Chairman CONNALLY. But it was an emergency matter. We could not have waited for all the debate.

Senator LODGE. I think the Senator from Texas has taken more time in the course of the sessions here, and Congress can act very quickly on a matter of that kind.

Chairman CONNALLY. You what?

Senator LODGE. I say, Congress can act very quickly in a matter of this kind, and the Senator from Massachusetts has never taken as much time as the Senator from Texas, so far as time is concerned. Chairman CONNALLY. I am sorry, but the Senator from Texas has not taken very much time.

Senator LODGE. I have not taken much time either; but the Senator asked about the question of bringing it up before Congress, and then he paused, and it seemed to me he paused for the purpose of getting an answer. It seems to me it would have been better to bring it up before the Congress.

Chairman CONNALLY. I paused to find out if anybody disputed the statement made by Senator Taft.

Senator LODGE. I do not know anything about Senator Taft's statement, but I do have an opinion about the advisability of bringing that up before Congress.

Chairman CONNALLY. I would not have objected myself; I would have voted for it.

Senator LODGE. So would I.

Senator BREWSTER. In Germany and Japan we acted very quickly, inside of an hour.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course, we acted very quickly because they already had attacked us. We did not wait and we did resist.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO OUR ALLIES IN KOREA

Suppose we undertook to extend the hostilities beyond Korea, to spread the war. Our allies have not agreed to such course of action, have they?

Secretary ACHESON. No, Senator Connally; they have not.

Chairman CONNALLY. So far they have opposed it, is that correct? Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. The best way of expressing their attitude is that they believe that would incur grave risks of enlarging the war, and involving Europe in it, which would put them in a most exposed and dangerous position.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, we have got the help out there now of the Dutch and the French and the Canadians and Greeks and Turks and Belgians and some of the rest, probably. Would we not jeopardize our whole position in the Far East if we disregard the wishes of our allies that have been expressed?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we would gravely endanger the whole coalition if we insisted on taking unilateral action which seemed to disregard their very grave dangers.

Chairman CONNALLY. A good deal of criticism has been made to the effect that our allies have not contributed their fair share of the fighting forces in Korea.

Has the State Department undertaken to stimulate such cooperation and to get them to increase their aid?

Secretary ACHESON. We have been constantly at work with all the members of the United Nations, and we believe that it would be possible to have them contribute troops to bring that about. Many of them have, in the light of their own responsibilities and dangers, taken very effective action.

We are now in the course of discussions with other members of the United Nations and we have hopes that we will get further contributions of troops.

PREPAREDNESS OF NATIONALISTS ON FORMOSA

Chairman CONNALLY. The Nationalists entertain the hopes of going back on the mainland of China. Do you think that they would have any success against Red Communists without our intervention and our military aid?

Secretary ACHESON. I think it has been stated by the Joint Chiefs and General Bradley and General Marshall that they could not carry out such an operation at the present time on account of the state of their preparations, and they could not carry it out at any time. without the water lift and air support of the United States Navy and Air Force.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the recall, I will call it for lack of a better word, from his command in the Far East, were you present at any of these conferences that the Chiefs of Staff had with each other or otherwise about the matter?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I was not present at any conferences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

POSSIBLE PRESSURE OF ALLIES FOR RECALL

Chairman CONNALLY. It has been charged also or intimated that General MacArthur's recall might have been influenced by pressure from some of our allies on this Government. Do you know anything about such a charge?

Secretary ACHESON. That is not correct, sir. There was no pressure, representation, or request of any sort by any of our allies.

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman, for the present. I will reserve the right to interrogate the Secretary later. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

INITIATION OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, did you originate the idea or plan of firing General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Who first approached you relative to the firing of General MacArthur?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, if I may state my participation in the events which led to his recall, I will be glad to do that. I was telephoned to on the afternoon of the 5th of April, which as I recall it was a Thursday afternoon, late in the afternoon, by the President who directed me to attend a meeting to be held at his office on the following morning, a meeting arising out of the situation created by the letter to Congressman Martin, and I went to that meeting. Do you wish me to go on?

Senator WILEY. I am listening here but it is difficult.
Secretary ACHESON. Sorry.

Senator BRIDGES. General Bradley testified that someone made a telephone call to him which caused him to bring about the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he could not remember who called him up on this matter, but he did remember that he called a few minutes afterwards the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider it. Did you make the telephone call to him?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

ESTIMATION OF MAC ARTHUR

Senator BRIDGES. Do you know General MacArthur personally, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I have never had the pleasure of meeting him.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you share the opinions of General Marshall, General Bradley, and others of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they testified here under oath they considered him the greatest military authority in the Far East?

Secretary ACHESON. I have read their testimony and they are in a position to know about these matters, and I should share their opinion, based on their opinion. It isn't based on any of my own because Í know nothing about those things.

I

Senator BRIDGES. Do you share their opinion that insofar as they knew, he probably had a greater knowledge of the political situation in the Far East than anyone?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should think that that statement is rather too broad.

I should think that General MacArthur had a very fine knowledge of the situation in the areas where he had served, and with which he is familiar.

As I recall his own testimony, I don't think he claimed to have any knowledge of areas with which he was not familiar.

