DIFFERENCES ON STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUBBER

In regard to the situation which existed in the past, and exists now, in regard to rubber, in the past we have had some difference in respect to the classification of rubber, as to whether that was strategic or not. We thought it was; others thought it was not.

The difference in our appraisal of the rubber problem and the appraisal of certain other countries, including the British, was largely a question of judgment of its strategic value, and a question of the effectiveness of the controls if they were imposed-and not by the British-considering the volume of rubber in the world which would not be under effective control.

We regard rubber as a strategic commodity. We were concerned with the size of the shipments being made, and we sought their reduction.

We welcomed, therefore, the British decision on May 10, to embargo rubber from British colonies to China, even though they, like we, know that this may not completely cut off the supply of rubber to China or to the Soviet bloc.

I think that gives you what you asked me.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was interesting; but I wanted the broad outlines of a policy, rather than the details.

RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE TO POSSIBLE NAVAL BLOCKADE

The question I really wished to get to was this:

Almost simultaneously with our decision to intervene militarily in Korea, and to attempt to stem the tide of aggression, a naval blockade on all of North Korea was invoked and put into effect.

Was that unilaterally undertaken by the United States, or was that blockade imposed through the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. That was under the United Nations resolution. Chairman RUSSELL. Under a United Nations resolution which imposed a naval blockade on Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; that is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, that was one of the sanction that was being applied to aggressor forces?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When the Chinese Communists intervened in great strength, in North Korea, was any effort made to get the United Nations to vote a similar naval blockade on Communist China?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. We have not taken up in the United Nations the imposition of a naval blockade.

It has been the view of all elements in our Government that the first effort we should make was in connection with the economic blockade. We have made those efforts and I think have had considerable success.

I think it is clear that we cannot get nations to go further in regard to a naval blockade than they are willing to go on an economic blockade, since it is a more drastic sanction.

We have always felt that if we can get a very effective economic blockade, a naval blockade becomes much less important.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I can conceive, of course, of an economic blockade being very effective, if all of the United Nations were to agree to it.

The thing that has disturbed me about it, Mr. Secretary, as one who has had very high hopes for the efficacy of the United Nations for preserving peace, seems to be the degree of enthusiasm with which the United Nations meets aggression from a small power, as compared with their lack of enthusiasm when there is a considerable power involved.

Secretary ACHESON. We have been pressing, Mr. Chairman, as you know, to extend this economic blockade, and I think we have had considerable success.

Some of our associates have problems which are, for them, serious problems, and ones which we do not have in the same degree. We have some of the problems to a lesser degree, in Japan, and those problems made them hesitate to take complete and drastic measures. Chairman RUSSELL. Well, have you used every means at our command, in the United Nations, to encourage the other members to approve formal action on an economic blockade, and the necessary steps which are to be taken, to make it effective?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe we have, sir, and are continuing to do it, and I expect it will be increasing in effectiveness.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON SEATING CHINA IN THE UN

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, what is the official position of our Government as voiced through the State Department on the admission of Red China or the Peoples Republic, whatever the name the Peiping government has, into the United Nations?

Secretary ACHESON. We have opposed that, Mr. Chairman, and opposed it very vigorously and very successfully. I should like, if it is proper, to review a little bit what we have done. I don't want to impose on your time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, my time is about to expire, and if you will conclude with our position with respect to Formosa, why you may go ahead and make your statement. My time has expired but that doesn't cut you off.

Secretary ACHESON. In regard to the first question you asked me, about our attitude toward the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations, I said that we have opposed that and opposed it very effectively.

Senator WILEY. Can't hear you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ACHESON. I said that we had opposed the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations, and we had opposed it, I thought, very successfully. The attitude of the Government, it has been, I think, clear, was expressed by General Marshall that we cannot allow governments that want to get in the United Nations to shoot their way in. That is a very dramatic way of expressing it. There are 46 organizations of the United Nations and its affiliated special agencies to which the Chinese might be admitted if that action was taken by these bodies. The question has come up 77 times in these various 46 bodies. The vote has been against the admission 76 times out of the 77.

In the case of the Universal Postal Union in the year 1950 the Chinese Communists, the United States dissenting, were seated for the purpose of that meeting, but that vote was reversed in the meeting in the year 1951.

Therefore, they have tried, or it has been tried by someone 77 times to have this take place, and that has been unsuccessful 76 times, and the important thing is that in regard to one case where the other action was taken, that was reversed at the last moment, so at the present time the Chinese Communists are not in any of the organs of the United Nations, and the Chinese Nationalist authorities represent China in all of them.

POLICY ON FORMOSA

The policy on Formosa as announced by the President on the 27th of June was that the Seventh Fleet was to see that there should be no attack on Formosa, or vice versa, there should be no attack by Formosa on the mainland, and that the fleet would see that both of those things were done.

The President has stated that we are not prejudicing the future of Formosa. That is a matter which should be decided, he said, either in connection with the Japanese peace treaty or by the United Nations, and the view which has been taken more recently is that the United Nations is the appropriate place where it should ultimately be decided.

