oil companies fairly early in the game, following the things that are now being done through the United Nations and through cooperation, we can make a great deal of headway. It may be that we can make enough. But if we ever resort to a blockade by force, it must be a United Nations operation unless we are going to get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China, which in my own opinion is extremely undesirable.

That states the situation as I recall it and I think it is, and I agree with it.

Senator BRIDGES. It was gone over at some length with Admiral Sherman by different individuals at different times and he made, I think, one of the statements you have quoted, but I think he stated it even more forcefully in other places.

MANNER OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES ON HOT PURSUIT

Now, did the State Department urge our allies in the United Nations to join with us on the hot-pursuit doctrine?

Secretary ACHESON. We took it up with them and got their point of view. I presume they urged them to do it. It was done by our embassies abroad. I don't know how it was done.

Senator BRIDGES. Is there not a far difference between asking it up and urging it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. You are asking me to testify to things which were done in a foreign country where I was not present. The telegrams we sent out indicated that our Chiefs of Staff thought it was important and that we agreed with it, and we would like to do it. We got back the responses that the other countries did not want to do it.

Senator BRIDGES. But as far as you know, as Secretary, in sending out the orders you urged that it be done, or didn't you? I mean you said you did not know the action there, but you know what you told them.

Secretary ACHESON. I knew that I was anxious that the views of the Joint Chiefs should be agreed to, and I presume I did everything proper in the telegram to bring that about.

INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. I quote to you from a statement here:

Independence of China is gravely threatened. In a Communist world there is room for only one master, a jealous, implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese in one community after another are now being destroyed because they love China more than Soviet Russia?

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is hardly a statement. I think that a great many Chinese are being destroyed for that reason. It indicates what I have said several times-that this regime has not put the interests of China first. If that is what you are driving at.

Senator BRIDGES. I quote:

The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment to forced labor into Manchuria, Siberia, the arbitrary seizure of properties, the destruction of loyalty within the family, and the expressions of free speech, these are the facts behind the parades, celebrations, and empty promises.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is true.

Senator BRIDGES. And continuing further:

The continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression means, in fact, that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have pointed that out myself several times. Senator BRIDGES. And I quote further:

The peace and security of China are being sacrificed by the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Is that your viewpoint?

Secretary ACHESON. I think broadly speaking that is right. The expression "foreign masters" may be open to a little question. The Chinese Communists who are in control of the government are Moscow-trained people and are faithful to Moscow. I assume, and I believe, that they go along quite willingly with the Moscow line. Senator BRIDGES. And I quote further:

But one thing we can say: If the Chinese people move to assert their freedom, to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes, they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

Secretary ACHESON. I have been asked about that before, and I have said that I was sure that they would have a hearty welcome., Senator BRIDGES. Continuing further:

We can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in what is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities of Peiping for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct, the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly involved.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have stated publicly in regard to that sentence that we do not recognize the Chinese Communist government and we don't propose to recognize it, and that is I believe what they are saying in that statement.

Senator BRIDGES (reading):

We recognize the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China. Do you agree to that?

Secretary ACHESON. We do recognize the Nationalist Government. We are giving them substantial help. We are going to continue to do that, and I believe it is quite true that the ultimate success, if

there is going to be any success in China in freeing itself from this foreign domination, has got to come basically from the Chinese.

COMMENTS ON SPEECH BY DEAN RUSK

Senator BRIDGES. Those quotes I quoted were from the speech made in New York by your Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. The reason for asking it or one of the reasons for asking is my own doubt in the past over our policy on China, and secondly an article that appeared in the Washington Post on May 22, 1951, following the speech made by Mr. Rusk in New York entitled, the headline is "Policy change on China war is denied here," and then it goes on:

Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, spoke on his own when he said in New York Friday that the Communist regime in Peiping is not Chinese. He did not consult in advance with his own Department or with others or with the allied governments before saying the Nationalist Government more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China. The Assistant Secretary of State did not seek the advice of the State Department's own policy-planning staff which usually discusses and approves important policy pronouncements, nor did he consult high parties in the Pentagon on the theory that one of his colleagues in his New York speech did not have military assistance.

Then this goes on further, and I quote from that:

Rather than disavow his subordinate on the eve of the Senate hearings, Acheson is supposed or expected to poo-poo any idea that American policy is changed or that the Rusk speech has any importance as a policy statement.

Then he went on. Now Mr. Rusk made the speech. This article was written by one of the outstanding reporters who rather specializes in foreign affairs, and it sort of took the ground out from under the effect of Mr. Rusk's speech, and I would like to have you comment if you will on this article and its accuracy.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, Senator, I really can't comment on the accuracy of newspaper articles. I can comment on the facts, which I have done in regard to this speech.

