MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST T TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1951 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding. Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Stennis, Flanders, and Long. Also Present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee, William H. Darden, clerk, Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Chairman RUSSELL. The Secretary of State advised me that he wishes to make a brief statement before the questions start. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. TESTIMONY OF HON. DEAN G. ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER— Resumed TELEGRAM TO EMBASSIES REGARDING HOT PURSUIT Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Chairman, when we rose yesterday afternoon, Senator Cain had requested that I furnish the telegram which was sent to certain of our embassies in regard to this hot-pursuit matter. There was some discussion of that in the committees. I have given that consideration over the night and I shall be glad to read the telegram at the present time. The telegram is dated November 13, 1950: "Please discuss with" Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I say something just from a procedural standpoint, that is without any qualification. I have no intention of moving to make it public or anything of the kind, but it is without restrictions? I mean it may be censored. Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I understood the Secretary to say. He had given it thought over last evening and that he had decided that he would print it here in accordance with all other evidence that goes into the record. It will be handled in line with the procedures that we have adopted. Senator HICKEN LOOPER. I want to make it clear that I have no objection to the censoring of it at the moment, if the censor believes it should be censored. Chairman RUSSELL. If there is any objection, it will depend on the censor and then the committee will take action on it later. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. Secretary ACHESON (reading): Please discuss with Foreign Minister at earliest possible moment grave problem confronting UN forces in Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking UN forces in Korea itself. See excerpt from Austin's statement to UNSC on November 10. This problem arises in two respects. First, ground forces can move into Korea and supply themselves from bases and lines of communications which are largely sheltered by immunity of Manchuria. Secondly, enemy aircraft (nationality not always known) operate from Manchurian fields, dash into Korea air space to strike UN air and ground forces and then fly to safety behind Manchurian border a very few minutes away. UN Commander has strictest orders about violations Manchurian territory in addition to orders to use extreme care in operations near the frontier itself to insure that hostilities are restricted to Korea. This determination to play according to the rules imposes most serious handicap in face of an enemy which is willing not only to break the rules themselves but to exploit proper conduct UN forces. United States Government is determined to do everything possible to localize conflict in Korea. This is illustrated by rigorous instructions to commanders as well as by efforts made to adjust accidental intrusions into Chinese territory by offering compensations for damages, et cetera. It is obvious, however, that the abuse of Manchuria by the enemy could easily impose an intolerable burden upon UN forces operating lawfully and properly on UN missions in Korea. Therefore United States Government wishes to inform government to which you are accredited that it may become necessary at an early date to permit UN aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' flying time into Manchuria air space. It is contemplated that UN aircraft would limit themselves to repelling enemy aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea. We believe this would be a minimum reaction to extreme provocation, would not itself affect adversely the attitude of the enemy toward Korean operations, would serve as a warning, and would add greatly to the morale of UN pilots who are now prevented from taking minimum defense measures and for whom in case of bomber pilots it is impossible under existing conditions to provide adequate air cover. For your information we are not asking the concurrence of Government because we believe the highly limited application of hot-pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it important that Government be notified of the problem. Please telegraph any reactions NIACT. ACHESON. Chairman RUSSELL. Will you tell us what that NIACT means? Secretary ACHESON. That is a type of immediate reply. It is a reply which gets immediate treatment and is not dealt with in the order in which the replies come in. It is pulled out. Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to know the interpretation and explanation a little bit of the term "Government concurrence there." Secretary ACHESON. May I leave the discussion of this telegram until people question me, Senator? Senator SALTONSTALL. Surely. Secretary ACHESON. I must give various bits of information that I have been asked for. GOVERNMENTS HAVING GROUND FORCES IN KOREA I was also asked yesterday what_governments other than the Governments of the United States and Korea had ground forces in Korea in the middle of November 1950. I have here the governments which had the three types of forces, and I will read the ground forces. Australia, United Kingdom, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey. Air forces: Australia, Belgium, Canada, United Kingdom. Naval forces: Australia, Canada, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Thailand, Netherlands. MILITARY MATÉRIEL SUPPLIED TO CHINA AFTER RAISING EMBARGO I was also asked yesterday by a Senator to supply the information as to what military matériel was supplied after General Marshall, as Secretary of State, raised the embargo which had been imposed in August 1946, when he raised that on May 26, 1947. Following is the reply to the request. On May 26, 1947, the Chinese Government was informed that the Department of State would approve the sale to China of 130 million rounds of surplus rifle ammunition and would approve export licenses for transport planes and spare parts for all equipment, including combat items previously transferred under the eight and a third group air program. On June 25, 1947, the Chinese Government purchased 130 million rounds of ammunition for 10 percent of procurement cost. The ammunition was shipped on July 14 and August 11, 1947, from the west coast of the United States. In July 1947 the Chinese sought to purchase 43 C-47 aircraft as part of the eight and a third group air program. Since this program was already fulfilled, the Chinese were told they could buy through normal surplus-property channels. They purchased 150 C-46's on December 22, 1947. On December 9, 1947, the