Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

Senator LONG. That is what guided your decision in feeling that such benefit as that point might offer the Russians, that it was not worth taking the chance for what benefit it might offer the Chinese, that it was not worth taking the chance of becoming involved in a war with Russia?

Secretary ACHESON. That is right, Senator.

Senator LONG. Now, military men call that a calculated risk; in other words, whether the risk of what you hope to gain is worth what you might lose if it did not work out in the way that you hoped that it would.

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

CRUSHING AGGRESSION

Senator LONG. There was some doubt in my mind about this idea of crushing the aggressors. I do not know whether that language was ever used, but it seemed to me that at one stage of the Korean episode we were actually attempting to crush the aggressor; in other words, as long as we were fighting the North Koreans we hoped that we would completely put down resistance in North Korea, and in doing so we would have crushed the North Korean Army.

Wasn't that our objective at one time?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We had split their army in two, and a very large part of it was surrounded, and later captured, in South Korea.

Part of the army had gone north, and various bands were trying to slip through the mountains and rejoin them in the north, and General MacArthur went up there to round those people up.

Senator LONG. Now, at that stage when General MacArthur was trying to launch his last offensive, as he stated, against the Chinese border, right up to the border of Manchuria, it was possible that, if the Chinese had not come in, in short order we would have completely crushed the aggression or crushed the aggressor; isn't that true? Isn't it true that we might have completely put down resistance by the North Koreans?

Secretary ACHESON. Both might have happened.

Senator LONG. If China stayed neutral, that probably would have happened?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. On the other hand, when China came in, and when the United Nations themselves declared China to be the aggressor, then the task of crushing the aggressor became a totally different type of task, did it not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. In other words, it involved the task of crushing all China.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

Senator LONG. So that, therefore, when we speak of this term "crush the aggressor," it is a case of referring to two completely different tasks, depending on whether you refer to it before the Chinese Communists came in or after they came in.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. I think you will find the phrase was "crush the aggression."

REASONS FOR EMBARGO FROM AUGUST 1946 TO MAY 1947

Senator LONG. I wish you would clear up in my mind the embargo that you said at one time existed, especially on the Chinese Nationalists. Would you tell me when that embargo took place, the reason for it, and when it was lifted?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed in August 1946 and was lifted in May 1947.

Senator LONG. And what was the purpose of it?

Secretary ACHESON. That was imposed at the request of General Marshall when he was acting on the so-called Committee of Three, as the Chairman of that Committee of Three to bring about the ceasefire and the end of hostilities in China.

There were sporadic attacks which were started on each side, sometimes of considerable magnitude, and General Marshall was engaged in bringing those to an end.

He was criticized by both sides for what he did, and he took the position that it would be quite inconsistent to be acting as the chairman of a group which was attempting to stop hostilities and at the same time be furnishing arms to one side when they started hostilities; and therefore, he requested that military supplies of all sorts should be denied to anybody in China.

Senator LONG. Now, he was at that time in China as an official or unofficial repersentative of the United States Government?

Secretary ACHESON. He was the President's personal representative in China.

Senator LONG. So, as the personal representative of the President, for the purpose of attempting to carry out a cease-fire agreement between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, it was his feeling that in that capacity of trying to settle the differences between those factions that it would be inconsistent for us to be supplying arms and aid to either one side or the other?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. He came to that conclusion after fighting had been resumed and he again was trying to stop it.

Senator LONG. And when it seemed clear to him that the fighting could not be stopped, was the embargo lifted?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. It was lifted in May, and some material was even given the Nationalists in April 1947.

Senator LONG. To your knowledge, was there any substantial period of delay in giving aid to the Nationalists after it had become clear to all concerned there was to be no ending of the fighting by peaceful means?

Secretary ACHESON. I don't think so, sir. We put into the record. what was done after that time, and I have been asked by the chairman to try and give a more substantial account of all the arms shipments and I am preparing that and will forward it to the chairman.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINESE UNITY

Senator LONG. At that time it was the policy of this country, I take it, with regard to China affairs that we would attempt to get all the various elements of the Chinese Nation together under one government and which would be a democratic government with free elections; is that correct?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. We were assisting the agreements which the Chinese themselves had worked out with all factions in China to accomplish that purpose.

Senator LONG. And it was the general understanding that the Chinese Nationalist Government, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, would be the controlling faction, the majority faction of any group that might be established as a unified government?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Long.

Senator LONG. That is the type thing to which the wire by General MacArthur referred, I take it, that is by General MacArthur and two others. They were all cognizant that that was the type thing toward which this Government was working.

Secretary ACHESON. Admiral Spruance and General Wedemeyer. What they said is:

It is suggested that the United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as the basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China.

REHABILITATION OF KOREA AFTER CONFLICT

Senator LONG. Do you know whether anything is being done at this time to attempt to rehabilitate the Republic of Korea, particularly those parts of the Republic of Korea as presently occupied by American troops?

Secretary ACHESON. That is being done at the present time under the direction of the United Nations commander. Whenever the fighting is brought to an end, it will be carried on under the United Nations Rehabilitation Commission which was set up in the last General Assembly, but as long as the fighting goes on, everything which is done there is under the command of the commander, UN.