Mr. Rusk did not believe that he was stating any change in any particular in any policy established by the President followed by the Department.

I do not believe he intended to or did. I have said that at press conferences and private conversations and I say it again. I have been through this speech. Press conferences picked out each one of the actual statements of policy and have pointed out that they have been followed for a long time and are still being followed and we will still continue to follow them.

ALLEGED STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Was our American Ambassador to Korea actually in accord with State Department policy when he expressed, or was he expressing views which were the policy of the Department, when he advised Congressman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., that it was not our purpose to fight communism in Korea, and when he justified the arming of the North Koreans by the Soviet Union?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know anything about that, sir. I don't know that he made such a statement.

83797-51-pt. 3—6

I will try to find it and read it and answer your question later.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean, if he did-my point is, if he made it, and I have here a photostatic copy of a letter written by Congressman Scott, setting forth these facts dated October 14, 1950, and referring to his previous conversation.

I wondered, if we have got an Ambassador there, if it is true that he stated it was not our purpose to fight communism in Korea, and then he proceeded to justify the arming of the North Koreans by the Soviet Union, how you could keep him in office, if those were his

actual statements.

Secretary ACHESON. If you would care to give me the letter, I will have it investigated. I am quite certain that whoever thought that Ambassador Muccio said anything like that is quite mistaken, as Ambassador Muccio's entire effort, since he has been over there, has been to build up the Government in South Korea against communism. He has given everything he had to that, and displayed great gallantry in holding the Korean Government together at a time when it was quite panic-stricken.

He has risked his life many times in the course of this campaign. He has been decorated by the Persident for loyalty and devotion, and I am just sure that he did not say what is attributed to him.

EXPLANATION OF PRESS CLUB SPEECH OF JANUARY 12, 1950, AND
REFERENCES TO DEFENSE PERIMETER

Senator BRIDGES. When you addressed the National Press Club January 12, 1950, you described what you called the defensive perimeter of the United States. You included Japan and the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippine Islands.

Why did you exclude Korea, Formosa, and, for instance, the mainland of Asia?

Why did you make that specific statement?

My point in asking it, Mr. Secretary, was that you were Secretary of State of our country then, and when you made that statement, that that was the perimeter of our defense, if it wasn't sort of an invitation to the Russians to-the Communists-that they were free to attack in Korea, by eliminating those points as part of our defensive perimeter? Secretary ACHESON. In my speech at the Press Club January 12, 1950, in the part to which you refer, I was speaking of those defensive areas, those defense points in the Pacific at which United States. troops are stationed, and which United States troops must defend.

I said the defense perimeter runs from-this defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan, and then goes to the Ryukyus-that is Okinawa-we hold important defenses in the Ryukyu Islands and those we will continue to hold. In the interests of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under a trusteeship of the United Nations. They are an essential part of the defense perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

All of these places are places where American troops are stationed and which are to be held in order to defend the perimeter.

Then I go on in my speech to say the defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Again we have troops sta

tioned there. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned from bitter experience the vital connection between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about it. And it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States.

But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

I then went on to talk about other areas in the Pacific and said so far as the military security of the other areas of the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can quarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationships.

Should an attack occur, one hesitates to say where such an armed attack would come from. The initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

Now, I think I said what I tried to say very clearly, that the United States had certain points which were a defensive perimeter. At those points United States troops were stationed; there they would stay and there they would fight.

In regard to other areas, I said nobody can guarantee that; but what we can say is that if people will stand up and fight for their own independence, their own country, the guaranties under the United Nations have never proved a weak reed before, and they won't in the future. I think that is a fairly accurate statement of what has happened.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges, your time has expired. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I think Senator George is ahead of me.

Senator GEORGE. No.

Secretary ACHESON. Could I just add to my answer?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. What I said here is almost exactly what Mr. Dulles was saying in Korea in June 1950.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George, of course, has seniority, but under the set-up from table to table, why it so happens that you were next under the seating arrangement that we had.

Senator WILEY. I was hoping to go over until tomorrow. I have been penciling down some questions here.

Senator BREWSTER. How long do you expect to hold the hearing? Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, the committee is at liberty to recess any time that it sees fit to do so. I had tentatively planned to recess by between 5:45 and 6 o'clock, somewhere in there. If the committee wishes to recess now I have no substantial objection.

PROPOSAL TO RECESS

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to see us recess now. I do not know whether it makes any difference to anybody else, but I think we have had quite a day of it. I have an engagement.