Chinese signed a commercial contract for 612 million rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. On December 16, 1947, the Chinese were informed of the availability of surplus ammunition, explosives, combat matériel, including combat planes, for the eight and a third air group program. On January 7, 1948, the Chinese signed a contract for the purchase of all surplus ammunition in the Marianas for 1 cent on the dollar. In March and April 1948 the Chinese were informed of the type and quantity of surplus ammunition available in Hawaii and the Pacific. On April 29 and June 11, 1948, contracts were signed whereby the surplus sale of ammunition located in Hawaii was covered. On May 22, 1948, contracts were signed for the sale of surplus ammunition remaining in the Pacific and not including-not included in previous contracts. The bulk of this was located at Okinawa. The China Aid Act, providing 125 millions as a grant, which could be used for military assistance, was approved on April 3, 1948. By December 31, 1948, 60.9 million dollars had been shipped. The breakdown of this is given on page 953 of the white paper. During 1949 an additional 55 million were shipped, making a total of 115.7 million under this grant, leaving a balance on January 1, 1950, of 9 million unshipped. As of February 28, 1951, 42 million remained unshipped, although 312 million were in procurement, so that only 1 million remained unobligated. Then, I have a note which might be useful here to put in, that after December 1948, at the request of the Chinese Government, all shipments under the 125 million air program were shipped to Formosa. About half of the shipments under this program, accordingly, went to Formosa. In addition to the grant aid mentioned above, the Chinese had been steadily procuring arms in small quantities from commerical sources with their own funds. During 1949, shipments to Formosa included 123 million .30-caliber rifles-I am sorry, 123,000 .30-caliber rifles; 68 million rounds .38caliber ammunition; 19 million rounds .45-caliber ammunition; 30 Sherman tanks from the United Kingdom; 100 light tanks; 100 scout cars; 200 AT-6 aircraft. Then, I have one other point that I should like to bring out. Yesterday, I think, in answer to a question of Senator Knowland regarding the letter to Admiral Smith, which was dated October 2, 1948, it was asked whether this was a letter signed by Mr. Clayton and superseded a few days later. My statement about a few days later was in error. The letter to Admiral Smith referred to by Senator Knowland, was dated October 2, 1946, and the letter from Assistant Secretary Garrison Norton to Admiral Smith to which I referred was dated April 18, 1947. That is all I have. DEFINING "GOVERNMENT CONCURRENCE" Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, is it in order now, without asking a question, to simply ask the Secretary to amplify a little what he meant by the words "Government concurrence" in that telegram? I think I know, but I would like to have that amplified. Chairman RUSSELL. If Senator Stennis is willing to have it done on his time. Senator STENNIS. Yes; that is all right. Chairman RUSSELL. I understood you to say Government concurrence was not sought in the telegram. Secretary ACHESON (reading): For your information we are not asking the concurrence of the Governmentthis means of the government to which the recipient is accredited because we believe the highly limited application of the hot-pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense but we think it important that the Government-adding, to which accredited-be notified of the problem. Please telegraph any reaction. In other words, we are not asking that the Government to which the recipient of this telegram is accredited concur but we wish to inform the Government of the situation and of the reasons why such action might be necessary and we are asking the Government to indicate its reaction. Senator SALTONSTALL. But as the result of that they objected. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis, you may proceed. POSSIBILITY OF NAVAL BLOCKADE Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, it is not my desire to intentionally repeat, and I will be as brief as I can be. But I want to ask you a few questions with reference to the possibility of a naval blockade as set out by Admiral Sherman. Now, of course, I understand that there is a resolution passed by the United Nations with reference to an economic blockade. You advocated that and it was a United States resolution introduced, as I remember. Now, was there any movement on foot on this matter of getting the United Nations to blockade, first diplomatically and of course there is the military question-is there any active movement now in the United Nations for planning of a naval blockade? Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; and I think that Admiral Sherman made it clear that he had not recommended a naval blockade, nor had it been overruled and it is his judgment that the best way to proceed at the present time is the way we are proceeding, by trying to make as complete as possible the economic restrictions and, therefore, that is what we are concentrating on. Senator STENNIS. I know, but if a military or naval blockade would be practical then I should think there would be some movement or some effort in the United Nations to try to work out some plan that would be prepared for possible use at some future time, anyway. Is there any activity or any agitation by the United States in the United Nations for that plan? Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. As I said, a naval blockade at this time has not been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are not pushing it in the United Nations because we believe we are much more likely to get our results by increasing the economic restrictions rather than asking nations to go further in a military way than they are prepared to go in the economic way. UN RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Senator STENNIS. Now, in reference to the economic blockade, Mr. Secretary, as I understood the resolution, it left each member nation largely to its own judgment as to the application of this blockade. Is that correct? Secretary ACHESON. The resolution recommends that: Every state A. Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy supplies, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. B. Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo and apply controls to give effect to the embargo. C. Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other states pursuant to the present resolution. E. Cooperate with other states in carrying out the purposes of this embargo. F. Report to the Additional Measures Committee within 30 days and thereafter at the request of the committee on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution. Senator STENNIS. Item B there, does that not largely leave it to the discretion of the member nation as to the application of the resolution? 83797-51-pt. 3— -18 |