Senator LONG. It would seem to me that much of our ultimate success may depend upon the degree to which we can make democracy meaningful to the people of Korea and the type of government which we believe responsive to the needs of those people.

Ultimately we hope to have free elections. If we do, the hope of democracy prevailing in those countries would depend upon the people's experience under that form of government.

Therefore I certainly do hope that everything that can be done will be done to demonstrate to the peoples of Korea that democracy at least by our standards means that the people would someday certainly know a better life and rehabilitate their land.

Thank you, sir.

Secretary ACHESON. I agree with you, Senator.
Senator LONG. No further questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. I pass.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?
(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

The chairman passes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN MILITARY POLICY

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago the very able Senator, my friend from Alabama, referred to a statement which I was supposed to make some hours from now to the effect that the strategy, military strategy, had been affected by decisions in the State Department, and my authority for that, I refer any of the Senators of this committee to the testimony that has been given here by our military leaders over the last few weeks when time after time when questioned about a certain phase of military policy or military strategy or their plans or their program, they would reply that that is a political decision, that that is something in effect that we have to bow to the political on, that that is circumvented by the political.

The distinguished Secretary of State just a few moments ago, in referring to Rashin, pointed out that the military had made an attack on that area and that weather prevented another one; and then that the State Department did protest very vigorously about further attacks. So that I will say to my distinguished friend from Alabama that I expect to make that statement, although I haven't made it yet. I thing the record will adequately bear out my authority for it. Now, Mr. Chairman, in the last day or two, 2 or 3 days

Chairman CONNALLY. How many times have we been around with the Secretary?

Chairman RUSSELL. We are now in the eighth round, Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. How much longer are we going to do this, just one after another?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I can't answer that question.

Chairman CONNALLY. Exhausting everybody. Eight times. Each Senator has had an opportunity to question the Secretary 8 times, and I suppose it will be 18 times before they get through.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Senator BRIDGES. The last 2 or 3 days there have been allegations made and recommendations made to the effect that there is an organized group in this country which is supposed to be irresponsible and performing actions which are not in line with the policy of our country with relation to the China policy, known as the China lobby. Now I know that the Senators on these committees who have urged the investigation, all of them are my friends and all of them are patriotic American citizens and very patriotic Senators, and therefore I do not believe that they knowingly in any way certainly would want to be associated with the facts which I am now going to present.

COMMUNIST PARTY LINE ON UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

On September 26, 1949, my good friend and very able senior Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, placed in the Congressional Record on page 13269 a letter from the Communist Party in New York, dated March 1, 1949, and their program for action on the China policy as suggested by the Action Conference on China Policy, New York City, January 29, 1949.

I would like to read it.

To All Sections and Counties.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE
New York, N. Y., March 1, 1949.

DEAR COMRADES: Enclosed please find program for action on China policy, as voted upon by a united front action conference on China, held in New York on January 29, 1949.

We are sure that you will find this material not only informative but helpful in planning sections on China in your communities.

A special outline has also been issued by the national education committee on Communist policy in China. This can be secured through orders from your district education department. The outline can be used as the basis for discussion in your sections and branches.

Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York York City.

Comradely yours,

MAY MILLER, Assistant Organizing Secretary.

The program enclosed, referred to by May Miller, assistant organizing secretary, reads as follows:

1. Demand a congressional investigation.

A. Of the Chinese lobby in Washington. One of the largest spending foreign influences in our Capital; not registered as foreign agents.

B. Of the billions of dollars of private accumulation deposited in American banks and investments by Chinese officials and individuals.

2. Demand a new China policy.

A. An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.

B. Preparation by our Government to recognize the government which the people of China are now establishing.

C. Planning now by our authorities for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

3. Get the facts and implications of the Government's China policy to the American people.

Immediate step for carrying out the action program:

1. Get your organization immediately to pass a resolution on China policy (use the enclosed January conference resolution for suggestions).

Send copies of your organization's resolution to your Senators and your Congressmen; give it publicity in your organization's publication and elsewhere; send a copy to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

2. Make use of the political ammunition of facts; the American people, if they know, will act.

A. Make a drive to get readers and subscribers to Far East Spotlight, the committee's monthly magazine. This is the indispensable tool for every fighter for a new and friendly policy toward China. Previous sources of reliable information about China and the Far East now have an NAM slant; only Far East Spotlight gives you the positive and encouraging facts about the Chinese people's great and successful fight against American reaction, and keeps you up to date about Washington's evil plans to go on backing reaction in China and the Far East. Subscription: $2 a year. Introductory offer: $1 for 8 months. Members of the CDFEP get this free.

B. Push the sale and reading of Anna Louise Strong's Tomorrow's China. Paper bound, 65 cents; cloth bound, $2. Organizational orders for five or more: 25 percent discount.

C. Have meetings on the China policy issue.

(a) The committee can furnish speakers.

In the New York City area: Telephone the speaker's bureau of the committee any afternoon, Bryant 9-6343.

In California, the San Francisco area: Contact Mr. William Kerner, 1841 Ellis Street, San Francisco.

Los Angeles area: Contact Mrs. Jeanette Orel, 362 South Columbia Avenue, Los Angeles.

(b) Send your organization's own speakers to the briefing session on China. First session: Friday night, February 18, 7:30 sharp. Telephone the committee

for registration blanks: Bryant 9-6342. No fee.