MILITARY MISSION AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. What was the original military mission of the United Nations troops when they went to Korea?

Secretary ACHESON. The mission was stated in the resolution of the 25th and the 27th,-Well, the 25th, try to bring about peace; and the 27th recommends that the members of the United Nations

furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. Senator BRIDGES. And what was the political mission of the United Nations in Korea? Was it the same?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, the political objective of the United Nations, in regard to Korea, ever since 1947, has been to bring about a unified, free and democratic Korea.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now, you testified earlier about our President, and I quote from the statement of the President of the United States, made on November 16, 1950, in which he said:

* which reaffirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate; to protect fully legitimate Chinese

and Korean interests in the frontier zone; the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea as soon as stability has been restored; and a unified, independent democratic government established throughout Korea.

Now, that was the President's statement on November 16, 1950. Now, that isn't what you testified to a short time ago, is it, Mr. Secretary, in the remarks which you gave here?

How do you justify them in consideration of the President's statement on November 16, 1950?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that they are quite consistent, Senator Bridges. As I say, the military mission which was given to the United Nations forces was to repel the armed attack and to establish international peace and security in the area.

The United Nations, as I said before, has always since 1947 had the political objective of unifying Korea under free and democratic institutions.

The resolution of the General Assembly of October 7 reaffirmed that long-term objective.

In the period from shortly after the Inchon landings until the intervention of the Chinese Communists, it looked as though both of these objectives could be attained. That is, that as the forces of the North Koreans, who had been attacking South Korea, were rounded up, destroyed, or surrendered, that then the country could be put together; and if that could have been done, both objectives would have been realized and the United Nations forces would have been withdrawn as the President said, as soon as stability had been achieved in that area.

Unhappily, the intervention of the Chinese Communists threw our forces back and made it militarily difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the political objective.

Senator BRIDGES. What was the date when the Chinese Communists came in?

Secretary ACHESON. They actually attacked, I believe, on the 26th of November. They had been known to be in Korea, I think, since perhaps the 24th of October, certainly in the early days of November, we began to get reports from the commander in chief, Far East, that units were in North Korea.

TAKING UP DEFENSE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ALLIES

Senator BRIDGES. Do you intend to correlate or carry out the general military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in your negotiations with other countries?

Secretary ACHESON. I am afraid I don't understand.

Senator BRIDGES. Let me quote from the record. I quote a question addressed to Secretary Marshall by Chairman Russell:

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the United Nations Organization made any specific recommendation as to the imposition of a naval blockade on China and the bombing of Manchurian bases, or did that originate within the Security Council in attempting to comply with the original directive of the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. If I understand your question correctly, Mr. Chairman, there was initiated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposal of about December 7 or 8 to authorize General MacArthur to institute a procedure in the air called hot pursuit, which means that our planes could follow theirs for a stated dis tance over the Yalu River into Manchuria.

That was considered, concurred in by me. As a matter of fact, I urgently recommended it. It was concurred in by the Secretary of State and approved by the President, and the Secretary of State was directed to take that up with the 13 nations involved with us in the fighting in Korea. They voted solidly against it. So for the time being, we had to drop that.

What are your comments on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think I have been over that before, Senator Bridges. General Marshall's recollection was it had been approved by the President. I did not recall that, but he is undoubtedly right.

It was my duty to take it up with these various countries, and, as I told you, we took it up with six countries.

The first time I think that General Marshall testified about this matter he said that I was to take it up with several countries and that these countries took the attitude which I have described.

In several later questionings he referred to all of them. My own recollection differs from his as to the number with whom this matter was discussed. But it was my duty to take it up with them, and I did, and I got their attitudes and reported those back.

Senator BRIDGES. Yesterday or the day before, Admiral Sherman testified that he favored a United Nations naval blockade of China, Red China, and he said in questioning that he had stressed this regularly, and he was satisfied that he had stressed it with such regularity and such vigor that the Secretary of State Acheson had pursued the matter in consultations with other United Nations members.

NAVAL BLOCKADE NOT DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES

Now, I have before me a paper of this morning, and an article headed "State Department chills China blockade bid." It says:

Despite repeated recommendations by the United States Navy for United Nations approval of a naval blockade of Communist China, the American State Department has never asked other UN members to support such action, it was learned today.

Then I go on further:

UN delegates, familiar with all consultations concerning the conduct of the Korean War, disclosed today that Acheson and his subordinates not only have not pursued the blockade proposal with "vigor" but have not even mentioned it in talks with representatives of other UN members.

What is your comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. You are reading from the Times Herald? Senator BRIDGES. I am; from a report which is listed from a wire service, whatever it is-CTPS.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think my comment would be, Senator Bridges, that I have given my testimony before in answer to questions, I think, by the chairman on this subject.

I have before me the record on pages 4315 and 4316 of Admiral Sherman's testimony, in which he said:

And I want to make clear that I have not advocated establishing a blockade and been overruled. I have discussed the problem here in relation to the recommendations of General MacArthur to go ahead with it, to show what the problems are, what the possibilities are, and to try to make an objective analysis of it. In my opinion the time has not arrived for such an undertaking, because I still believe that the best way to stop this traffic is by mutual agreement between the United Nations. I think, beginning with the action of some of our own