It has been our clear view that the attack on Korea makes it quite impossible to discuss this matter, and therefore we have put it to one side in the United Nations, carrying the great body of support with us, and therefore the matter is not discussed in any way at the present time.

CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. Senator Connally.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Secretary, our objective, I believe you stated, in Korea is to defeat the aggressors and to establish peace. Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And ultimately a government in Korea, a civil free government; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. We have a government in Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Chairman CONNALLY. South Korea.

Secretary ACHESON. Our objective is to stop the attack, end the aggression on that Government, restore peace, providing against the renewal of the aggression.

Those are the military purposes for which, as we understand it, the United Nations troops are fighting.

The United Nations has since 1947 and the United States has since 1943 or 1944 stood for a unified, free, and democratic Korea. That is still our purpose, and is still the purpose of the United Nations.

I do not understand it to be a war aim. In other words, that is not sought to be achieved by fighting, but it is sought to be achieved by peaceful means, just as was being attempted before this aggression.

Chairman CONNALLY. After the fight-by peaceful means after the fighting is over.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Secretary, do you regard an all-out war with Russia as being inevitable?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

RISKS IN EXPANDING WAR BEYOND KOREA

Chairman CONNALLY. Have not our policies been designed to prevent or to obviate an all-out war with Russia? Have not our policies been designed to prevent any such eventuality?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. If there was an expansion of the war in the Far East, would that or not involve us in risks of an all-out war either with the Chinese Communists on the mainland of China or possibly with Russia itself?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it would involve us in those risks, Senator.

Chairman CONNALLY. Would those risks be serious?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, in my judgment, they would.
Senator SALTONSTALL. Could you repeat that, please?

Secretary ACHESON. I said, "Yes, in my judgment, they would be serious."

Chairman CONNALLY. Now, of course, you are acquainted with the treaty between Red China and Russia, are you not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I am, Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, just how far do you regard that as being operative? I mean by that: when would that treaty call Russia into a war if we should have one with Red China?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should not like to undertake to interpret the treaty or make statements as to when it would be called into effect.

I think it is significant that increasingly, both Soviet and Chinese propaganda is making charges that Japan is being used in connection with the fight with the Chinese, and sometimes that Japanese are being used. It is quite untrue that Japanese are being used.

Of course, Japan is the place where our military headquarters are. That propaganda seems to me to be calculated to lay a foundation in case it is wanted to be used, to invoke this treaty.

Chairman CONNALLY. We have no way, of course, of being assured or being sure as to what the intentions of either the Red Chinese or the Russians are with regard to ourselves, have we?

Secretary ACHESON. No; we have no way.

Chairman CONNALLY. It is purely speculation and guesswork.

Do you have any definite ideas about the ability of Chiang Kaishek's army on Formosa being of any service to the allies or the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think that has been covered by the military authorities who were in a much better position than I am to do it.

POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Chairman CONNALLY. That is true. The General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, sets forth the objectives of freeing, unifying, and rehabilitating Korea. Are there any negotiations now going

on to modify unilaterally them or revise these objectives, that you know of, or make any new attempt to negotiate with the Red Chinese?

Secretary ACHESON. I believe that the Good Offices Committee set up by the resolutions of the General Assembly has made repeated efforts, sent messages to the Communist authorities to bring about a cease-fire, and a settlement of the fighting in Korea. So far as I know, they have had no success of any sort.

Chairman CONNALLY. Heretofore Red China has insisted that in any discussion or conversations regarding a peace settlement that they would want the question of Formosa and the seating of Red China in the United Nations considered; is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, that is true, Senator Connally, and in many cases they have gone much further than that and they have said not only that it must be considered, but it must be agreed to. Chairman CONNALLY. Must be agreed to.

Are there any indications that Red China has receded from a part of that position or modified it in any way-its demand in that regard?

Secretary ACHESON. I know of no evidence to that effect.

Chairman CONNALLY. I had a note here about the veto on the seating of Red China in the United Nations, but I will not ask you that question.

Have you any definite views on public opinion at the present moment in regard to the winning of the war?

Secretary ACHESON. Public opinion in the United States?
Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I have no other views than a reader of the press.

UNITED STATES SENTIMENT AT OUTBREAK OF KOREAN WAR

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, it is my recollection that when we first went into Korea, everybody threw up their hats and hollered "Hurray," and then when the tide of war went a little against us, they began to cool off, and so on.

I remember a statement in the paper, of Senator Taft himself, saying that he thought it ought to have been submitted to Congress; it ought not to have been done without submitting it to Congress, but that if it had come to a vote he would have voted to go into Korea. Does anybody dispute that? I pause.

Senator BREWSTER. If you will amend that to say that he assumed that proper military appraisals had been made, which we now find were utterly lacking.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is not what I read in the paper.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what anybody assumed who had any intelligence. We discovered to our amazement that it was not the fact.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am sorry I have not got any intelligence. Senator LODGE. Does the Senator from Texas doubt the advisability of having put this up to the Congress?

Chairman CONNALLY. I would not have objected; I would have voted readily for it.

Senator LODGE. Don't you think it was a good idea?