tingency is not one desired, but a contingency that may occur, and where you may have to deal with it.

You asked me where the papers are which indicated the attitude of the State Department. Those are not sent out to these people in the field. Those are papers in the Department itself.

STATEMENTS FROM THE WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, General Wedemeyer was sent out at a time when I think you were not in the Department to make a report on China and Korea. That was in 1947. You are familiar with the Wedemeyer report, are you?

Secretary ACHESON. I have read it; yes, sir. I don't carry it all in my mind now.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with this part of the Wedemeyer report, reading as follows:

Unlike other powers, since VJ-day China has never been free to devote full attention to internal problems that were greatly confounded by 8 years of war. The current civil war has imposed an overwhelming financial and economic burden at a time when resources and energies have been dissipated and when in any event they would have been strained to the utmost to meet the problems of recovery. The National Government has consistently since 1927 opposed communism. Today the same political leaders and the same civil and military officials are determined to prevent their country from becoming a Communistdominated state or Soviet satellite. Although the Japanese offered increasingly favorable surrender terms during the course of the war, China elected to remain steadfast with her allies. If China had accepted surrender terms approximately a million Japanese would have been released for employment against American forces in the Pacific.

Are you familiar with that part of his report?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't remember it, sir.
I listened to you read it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you agree that had the Government of the Republic of China negotiated a side deal with the Japanese during World War II, it would have freed approximately a million of their troops to be used against the Allies elsewhere?

Secretary ACHESON. I agree that it would have been most disadvantageous. Whether it would have released those troops or not, I am not in position to say.

Senator KNOWLAND. The paragraph I read to you was from page 768 of the so-called China white paper, which gave the Wedemeyer report on China, although the report on Korea was not released until quite recently.

Reading from page 773 of the China white paper, also from the Wedemeyer report, is this:

A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United States regards as vital to the peace of the world.

Were you familiar with that part of General Wedemeyer's statement?

Secretary ACHESON. I have listened to you read it, sir; yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. He ends up his report on China with certain specific-what I assume he believed to be-constructive recommendations.

I read, on page 774:

That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the Unitea States for increased material and advisory assistance.

That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits.

That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented.

That China accept American advisers as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended. That report, Mr. Secretary, was made in September of 1947. The report was not approved by the State Department, was it?

Secretary ACHESON. The report was made to the President.
Senator KNOWLAND. It was made to the President.

Secretary ACHESON. I think General Marshall has testified that he did not agree with certain recommendations in it; and I think that he had particular reference to the recommendation that they should request a trusteeship for Manchuria.

Senator KNOWLAND. You were back in the State Department, you testified this morning, at the time the China white paper was issued, were you not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

SUFFICIENCY OF PAST AID TO NATIONALISTS

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention to Roman numeral XVI, page Roman numeral XVI, in the letter of transmittal from yourself to the President of the United States, I would like to read. that paragraph to you :

It must be admitted frankly that the American policy of assisting the Chinese people in resisting domination by any foreign power or powers is now confronted with the gravest difficulties. The heart of China is in Communist hands. The Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50 years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East. In the recent past, attempts at foreign domination have appeared quite clearly to the Chinese people as external aggression and as such have been bitterly and in the long run successfully resisted. Our aid and encouragement have helped them to resist. In this case, however, the foreign domination has been masked behind the façade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chinese to be wholly indigenous and national.

Under these circumstances our aid has been unavailing. The unfortunate, but inescapable fact is, that the ominous result of a civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities would have changed that result. Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

Do you remember that part of your letter of transmittal?
Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you not feel, Mr. Secretary, that that is more of a defeatist approach to the problem of China than this Government took on the situation in Greece, as an example, where the country was confronted with civil war, and where all the officials in the Government, at least have not been beyond criticism in either

83797--51-pt. 3--10

their administrative capacity or perhaps other reasons, as in the case of China, and yet they were not washed out or washed off at that time, were they, in the Turkish program?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think that it is more defeatist an attitude than was taken in the other case. The circumstances were entirely different, and I think this is an accurate statement of the situation.

Senator KNOWLAND. You believe there was nothing that the country could have done that could have possibly changed the result?

Secretary ACHESON. I think what we said there was, "within the reasonable limits of its capabilities." I think with that qualification what was said in this letter is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see. You feel that nothing we could have done within the reasonable limits of our capabilities could have possibly changed the result in China?

