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advantage of the blow the Chinese people Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern

My purpose, as I indicated, in reading these charges against the so-called China lobby were instigated by the Communist Party as early as March 1, 1949, and that they have been pressed by them since.

And, in doing this, I want it clearly understood that I am not, in any way, reflecting upon my colleagues here who have called for such an investigation.

That is their privilege. They are my friends, and they are patriotic American citizens and Seantors; but I do feel that this is an important thing and shows definitely where this move started from, originally. Senator LONG. What is the date of that communication, sir? Senator BRIDGES. The date is March 1, 1949.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't suppose that is a Trojan Horse message, like it was indicated that the telegram from the Chamber of Commerce was, do you, Communist-inspired?

Senator BRIDGES. I don't know. It appeared in the Congressional Record of September 26, 1949.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1945

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, on an entirely different subject, I have in my possesion a document from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, Washington, D. C.

It is entitled "The Chinese Communist Movement," and dated July 5, 1945.

Now, I understand-and the censor will check this to verify thisthat this has been declassified, and that it is, therefore, not secret any more, but if there is any question about that, I would ask the censor to check on this.

My reason for bringing this in at this time is here is a report prepared by the War Department Intelligence Division before the war

83797-51-pt. 3- -39

ended in July 1945, which so clearly, just as clearly as Mein Kempf, written by Hitler, indicates what Hilter proposed to do, so it documents completely and predicts the bases of the Chinese Communists, and what they were going to do, and this document has been in the hands-was prepared by the Intelligence Division of the War Department, and, of course, is available to our Government, and with this as a background, I canot see how the people who have made our policies, some of whom have been misled on this thing, have made statements which they have made.

I think this is a very important document. It is dated War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Washington.

CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT PREPARED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. THE PROBLEM

The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the problem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary statements of fact.

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in China and in the Pacific. A major project was, therefore, initiated at the end of 1944, under which the most competent analysts-both civilian and military-were assigned to the examination of all material available, and to the compilation of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books.

2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS

Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy. (2) The Chinese Communist movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea, and probably north China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and north China. In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and north China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

(a) High morale

(5)

The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.

(b) Policy of establishing communism through “democracy”

The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: First, the change of the Chinese semifeudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must have the "support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy.”

(c) "Soviet democracy"

While the Chinese Communists, call their present political system "democ racy," the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party than is the so-called one-party dictatorship of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by

the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungkingcontrolled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past 4 years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communistcontrolled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China.

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China,

(d) Part of international Communist movement

The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

(e) Desire for United States support against Japan and the Kuomintang

This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims; the subjugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communistcontrolled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and the Chungking Government.

(f) De facto independence

The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing territory (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth of China proper), a population of probably more than 70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that by unanimous consent we might modify our rule to permit Senator Bridges to insert the rest of this document at this point in the record?

Senator BRIDGES. I would be glad to.

Senator LONG. In order not to prolong the hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly the Chair will not be in position to oppose anything to expedite the hearing; and at the risk of violating the rule, I will permit the unanimously-consent request. Is there objection?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that agreeable to you?

Senator BRIDGES. It is agreeable to me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, then, the matter will appear in the record at this point.

Senator LONG. It is a very informative document and I am very interested in it, but it is quite long.

Senator BRIDGES. I thank the Senator from Louisiana for not having to read it all.

(The remainder of the document referred to is as follows:)

(g) Rivalry with the Kuomintang

(1) Failure of the "Entente Cordiale."-During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang Entente Cordiale, 1923-27, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, Nationalist, democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. (2) Development of the "united front" movement.-The ensuing civil war, 1927-37, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties in the capitalist democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of Fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.

Under the terms of the united-front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

(3) The "war within the war."--The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to the Chinese high command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called traitors by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called united-front governments, which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "antidemocratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases.

Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-à-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The interparty struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that American guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

(h) Role in World War II

In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi war, the Chinese Communists have contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of north China's resources in foodstuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.

Contrary to the widely advertised reports of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the Nationalist Government troops. The generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested in the war against Japan.

(i) Military capacity small

The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October

1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles available. Rifles were available for only about 250,000 men in October 1944. (j) The alternative settlements of the Kuomintang-Communist problem

(1) General.-As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a settlement which would be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a national assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose federation represented by a coalition government of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

(2) Generalissimo sponsors the national assembly.-Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the national assembly, which is to convene on November 12, 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the reestablishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the Communists.

(3) Chinese Communists sponsor idea of coalition government.-The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the coalition government is the only solution of the interparty problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

(4) Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake.-Here the matter rests (July 3, 1945). For the time being it is a question of the national assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan. (k) International implications

(1) Common policy of United States and U. S. S. R.-It is generally believed that a peaceful interparty settlement in China depends largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on.

(2) Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China.-Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the reactionaries in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications that