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I thought the military testimony was, if my recollection is right, that it was not likely to be decisive, and my conclusion is that the course we are pursuing is the most likely to produce a settlement in Korea with the minimum risk and danger and loss to our country. Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator's time has expired.

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Senator

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, yesterday I believe you testified to the fact you were appointed Assistant Secretary of State on February 1, 1941. Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

MESSAGE TO CHIANG TRANSMITTED BY BROWDER

Senator KNOWLAND. Were you familiar with the fact that on October 12 the then Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, at the request of Mr. Earl Browder for a transmittal to Mao Tse Tung, gave this as a statement of American policy in regard to China? I want to read it to you:

With regard to the specific charge that the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representative that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists, what this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position both in diplomatic contexts and publicly that the United States favors complete unity among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.

With regard to the specific charge that these officials continue the old policy of war against the Communists in China, this Government has had no such policy either old or new. This Government has, in fact, viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the serious menace of communism in China.

Were you familiar with that statement of policy while you were Assistant Secretary of State?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't recall the episode that you refer to there. As I gathered what you read, it seems to me that the idea of unity among all the groups in China is in accord with the statements of the generalissimo that I went over this morning, and was in accord with the policy which was certainly active a few years later when we were trying to unify the groups fighting the Japanese.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I listened very intensely to your statement this morning, and I thought you covered the ground you cared to cover very well, but I did not find any new material to what you had included in your letter of transmittal to the President on July 30, 1949, in the white paper. It is the same general scope, is it not, of your letter of transmittal to the President?

Secretary ACHESON. I wasn't trying to add any new material.

YALTA AGREEMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this, Mr. Secretary. At the time of the Yalta Confernce you were in the Department of State, and we have had some discrepancy in the testimony regarding that. I wondered, either of your own knowledge at the time or since you have assumed the increased responsibilities in the State Depart

ment, whether you could clear up something that I think needs clearing up before this committee.

On page 564 of the first volume of the hearings before this committee, which is in the green cover, I was interrogating Mr. Secretary Marshall relative to the Yalta Conference, and I said to him:

Were you familiar at Yalta with the Manchurian provisions of giving Dairen and the rights on the Manchurian railroad and Port Arthur to the Soviet Union? Secretary MARSHALL. I don't think I was, sir. Senator KNOWLAND. You were not.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Was that made in the political

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Committee?

Secretary MARSHALL. Those were entirely separate from the military.
Senator KNOWLAND. They were separate from the military?
Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Now, going from the testimony of Secretary Marshall over to the hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities of August 5, 1948, Mr. Alger Hiss was on the stand, and then Congressman, now Senator, Mundt was questioning him by coincidence on the same subject, and here is what he had to say:

Did you participate in the portion of the Yalta Agreement which gave Russia control of the chief Manchurian railroad?

Mr. Hiss. That was not part of the political agreement. I knew nothing of that until many months later. That was in the military talks in which I did not participate.

Now, could you throw any light on who is correct, Secretary Marshall or Mr. Hiss, in their recollection of the Yalta Agreement and who dealt with that particular subject?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I do not know. I think the persons who were there are the best people to tell you about it.

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to the fact that on June 1, 1951, in answer to a request that I had made during the hearings, the Defense Establishment, over the signature of Mr. Lovett, wrote a letter to the chairman of the committee, and the last paragraph deals with this same subject:

(h) At what time was General MacArthur notified of the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta Agreement (p. 1472 tr.)?

Then Mr. Lovett has this to say:

General MacArthur was informed of the decisions made by the combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta in February 1945. There is no record in the Department of Defense of General MacArthur having been informed of the Manchurian provisions of the Yalta Agreements, which was made on the political level and not a military decision.

So, apparently after his testimony they went back to the Defense Department, reviewed the situation and by letter over Mr. Lovett's signature, make the flat-footed statement that it was not a military decision but was one that was taken up in the political committee, and you say you have no knowledge of that?

Secretary ACHESON. I have no knowledge of that at all, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. As an Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Secretary, did you have anything to do with the assignment of Mr. Hiss as one of the American representatives to the Yalta Conference? Secretary ACHESON. What I had to do with it was to sign his travel orders, which I did, as I signed the travel orders of all members of that delegation.

Senator KNOWLAND. You made no recommendations of any kind that he be included on the mission to anyone, directly or indirectly? Secretary ACHESON. No, sir.

WALLACE MISSION TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, referring to the year 1944, at that time I find that in addition to being Assistant Secretary of State, you were a member of the Department of State Policy Committee from January 15, to December 20, 1944.

This, of course, was prior to the Yalta Conference.

You have testified this morning relative to the trip to the Far East of the then Vice President of the United States, Mr. Henry Wallace. Was that an official Government mission to China?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes it was. He went as the representative of the President.

Senator KNOWLAND. Of your own knowledge, do you recall who accompanied Mr. Henry Wallace as part of the mission out there, to meet with the generalissimo?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, there were various people. I believe among them was the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. John Carter Vincent.

Secretary ACHESON. John Carter Vincent.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you have anything to do with the recommendation that John Carter Vincent accompany Mr. Marshall? Secretary ACHESON. Not that I can recall.

Senator KNOWLAND. Pardon me, strike that; accompany the Vice President, Mr. Wallace.

Secretary ACHESON. Not that I recall. It was not in my field of responsibility.

Senator KNOWLAND. I find on page 551 of the China white paper, where it discusses the various conferences held-Vice President Wallace with President Chiang Kai-shek-that in addition to Mr. John Carter Vincent being present, Mr. Owen Lattimore was present. Do you know under whose authority he attended those conferences?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; he was an employee of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator KNOWLAND. On the recommendation

Secretary ACHESON. Wait a moment. My assistant tells me that he was an employee of OWI. He was an employee of the Chinese Government, either before or after-before. I am correct in that. He was an employee of

Senator KNOWLAND. On the recommendation of the Government of the United States, I understand.

Secretary ACHESON. I don't know anything about that. I had nothing to do with it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me call your attention to page 553, since you have testified that Mr. Wallace's mission was an official mission of this Government, where it gives part of the conversations between President Chiang Kai-shek and our Government's representative there, and I am reading from page 553:

President Chiang referred to the clever Communist propaganda to the effect that they were not tied to the U. S. S. R.; that they were, in fact, nothing more

than agrarian democrats. As a matter of fact, the Communists follow the orders of the Third Internationale.

Now, that was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's view of the Communists.

Now, let me read our Vice President's views.

Secretary ACHESON. May I find this thing that you are reading? Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir; page 553 of the China white paper. Now, immediately below that-it is about half way down the page-Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, and, it seems, the official representative of this Government, was giving his opinion of Communists to the generalissimo, and I quote:

Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that the difference in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communist might be explained by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communist seizing power, whereas the Chinese Communist definitely desired to do so in China.

Now my question, Mr. Secretary, is this: Is it not a matter of fact that up until the attack by the Nazi regime upon the Government of the Soviet Union, the Communists in this Nation were doing everything they could to disrupt our war industry then trying to give aid to Britain and the western allies, and it was only upon the attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany that they finally came around to support the war effort and possibly in that case it was more because of Russia than because of the United States. Are you familiar with that history?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, Senator Knowland.

POSSIBLE EFFECT OF EMBARGO ON MILITARY SUCCESS OF NATIONALISTS IN 1947

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to ask this question: In your introduction to the white paper to which I have previously referred on Roman numeral XI, the letter of transmittal, you had this to say, which you repeated in your testimony this morning:

By the time General Marshall left China at the beginning of 1947, the Nationalists were apparently at the very peak of their military success and territorial expansion.

Do you believe that that was a correct statement as of that period of time in 1947?

Secretary ACHESON. If I can find-"By the time General Marshall left China at the beginning of 1947," at the bottom of the page? Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I say you believe that that was a correct estimate of the situation at that time that they were at the peak of their position in China?

Secretary ACHESON. That I described this morning.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; that is what I understood.

Secretary ACHESON. In the same way; and I pointed out it was a very deceptive peak because by overextension they got themselves in a very bad situation.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with the official statement issued by the President of the United States on

December 18, 1946, relative to our policy toward China, were you not? Secretary ACHESON. December 18?

Senator KNOWLAND. December 18, of 1946.

Secretary ACHESON. I undoubtedly was.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did the State Department draft that statement for the President, do you know? It is on page 689 of the white paper. Secretary ACHESON. I cannot answer that because I do not recall. Undoubtedly, the State Department had a good deal to do with drafting it, whether it drafted the final draft or not.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, could you find out for the committee whether the original draft was prepared in the State Department? Secretary ACHESON. I undoubtedly can find that out.

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to call your attention to the bottom of page 691 of the white paper, reading as follows:

From VJ-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately 600 million, mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which were later suspended.

And then further on in the next paragraph it says:

Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded; thus no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

Are you familiar with that?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we were talking about that this morning, and this was during the period of the embargo which went into effect in August of 1946 and was taken off in May 1947.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was merely raising the point in view of the fact that by your own statement in the letter of transmittal to the President, China-the Republic of China-had reached a high point in its getting back a good deal of the country, how much part the placing of the embargo and the constant pressure to form a coalition with communism might have played in the undermining of the morale of the Government of the Republic.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I explained that very fully, I thought, my own view on it, this morning, and I do not think that it is exactly the way you stated it. I don't think what we did had that effect.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHINESE AND GREEK SITUATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with the top secret memorandum C-62-7 of General Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek, dated November 10, 1945?

Secretary ACHESON. Not by that description, sir. Have you got it there?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have it here.

Secretary ACHESON. Is it in the white paper?

Senator KNOWLAND. No; it is one of the documents apparently eliminated from the white paper.

Now I read you subparagraph 3 (d) relative to conference with Secretary of State.

Secretary ACHESON. The date of this paper?

Senator KNOWLAND. This is November 10, 1945. It said:

He repeated the President's words "promising support to you and the Nationalist Government," but he also declared the President's instructions that the United

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