at this time, to restate the points of our foreign policy in the Far East.

You have done so in your original statement, and it has been discussed from time to time in the hearing.

I would like, Mr. Secretary, in a very amateurish way, to give what I conceive to be a restatement of your ideas as to our foreign policy and ask you if that is substantially correct. I do this in the interest of showing that we do have a definite and, I think, as far as it goes an effective foreign policy in the Far East; and that some statements that we have no foreign policy at all in the Far East are incorrect.

OUR FAR EAST POLICY

Is this true, Mr. Secretary, that insofar as our foreign policy in the Far East we have consistently tried to build up and to support the Nationalist Government of China?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that another part of our foreign policy is that we have stood by and tried to support the people of the Philippines and to help them in every way possible to see they have security and a stable government?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that we showed that we were not interested in annexing their territory by doing what I think was one of the greatest things that has ever been done, by any nation-granting the people of the Philippines their independence some 6 years ago? Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. And, Mr. Secretary, we have had a definite foreign policy in connection with Kashmir in using our good offices to try to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistan agreement so those two Governments could get along peacefully and pursue what we would hope to be a democratic government. Is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. We have done everything we could through the United Nations to that end.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that, insofar as Indochina is concerned, we used our good offices in trying to see that the people of that nation had some degree of independence, and that we have supported the standing government against the inroads of the Communists-is that Bao Dai? How do you pronounce it?

Secretary ACHESON. Bao Dai.

Senator KEFAUVER. I mean we supported the Bao Dai government against Ho Chih Min. Is that Communist?

Secretary ACHESON. Ho Chih Min.

Senator KEFAUVER. And is it true that we are pursuing our policy in Indochina in that direction?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that in Malaya and Burma we do have missions of some kind with which we are trying to assist them to stay a part of the free world?

Secretary ACHESON. I think we have been giving assistance thereI will have to look it up-in connection with the fight against the Communists.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is generally a part of our Far East policy; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES FAR EAST POLICY

Senator KEFAUVER. And that in connection with making a Japanese peace treaty satisfactory with our friends in the Pacific, especially Australia and New Zealand, we have negotiated or are in the process of negotiating agreements with these two outstanding democracies of mutual protection?

Secretary ACHESON. We are now working on such arrangements with Australia and New Zealand.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that is leading in the direction or is part of the general pattern of working out a peace treaty with the Japanese people; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that we are taking effective steps, and Mr. Dulles and other members of the State Department have been in Japan recently in an effort to bring about a reinstitution of the Japanese nation on a democratic basis?"

Secretary ACHESON. That has been the constant effort of the occupation and all branches of this Government.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that in Korea we are trying to avoid the mistake that was made after World War I of letting aggression be rewarded, feeling that on this first severe test that we had to take a definite stand in the interests of the United Nations and generally of the Far East policy of this Nation; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. The whole question of collective security was involved, and we have taken a very firm stand; yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the importance of maintaining our position and of retarding aggression in Korea, I think sometimes the Members of the Congress and people of the public generally may overlook the importance of what we are doing there as it relates to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the other nations that we have been in negotiations with in the carrying out of our foreign policy. Do you note that that is true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Is it not true that our position, the position of ourselves and our allies in preventing the aggression in Korea, is enabling us to carry forward with more success the foreign policy that we and our friends have decided is the correct one, and these other nations that I have referred to?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

Senator KEFAUVER. What would happen, Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, if we should do as some few people have been suggesting and have suggested, but, of course, as General MacArthur and General Marshall and others have said would be catastrophic, if we should withdraw our assistance in Korea and let the country be overrun? What would be the effect upon Indochina, Burma, and Malaya?

Secretary ACHESON. It would be very adverse, indeed, Senator. Senator KEFAUVER. Another part of our foreign policy has been to consistently maintain that Formosa should not be in Communist hands. Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. I suppose an abandonment of our effort in Korea would also very adversely affect our position in Formosa? Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, in contemporary times are there any other parts of our foreign policy in the Far East that you at this time should like to bring out for the attention of the Congress and the American people?

Secretary ACHESON. I think you have covered the main points, Senator, with the understanding, of course, that the whole economic program operates throughout that area.

Senator KEFAUVER. Going back a little bit, another point in your program was trying to assist Chiang on the recommendations of Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, Admiral Spruance, Mr. Hurley, a generally bipartisan group. They did, upon his invitation, try to assist in bringing stability and working arrangements between the forces in China into effect?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. But, at no time, except by the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek, has the American Government tried to force any consolidation with Communists upon Chiang; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. We have never tried to force that at all.

STRENGTHENING BIPARTISANSHIP

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I have a feeling that the American people generally and all parties are in agreement that we certainly cannot have two or three foreign policies in this country and get along; so, I think it has been very helpful to bring about some general understanding again of what we are trying to do. But, unfortunately, we do have disagreement, particularly among us in political life, in our Far East policy.

I think that may be somewhat brought about by lack of understanding of just what the administration's program was and what was trying to be accomplished.

What recommendations do you have to try to get back to the good days when Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally and many others-and we were able to have a so-called nonpartisan foreign policy and leave out bickering, which hurts our effort, or is that a question you would rather not go into at this point?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am just doing everything I can all the time to bring that about.

I know nothing that I have not done that I could do.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, yesterday I had the opportunity, Mr. Secretary, of appearing before the Rules Committee of the Senate in connection with further plans to strengthen or reorganize the procedures of Congress, and I stated there that I thought it would be helpful to Congress and the people, in understanding our foreign policy, if on occasions it would be possible for Cabinet members, and particularly the Secretary of State, to explain to the Members of Congress what our plans and purposes were, and what we were doing at that time, and to have a face-to-face discussion under the properrules so as to bring out the facts and let the American people know what is going on.

Would you favor such a program, on your own part?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I am always glad to discuss these matters with any groups in the Congress, whether they are committees or private groups, or the whole Senate or House, in whatever way they would like to have it discussed.

Senator KEFAUVER. I have no other questions at this time, Mr. Chairman,

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I compliment you upon the way you have handled the questions that have been asked you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman, do you desire to proceed now, or shall we proceed with another member of the Armed Services Committee?

Senator SPARK MAN. If it has reached me again, I will take it.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were reached earlier, but suggested it would be fair to give some other member at this table an opportunity, and I did.

. If you wish to go ahead now, you may proceed. Senator SPARKMAN. I will, Mr. Chairman.

MILITARY AID GIVEN CHINA

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you just a question or two about military help to China, without duplicating the great deal that has been said. Do I understand correctly, from the record, that the only time that there was any let-up in our granting military aid to China was during the 10 months from August 1946 to May 1947?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is correct, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the way I get it from the record, and that even during that time there were certain arms turned over, I believe, by abandonment by our forces in some area of China, perhaps our Marines.

When did the Marines come out of China?

Secretary ACHESON. The ammunition was made available by the United States Marines and Navy in north China beginning in April until September 1947.

The other day there was a question raised by Senator Brewster as to whether the phrase "small arms and artillery ammunition" meant small-arms ammunition and artillery ammunition.

The answer is "It did." I have here and will submit as an exhibit in the record a detailed statement of all the ammunition which was turned over by the Marines at that time, and it is all ammunition, and it is ammunition for artillery and ammunition for small arms. Chairman RUSSELL. Since the document consists of only three pages, it will be printed in the record.

(The document referred to above reads as follows:)

ANNEX III. AMMUNITION MADE AVAILABLE BY THE UNITED STATES MARINES-NAVY IN NORTH CHINA-APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1947

When the United States Marines were evacuated from North China, the Military Establishment and the State Department agreed to authorize them to leave behind a number of dumps of ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists were to be informed so that they could take possession, without cost to them. This decision was implemented by the Marines between April and September 1947. The Chinese Nationalists were informed in every case and took control of the ammu

83797-51-pt. 3——37

nition. Small stocks of Navy ammunition were also made available to the Chinese during this period.

A. The following ainmunition was abandoned by the First Marine Division during the months of April to May 1947 in the Peiping-Tientsin area:

B. The following ammunition was transferred to the Chinese Navy and charged to lend-lease:

(1) Ammunition transferred from storage at Tsingtao Airfield (this ammunition had previously been removed from magazines of vessels transferred to the Chinese Nationalists under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.).

(2) Ammunition in the magazines of some of the ships transferred to the Chinese (while the ships were transferred under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.; the ammunition in the ships was accounted for as part of the transfers accomplished in North China).