution. 3. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

That was the one of the 25th of June.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was followed by another resolution which was adopted on June 27?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. I have that before me if you would like me to read it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the pertinent findings.

Secretary ACHESON. There are again paragraphs which set forth their findings, which are chiefly that the North Koreans continue a breach of the peace, and are not withdrawn as required by the Security Council, and they have noted the appeal of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security; and recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. Both of those resolutions were adopted during the time that the Soviet delegate-Soviet Russia was boycotting the United Nations, were they not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, sir. The Soviet delegate did not return to the Council until the first of August.

There was also a resolution on the 7th of July.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JULY 7

Chairman RUSSELL. The 7th of July? Well, to complete the record you might give the pertinent findings of that resolution. I believe that was the one requesting the United States to-you had better read it. There are so many of them I get them confused.

Secretary ACHESON. They recite that they have determined that the armed attack was a breach of the peace. They recommend to the members of the United Nations that they furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea, and so forth; and then there are statements as follows:

Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of the 25th and 27th of June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area.

2. Notes that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea.

3. Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States. 4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces. 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations