Senator CAIN. Either read, it, sir, or place it in the record at this point.

Chairman RUSSELL. If it goes in just at this point, he will have to read it, Senator Cain; otherwise it will be a part of the appendix.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that. And, Mr. Secretary, I would then appreciate your reading the message-for on the day of your testimony about it you, as I understand, only its concluding sentence or two. I have never seen this telegram and have a natural interest in it.

Secretary ACHESON. The telegram is top secret, then there are some symbols after that-IVI. I don't know whether I ought to read all this, that this is significant or not. I will leave out all the symbols. I don't know what they mean.

Senator CAIN. Would you permit me to say this, sir? In your testimony the other day you made this reference to the cable-that it was in a cable of December 1945 which, although it was marked "top secret," also says cryptographic security does not apply.

Secretary ACHESON. Very well; that is right. I was puzzling over some symbols here which I shall leave out because I don't understand them.

Senator CAIN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON (reading):

Top Secret IVI

URGENT

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY.

HANDLE AS TOP

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 44g and 53a, AR 380-5 From: CINCAFPAC Adv Tokyo Japan

To: War Department

7 DECEMBER 1945

From SCAP to WARCOS for JCS info COMGEN China CINCPAC Pearl passed Com 5th Flt passed COMSEVENTHFLEET pass CINCAFPAC CNO this is TOPSECRET.

1. Policy of the US in China is subject to WARX 86183 and CNO 302312 refer. 2. In the absence of specific answers to the questions raised in COMGEN China's CFBX 16459, but assuming that the policy outlined in WARX 86183 will be approved and that the strength of the US Forces in China can be adequately maintained the following comments on the points raised in the latter reference are submitted with the concurrence of MacArthur, Spruance, and Wedemeyer.

3. The Chinese have requested lift for six more armies totaling approximately 200,000 men with approximately 30,000 tons of equipment into North China ports using US shipping. Thereafter, the Chinese Armies in northern China and Manchuria will require approximately 50,000 short tons of supplies per month. With these forces the CNA will be able to occupy the vacuum left by the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese forces. Wedemeyer states that he should be able to deliver approximately 500,000 Japanese per month to all Chinese ports including FIC north of 16 degrees, Formosa and Manchuria.

4. A schedule for lifting the six Chinese Armies mentioned above has been worked out making use of about 75 LST's of the Seventh Fleet. Providing the US Navy crews for these vessels can be maintained and further provided no untoward circumstances arise it appears practicable to lift these six armies in about 50 days from the date of approval by the JCS, which date is hereafter referred to as "X" day in this message. The 50,000 tons per month of supplies required by the Chinese armies in the north can apparently be moved in Liberty ships by methods which are discussed in more detail below. It is emphasized that the whole question of lifting the Chinese armies hinged upon our ability to maintain US Navy crews in the necessary LST's for a period of approximately two months. By methods further discussed below it is believed a considerable number of men can be obtained from LST's now in Marianas. It will probably be necessary however to authorize Commander Seventh Fleet to invoke 60 days of military necessity in some cases.

5. A. Japanese crews can be made available for 100 Liberty ships and conversion of those to be used in repatriation can be accomplished in Japan and the Philippine Islands. It is estimated that 25 of these ships manned initially by Japanese merchant crews will be required to supply 50,000 tons per month to Chinese armies referred to above. The first Liberties can be made available in Japanese ports on X plus 21 days and the remainder over a period of 60 days additional.

B. It is recommended that an additional 25 Liberties be made available to the Chinese to release the Japanese manned Liberties supplying Chinese armies. The first six ships assigned to the Chinese can be manned in about 30 days and an additional 19 within six months. Initially maintenance and supply will be moved to Chinese ports in miscellaneous shipping made available by previous action, movement of selected loaded Liberty ships in Japanese, Ryukyus and Philippine ports and loading of ammunition and other supplies in Ryukyus and Philippines on American crewed ships. Following this initial impulse maintenance shipping will be accomplished in Liberty ships as indicated above. C. COMGEN China will establish depots at local points in China and Manchuria and desired to obtain equipment and supplies for these dumps from the Pacific area instead of from the interior of China where Chinese dumps are located.

6. COMGEN China will establish temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel at ports.

7. COMGEN China will make the necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of repatriated to ships.

Now, there is a garble in "8" and the following telegram corrects the garble, so I will read the corrected telegram:

8. An operating procedure for reception and grouping of Japanese repatriation from China exists in Japan. Procedures and facilities in Japan are adequate to handle increased flow of personnel encompassed by this plan.

9. As stated above it is proposed to man 100 Liberties with Japanese crews and an additional 25 with Chinese crews as they are trained. As indicated above, for some time it will be necessary to use 25 Japanese manned ships for the logistic support of the Chinese armies, but eventually this task will be assumed by the Chinese manned ships. When these 25 Japanese manned ships are released they will be used for repatriation proposed.

10. The Japanese Civilian Merchant Marine Committee will provide crews for 100 Liberties for operation under the supervision of SCAJAP. Conversion will be handled as indicated above.

11. 100 LST's now in the Marianas and at present scheduled for eventual disposal can be turned over to SCAJAP and can be manned by Japanese crews. The first can be ready in Japanese ports on X plus 18 days and the last number of US Naval personnel experienced in amphibious craft available for assignment within the Seventh Fleet. It is suggested that LST's for Japanese manning be turned over to the War Shipping Administration to charter to the Japanese Government for operation by the Japanese Merchant Marine. It is realized that there may be legal difficulties in thus disposing of commissioned US Naval vessels but the exact technique of handling this situation cannot be determined here.

12. Prompt action is requested as 85 empty Liberties become available in December and will be held pending decision. Also continued operation of current instructions will reduce number of LST's now available in Marianas for Japanese manning.

13. It is suggested that the US assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as basis for negotitation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China.

End.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, on June 7, 1951, the following message was addressed to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, N. Y.:

Following is an extract from hearing of June 6, 1951, page 5,389, which quotes telegram dated June 7, 1945, sent by General MacArthur, Admiral Spruance, and General Wedemeyer which states: "It is suggested that the United States' assist

ance to China, as outlined above, be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China." The above implies that you favored a coalition government between Chinese Communists and Republic of China. I am desirous of having your views, stating background of above quote and whether in fact the three commanders did recommend a coalition of Chinese Communists and Republic of China. furnish full text of above quoted message? Can your reply be released? While Will you I will be in California for the next 2 days, please reply to my Washington office. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, United States Senator.

MAC ARTHUR COMMENT ON 1945 TELEGRAM

On the next day, June 8, the following telegram was received in the office of the Honorable William F. Knowland, United States Senate, and signed "MacArthur, New York."

In response to your message of the seventh I send the following for such use as you may desire: Any inference drawn from anything I have ever said or done that I sponsored a compromise which would favor the forces of communism at the expense of the forces of freedom or would effect a political coalition of such diametrically opposed and irreconcilable forces is a prevarication without color or factual support. For anyone to read such an inference from the quotation contained in your message is almost beyond belief. In the period just following the end of the war China was faced with a complete break-down of that internal unity which had been welded to promote the common defense against Japan. The. Communists, but a nebulous threat at the time, constituted only one of many factions which sought ot secure the balance of political power. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was trying desperately to effect a sound basis for political unity through the call of a convention reasonably representative of all segments of the people. It was this situation as I recall it that prompted Admiral Spruance, General Wedemeyer and I with others to meet in Tokyo in the effort to formulate a proposed policy governing American aid for recommendation to Washington.

The purpose of the plan agreed upon in that conference as we saw it and I certainly myself so interpreted it was to strengthen the hand of the existing government with which we had been allied in war to resist a tendency to revert to the traditional China compartmented under war lords with little or no Federal allegiance and engaged in perpetual internecine conflict. With Communists representing a minority faction at that time they were a distinct threat to the unification desired. They did not recognize the supremacy of the Federal power. They consequently had to be destroyed by force or dealt with politically just as we have since successfully done in Japan. It was felt that the American Ambassador by a wise and judicious play upon the potential of American assistance might materially strengthen Chiang's efforts to secure political unification through discouragement of all movement which opposed it by force. As far as I know the proposal which you quote was never again heard from until its resurrection the other day before your committee. My views were never sought either as to its implementation or its interpretation and I heard nothing further from it. It has not heretofore formed any part of the published documents of the State Department dealing with the China question. Nor was it discussed or even alluded to in any way, shape, or manner by General Marshall when he visited my Tokyo headquarters enroute to China. It is fantastic to believe that had he been enroute to implement a recommendation of mine he would have failed even to mention it to me. The action of the Marshall mission was to employ the potential of American assistance as a weapon to force the existing government into a political alliance with the Communists. intent of the message in reference. Its effect could have been foreseen. It at This was the exact opposite of the once weakened the government and materially strengthened the Communist minority. It was one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history for which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster and will in all probability continue to do so indefinitely. Had it been intended to convey the interpretation which has been loosely given the message you may be sure that the three who signed it would have so stated in unequivocal language.

Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, I merely sought in this half-hour of time, to provide the record with the various documents referred to by the Secretary several days ago.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Secretary will be given an opportunity to make before the committee any remark he cares, or wishes to, at this time.

Senator CAIN. Indeed, sir, I think the Senator knows the rules by which this committee has carried forward its work for the past month

or

Senator MORSE. Let the record show, Mr. Chairman, a procedural fact, that the chairman was tapping with his gavel, which indicated that the time of the Senator from Washington had expired, and I didn't want any other Senator to proceed until the Secretary had been advised that he would be allowed to make an answer, if he chose to. Chairman RUSSELL. The Secretary is so advised.

Senator CAIN. May I say that that is a source of argument between the Senator from Oregon and the Chair.

Senator MORSEV. If the Senator from Washington had any other idea, he was mistaken.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ACHESON. I haven't any desire to comment on General MacArthur's telegram; no, sir.

THE 1945 TELEGRAM AND MARSHALL'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHINA MISSION

I think, if you will look at page 567 of the White Paper, you will see that the exchange of messages which were going on with the three military people referred to in this telegram, is a part of the instructions which were to be gotten out for General Marshall to go to China; and on pages 606 and 607, is Secretary Byrnes' memorandum for the War Department; and at the top of page 607, it says:

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that: (1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance.

This is page 607.

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

That was one of the documents enclosed with the President's letter of instruction of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. This memorandum went to the War Department.

There was also enclosed the statement by the President, a long statement on policy which we have referred to many times, and if my recollection is correct, all of these were sent by telegram to the headquarters of SCAP in Tokyo.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, some of the Senators have not completed their questioning, so the committee will take a recess at this stage until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1: 12 o'clock p. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Green, Sparkman, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Cain, and Long.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper having had an examination period yesteday afternoon, I will now revert to the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, time will not permit me to ask all of the questions that I have been asked to ask the Secretary by a couple

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