Secretary ACHESON. That is what I believe, and I think we did do a very great deal within the reasonable limits of our capabilities.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, let us turn to the policy memo of December 23, which I think quite adequately reflects the policy of the Department, as ennunciated in the white paper; and let us go over a few of the paragraphs.

On the background information, it states:

DEGREE OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control.

I think that is substantially a statement of fact; that that was the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control as of that date.

Then, turning to subparagraph 3, you state:

Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you specifically at what time and by whom was the Department of State ever advised that the island was not of a strategic importance to the United States?

Secretary ACHESON. May I, first of all, say that this is a policy information paper; this is not a statement of the United States policy toward the Far East.

Senator KNOWLAND. You were advising 552 official American representatives abroad.

Secretary ACHESON. I just wanted to correct the title.
Senator KNOWLAND. I see.

Secretary ACHESON. You did not state it in just that way.

In answer to your question, the State Department was not advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by anyone that Formosa was of no strategic importance to the United States. That I do not think is what this paragraph says.

I think this paragraph talks about mistaken conceptions of its strategic importance to the United States in defense of the Pacific. There had been a great deal of talk, both before and after this

paper was issued, that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic to the defense of the United States; indeed, there have been statements to the effect that if it were lost, the defense of the United States would be thrown back to our western coast. That, I think, is not a view which has been held within the Government.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Supreme Commander in the Far East, General MacArthur, felt rather strongly on that subject; did he not? Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. When I said "within the Government," I meant within the Washington branches of the Government. Senator KNOWLAND. You are familiar with the fact, are you not, Mr. Secretary, from reading the testimony before this committee, that Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman have all stated that the island was of strategic importance and that it should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands?

Secretary ACHESON. I never had the slightest doubt about the fact that it was of strategic importance and that our Chiefs of Staff thought so, and that means should be taken, if they could be taken short of employing our forces, to prevent it from falling into hostile hands.

That restriction as to the use of our forces was changed as of June 25, 1950.

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention, Mr. Secretary, to page 4397 of the record of yesterday, June 1, let me read you the following: Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

And then point No. 2:

Formosa has no special military significance.

From whom in the Military Establishment did the State Department get any advice, and the dates, if any, advising them that Formosa had no special military significance?

Secretary ACHESON. No one has advised the State Department that Formosa has no military significance. As I said yesterday and today, Senator, this is a directive as to the line to be taken in the event that Formosa falls, in order to minimize the damage to us.

If it falls, therefore it.is not in the hands of people friendly to the United States; this indicates that they should minimize that damage by saying that it has no special military significance.

As I said yesterday, this is a common attitude in dealing with things which are disadvantageous to us.

MILITARY AID TO FORMOSA BEFORE KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to page 4398 of yesterday's record, paragraph 4:

In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself

I might say parenthetically I assume this was to build up public opinion in this country

we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops

and, so far as I know, General MacArthur has never advocated doing either one of these two

supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would (a) accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime.

Now, in the light of the first statement I read this afternoon that this was the last substantial part under Nationalist control, how do you square that with the fact that if they were furnished some arms, or if, as we ultimately did, we dispatched naval units in the form of the Seventh Fleet, that would accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime?

Secretary ACHESON. Now, may I say, Senator, that in reading from the record you are still reading from the information paper?

IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. I am reading from the information paper, but I believe that the information paper clearly fits in with the attitude expressed by the Department in the China white paper, which was prior to this document, and clearly fits in with the statement of the President of the United States on January 5, 1950, in which it was publicly announced then as a matter of the same policy which underlines this document-No. 28, I have been reading from-in which the President says:

Similarly the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.

I am merely trying to point out that I believe that, far from being a mere guidance paper in the event that certain things should happen, by the attitude which the Department took in its China white paper on or about August 1 of that same year, and by the ultimate statement of the President on January 5 of the following year, this paper clearly enunciated the policy which we were following in regard to Formosa.

MINIMIZING POSSIBLE LOSS OF FORMOSA

Secretary ACHESON. The object of my observation was to make it clear in the record that you are reading from the information paper. Now, you argue that the information paper in some respects does state policies agreed upon within the Government.

If you ask me, as I think you started out by asking me, why this paper says that in areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would accomplish no material good for China or its. Nationalist. regime-why is that said? That again is part of this information paper which tells people how to deal with minimizing the damage from a possible fall of Formosa.

Since we were precluded by the decisions of our own Government from sending in any troops or dispatching naval units, the line that is recommended here, which people are told to take, is that that would not accomplish any good, since you could not do it under the decision, and since the whole paper is based on the assumption that you are